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Abstract 
‘Non-violent Islamist extremism’ has become an important political issue in Britain 
in recent years. Since 2011, with the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy, 
Prevent, non-violent Islamist groups have been considered as a security risk for 
spreading a divisive ideology that can lead to violence. Concerns with these groups 
intensified in 2014 for their alleged role in providing the ‘mood music’ for the 
radicalisation of British Muslims joining the Islamic State’s insurgency. Yet, 
terrorism isn’t the only concern regarding non-violent Islamists in Britain. In the last 
few years, the government has expressed concerns about their impact on social 
cohesion and civil liberties, including women’s rights. It has also voiced concerns 
regarding non-violent Islamist extremism and entryism within key British 
institutions. In 2015, it created the Extremism Analysis Unit—the first official body 
dedicated to study violent and non-violent extremism—and published its first 
‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’. The key protagonists of non-violent Islamist 
extremism allegedly include groups and individuals associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami. Some analysts describe them as part of the 
‘global Muslim Brotherhood’, but do they constitute a singular phenomenon, a social 
movement? Adopting a conceptual approach informed by New Social Movement 
theory and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, this thesis answers this question 
affirmatively, detailing how such groups and individuals are networked 
organisationally, bonded through ideological and cultural kinship, and united in a 
conflict of values with the British society and state. Using original interviews with 
prominent movement leaders, as well as primary sources, this thesis shows how it is 
not so much ‘Islamist’, in aspiring for an Islamic state, but concerned with 
institutionalising an Islamic worldview and moral framework throughout society. Its 
conflict with the government does not simply concern the control of state 





The Global Muslim Brotherhood and  
‘Non-Violent Islamist Extremism’ in Britain 
This thesis is the first sustained analysis of one particular strand of ‘Islamist’ 
activism in Britain. Islamism of various hues in Britain has been the topic of many 
studies in recent years, but none has explored in such detail the organisational and 
ideological connections of the groups and individuals associated with 
‘participationist’ Islamism. Moreover, none has explicitly raised the question as to 
whether and how these individuals and groups collectively comprise a movement in 
Britain. Lorenzo Vidino’s book from 2010, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the 
West, provides the most explicit conceptualisation and detailed analysis of such a 
movement in Europe and America, but the sole chapter dedicated to Britain, whilst 
informative, is relatively limited and already somewhat dated. Studies of 
participationist groups in Britain have appeared in various articles and think tank 
reports, and they provide some valuable insights for this thesis, but this is the first 
study to analyse such groups so comprehensively and to do so with specific focus on 
their collectivity. 
Participationist Islamism, it should be said at the outset, is a term borrowed from a 
taxonomy provided by Jeffrey Bale.1 It is also shared more widely by Vidino and 
others.2 Characterising Islamism in fairly typical terms as a ‘political ideology’ that 
insists on the establishment of an Islamic world order or Islamic state,3 Bale divides 
Islamists between those who reject and those who accept participation within 
                                                
1 Jeffrey Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’, National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism website. December 21, 2009. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/militant-islamist-networks-west. 
2 Vidino (2009b), pp.165–176, and Vidino (2010), pp.15-16. See also McRoy (2006) and Quilliam 
(2010). 
3 Bale (2009), pp.79, 80. 
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democratic political systems.4 The ‘rejectionists’ are sub-divided into violent 
jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda, and ‘ostensibly non-violent groups’, such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Both, he says, ‘openly disparage the institutions and values of Western 
host societies’, which they ultimately aspire to destroy.  
Separate from these are the ‘participationists’, who are understood to seek an 
Islamic world order or state through non-violent means. These include groups and 
individuals alleged to have historical and ideological connections with the Egyptian 
organisation founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The 
Society of the Muslim Brothers), and the organisation established in colonial India 
by Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in 1941, Jama’at-i-Islami (The Party of Islam). Since al-
Banna and Mawdudi considered the purpose of their work as the revival of Islam’s 
pre-eminence and glory, the Ikhwan, Jama’at and the groups associated with them 
are also referred to as ‘Islamic revivalists’.  
This thesis uses both terms, ‘participationists’ and ‘revivalists’. The former is used 
mainly because this is how many observers refer to the individuals and groups 
associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at. It correctly describes their preference for 
engagement in democratic politics and thus distinguishes them from Muslim 
activists that reject involvement in what they see as corrupt and forbidden ‘man-
made’ systems of government. The term ‘revivalists’ is also used, since this is how 
the individuals and groups in question tend to see themselves. This thesis tends to 
use this term more frequently, since it assumes less about the importance of the 
Islamic state as a goal than the term ‘participationist’ does. In itself, 
‘participationist’ merely reflects a chosen approach to activism, but it derives from a 
taxonomy of Islamism, described briefly above but elaborated upon in Chapter 2, in 
which all protagonists are deemed to be striving for an Islamic state. The term 
‘revivalist’, however, leaves open the question of the extent to which the conceived 
revival of Islam is directed to a political state of affairs—an Islamic government—
or a society infused with Islamic values. 
 
                                                
4 Jeffrey Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’. 
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‘Non-violent extremism’: a conveyor belt to terrorism? 
Over the last few years, the relevance of this thesis has become more evident as the 
British government has become increasingly concerned about non-violent forms of 
Islamism in Britain. Although the government does not distinguish between 
rejectionist and participationist non-violent Islamism, it nevertheless sees a 
significant problem in what it calls ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. The 
government’s concern is primarily driven by security interests. Although not 
universally shared amongst government officials, the notion that non-violent 
Islamist extremism may act as a pathway to violent extremism, i.e., terrorism, has 
been officially endorsed by the current Conservative government.5 Some senior 
government leaders, including Prime Minister David Cameron and Home Secretary 
Theresa May, have expressed a broader concern regarding the detrimental effects of 
such extremism upon community cohesion and human rights, yet the over-riding 
pre-occupation with it relates to its potential radicalising influence upon British 
Muslims who may end up involved in planning, preparing or conducting terrorist 
attacks. 
In February 2011, at the Munich Security Conference, Cameron identified a 
spectrum of Islamist extremism, stretching from non-violent to violent ideological 
orientations. He declared: 
Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority.  At the furthest 
end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist 
realm, governed by an interpretation of Sharia. Move along the spectrum, and you 
find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist 
worldview, including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values.6 
He added that the ‘radical beliefs’ of many convicted terrorists were initially 
influenced by ‘non-violent extremists’. The Munich speech marked a significant 
shift in government security policy. Several months later, the government launched 
                                                
5 ‘PM's speech at Munich Security Conference’, British Government website, February 5, 2011. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference.; ‘Extremism: 
PM speech’, British Government website, July 20, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech. 
6 ‘PM's speech at Munich Security Conference’. 
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its revised counter-radicalisation strategy, Prevent, which emphasised the 
importance of targeting the ideology shared by both violent and non-violent Islamist 
extremists. For the first time, it provided a definition of extremism as ‘the vocal or 
active rejection of British values’.7 
Heightened fears regarding the dangers of non-violent Islamism in Britain have been 
stoked more recently by several international developments. The first is the rise of 
the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. From mid-2014, non-violent Islamist groups 
in Britain, including those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and the rejectionist 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, came under heightened scrutiny for their alleged role in providing 
the ‘mood music’ for the radicalisation of British Muslims joining IS’s insurgency.8 
The gruesome beheadings of British and American journalists and aid workers by a 
British IS jihadist, Mohammed Emwazi, beginning with that of James Foley in 
August 2014, increased concerns about the possible radicalising influence of these 
groups. Such concerns were intensified by estimates that hundreds of Britons had 
joined the ranks of IS in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, fears of the return to Britain of 
substantial numbers of British jihadists to conduct acts of terrorism, supported by 
direct threats to Britain issued by British IS members,9 led the government to 
elevate the terrorism threat level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’, the second highest of 
five levels.10  
The second international development to stimulate concern over non-violent 
Islamists in Britain was the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after 
the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ and its ousting from office almost a year later. In April 
2014, reportedly prompted by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Cameron 
ordered an internal review of the Muslim Brotherhood to understand the group’s 
                                                
7 Home Office (2011), p.107. 
8 See Haras Rafiq, ‘London has been primed for decades by Muslim Brotherhood extremists’, The 
Express, August 24, 2014. http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/502795/London-has-
been-primed-for-decades-by-Muslim-Brotherhood-extremists. See also Sarah Ann Harris, ‘As 
officials try to identify US journalist's killer – how do Britons become IS murderers?’, The Express, 
August 21, 2014. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/501621/After-James-Wright-Foley-s-murder-
how-do-Britons-becomes-IS-killers. 
9 Dipesh Gadher, ‘We’ll fly black flag of jihad over London’, The Sunday Times, June 15, 2014. 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Defence/article1422787.ece. 
10 Tom Whitehead and Steven Swinford, ‘Britain facing “greatest terrorist threat” in history’, The 
Telegraph, August 29, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/11065167/Britain-facing-greatest-terrorist-threat-in-history.html. 
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‘philosophy, activities, impact and influence on UK national interests, at home and 
abroad’.11 After a considerable delay, a summary of the review’s main findings was 
published in December 2015.12 The full report has been withheld from publication. 
In addition to the organisation headquartered in Cairo and its offshoots abroad, the 
review also considered British groups associated with Jama’at-i-Islami, indicating 
that the government sees the Brotherhood in Britain as a broad-based ideological 
movement. Supporting this interpretation, the summary document clusters Ikhwani- 
and Jama’ati-associated groups together in what it calls ‘the UK Brotherhood 
movement’.13 
The review appears to have been commissioned amidst concerns that the 
Brotherhood may be harmful for social cohesion and even linked to terrorism.14 
Indeed, although the main findings summary states that the Muslim Brotherhood 
‘has not been linked to terrorist related activity in and against the UK’, and ‘has 
often condemned [Islamist] terrorist related activity in the UK’, it notes that 
‘Muslim Brotherhood-related organisations and individuals in the UK have openly 
supported the activities of Hamas’.15 More importantly, it cautions that ‘aspects of 
Muslim Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary 
to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national 
security’.16 
The view that non-violent Islamists pose a problem for national security and social 
cohesion has long been expressed by Quilliam, a London-based think tank. In 2010, 
Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain of Quilliam wrote to Charles Farr, the director 
general of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, providing an extensive 
analysis of what they referred to as ‘the UK's counter-extremism strategy’ with a 
view to ‘mak[ing] it more effective both at preventing terrorism and at fostering 
                                                
11 ‘Government review of the Muslim Brotherhood’, British Government website, April 17, 2014. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-review-of-the-muslim-brotherhood. 
12 House of Commons (2015). 
13 Ibid., para.28, p.5. 
14 Lorenzo Vidino, ‘For too long, London has been a hub for the Muslim Brotherhood’, The 
Telegraph, October 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/11171454/Lorenzo-Vidino-For-too-
long-London-has-been-a-hub-for-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.html. 
15 House of Commons (2015), paras.36-37, pp.6-7. 
16 Ibid., para.39, p.8. 
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greater integration and national cohesion’.17 The ‘non-violent, yet extremist, 
ideology’ of groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, they 
suggested, has been ‘increasingly recognised as a root cause of Islamist extremism 
and terrorism’.18 The kick back against Prevent by such groups, they claimed, was 
attributable to this recognition. 
Quilliam appears to have an influential role advising the British government. Nawaz 
claimed credit for helping draft Cameron’s speech delivered in Birmingham in July 
2015, in which the prime minister reiterated the view that non-violent extremism 
serves as a possible precursor to involvement in terrorism. ‘I’m proud to have 
helped with UK PM Cameron’s speech that names and isolates Islamism,’ Nawaz 
wrote. ‘Our work is taking root’.19 Quilliam’s influence may be significant, though 
Cameron had expressed similar views prior to becoming prime minister. In 2008, he 
warned against the ‘extremist mindset that gives succour to terrorists by excusing 
their actions’, noting the role of non-violent apologists for terrorism, including 
government officials and academics.20 
Quilliam is not the only voice outside government suggesting that there is a 
relationship between non-violent extremist groups and terrorism. In 2011, Michael 
Whine of the Community Security Trust similarly contended that the ideologies of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami in Britain promote ‘extremism’ and 
act ‘as a conveyor belt or springboard that enable some activists to become 
terrorists’.21 This view has been expressed more recently by Samuel Westrop of 
Stand for Peace. The role of non-violent extremists ‘within the conveyor belt’, he 
has argued, is not equivalent to the influence of a single preacher, activist or group, 
                                                
17 Quilliam (2010), p.1 (note: pages references for this document refer to the page numbers of the pdf 
file, which includes several unnumbered pages for a covering letter, and not those as they appear on 
the document itself). 
18 Ibid., p.7. 
19 David Shariatmadari, ‘Maajid Nawaz: how a former Islamist became David Cameron’s anti-
extremism adviser’, The Guardian, August 2, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/aug/02/maajid-nawaz-how-a-former-islamist-became-
david-camerons-anti-extremism-adviser. 
20 ‘David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust’, Conservative website, March 4, 2008. 
http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599684. 
21 Whine (2011), p.17. 
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but is found in the production of ‘a culture of extremist Islamic thought’ perpetuated 
by a network of schools, mosques and other social institutions.22  
For the government to tackle non-violent extremism, it is surely important for it to 
identify which groups and individuals to be concerned about. Yet, at least to the 
public, the government usually talks of non-violent Islamist extremism in general 
terms, rather than singling out particular groups or individuals. There have been 
some exceptions. In 2007, for example, Cameron advocated the banning of Hizb ut-
Tahrir, as had former prime minister Tony Blair two years earlier.23 He reiterated 
this call a year later, describing the group in unequivocal terms as ‘a conveyor belt 
to terrorism’.24 In 2011, however, David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation, told Parliament that he does ‘not recommend changes to the 
system for proscription’ that would allow Hizb ut-Tahrir to be banned.25 The group 
continues to operate legally in Britain, although other rejectionist groups have been 
banned under the Terrorism Act 2000, including al-Muhajiroun an Islam4UK.26 
The notion of non-violent Islamist extremism serving as a conveyor belt to 
terrorism, as well as the singling out of Hizb ut-Tahrir as an exemplary group to be 
proscribed, has met with some criticism. Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-
Mazer, for example, state, ‘Approaches that emphasize specific forms of Islamic 
ideology or theology as causal “mood music” for terrorism are, at best, 
existentializing red herrings that are prone to miss the point, no matter how 
politically faddish’.27 They note that ‘ideology, whether defined rather broadly as 
one of “Islam under threat” or more specifically as a “Salafi-jihadi” orientation, is 
present in a variety of cases where individuals don’t become terrorists. It is therefore 
illogical and dangerous to assume that identity issues and/or ideology in and of 
                                                
22 Samuel Westrop, ‘How to Radicalize an Entire London Borough’, The Gatestone Institute, May 5, 
2015. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5677/tower-hamlets. 
23 Jonathan Freedland, ‘Free speech: reason to hope’, The Guardian, July 6, 200. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jul/06/freespeechreasontohope. 
24 ‘David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust’. 
25 Shiv Malik, ‘Watchdog recommends Tory U-turn on banning Hizb ut-Tahrir’, The Guardian, July 
18, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir-ban. 
26 See Raymond (2010). 
27 Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010), p.899. 
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themselves are causing terrorism’.28 Similarly, Arun Kundnani writes, ‘the official 
narrative implies that, once an individual has adopted an extremist religious 
ideology, terrorism will result, irrespective of the political context or any calculation 
on the part of an organisation or social movement’.29 Rather than a religious 
ideological outlook, Kundnani argues that the factors that lead to terrorism are 
political, the most important being grievances such as those relating to the American 
and British ‘occupation’ of Iraq. 
Critics of the notion that non-violent extremism leads to violence, including the 
leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, Abdul Wahid, also point to leaked classified 
papers prepared in 2010 for the Cabinet’s home affairs committee. One of these 
papers reportedly stated: 
It is sometimes argued that violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way of 
a passing commitment to non-violent Islamist extremism, for example of a kind 
associated with al-Muhajiroun or Hizb ut Tahrir ... We do not believe that it is 
accurate to regard radicalisation in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving 
from grievance, through radicalisation, to violence … This thesis seems to both 
misread the radicalisation process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.30 
Such criticisms are part of a complex debate on non-violent Islamism in Britain. It 
would be an oversimplification to portray this debate as one between the 
government and its detractors. Within government there are some officials who 
endorse the view shared by Cameron’s critics. In 2010, for example, Robert Mason, 
a senior official of the Department for Communities and Local Government, wrote a 
‘restricted’ memorandum to Communities Secretary Eric Pickles, asserting that the 
papers mentioned above present ‘a clear assessment that individuals do not progress 
through non-violent extremist groups to violent groups’.31 He added, ‘Extreme 
groups may also provide a legal “safety valve” for extreme views’. 
                                                
28 Ibid., pp.894-895. 
29 Kundnani (2015), p.15. 
30 Andrew Gilligan, ‘Hizb ut Tahrir is not a gateway to terrorism, claims Whitehall report’, The 
Telegraph, July 25, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-
Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html. 
31 Ibid. 
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And there are others outside government—academics and journalists—who, like 
Cameron, see non-violent Islamist groups as playing a significant role in 
radicalisation and terrorism. Whine, Westrop, and Nawaz have already been 
mentioned. Peter Neumann and Brooke Rogers of King’s College London have also 
expressed concern regarding Islamist ‘gateway organisations’ that they say ‘form 
part of a “conveyor belt” through which people are primed for their later 
involvement in terrorism’.32 According to Neumann and Rogers, such organisations 
provide individuals with ‘the ideological framework—the mindset—which leads to 
involvement in violence’, as well as the ‘social networks with violent extremists’ 
that enable violent action.33 They identify three gateway organisations in Britain—
Tablighi Jama’at, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun—all of which are rejectionists, 
not participationists. 
Participationist groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have not featured as 
prominently in the debates concerning non-violent Islamism in Britain as 
rejectionists have. This is probably because the primary concern with non-violent 
Islamism is with its potential for radicalising Muslims and thus its function as a way 
station for Islam-inspired terrorism. There is no hard data regarding terrorism arrests 
and convictions in Britain that compares the number of terrorists’ linked with 
rejectionist groups to the number linked with participationists. But it is likely that 
far more terrorists are linked to rejectionist than participationist groups. According 
to Raffaello Pantucci almost half of the terror plots carried out or foiled by police in 
Britain in the last two decades have been connected to al-Muhajiroun.34 
Brotherhood-associated groups in Britain, whilst supporting the terrorism campaigns 
of Hamas in Israel and other insurgencies they consider as defensive in nature, 
generally condemn terrorism in the West and refrain from openly promoting 
hostility between Muslims and secular, Western culture.  
Although some analysts, such as Whine, have expressed concerns regarding 
Brotherhood-linked groups’ potential for radicalising Muslims in Britain, such 
concerns are less pronounced compared with those regarding groups that openly 
                                                
32 Neumann and Rogers (2007), p.31. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Pantucci (2015). 
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reject Muslim political participation, publicly affirm Britain’s future status as part of 
a global Islamic caliphate, and—without believing they need an intermediary role 
with government—have less to lose by stridently denouncing government policy. 
‘Non-violent Islamism’, social cohesion and entryism 
The government’s concerns regarding non-violent Islamism may have centred on 
radicalisation and terrorism, and the debate on the role of non-violent Islamism as a 
precursor to violence may have focused more on rejectionist groups than 
participationists. But in the last few years, the government has begun to express 
serious concerns about non-violent Islamism’s impact on social cohesion and civil 
liberties, including women’s rights. It has also begun to express the need to 
safeguard against non-violent Islamist extremism and entryism within key British 
institutions. It is in relation to these concerns that participationist groups and 
individuals have played their most significant role in the debate on non-violent 
Islamism in Britain. 
In December 2013, a government report identified schools, universities and prisons 
as institutions vulnerable to ‘the ideology of Islamist extremism’.35 Building on the 
findings of this report, a new statutory duty came into force on July 1, 2015, 
requiring all public bodies, including schools, prisons and local councils ‘to take 
steps to identify and tackle radicalisation’.36 The ‘Prevent duty’, as it is known, has 
its legal basis in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which came into effect in 
February 2015.37 Official guidance notes for this duty state that the staff of the 
‘specified’ public institutions ‘need to know what measures are available to prevent 
people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist 
ideology that can be associated with it’.38 
                                                
35 Cabinet Office (2013), p.1. 
36 ‘PM statement on Tunisia and European Council’, British Government website, June 29, 2015. 
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37 See Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6). Available online at: 
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Extremism in British schools has been a special concern of the government. New 
teachers’ standards were introduced in 2012, stipulating that ‘teachers must not 
undermine fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and 
beliefs’.39 Prior to November 2014, all schools were required to ‘respect’ these 
values. Now, however, they have a responsibility to ‘actively promote’ them, as a 
bulwark against extremism and for the ‘spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development of pupils’.40 Whilst the Prevent duty focuses on vigilance and the 
prevention of radicalisation, this responsibility to promote ‘British values’ in 
schools is geared to the more positive task of ensuring knowledge of and 
identification with democratic, progressive culture. 
One event that encouraged the government to introduce these changes was the 
‘Trojan Horse’ scandal in Birmingham, where a government-commissioned inquiry 
found city schools had been targeted by a ‘co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained’ 
campaign to introduce ‘an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos’.41 Of particular 
controversy was the central involvement of a senior member of Britain’s largest 
Muslim umbrella group, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), who has now been 
banned from any involvement in British schools.42 
This ‘plot’—and the problem of a rejection of British values within religious 
supplementary schools—was mentioned by Home Secretary Theresa May in a 
speech she gave in March 2015.43 Calling for a partnership between government and 
civil society to combat extremism, she identified the problems with non-violent 
extremism in universities, charities, local government and religious arbitration 
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tribunals. Specifically, she identified the discrimination against women in shari’a 
courts across the country as a problem to be investigated by an independent 
commission. This follows similar concerns raised in three separate reports produced 
by the think tank Civitas, the advocacy group One Law for All, and the former 
deputy speaker of the House of Lords, Caroline Cox.44 
In her speech, May also singled out the London Borough of Tower Hamlets for 
‘allegations of corruption, cronyism, extremism, homophobia and anti-Semitism’. 
These allegations were made in several high profile investigations by The 
Telegraph, which confirmed the infiltration of the Labour Party within the borough 
by the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), as well as its covert involvement in Lutfur 
Rahman’s successful campaign to become the borough’s mayor in 2010. The 
newspaper’s Andrew Gilligan also exposed the extremist orientations of IFE. Based 
in the Jama’at-i-Islami-associated East London Mosque, which has a record of 
hosting speakers expressing views clearly antagonistic to liberal democratic 
values,45 the organisation came under the spotlight when Gilligan revealed IFE 
literature describing its commitment to change the ‘very infrastructure of [British] 
society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed … from ignorance 
to Islam’.46 Furthermore, several IFE activists were recorded by an undercover 
reporter for Channel 4’s Dispatches programme as stating that the organisation had 
‘a lot of influence and power in the council, councillors, politicians’.47 Thus, it was 
perhaps unsurprising when, in November 2014, the government’s chief inspector of 
schools stated that hundreds of children in six of the borough’s Islamic schools were 
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recognised by the government of being at risk of ‘extremist influences and 
radicalisation’.48  
In July 2015, Cameron delivered a key speech outlining the government’s new 
counter-extremism strategy. Indicating a concern regarding non-violent extremism 
beyond its potential pathway to violence, Cameron emphasised the importance of 
combatting ‘[i]deas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as democracy, 
freedom and sexual equality … [and] which actively promote discrimination, 
sectarianism and segregation’.49 Communal segregation is a theme he has touched 
on before; in 2008, speaking at the Community Security Trust, he identified ‘the 
fostering of community divisions which push people into mutually antagonistic 
blocs’ as a threat to British society, in addition to terrorism.50 The July speech, 
however, consolidated the view within government policy that ‘extremist ideology’ 
posed not just the risk of terrorism but also a threat to Britain’s liberal democratic 
culture.  
This could not have been put in plainer terms than those expressed by Theresa May 
in the foreword to the new Counter-Extremism Strategy, published in October 2015. 
She wrote that ‘the threat posed by extremists is not limited to violence’.51 The 
strategy aims to address several concerns she had expressed in her March 2015 
speech—namely, entryism into key British institutions, including schools, and the 
discrimination against women in shari’a courts—plus other issues alleged to stem 
from ‘extremist ideology’, such as ‘isolated communities’, Forced Marriage and 
Female Genital Mutilation. A new body in the Home Office, the Extremism 
Analysis Unit, will play a key role in developing this strategy. 
The understanding that participationist groups bring their own set of problems to 
British society independent from their potential radicalising influence has been 
expressed by some observers outside Whitehall. Quilliam, for instance, has warned 
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that engagement with organisations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Jama’at-i-Islami, such as MCB and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), 
‘threatens integration and national cohesion by encouraging the spread of a 
supremacist ideology’.52 A few others have described the problem of 
participationists as one of cultural subversion. Whilst Cameron has described 
‘Islamist extremism’ as a ‘subversive doctrine’,53 the elaboration of ‘non-violent 
subversion’ has been left for a small number of journalists and analysts.54 Charles 
Moore, the former chairman of the think tank Policy Exchange, for example, in 
discussing the Birmingham Trojan Horse plot, asserts: 
All Islamist schools of thought are hostile to democratic processes, many explicitly 
so. They strive to create a global society in thrall to their version of Islamic law. As 
we learnt when Islamists educated in British comprehensive schools blew themselves 
up and killed 52—mainly their fellow citizens—in July 2005, some use violence to 
try to bring this about. Most don’t, but they do work to subvert—that is the right 
word—the institutions that we all need. They are organised in schools and 
universities. They infiltrate local government and public administration. They are 
expert at getting public money under false pretences. They are not ‘negligible’, but 
still we neglect the threat they pose.55 
Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, in a report published by Policy Exchange that 
discusses the ‘challenge posed by political Islamists who ostensibly eschew 
violence’, suggest that the British intelligence services ‘need to recover some of 
their intellectual inheritance in relation to developing a definition of “subversion”’ 
fit for such a challenge.56 According to Patrick Sookhdeo, ‘a careful and deliberate 
strategy by certain Muslim leaders’ to subvert British society was presented decades 
ago at a conference in 1978 organised by the Islamic Council of Europe. This 
strategy, he writes, urged Muslims to resist assimilation and organise themselves 
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according to Islamic principles: ‘The ultimate goal of this strategy is that the 
Muslims should become a majority and the entire nation be governed according to 
Islam.’57 
Contrary to these fears of non-violent Islamist ideology in Britain as either a 
disseminator of social discord or a conduit for terrorism, some observers have in 
recent years argued that the new leaders of some of the key organisations of concern 
are evolving innovative and self-critical reformulations of their religious tradition.58 
Such an analysis, as provided by Sophie Gilliat-Ray and Seán McLoughlin, supports 
the view that, far from being a subversive threat, the leaders of these organisations 
advocate a political vision inspired by Islam that is compatible with liberal 
democratic values. Such a vision, it is alleged, is shared by politically active 
Muslims across Europe.59 Jytte Klausen, for example, states, ‘Europe’s Muslim 
leaders are not aiming to overthrow liberal democracy and to replace secular law 
with Islamic religious law, the shariah. Most are rather looking for ways to build 
institutions that will allow Muslims to practice their religion in a way that is 
compatible with social integration’.60  
The question of a ‘participationist’ Islamist movement in Britain 
This apparent disagreement between critics of these groups and their more 
sympathetic observers lies at the heart of local community and national security 
policy conundrums. It is also the starting point for this thesis. Put succinctly, it 
concerns the nature of the politics of the organisations and individuals of concern: 
Do they constitute a subversive Islamist brotherhood that inculcates socially divisive 
values, whilst seeking the gradual imposition of shari’a law and ultimately an 
Islamic state? Or do they form a progressive Islamic movement at home in Britain’s 
liberal democratic culture that merely seeks social justice for Muslims as equal 
citizens? Underlying this question, however, is the arguably more fundamental 
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one—largely absent in the academic and think tank literature—that concerns 
whether and how they comprise a movement at all: 
Do the individuals and groups in Britain that are commonly identified as 
non-violent ‘participationist’ Islamists comprise a social movement? And 
if so, what is distinct about this movement? 
The initial objective of this study, stemming from an interest in the question of the 
potentially subversive nature of political Islam in Britain, was to identify and 
elucidate the political goals and strategies of the ‘non-violent Islamist’ movement in 
Britain. Yet preliminary research, including the conduct of a number of interviews 
with Muslim activists, prompted a step back to enquire as to whether such a 
movement exists in Britain in the first place. This step is important because the 
accuracy and usefulness of the term ‘Islamist’ in relation to individuals and groups 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami in Britain—and the 
assumption, if not the explicit claim, that they comprise a movement—has long 
been something taken for granted, particularly in think tank and news media 
discourse.  
Hence, it must be emphasised, the starting place of the thesis is with a cluster of 
individuals and the organisations that they are involved in, not with non-violent 
Islamism per se. The question is not simply whether there is a certain kind of 
Islamist movement in Britain. It is, to be more precise, whether the individuals and 
the organisations that are explicitly or tacitly considered to comprise such a 
movement comprise a movement at all, whether it may accurately be called 
‘Islamist’ or otherwise. This thesis is concerned with these actors precisely because 
they are usually considered as Islamists since, by definition, Islamism presents 
interesting and serious challenges to any liberal democratic society or state. But it 
tries to minimise the assumptions regarding their political orientations.  
Rather than simply interrogate whether they aspire for an Islamic state—as all 
Islamists are by definition assumed to do—it more openly seeks to fathom whether 
and how they are bonded by a worldview and an associated set of values, regardless 
of its specific characteristics. It happens that they are bonded in such a way, but the 
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Islamic state does not feature as prominently as might be expected, and thus the 
applicability of the moniker ‘Islamist’ is found wanting. 
In order to answer the research question posed above, this thesis undertakes two 
preliminary tasks. The first is the elucidation of a concept of social movement 
required to gauge whether or not the individuals and groups associated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami may be considered as a movement. The 
second is the identification of these individuals and groups, in order to know to 
whom the concept will be applied. These two necessary steps are undertaken, 
respectively, in Chapters 1 and 2, which comprise Part I of the thesis. They are 
outlined below. 
There is a vast body of literature to turn to for a potentially suitable concept of 
social movement. Much of this work, referred to as social movement theory, falls 
between two broadly recognised ‘paradigms’, the political process (PP) and new 
social movement (NSM) approaches. Chapter 1, which reviews both, reveals several 
key flaws in the PP approach that render it inappropriate for the task at hand: Not 
only does it inadequately accommodate matters of culture, it also problematically 
relies upon a ‘rational actor’ model that assumes the existence of a movement. This 
is unfortunate, since most treatments of religious and Islamic activism take a PP 
perspective. A much more suitable starting point is offered by the NSM approach 
because of its appreciation of the cultural stakes in social movement struggles, its 
emphasis upon latent networks beneath the level of public protest, and its eschewal 
of the movement as an a priori given.  
The NSM approach views social movement struggles as having a symbolic 
dimension, in which cultural codes—normative ways in which the world is seen and 
described—comprise both vehicles for change and the very objects of change. For 
Alberto Melucci, movements ‘do not fight merely for material goals, or to increase 
their participation in the system. They fight for symbolic and cultural stakes, for a 
different meaning and orientation of social action’.61 They present a ‘symbolic 
challenge to the dominant patterns’ in society, exhibited in ‘different way[s] of 
                                                
61 Melucci (1985), p.797. 
  21 
naming the world’.62 Yet, the NSM perspective has a limited conception of the 
inherently political nature of symbolic conflict. It fails to appreciate that power is 
not only contested ‘externally’ with the dominant political and social institutions, 
but also ‘internally’ where the collective solidarity of a movement is a key stake in 
its struggle. Pierre Bourdieu’s work on symbolic power helps to address this 
shortcoming. Bourdieu recognises that a constitutive element of social conflicts are 
struggles over the authority to classify not only the social order but group identity, 
over the authority to elicit an unquestioned way of seeing not only social and 
political reality but also a sense of one’s place within it as distinct from that of 
others. 
The concept of social movement presented and elaborated in Chapter 1, it may be 
put here, is of an organised network of individuals connected by the bonds of 
cultural solidarity and a conflict of values with institutional authority. This concept 
may be broken down into three elements, which any social movement may be 
thought to possess. Accordingly, the recognition of individuals and groups as 
comprising a social movement may be enabled by the recognition of them as 
possessing three characteristics: Firstly, they have to be collectively engaged in 
purposive work, that is, they have to be networked organisationally. Secondly, they 
need to share cultural solidarity, including a shared way of seeing and evaluating the 
world. This involves a shared understanding of who they are as a distinct 
community and the meaning of their work. Thirdly, they have to be organised in 
opposition to political authority, not merely for equal rights or justice but for a 
transformation of the very values that underpin the social and political order. These 
three elements serve, respectively, as the prisms through which the actors of interest 
are viewed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, which make up Part II of the thesis. 
The second preliminary task is the identification of the individuals and groups that 
form the object of this study. This is enabled by a review of the academic and think 
tank literature that is concerned with understanding participationist Islamists and 
their politics. This literature, which is reviewed in Chapter 2, contains two broadly 
opposing views of these actors, as mentioned, as either Islamist subversives or 
Islamic reformists. Despite this divergence of views, however, there is general 
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agreement regarding who these actors are: They include individuals involved in the 
founding of groups associated with either the Muslim Brotherhood or Jama’at-i-
Islami, individuals currently working in such groups, and the groups themselves. 
This thesis also turns to this body of literature to evaluate the extent to which the 
question of a participationist movement in Britain has already been answered. It 
finds, in fact, that the question has not explicitly been raised, although some kind of 
collectivity is usually assumed in the classification of these groups as non-violent 
Islamists. Whilst these groups are typically described as constituting two ‘streams of 
Islamist ideology’63 with their respective origins in the Brotherhood and Jama’at, 
they are also considered as part of a singular movement or network because these 
two streams, as described in a recent Pew report, are alleged to share the same 
‘political ideology … that calls for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system 
of government’.64  
Whilst the notion of a participationist Islamist movement in Britain is tacit in most 
analyses, in several analysts’ work such a movement is explicitly referenced. As 
already noted, Vidino uses the term the ‘New Western Brotherhood’ to refer to such 
a phenomenon. Similarly, Stephen Merley refers to the ‘global Muslim 
Brotherhood’, which is adopted in the title of this thesis. But whilst Vidino and 
Merley provide many insights into the activities of the relevant individuals and 
groups, their work does not fully answer the question as to whether such a 
movement exists in contemporary Britain. As already noted, Vidino’s treatment of 
participationist Islamism in Britain is somewhat limited and dated, and Merley, 
whilst having written several incisive reports on the Brotherhood, has not produced 
an analysis dedicated to the Brotherhood in Britain. Furthermore, whether tacitly 
assumed or explicitly articulated, the notion of a participationist movement isn’t 
adequately theorised in the literature. Typically relying upon the notion of ideology 
as the main identifying factor, it would certainly benefit from a clarification of this 
notion.  
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The literature that problematises the understanding of these actors as Islamists does 
so in several ways. One line of argument is that they are engaged in a process of 
reform in line with Europe’s liberal democratic values, as mentioned earlier.65 
Another is that, as a result of the Arab Spring, the doctrinaire orientations of 
Islamists have diluted to the point of being unrecognisable.66 A third line of 
argument doubts the political continuity between al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood 
and its Western offshoots.67 Such analyses, however, do not amount to a coherent, 
direct or effective counter-argument. Whilst some prominent figures may have 
abandoned Islamist aspirations for a society and state infused with shari’a 
principles, or abandoned Britain’s shores in pursuit of political aspirations in the 
post-‘Arab Spring’ Middle East, the network of revivalist individuals and groups 
has not diminished as a result. Klausen claims that ‘Muslim organizations that link 
faith with political advocacy are often described as the offspring of the ‘Muslim 
Brotherhood’, but the label lumps together groups and individuals who have little in 
common’.68 Yet, as this thesis demonstrates, this claim does not stand up to scrutiny. 
Part II of the thesis is structured by the three elements of the concept of social 
movement introduced in Chapter 1. The first of the these elements is the focus of 
Chapter 3, which seeks to confirm the existence of the organisational network of the 
individuals and groups in Britain identified in the previous chapter. This analysis 
builds on the literature presented in Chapter 2, which illustrates of some of their 
organisational relationships. But it incorporates additional insights gleaned from 
interviews with some of the Muslim leaders within the network. This enables a far 
more complete picture of the organisational dimensions of this network than is 
currently provided in any open sources.  
Chapter 3 describes some of the numerous interpersonal and inter-organisational 
relationships comprising the network, as evident in collaborations and affiliations, 
but most importantly in various inter-locking leadership structures, formal and 
informal. These include MCB, the country’s largest Muslim umbrella group, and 
                                                
65 McLoughlin (2005), Gilliat-Ray (2010). 
66 Brandon and Pantucci (2012). 
67 Klausen (2005). 
68 Ibid., p.12. 
  24 
numerous overlapping leadership clusters apparent in the multiple senior positions 
that key individuals have in various groups. These leadership structures also include 
a semi-formal group comprised of key leaders of Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated 
organisations, the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations. This 
committee, which is absent from all of the academic and think tank literature on 
Islamism in Britain, was revealed in an interview with Abdullah Faliq, an 
experienced Muslim activist involved in numerous organisations, including the 
Islamic Forum of Europe and the Cordoba Foundation.69  
Chapter 4 shows how the individuals comprising the network identified in Chapter 3 
share cultural solidarity, particularly in terms of how they classify themselves as a 
community, how they conceive of their relationship to the environment in which 
they live, and how they understand their work and its purpose. Of all five chapters, 
this one has drawn the most heavily upon the interviews conducted with prominent 
figures from the revivalist network. It regards their conception of communal identity 
through specific Islamic concepts, such as the Muslim umma, and Islamic moral 
principles implicit to their work, including that of ‘Enjoining the Good and 
Forbidding the Wrong’. Their sense of distinction as a group is expressed in their 
perception of non-Muslims as part of the broader community of humanity to which 
they have a duty to deliver Islam. It is also expressed in their perception of other 
Muslims as mistaken in isolating themselves from Britain’s non-Muslim 
mainstream, or in integrating themselves seamlessly within it, or in placing the goal 
of an Islamic state prior to the attainment of a society infused with Islamic beliefs 
and values. Whilst noting some variation in the way in which these individuals 
understand their collective identity and certain Islamic concepts through which they 
understand their work, this chapter shows that there are nevertheless grounds to 
assert that the network embodies cultural solidarity characteristic of a social 
movement. 
One of the key contributions of the thesis is a novel and nuanced understanding of 
what other analysts may refer to as the ‘ideology’ of Islamic revivalists. This 
includes their ideas and thinking but, underlying this, their way of perceiving and 
evaluating the world. Of particular significance is the concept and importance of the 
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Islamic state in the revivalist worldview and value system. These actors, it is shown 
in Chapter 4, are connected by their understanding of themselves as Islam’s 
vanguard within British society, but their understanding of the Islamic state—
contrary to their classification by critics as ‘Islamists’—is not as a goal to be strived 
towards. It is, rather, a reward for widespread piety. Their key aspiration is not, 
strictly speaking, an Islamic mode of governance but a society in which Islam is 
willingly embraced. This shows that what distinguishes them from rejectionist 
Islamists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, is not simply a choice of 
strategy but an important aspect of their worldview. This finding has emerged from 
a number of interviews with prominent leaders of revivalist groups. 
The key figures and groups comprising the revivalist network have a conflictual 
relationship with the British political authorities. They are engaged in a cultural and 
political struggle concerning perspectives, values, and a way of life, as well as the 
authority to determine them. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, this conflict has both 
practical and symbolic dimensions. The practical dimension of the conflict concerns 
the institutional and legal structures that regulate peoples’ lives. It is evident in the 
fields of political advocacy and local governance, as well as education and 
arbitration, particularly where Muslim communities are concerned. Concerns 
regarding Birmingham’s Trojan Horse affair and shari’a courts, as expressed by 
Theresa May, point to key examples. Connected to the practical dimension of this 
conflict, there is also a symbolic or cognitive dimension. This is evident in 
competing efforts to classify—and to command the authority to classify—the 
‘correct’ understanding of what fundamental social values are, what counts as 
‘extremism’ and what Islam is.  
The stakes of this conflict are thus twofold: On one hand, they include the 
institutionalisation of competing worldviews and related values—Islamic and liberal 
democratic—within civil society structures, government policy and state legislation. 
On the other hand they include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews and 
related values within the minds of people, including policymakers, British Muslims 
and the general public. As Chapter 5 shows, these two dimensions overlap, 
particularly in revivalist groups’ efforts to undermine the government’s counter-
extremism strategy both symbolically, where concepts such as ‘extremism’ are 
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contested, and practically, where changes in government policy are sought through 
protest, advocacy or testimony. In presenting this multifaceted conflict, this chapter 
shows how the network meets the third criterion for a movement as specified in 
Chapter 1. In doing so, it presents arguably the most comprehensive, nuanced, and 
up-to-date analysis of the political and cultural fault lines between Islamic 
revivalists and the British authorities. 
A note on methodology 
The research presented in this thesis was conducted using a qualitative 
methodology. This involved conducting and analysing interviews with many of the 
leaders of the relevant Muslim organisations. Most interviewees were identified 
from a thorough examination of the literature on Islamism in Britain, including 
academic works, think tank reports and news media reports. A few were identified 
by their colleagues or peers who had already agreed to be interviewed. 
Arranging interviews was fairly straight-forward in some cases but difficult in 
others. In some cases, individuals who were interviewed subsequently helped to 
arrange interviews with others who were difficult to establish direct communicative 
channels with. In the case of one prominent Islamic institution, the person originally 
requested by the thesis author for an interview was substituted by the institution for 
another member of staff. This was explained by the institution as a precautionary 
measure against hostility of the kind that it had apparently experienced in certain 
media reports after granting interviews with other researchers. Nonetheless, it 
enabled face-to-face meetings with other staff members, one of whom was 
interviewed at a later date. 
Most interviews were held in the offices of the organisations in which the 
interviewees have a formal role. Some were held in public places, including a 
bookshop café and a park. One was held in the home of the interviewee. The 
interviews, which lasted between one and two hours, were semi-structured with a 
list of key questions and themes centred on the role of Islam in their work. At the 
same time, they allowed for a free discussion of concepts, issues and concerns 
deemed relevant. In all but one case, the interviews were audio recorded and then 
fully transcribed. The transcriptions were then compiled, which allowed for a 
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thematic analysis. Recurrent themes and issues were identified and the relevant key 
terms—such as shari’a, da’wa, and the Islamic state—were then searchable and 
comparable between the notes for different interviewees. 
Significantly, representatives from almost all of the key participationist 
organisations were interviewed, including senior figures from MCB, MAB, IFE, the 
Islamic Foundation, the Cordoba Foundation, the Islamic Sharia Council, the East 
London Mosque and Muslim Aid. Interviews were also conducted with several 
individuals who have played important roles within this network, but who are not 
currently associated with any group in it. These include, most notably, Dilwar 
Hussain and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. The complete list of interviewees and their 
biographical information is provided in Appendix 1.  
The thesis author undoubtedly would have benefitted from being able to interview 
more leaders (or former leaders) of Muslim groups of interest. Certain prominent 
individuals either did not respond at all to requests for an interview or responded but 
declined. The relevance of other individuals within the network only became 
apparent after the time allocated for interviews had elapsed. However, key figures 
representing most of the key organisations were interviewed and the collection of 
interviews conducted for this thesis amounts to a unique and valuable body of data. 
As the first sustained analysis of this particular strand of Islamic activism in Britain, 
this thesis has drawn upon interviews with more prominent participationists than 
any other piece of work in the currently available literature.  
Supporting the data obtained from interviews, the research for this thesis also 
involved the analysis of primary source material published by the relevant 
individuals and organisations. Such material included books, magazines, 
newsletters, brochures, and online articles, as well as speeches given by some of 
these figures that were sourced on the Internet at websites such as YouTube. Some 
interviewees provided the thesis author with literature recently published by the 
organisations they work for. As with the interview data, the primary source material 
was particularly useful for Part II of the thesis. 
It might be charged that Chapters 3, 4 and 5—the main part of the thesis—does not 
focus on exactly the same individuals and groups, that they each give some attention 
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to certain actors that don’t appear so prominently in the other chapters. This may be 
true, but only to some extent. It has not been possible, in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively, to account for the ways in which all the figures and groups mapped out 
in Chapter 3 possess cultural solidarity and conflictual relationships with 
institutional authority. But there is sufficient overlap in the attention given to the 
various figures and groups to provide a clear enough image of what this thesis 
affirms as a social movement.  
§ 
This thesis concludes that the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain is a social 
movement. It presents an understanding of this movement that is important both 
academically and politically. Although there is much more to be learned about the 
individuals and groups that comprise the movement, as well as their collective 
nature, this thesis presents some valuable insights into their organisational 
connections, their worldview and values, and their conflict with Britain’s liberal 
democratic culture, as well as the political authorities that seek to protect it. In 
identifying and elucidating some of the distinct features of participationist 
Islamism—what this thesis also refers to as Islamic revivalism—it contributes to a 
more nuanced understanding of what the government sees as ‘non-violent Islamist 
extremism’ in Britain. This may be helpful not only for policymakers seeking to 
refine an approach to what Cameron has called ‘the struggle of our generation’.70 It 
may also be helpful to expand and refine the academic study of Islamic activism in 
the West and social movements. One specific and valuable contribution to this body 
of work is a novel concept of social movement as presented in Chapter 1, which 
uniquely synthesises NSM theory with aspects of Bourdieu’s political sociology. 
                                                
70 ‘Extremism: PM speech’. 
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Chapter 1 
Conceiving Social Movements:  
Social Movement Theory and Bourdieu 
This thesis concerns the existence of a ‘participationist’ Islamist movement in 
Britain. It therefore requires a concept of social movement for assessing whether 
characterisations of certain British-based individuals and groups as comprising such 
a movement are accurate. The task of this chapter is to present such a concept. It 
does so in the course of reviewing the body of literature known as social movement 
theory, where various concepts of social movement have been developed.  
The two most dominant approaches within social movement theory are the political 
process (PP) and new social movement (NSM) approaches. Since movement theorists 
consistently refer to these approaches in the literature as the two main ‘paradigms’ of 
social movement theory, this thesis considers the usefulness of both for the task at 
hand. Resource mobilisation theory is often referred to separately in the literature, 
but is widely considered as having been subsumed within the PP approach.1 
The PP approach is of limited analytical use because of its inadequate 
conceptualisation of culture and its problematic reliance upon a ‘rational actor’ 
model that assumes what this thesis seeks to ascertain, namely, the existence of a 
movement. This is unfortunate because most treatments of religion within social 
movement theory, including that of Islam and Islam-inspired activism, take a PP 
perspective.  
The NSM approach, however, because of its appreciation of the role of culture in the 
constitution of social movements, as well as its rejection of the concept of movement 
as an a priori given, offers a more suitable starting place for the analysis of social 
movements, especially for the apprehension of one that is the subject of speculation 
                                               
1 Morris (2000), p.446; Jasper (2010), p.966. 
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due to its allegedly clandestine nature. The NSM approach, particularly as articulated 
in the works of Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine, rightly emphasises the 
importance of the cultural stakes in social movement struggles. It observes that social 
movement challenges to normative social values and practices have a symbolic 
dimension, where codes and meanings comprise both vehicles for change and the 
very objects of change. 
However, the NSM approach fails to appreciate that the identity of a given 
movement is itself constituted by ongoing symbolic struggles. These include 
competition for the legitimacy to represent an oppressed population, both within this 
population as its vanguard and in the wider public field as its interlocutor. 
Inseparable from this struggle for legitimate leadership is one for the legitimacy to 
define this population as a constituency. Insights from Bourdieu’s work, particularly 
on symbolic power, help to address this shortcoming in NSM theory and round out a 
useful conceptual framework for identifying and understanding social movements.  
Accordingly, this chapter introduces the two main approaches of social movement 
theory, including their limited application to Islamic movements. It explains the 
problems of the PP approach that prompt its rejection for the purposes of this thesis 
and highlights some of the useful elements of the NSM approach. It also presents 
some of the key concepts from Bourdieu’s political sociology and explains how they 
can be fruitfully brought together with aspects of NSM theory to arrive at the novel 
concept of social movement adopted in this thesis.  
Firstly, however, it is worth briefly presenting this concept up front. It will be 
elaborated in greater detail later in the chapter, but presenting it here will help guide 
and make more meaningful this chapter’s navigation through PP and NSM theory, as 
well as the salient aspects of Bourdieu’s work.  
Social movements are understood as collectively mobilised networks of individuals 
connected in a struggle against institutional power with both political and cultural 
stakes. The recognition of a given movement, in this formulation, is contingent upon 
the possibility of recognising organised networking between individuals, shared 
cultural solidarity between them, and a conflict of values at the heart of their 
collective struggle. But this involves a recognition of the symbolic struggles of 
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classification that determine, on one hand, collective identity, and, on the other, the 
‘legitimate vision of the social world’.2 
1. The ‘Political Process’ approach to social movements 
Most contemporary academic treatments of social movements lie within the PP 
tradition. The PP approach, developed by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and others, 
describes social movements as an example, but not the only type, of ‘contentious 
politics’.3 Movements are characterised in relation to the state, assumed as the 
gatekeeper to political and social change. According to this approach, movements 
typically take the shape of one kind or another of public protest against the 
government in the name of ‘constituencies lacking formal representation’.4  
Studies of social movements within the PP paradigm are typically historical. They 
begin with a social movement already identified (and named) and then look for the 
factors that account for its emergence, success or failure. The PP model ignores the 
question of the origination of social movements in favour of the question of their 
‘mobilisation’. It does not perceive the coming-into-being of social movements, since 
it pre-loads into the analysis an a priori agent that ‘does’ the mobilising. Since this 
thesis seeks to know whether a specific set of agents amounts to a social movement 
or not, it cannot adopt such an approach. For this task, in the words of Alberto 
Melucci, ‘the existence of a movement is precisely what needs to be explained’.5  
The PP approach is unhelpful for any inquiry into the existence of an alleged 
movement, one that is not assumed from the beginning of an analysis, especially 
when it is considered to be wholly or partly clandestine, as with the global Muslim 
Brotherhood. It is also unhelpful for an inquiry into contention beyond political 
antagonism with the state. The PP model, unlike that of NSM theory, does not 
accommodate the possibility of cultural fields of contention where a concerted 
struggle for an alternative way of life is played out. The model even restricts political 
                                               
2 Bourdieu (1989), p.22. 
3 Tilly and Tarrow (2007). 
4 Tilly (1984), p.306. 
5 Melucci (1989), p.30, emphasis added. 
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contention to public protest against centralised state power. Contention with 
governmental and non-governmental power distributed across and within different 
social spheres—in education, business, media and law, for example—is absent. 
1.1. The PP approach and ‘rational actor’ model 
The PP concept of social movement is of a rational agent situated within a political 
environment, driven by calculated political interests and objectives. This concept 
emerged in reaction to mid-twentieth century accounts of collective behaviour—
including crowds, riots and fads—which characterised such behaviour as irrational. It 
relies upon a rejection of this earlier characterisation of collective action and, in 
doing so, perpetuates a false dichotomy between the rational and irrational. The 
rational actor assumption at the heart of PP models prompts some analysts to elevate 
the issue of whether social movements are rational or irrational, as Quintan 
Wiktorowicz does in his eschewal of ‘popular perceptions of radical Islamic groups 
as irrational, “crazy,” or deviant’.6 But this obfuscates the more important and 
complicated issue of how to understand the rationality of social movements—
described by Wiktorowicz in terms of cost/benefit calculation—as situated and 
produced within social activity, rather than in the heads of individuals. 
The philosophical objection to the rational actor assumption at the heart of the PP 
approach—that it begs the question of the movement’s existence—is complemented 
by a scientific objection. Recent studies in cognitive science—completely ignored in 
all streams of social movement theory—show that human behaviour is neither 
fundamentally nor exclusively guided by rational consciousness, as assumed both in 
the traditional psychological sciences and in the public imagination. John Bargh and 
Ezequiel Morsella note a marginal but growing body of scientific research that 
demonstrates ‘the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance 
systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational’.7 Bargh and Morsella observe that, 
far from being irrational, ‘unconscious processes not only adapt us to the present 
situation, but they also influence the tracks we lay to guide our future behavior’.8 
                                               
6 Wiktorowicz (2004b), p.20. 
7 Bargh and Morsella (2008), p.73. 
8 Ibid., p.77. 
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Ruud Custers and Henk Aarts similarly note a significant body of research which 
shows that even goal-pursuit is primarily unconsciously driven.9 
These ‘unconscious behavioral guidance systems’ are strikingly equivalent to the 
socially and historically inherited ‘schemata of perception, appreciation, and 
action’—the habitus—that Bourdieu says unconsciously guide and give sense, in a 
very practical way, to human behaviour.10 ‘The habitus,’ Bourdieu writes, ‘is a 
spontaneity without consciousness or will, opposed as much to the mechanical 
necessity of things without history in mechanistic theories as it is to the reflexive 
freedom of the subjects “without inertia” in rationalistic theories’.11  
Yet, noteworthy about the habitus is that it is constructed socially. In Bourdieu’s 
words, it is a ‘socialized subjectivity’.12 The unconscious ‘systems’ or ‘schemata’ for 
perceiving, judging and orienting action that make up the habitus are individually 
embodied but necessarily social. They originate within, and are shaped by, specific 
social and economic conditions experienced collectively. Habitus, Bourdieu asserts, 
manifests in groups in the largely unconscious, taken-for-granted cultural practices, 
as well as related competences and desires, which are shared by individuals. They are 
also inseparable from particular arenas of struggle that he calls fields.  
Thus, the rationality of groups including social movements cannot adequately be 
conceived in terms of conscious, cost-benefit calculation. It has to be seen in relation 
to what the rational actor model ignores—and what makes conscious calculation 
possible—namely, the unconsciously-held perceptions, attitudes and orientations of 
the habitus, which are produced and contested socially. Individuals come to identify 
and act as a group, including politically organised ones, not as the result of them 
each rationally calculating the costs and benefits of ‘joining’—the notion of which 
assumes the group a priori. They do so, at least in part, because they have a similar 
habitus that enables them to perceive the same grievances, collaborate 
organisationally with the same ‘logic of practice’, and share a language of solidarity 
                                               
9 Custers and Aarts (2010). 
10 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p.16. 
11 Bourdieu (1990), p.56. 
12 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p.126. 
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in both words and deeds. The habitus—in which certain beliefs and practices, as 
distinct from others, are inculcated and reproduced—presents a potential or virtual 
group.  
Such a group has its own historically and socially cultivated ‘rationality’, its own 
way of making sense of the world and manner of making decisions. One of the key 
stakes in social movement struggles is precisely the establishment of one particular 
way of making sense of the world over another, more dominant one. Thus, rationality 
is far from a mere tool to establish the best way of achieving one’s goals. If we must 
talk of social movement goals, then as a strategic capacity for evaluating and acting 
the world, one that is in contention with alternatives, rationality itself may also be 
considered as a goal. It is perhaps more accurate, however, to say that the 
establishment of an alternative rationality underlies social movement struggles.  
1.2. ‘Cultural framing’ and symbolic struggles 
The PP approach views social movements in terms of three conceptual elements, 
which are worth regarding briefly prior to an examination of NSM theory. The first 
element, ‘mobilising structures’, refers to the formal and informal ‘vehicles’ through 
which people participate in collective action. These include ‘informal networks, 
preexisting institutional structures, and formal organizations’.13 The second, 
‘political opportunity structure’, refers to the opportunities and constraints within the 
political environment affecting the emergence, dynamics and success of social 
movements.14 The third, ‘cultural framing’, refers to the efforts of movement 
participants to engage with ‘the cultural reservoir of possible symbols’ and generate 
meaningful ‘frames’ of reference that can attract potential movement members.15 The 
key types of frames, proponents argue, are diagnostic, which explain the problem to 
which the movement is geared to address; prognostic, which propose the actions 
                                               
13 Morris (2000), p.446. 
14 Tarrow (1998), p.20. See also Tilly (1978), Tarrow (1994 and 1998), McAdam et al. (1996), and 
Morris (2000). 
15 Tarrow (1998), p.109. 
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required to remedy the problem; and motivational, which attempt to rouse support 
and mobilisation.16 
These elements provide a potentially valuable way of understanding social 
movements, but this is obscured since they are all viewed instrumentally rather than 
constitutively: Organisations and networks, political opportunities and symbolic 
frames are all ‘used’ for the purposes of mobilisation by an already-existing 
movement.  
Movements do not just use networks, however, since they are networks. Movement 
leaders may capitalise on their networks, employing what Bourdieu calls ‘social 
capital’. But they do so from their position within them, not from an instrumental 
position external to them. Far from simply manipulating networks, movement leaders 
act within them where their power to do so depends on the recognition given to them 
from the individuals comprising the network. Such recognition is dependent upon an 
aligned manner of perceiving grievances, as well as shared trust in the authority of an 
elite. The building of such trust cannot be taken for granted in any study of collective 
action, since the authority of leaders and the solidarity that emerges in networks are 
key stakes in movements’ struggles. 
Movements do not just exploit opportunities in the political environment, either. 
Opportunities, like networks, may be capitalisable, but they also shape social 
movements in important ways. Situations facing movements are never simply 
resources or tools to advance a programme definable independently from movement 
actors. Opportunities, as well as constraints, not only depend upon such actors’ 
ability to perceive and value them as such; they also help constitute social 
movements’ struggles.  
The symbolic aspect of social movements’ struggles are particularly important for 
identifying movements, as this thesis will show. But claims that movement activists 
use frames to garner movement support fail to acknowledge that framing is not 
simply something that ‘frame articulators’ do. The construction of frames—symbolic 
structures through which the world is seen, evaluated and presented—is never simply 
the product of conscious design, as this view implies. Movements do not just use 
                                               
16 Snow and Benford (1988). 
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frames, since frames form the medium in which activists think and, as such, are not 
entirely transparent to consciousness. As Marc Steinberg has observed, ‘collective 
actors are partly captives within the discursive ﬁelds that they seek to manipulate’.17  
Any approach to movements that views symbolic action strictly in terms of the 
instrumentalisation of symbolic resources—‘using’ theology to attract members, for 
example—fails to grasp the extent to which movements are produced through 
symbolic conflict. Such a view fails to grasp the way in which movements are the 
products of symbolic contention with rivals both internally and externally: Internally, 
concerning the identity of the constituency served by the movement, and externally, 
concerning the social order that the movement is geared to change. Reducing 
symbolic framing to a tool for attracting members, furthermore, fails to comprehend 
that the symbolic aspect of movements’ struggles is inherently political. This is 
because such struggles concern not merely the acceptance of certain ideas and 
values, but also the power to institutionalise and naturalise them in practice. 
A religious movement, for example, may not merely struggle for the teaching of 
certain subjects in state schools—Islamic creationism, for instance. It may also 
struggle to consolidate the power to determine what is and what is not taught 
(intelligent design rather than evolution, for example); how it is taught (Islam 
mainstreamed in all subjects rather than a separate subject, for example); when it is 
taught (around prayer, for example); where it is taught (at school, at the mosque or in 
the home, for example); and to whom it is taught (boys only in a sex-segregated 
environment, for example).  
In short, symbolic framing is not simply ‘designed’ to win recruits through a process 
of mental ‘conversion’. It is an expression of classificatory struggles that concern not 
just the recruitment of members to a cause, or the conveyance and acceptance of 
certain ‘truths’, but the power over the practical means of establishing and protecting 
what passes as true. It is never simply a matter of the rational assent to knowledge 
and the consciously calculated acceptance of values. It is, rather, a matter of the 
control over the institutions that determine the nature of knowledge, as well as 
produce it. It is a matter of the command of the institutions that inculcate values 
                                               
17 Steinberg (1999), p.772. 
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within the largely unconscious and unquestioned patterns of individual and social 
practice. 
1.3. Political process treatments of religious and Islamic movements 
The treatment of religion in social movement theory is relatively scant. The studies 
of Islamic social movements within this theoretical oeuvre are even fewer. As 
Charles Kurzman has written, ‘Over the past generation, the fields of social 
movement theory and Islamic studies have followed parallel trajectories, with few 
glances across the chasm that has separated them’.18 But the treatments of Islam that 
do appear in the literature, which mostly occur within the PP tradition, tend to be 
limited to religiously inspired political activism in Muslim majority countries19 or 
violent, militant movements such as al-Qaeda.20 There is a dearth of sources in 
English that apply social movement theory to non-violent Islamic activism in Europe 
and North America. There is certainly none that relate social movement theory to 
participationist Islamism in Britain. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly reviewing several 
key PP treatments of religion and Islam that highlight some of the problems this 
thesis needs to avoid. 
Zald, Snow and Marshall, and Kurzman: Religion sidelined as a tool 
The earliest application of social movement theory to religion was by Mayer Zald in 
1982. In this article Zald adopts a resource mobilisation approach, which he 
describes as ‘helpful in understanding both the growth of religious movements and 
the use of religious organizations and resources in the political process’.21 The 
bottom-line unit of analysis for Zald is the organisation. In the same way that 
religious organisations are treated as givens, the existence of religious movements is 
likewise posited unproblematically. The analysis is thus limited to treating pre-
                                               
18 Kurzman (2004), p. 289. 
19 For example, Burke and Lapidus (1988), Alexander (2000), Munson (2001), Wiktorowicz (2004a), 
Bayat (2005), Beck (2009), and Tuğal (2009). 
20 For example, Sutton and Vertigans (2006), which considers both PP and NSM approaches, and 
Snow and Byrd (2007). 
21 Zald (1982), p.322. 
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existent organisations and their role in helping readily acknowledged, named 
‘movements’, some of which happen to be other organisations. 
Zald’s classical resource mobilisation perspective shares with the broader PP 
approach the fundamental premise of the rational actor. It also shares with it the 
conception of theology as a factor in movement mobilisation in strictly instrumental 
terms and not as a field of contention. Religious ideas and beliefs are merely 
resources to be mobilised: ‘Transformation of theology and ideology provides a base 
for justifying social movement activity … The transformation of the role of the 
Catholic church in Latin America and the role of Islam in Iran can only be 
understood by attention to these changes in theological justifications’.22 
Reflecting a general shift in the literature towards the greater incorporation of belief 
as a factor in movement mobilisation, Snow and Marshall attempt to offer a more 
systematic attempt to understand religion by placing grievances and ideology on a 
more level footing to resource mobilisation.23 In the first explicit treatment of social 
movement theory and Islam, the authors identify three conditions for the 
mobilisation of religious movements: the existence of a strain or grievance, a 
mobilising ideology and resource mobilisation.  
Snow and Marshall emphasise the importance of cultural imperialism, rather than 
just the economic variety dominant in Marxist-inspired analyses, as a key 
determining factor for the emergence of religious movements. Western cultural 
imperialism in the Muslim world is cited as the precipitating ‘strain factor’ in the 
emergence of Islamic movements, such as the Sudanese Mahdist rebellion against 
Britain in the late 1800s and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The authors state that the 
success of a movement’s mobilisation in response to cultural grievances critically 
depends upon possession of a mobilising ideology and an organisational network, 
effectively two kinds of religious resource. The agency of the movement, by virtue of 
pre-existing ideology and institutional embodiment, is, as with Zald’s, posited 
unproblematically. This does not provide any assistance for the task of identifying a 
                                               
22 Ibid., p.325. 
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  40 
given movement from within a field of social action, since it assumes foreknowledge 
of movements’ existence. 
Anticipating Snow’s later work on framing, in which its diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational functions are analysed, Snow and Marshall define ‘mobilising ideology’ 
as ‘an interconnected set of ideas and beliefs that provide both a call to and guide for 
action by defining what is wrong, attributing blame and responsibility, and by 
addressing the Leninesque question of “What is to be done?”’.24 Consistent with 
Zald’s treatment of theology as instrumental, Snow and Marshall refer to religious 
ideology as a tool to be ‘used’ for assisting movement mobilisation. The means of 
using this tool, they claim, are the networks of religious institutions and 
organisations, such as mosques and madrassas, through which ideology can be 
disseminated. ‘Islam,’ the authors state, ‘provides what might be termed a latent 
mobilization structure that, given the right set of strains and grievances, can be 
tapped or activated for revolt’.25  
This view of Islam as a tool for movement mobilisation recurs in the work of Charles 
Kurzman.26 He conceives the social movement as a rational agent calculating 
resource value and converting potential resources into real ones. In his analysis of the 
Iranian Revolution the movement theoretically pre-exists this act of conversion in the 
form of the ‘revolutionary ruhanis [who] needed to convert Islam from a potential 
resource into an actual one’.27  
The concept of social movement as articulated by Kurzman, Snow and Marshall, and 
Zald shares the basic premises of the PP approach: Movements are rational actors 
who mobilise resources, including ideological frames, for the attainment of specific 
political goals. Islam, according to these accounts, is reduced to a tool for the 
purposes of movement mobilisation and is thus not taken seriously as a constitutive 
factor in the grievances of movements, or as something over which movements 
struggle. Religiously inculcated dispositions and attitudes that underlie the 
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25 Ibid., p.141, emphasis added. 
26 Kurzman (1994). 
27 Ibid., p.63. 
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perception of grievances—key to understanding how movements emerge—are 
absent in this analysis. Also lacking is an appreciation of the religious dimension of 
political goals and, therefore, the role of religion at the heart of social movement 
contention. This is a significant failure of the PP approach to understand religiously-
inspired social movements. 
Wiktorowicz, Tuğal and ‘Islamic activism’ 
The first collection of essays explicitly dedicated to the convergence of social 
movement theory and Islamic studies, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, was edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz.28 Wiktorowicz’s academic standing 
as an authority on this disciplinary convergence, his role as a policy adviser in the 
U.S.’s National Security Council, and his apparently intimate knowledge of Islamist 
networks in Britain, make his views on social movements and Islam worthy of a brief 
assessment.29  
Wiktorowicz defines Islamic activism as ‘the mobilization of contention to support 
Muslim causes’.30 Consistent with the PP approach, he identifies the factors 
determining such mobilisation as ‘structural strain’ and discontent; organisational 
resources and ‘mobilising structures’; external ‘structures of opportunity and 
constraint’; and the construction of identity and meaning through framing processes. 
Also consistent with the PP approach, Wiktorowicz adopts a rational actor 
perspective of Islamic social movements. This is evident in his description of social 
networks, including mosques and student societies, as well as cultural symbols and 
language, strictly in terms of their use-value for recruitment and mobilisation. In an 
article entitled The Rationality of Radical Islam he explicitly endorses rational actor 
theory to support his view of ideology as a strategic means for Islamists to fulfil their 
spiritual goal of salvation.31 
                                               
28 Wiktorowicz (2004a). 
29 Dina Temple-Raston, ‘New Terrorism Adviser Takes A “Broad Tent” Approach’, NPR, January 24, 
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30 Wiktorowicz (2004b), p.2. 
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For Wiktorowicz, ‘contention’—as with networks and symbolic frames—is 
something to be mobilised for the achievement of movement goals and is thus 
sidelined from its constitutive role in the formation of both the movement and its 
causes. Islamic social movements and ‘Muslim causes’ both analytically pre-exist 
struggle. Likewise, frames—to which ‘[m]uch of the work of Islamic activism is 
devoted’—are ‘designed to mobilise participants and support’ and, therefore, reduced 
to a cognitive, instrumental function.32 Organisational forms and ideologies are 
subordinated to an unquestioned, unproblematised social movement: As selected 
instruments for a deliberative rational agent, they play no role in its construction. 
Wiktorowicz’s book, whilst pioneering in bringing together social movement theory 
and Islamic studies for the first time, omits to address the issue of Muslim activism 
in Muslim minority countries or contexts, so is of little direct use for a study of 
Islam-inspired political activism in Britain. Although Melucci is mentioned in 
passing several times in the collection of essays, the book as a whole fails to mention 
Touraine and other NSM theorists’ work altogether. One reference to Melucci is 
worth quoting fully, however, since it touches upon a key matter for this thesis, 
namely, the relationship between culture and politics, between society and state. 
Wiktorowicz writes: 
While a great deal of research has focused upon politicized movements that seek to 
create an Islamic state, the core imperative of Islamic movements is a desire to create 
a society governed and guided by the shari’a (Islamic law). Control and reconstruction 
of state institutions may be an effective instrument for accomplishing this 
transformation, but it is only one of many routes for change. In other words, the state 
is a means for the production of meaning, not an end. In fact, most Islamic struggles 
are waged through society and cultural discourse rather than state institutions or 
government decision-making bodies. Such efforts challenge dominant cultural codes 
and create networks of shared meaning about the proper functions of society, groups, 
and the individual (Melucci 1996).33 
Wiktorowicz is right to question one of the core assumptions in the literature on 
groups often described as ‘Islamist’, namely, that they are primarily driven by 
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political aspirations for an Islamic state. In this sense, he expresses an interesting 
departure from the PP approach’s emphasis on the state as the prime target of social 
movement activism. But Wiktorowicz's remarks are problematic since they pre-
determine the question of the political dimension of Muslim collective action. 
Curiously, Wiktorowicz does not deny the existence of political groups that call for 
an Islamic state.34 But his claim that the ‘core imperative’ of such groups, such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, is not really a matter of political governance 
dogmatically separates the political aspects of social movement contention from its 
cultural aspects, subordinating politics to culture: The Islamic state is not desired as 
an end in itself, but is just a means to the goal of a religious, cultural transformation.  
Wiktorowicz’s approach sets up a false choice between politics and culture in terms 
of the goal-orientedness of Islamic movements. It inhibits the recognition that 
cultural goals, such as a transformation of social values and practices within a given 
locality, are inherently political in containing within them transformations in the 
institutional structures of the state. These transformations in governance structures, 
however, do not merely facilitate transformations of social values and practices, 
since they help to constitute them. In such instances, the state cannot be treated as a 
mere means, since it is inseparable from the social transformation desired. Given that 
Islam, as understood by some Muslim activists, includes a requirement under certain 
social conditions for the state to be governed by shari’a, it is especially difficult to 
separate the notion of ‘a society governed and guided by the sharia’ and that of an 
Islamic state. 
Suhaib Hasan, the secretary and judge of Britain’s Islamic Sharia Council, for 
example, states that, although the Islamic state is not strictly an objective for 
Muslims, if Muslims became the majority population in the country and desired to be 
governed by shari’a, then their leader—the amir or caliph—would be obliged to 
ensure society is governed by shari’a through the authority of the state.35 In this 
view, the Islamic state is not considered as a means to achieve an Islamic society, 
since it is a manifestation of such a society—if anything, it is a means to maintain an 
Islamic society. The Islamic state marks a critical juncture in the emergence of an 
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Islamic society. It marks the consummation of such a society. The goal of having 
Islamic values and principles practiced throughout society, as conceived by Hasan 
and many others, is far from an alternative to the goal of an Islamic state, since 
Islamic culture—insofar as there is a Muslim majority—includes the way in which 
people organise and govern themselves politically. 
A less dogmatic approach to understanding the relationship between politics and 
culture within Islamic activism than that expressed by Wiktorowicz is found in the 
work of Cihan Tuğal.36 He contends that if we want to understand Islamist 
movements, we not only need to acknowledge the shift ‘from disruptive public 
confrontation with authorities to the challenging of dominant codes and creation of 
new meanings’—as emphasised in NSM theory—we also need to acknowledge the 
constitutive role of the state in the processes of cultural transformation. 37 
Criticising the predominant focus of PP theory upon public protest, Tuğal argues that 
in Turkey, ‘the Islamist movement generally shies away from challenging the state 
directly’, but is nevertheless engaged in political contention.38 Such contention, he 
writes, occurs in a ‘molecular’ sphere of social action that is both political and 
cultural: The ‘terrain of struggle encompasses society and state’.39 Tuğal’s 
illustration of Islamic activism in Turkey shows how political institutions can be part 
and parcel of a struggle over identity and values, but also ‘how daily life can be part 
and parcel of political struggles’.40 He argues that the political structures of society 
do not merely enable social change, since they are constitutive of social change.  
Tuğal describes institutional change, for example, in the official enforcement of 
prayer breaks in the workplace, not merely as the facilitation of cultural change, but 
as a part of it. State regulatory structures enable religious observance, but also further 
the production of it, and the generation of religious dispositions—which he describes 
in terms of Bourdieu’s habitus—demand further institutionalisation. Likewise, the 
naturalisation or institutionalisation of everyday practices in the public domain 
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cannot be seen as a mere instrument for the Islamist movement, since it helps 
constitute the movement by producing greater religiosity and thus new demands for 
the further institutionalisation of religious practice. In Sultanbeyli, he observes, ‘the 
mosque is not only a “resource” for Islamism; it is a primary site for the construction 
of Islamism as a movement and the production of Islamist subjects’.41  
Tuğal’s analysis describes demands for the Islamisation of political institutions and 
the political institutionalisation of Islam within one social movement. This shows 
that Wiktorowicz’s either/or choice between the goal of an Islamic state and the goal 
of an Islamic society governed and guided by shari’a is an unnecessary one: 
The goal of the Islamist movement is the production of subjects who will have 
different daily conducts, different rituals, and therefore different ‘internalized political 
programs’ than the secularist officials. The Islamist residents of the district share this 
vision with the Islamist administrators and believe that only practicing people are 
really fit to rule. Hence, the creation of an Islamist identity in Sultanbeyli is not 
separate from envisioning a different state. These observations suggest that social 
movement studies can benefit from focusing on how institutions constitute actors and 
how the reorganization of their daily life acts back upon the state.42 
1.4. Some implications for identifying movements 
PP theory can provide a useful approach to understanding social movements if the 
question of movement origination is absent from the analysis. It cannot be of much 
use prior to the acceptance of a given movement’s existence. Without an a priori 
social movement to mobilise resources, to design frames and to attract recruits, the 
task of explaining the mobilisation of movements becomes inseparable from 
understanding their coming into being. This is only possible without considering 
movements as rational actors and by acknowledging the unconscious or pre-
conscious strategic dimension of collective action. 
To recognise a social movement requires an understanding of networks not as mere 
‘vehicles’ for recruitment or mobilisation, but as constitutive features. It requires an 
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appreciation of the cultural dimension of movement solidarity present in what 
Melucci terms as ‘latent networks’ from which movements emerge. To identify a 
movement requires a reconsideration of political opportunities as partly constituted 
by the shared perceptual and evaluative dispositions of social movement agents. It 
also requires an understanding of symbolic frames beyond an instrumental function, 
of how symbolic systems constitute both a currency of power—Bourdieu’s 
‘symbolic capital’—and a key stake in social movement struggles. To recognise a 
social movement also requires an appreciation of contention beyond the political 
field. It needs to be able see a far more complex terrain from within which social 
movements emerge and a far more complex set of fields within which the stakes of 
their struggles are formed. 
2.  The New Social Movement approach to social movements 
An alternative paradigm to the PP approach, new social movement (NSM) theory, 
emerged in Europe in the 1980s from continental traditions of social theory and 
political philosophy.43 The key themes highlighted in NSM theory that are relevant to 
this thesis include the centrality of collective identity and solidarity to social 
movement formation; the formative role for movements of submerged, latent and 
temporary social networks; the cultural, as well as the political, stakes of movement 
struggles; and the symbolic dimension of movement activism.44 
Typical of the NSM approach, Alain Touraine asserts that, ‘The new social 
movements call into question, far more directly than their predecessors did, the 
values of culture and society’.45 Alberto Melucci concurs with this, asserting: 
Contemporary social conflicts are not just political, since they affect the system’s 
cultural production. Collective action is not carried out simply for exchanging goods 
in the political market or for improving the participation in the system. It challenges 
the logic governing production and appropriation of social resources.46 
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Melucci contends that the basis of contemporary conflicts has shifted to ‘the 
production of meaning’.47 Although movements cannot totally be divorced from 
politics—since they ‘confront political systems when they choose public 
mobilization’48—they are involved in forms of action that may be ‘pre-political 
because they are rooted in everyday life experiences’ or ‘meta-political because 
political forces can never represent them completely’.49  
Social movements may also be seen to be engaged in ‘meta-politics’ if they can be 
seen to be challenging the basic values upon which the political system rests. Such a 
transformation may be conceived by its advocates as a pre-requisite for a 
transformation in the political system. In the words of Greg Johnson, an American 
white nationalist writer, ‘The promotion of political change through the 
transformation of consciousness and culture is what we call metapolitics. 
Metapolitics refers to what must come before the foundation of a new political 
order’.50 In this sense, what Melucci terms as ‘pre-political’ and ‘meta-political’ 
action may be considered as one and the same. Johnson elaborates upon the kind of 
activities that constitute meta-politics for white nationalism: 
Metapolitics breaks down into two basic activities. First, there is education: 
articulating and communicating forms of white nationalism tailored to the interests 
and outlooks of the full array of white constituencies. This includes not just ivory 
tower theorizing but also artistic expression, topical cultural and political commentary, 
and the whole range of media by which they are communicated. Second, there is 
community organizing, meaning the cultivation of real-world communities that live 
according to our vision in the present and may serve as the seeds of a New Order to 
come.51 
Education and community organising can be seen as two types of activities that 
can—at least from the perspective of movement activists—pave the way to deep 
systemic political change. Such change, however, may be understood not merely as 
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facilitated by a transformation in consciousness and cultural values, but constitutive 
of it. Cultural values may not merely fulfil the function of ushering in a new mode of 
politics, since they may find also their expression in it. The political system may at 
once be an expression of cultural values and an institutional structure that reproduces 
them. 
2.1. A ‘relational’ concept of social movement 
The NSM approach, particularly as outlined in the work of Melucci, has a number of 
features that make it an appropriate starting place for an investigation into the 
existence of an Islamist movement in Britain or elsewhere. In addition to viewing 
social movement struggles as cultural and not merely political, as mentioned above, 
the NSM approach crucially does not assume the movement as given. Melucci, for 
example, states, ‘The empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as a 
result rather than a starting point, a fact to be explained rather than evidence’.52 He 
elaborates: 
Not taking collective action as a given reality and questioning what is usually taken 
for granted—namely, the existence of a movement as a homogeneous empirical 
actor—are what analysis is about. To understand how a social movement succeeds or 
fails in becoming a collective actor is therefore a fundamental task for sociologists.53 
This chimes with Bourdieu’s assertion—highly relevant to this thesis—that ‘the 
question with which all sociology ought to begin [is] that of the existence and mode 
of existence of collectives’.54 
Melucci and Touraine both rightly reject a rational actor model of social movements 
that defines movements in terms of goals or intentions, such as those to secure 
political rights. Both Melucci and Touraine reject the notion that movements may be 
identified in terms of the rational calculation and conscious expression of goals. For 
Melucci, ‘It is never the simple expression of actors’ intentions’.55 He states, ‘The 
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meaning of the action has to be found in the action itself more than in the pursued 
goals’.56 For Touraine, ‘A social movement is not an affirmation, an intention … A 
social movement can never be defined by an objective’.57  
This is because, in their view, making goals and intentions the key criterion by which 
to identify social movements overlooks the matrix of social relations in which 
movements ought to be discerned: on one hand, within fields of contention with 
adversarial powers, and, on the other, in what Melucci terms as ‘latent cultural 
networks’. In Melucci’s words: 
Currently one speaks of a ‘movement’ as a unity, to which one attributes goals, 
choices, interests, decisions. But this unity, if any, is a result rather than a point of 
departure; otherwise one must assume that there is a sort of deep ‘mind’ of the 
movement, instead of considering it as a system of social relationships.58 
Highlighting the importance of dynamic social relationships, Melucci and Touraine 
both propose a concept of social movement as a form of collective action comprised 
of three interrelated elements. With some refinements, these will be utilised in the 
approach adopted in this thesis, as will be made clear by the end of this chapter. 
Melucci outlines the three elements of social movements as follows: 
First, a social movement is a form of collective action which involves solidarity, that 
is, actors’ mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit. A second 
characteristic of a social movement is its engagement in conflict, and thus in 
opposition to an adversary who lays claim to the same goods or values … Conflict 
presupposes adversaries who struggle for something which they recognize as lying 
between them. Third, a social movement breaks the limits of compatibility of a system. 
Its actions violate the boundaries or tolerance limits of a system, thereby pushing the 
system beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without altering its 
structure.59 
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For Melucci, cultural solidarity and engagement in conflict are sufficient to 
characterise collective action, but what makes such action a social movement is 
engagement in a conflict that transgresses the dominant logic of the ‘system of social 
relationships’ in which the conflict occurs.60 Movements, he remarks, ‘transgress the 
norms that have been institutionalized in social roles, which go beyond the rules of 
the political system and/or which attack the structure of a society’s class relations’.61 
Melucci appears reluctant to describe the ‘systemic’ change targeted by social 
movements as political, preferring to describe it in terms of a transformation in the 
‘dominant codes upon which social relationships are founded’. Movements, he 
claims, primarily present symbolic challenges to the prevalent ‘cultural codes’—
different ways of ‘perceiving and naming the world’—whose notable feature is in 
‘rendering power visible’.62  
This strikes a chord with Bourdieu’s more sophisticated analysis of power, which 
places classificatory struggles at the heart of social life. For Bourdieu, however, 
symbolic contention is inherently political: ‘The categories of perception, the 
schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the words, the names which construct 
social reality as much as they express it,’ he asserts, ‘are the stake par excellence of 
political struggle’.63 
Melucci’s concept of social movement broadly resonates with Touraine’s. Social 
movements, writes Touraine, are a ‘type of conflict … defined by a clear 
interrelation between conflicting actors and the stakes of their conflict’.64 For 
Touraine, as for Melucci, a social movement is not an isolated entity but a relational 
one that has to be considered in connection with ‘an adversary and [with] what is at 
stake’. Accordingly, the three dimensions of the social movement, which resound 
with Melucci’s dimensions outlined above, are identity, opposition and totality. 
‘Identity’ refers to a ‘committed population’ in whose name the struggle is waged; 
‘opposition’ refers to an adversary against which the struggle is waged; and ‘totality’ 
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refers to the sphere in which the struggle is waged and the stakes of the struggle 
therein. These stakes, Touraine argues, amount to control of the dominant ‘set of 
cultural patterns—epistemic, economic, and ethical’—which he calls historicity.  
Beyond ‘regressive utopias’ and ‘anti-movements’ 
Melucci and Touraine do not consider religious movements in their work. This is 
because they both conceive of social movements as necessarily progressive and see 
religious movements as a kind of movement of the past. Whereas Melucci describes 
religious movements in terms of ‘regressive utopias’, Touraine describes them in 
terms of ‘anti-movements’.65 Melucci writes, ‘Unlike their predecessors, 
contemporary actors are not guided by a universal plan of history; rather, they 
resemble “nomads who dwell within the present”’.66 Such movements’ conceptions 
of social change in reference to ‘divine rule, natural law, or historical evolution’, 
writes Touraine, severely limits the possibilities of contesting historicity.67  
On these accounts, it would appear that there is no space for a contemporary 
religious social movement that appeals to a ‘metasocial principle’—such as shari’a, 
conceived as divine law—for the transformation of social practices, ethical 
principles, scientific culture and the political system. However, there is no reason 
that a contemporary religious movement may not be guided by such an appeal, 
inclusive of a ‘universal plan of history’. It is not difficult to see how the bottom-line 
stakes Touraine and Melucci allot for the new social movements—historicity, the 
capacity to produce ‘a new definition of nature and man’,68 or ‘the production and 
quality of human existence’69—may also be shared by a contemporary religious 
movement, however much it may invoke ‘metasocial principles’.  
The notion of religious movements as regressive is based upon the assumption that 
contemporary social movements must be driven by a progressive impulse. This is 
wedded to the dubious notion that history is programmed to proceed progressively 
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towards the globalisation of universal human rights and liberal democratic 
government. Fortunately, the NSM approach of Melucci and Touraine provides 
sufficient theoretical latitude to be able to develop the conceptual elements of ‘social 
movement’, including collective identity and solidarity, into a useful approach for 
mapping the putative global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. 
2.2. Collective identity and solidarity 
For Melucci and Touraine, the central aspect of their broadly shared tripartite 
concept of social movement—the ‘identity’ component for Touraine—may be 
characterised in terms of solidarity based upon social networks. Touraine describes it 
as the shared consciousness of the movement self-reflexively perceived as an 
historical actor. He elaborates on this when he states that a movement ‘starts when 
the denunciation of misery goes along with a moral appeal to the dignity of everyone 
and the solidarity of all’.70 Only after this may an opponent become identified, a 
conflict emerge and the movement become more clearly recognised. Similarly, for 
Melucci, what marks the movement in his tripartite model is ‘solidarity, that is, 
actors’ mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit’.71 ‘Solidarity,’ 
Melucci states, ‘is the capability of an actor to share a collective identity, that is, the 
capability of recognizing and being recognized as a part of the same system of social 
relationships’.72  
These definitions emphasise the conscious awareness of belonging to a group, but do 
not necessarily underplay the role of unconsciously shared cultural practices and 
dispositions in the formation of social movements. Melucci’s emphasis upon the role 
of ‘latent’ or ‘submerged’ social networks in comprising movements implies that 
solidarity—or at least a germinal form of it—pre-exists the formation of a social 
movement in loose webs of interaction between individuals and groups, which may 
subsequently be given a representative form and reinforced as a struggle materialises 
between the emerging movement and adversarial powers. This is implied in 
Melucci’s contention that collective identity is articulated in a language that is 
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‘incorporated in a given set of rituals, practices [and] cultural artifacts’ by a portion 
or the whole of the group.73 
However, Melucci offers little to help explain how collective solidarity may emerge 
from social networks. As mentioned above, he describes solidarity as ‘the capability 
of recognizing and being recognized as a part of the same system of social 
relationships’. But, as with Touraine, he does not address the dynamics and function 
of recognition in the construction of group solidarity. Nor does he address how 
individuals may be ‘part of the same system of social relationships’ prior to 
recognition. Bourdieu helps to fill these gaps. Bourdieu doesn’t explicitly address the 
self-reflexive solidarity of social movements, but does offer a way of seeing the pre-
conscious, cultural basis of such solidarity, as well as the kind of ‘symbolic 
mechanisms’ inherent to its emergence.74 
2.3. The habitus and symbolic power 
Bourdieu views the basis of solidarity in all social networks in terms of 
unconsciously shared cultural affinities—dispositions, practices—which he refers to 
as habitus. The group habitus, he says, ‘results from the homogeneity of the 
conditions of existence’, and is ‘what enables practices to be objectively harmonized 
without any intentional calculation or conscious reference to a norm and mutually 
adjusted in the absence of … explicit co-ordination’.75 For Bourdieu, a given habitus 
cannot be understood outside specific fields, which may be described as arenas of 
social conduct and conflict, each having distinguishable if not rigidly distinct forms 
of logic at play. He sometimes likens fields to games or markets, each demanding 
and inculcating a distinct ‘feel-for-the-game’. Bourdieu talks about politicians having 
solidarity from their shared commitment to the ‘rules of the game’ of the political 
field, from their shared investment in this field’s legitimacy. This is no more 
apparent, he says, than when it is attacked, such as when dissenters draw attention to 
the apathy of the working class.76 
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The largely unconscious solidarity between individuals with the same or similar 
habitus—expressed in the practical understanding they have and distinctions they 
make in their routine social interactions—may be understood as a requirement for the 
emergence of social movement solidarity. It may be considered as a source of 
‘latency’, to use Melucci’s term, of the becoming-conscious of the group as a group. 
But, following Bourdieu, the transformation of such ‘practical solidarity’ into social 
movement solidarity—where individuals recognise themselves as part of a given 
collective—needs to be understood in terms of symbolic struggles over the power to 
classify, and thus determine the reality of, the social world. Group identity is one of 
the stakes in such struggles. 
Melucci, noting the importance of recognition for the creation of social movement 
solidarity, states: ‘A collective actor cannot construct its identity independently of its 
recognition (which can also mean denial or opposition) by other social and political 
actors’.77 Yet, he falls short of explicating what Bourdieu highlights numerous times 
in his work, namely, the role of symbolic power in the construction of group identity.  
Collective identity, for Bourdieu, is a particular stake in symbolic conflicts that lie at 
the heart of social existence. Individuals’ recognition of themselves as part of a 
collective is an outcome of, and an ongoing stake in, ‘struggles over the monopoly of 
the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to 
impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to 
make and unmake groups’.78 Individuals’ recognition of themselves as members of a 
collective is not a rational consent to belong to it, even though it involves the 
capacity to consciously identify with it, since it is primarily tacit and practically 
embodied. The conscious ‘choice’ to be part of a collective does not, strictly 
speaking, determine whether or not an individual belongs to it, since it is the habitus 
that makes this choice possible in the first place. But the expression of belonging, in 
words and deeds, contributes to the creation of the collective as a possible 
movement. 
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According to Bourdieu, individuals’ recognition of themselves as part of a 
collective—and, thus, social movement solidarity—crucially depends upon a 
symbolic ‘labor of enunciation’, typically during a time of cultural strain. This is 
undertaken by a cadre of dedicated professionals who, from previous struggles, have 
accumulated prestige or reputation, otherwise referred to as ‘symbolic capital’.79 
Their capacity to elicit collective solidarity depends upon the recognition of their 
authority to generate ‘a consensus on the meaning of the social world’ that group 
members can relate to and locate themselves within.  
This ‘symbolic power’ is political, not only because it results from former struggles, 
but also because it is continually contested. It may be contested within a group, 
where rival conceptions of group identity are expressed along with a display of the 
credentials of those expressing them. Takfirism, the Muslim practice of declaring 
other Muslims to be ‘apostates’, exemplifies this kind of symbolic struggle. A less 
obviously hostile example lies with revivalist Islamic groups, such as the Muslim 
Council of Britain (MCB), making pronouncements on the ‘correct’ understanding of 
Islam or shari’a. This will be elaborated upon in Chapters 4 and 5. Symbolic power 
may also be contested between a group and ‘out-group’ adversaries, including 
representatives of the state as ‘the ultimate source of symbolic power’.80 This kind of 
symbolic conflict, as Chapter 5 shows, may be seen in British government officials’ 
pronouncements on Islam as a ‘religion of peace’ and MCB’s dismissal of the 
government’s authority to speak at all on matters of Islamic theology. 
By acknowledging the symbolic power struggles in the formation of collective 
identity, we are prompted to consider within the features of a social movement not 
just individuals’ recognition of themselves as part of a collective—as Melucci 
does—but also a conflict over the identity of the collective, which implicitly involves 
a struggle for the power to determine this identity and command recognition of it. 
Social movement struggles involve classificatory conflicts over collective identity, 
but such conflicts involve more than a clash over the distinguishing features of the 
collective. They also involve a clash of the authority of the individuals enunciating 
these features. Thus, our recognition of a social movement involves a recognition of 
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struggles over the power to identify the collective and classify the social world 
within which it is situated. 
2.4. Networks and organisation 
Melucci writes that contemporary movements may be traced on two levels: In 
addition to the visible level of mobilisation, movements can also be traced at the 
latent level of everyday social networks, ‘in the capacity and will to reappropriate 
space and time, and in the attempt to practice alternative life-styles. This dimension 
is not marginal or residual. Rather, it is the appropriate response to new forms of 
control that no longer correspond solely to state action’.81 Thus, social movements do 
not simply utilise networks, since they are networks. Movements are not just 
networks, however. They are networks of cultural solidarity, as outlined above, and 
they are organised. 
For a movement to attain a minimum level of ‘integration’ and for a conflict to take 
shape, states Touraine, the individuals comprising it must become organised.82 
Struggles over self-determination and the power to shape the social world in 
accordance with the collective habitus, after all, involve a relation with an organised 
or instituted power. Moreover, a collective struggle waged in the name of a group, in 
which the group’s identity is a key stake, requires some degree of organisation since 
it requires collaborative work. For the practical, pre-movement solidarity of a 
cultural network to develop into a mobilised or mobilisable movement representing a 
constituency with which individuals can politically identify and champion, a 
collective effort through durable operational structures is required.  
This does not mean that movements are organisations, however. In some of the early 
social movement studies, particularly in the resource mobilisation literature, 
movements are almost synonymous with organisations. But a social movement, a 
kind of collective action, ought not to be equated with one possible culminant form 
of collective action. 
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Neither does this mean that movements have to be comprised of organisations. 
Whilst organisations most certainly provide a structure for networking between 
social movement activists, it ought not be thought that organisations are the default 
building blocks of movements. Although this is how Islamism in the West is 
typically written about, it fails to see the operative networks of individuals cutting 
across organisational lines that possibly comprise a movement, particularly 
clandestine movements or movements-in-the-making. It suffices here to say that 
focussing discussion on the issue of whether a certain organisation is ‘Islamist’—
which may be unresolvable where there is a genuine diversity of political 
orientations and commitments amongst key staff—risks obscuring the more difficult 
task of mapping the transversal networks that might form a movement. This will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 3, which regards the organisational network of the global 
Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. 
2.5. Fields of contention 
Unlike theorists of the PP approach, Touraine and Melucci both understand social 
movements beyond the level of public confrontation with the state and even the 
sphere of institutional politics. Such an approach is useful for any inquiry into 
nascent movements or alleged movements whose existence, possibly because of their 
putative clandestine character, is in question. It is useful since it points to a wide 
range of possible sources of movement emergence ‘beneath’ public protest and 
political campaigning, to social networks where individuals are interconnected 
through shared social practices and a sense of solidarity that pre-exists political 
consciousness.  
Such an approach also opens up the possibility of seeing movements involved in 
conflicts within various spheres of social life, and in relation to a range of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, where control over social norms 
and practices are key stakes. Like the PP theorists, however, Melucci and Touraine 
lack a sufficiently sophisticated way of conceiving the multiplicity of arenas for 
struggle. Bourdieu’s theory of fields helps to address this shortcoming.  
According to Bourdieu, social struggles occur not just at the level of the ordinary 
judgments and mundane activities of everyday life. They also occur within ‘the 
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specialized fields of cultural production, such as art, science, religion, and the media 
… wherein authoritative representations of the social world are produced and 
disseminated’.83 For Bourdieu, fields are the sites of the unequal distribution of 
various kinds of capital, as well as of the struggle for their accumulation. In addition 
to economic capital (material wealth in the form of money or property), he identifies 
two other kinds of capital, cultural capital (knowledge, skills and other cultural 
acquisitions, for example educational qualifications) and social capital (connections 
available from being part of a social network). Each form of capital—a currency of 
power—can be converted into other kinds under certain conditions. 
Some academics, such as Nick Crossley, have recognised the usefulness for social 
movement research to incorporate this concept of different fields, since it recognises 
the site-specific dynamics, unspoken rules and currencies of power at play in the 
multiple sites of struggle within and across which social movements may mobilise. 
Crossley writes: 
Many movements will struggle in the media, in parliament, in the courts, in the fields 
from which they originally emerge, and in each case they will encounter a different 
‘game’ which demands different dispositions and resources from them. Media 
struggles demand a whole different set of resources and skills to legal struggles and 
both are different again from academic struggles.84 
In the context of Islamic activism in Britain, it might be added to these the fields of 
education, law, finance and politics, each of which require a different kind of ‘know-
how’ to navigate and operate within them. Demonstrating the intimacy between 
habitus and fields, certain dispositions and practical competencies are not only 
required to navigate such fields, they are also produced within them, for example, in 
the form of training. This helps ‘inculcate the practical mastery of the immanent 
logic’ of the given field and a ‘de facto submission to the values, hierarchies and 
inherent censorship mechanisms’ within it.85 
                                               
83 Wacquant (2013), p. 276. 
84 Crossley (2002), p.183. 
85 Bourdieu (1991), p.176. 
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One of the most important fields for the study of Islamic activism is education. This 
is because education plays a powerful role in the social dissemination of 
knowledge—including the unquestioned, tacitly held categories of thought that make 
knowledge possible—as well as in the inculcation of social values. Key amongst 
these values for social movement struggles are those relating to social divisions 
whereby group identity is formulated and contested. As Bourdieu notes, the state 
plays an important role in the provision of education. In the words of David Swartz, 
‘The fundamental assumptions and cognitive classifications we bring to our 
understanding of the modern social world are for the most part … imposed by the 
state, particularly through the educational system’.86 Chapter 5, which regards the 
conflictual relationship between Islamic revivalists in Britain and the state, includes a 
focus on education as a key field of contention. 
2.6. Conflict and the state 
The NSM approach to social movements characterises movements as involved in 
conflicts concerning not merely political rights or reforms, as the PP approach does, 
but also a cultural transformation of meaning and values. However, it doesn’t 
acknowledge the role of embodied power, principally the state, in the regulation and 
naturalisation of everyday cultural practices. Culture, as Tuğal’s aforementioned 
analysis of Islamism in Turkey illustrates, depends on political power for its 
institutionalisation within the social fabric. Accordingly, this thesis posits that social 
movements are concerned with cultural transformation, as Melucci and Touraine 
assert. But it also recognises that immanent to this concern is a struggle that 
inevitably involves political power, if not in the political field proper—where the 
stakes include access to governmental resources and influence over policy—then in 
other fields, such as education, where issues of authority and legitimacy are 
inextricable from symbolic struggles to determine the nature of the social order.  
Melucci and Touraine both characterise movements as conflictual and in relation 
with an adversary, one that is possibly the state but by no means synonymous with it. 
Touraine, for example, asserts that an adversary ‘may be represented by a social 
group even if, as often occurs, it is defined in more abstract terms, as capitalism or 
                                               
86 Swartz (2013), pp.140-141. 
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the state’.87 In this sense, their approach is less restrictive than that of the PP 
theorists, for whom the adversary of a social movement is incumbent government. 
However, in wishing to see social movement struggles beyond the field of 
institutional politics, it actually underplays the role of the state in an important sense, 
since it fails to acknowledge the symbolic power that the state wields in a diverse 
range of fields beyond the strictly political.  
The kind of adversary that distinguishes social movements from other kinds of 
collective action, according to the NSM approach, may be understood with a grasp of 
the stakes between the collective and the adversary: The key stake for a social 
movement, according to Touraine, ‘is the social control of the main cultural patterns, 
that is, of the patterns through which our relationships with the environment are 
normatively organized’.88 Touraine suggests three main kinds of such cultural 
patterns—‘a model of knowledge, a type of investment, and ethical principles’—
which correspond to the scientific, economic, and ethical bases of social 
organisation. Touraine terms this key stake, the social control of which pits a given 
movement against an adversary, historicity. Touraine does not highlight the authority 
wielded by the state as a stake in movements’ struggles, but it is difficult to ignore 
the fact, noted by Bourdieu, that the state is the key ‘agent’ that controls historicity. 
Building on the classical definition of the state provided by Max Weber, Bourdieu 
describes the state as the institution that ‘claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the 
corresponding population’.89 Bourdieu describes symbolic violence as the 
unconscious complicity of the dominated in the imposition upon them of ‘schemes of 
perception, appreciation and action’ by the dominant. Such complicity lies in the 
practical, tacit recognition that the dominated give to the authority of those in 
dominant positions vis-à-vis symbolic power. It is expressed in the unquestioned 
ways of seeing, judging and behaving, in accordance with the prevailing social order, 
                                               
87 Touraine (1981), p.85, emphasis in original. 
88 Touraine (1985), pp.754-755. 
89 Bourdieu (1994), p.3, emphasis in original. However, state monopoly over symbolic classifications 
is never complete. Bourdieu stresses that ‘the holders of bureaucratic authority never establish an 
absolute monopoly’ because ‘there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that 
aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions’. See Bourdieu (1989), p.22. 
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throughout which the state wields considerable symbolic power. Through an array of 
official and legal classifications that become practical, taken-for-granted 
understandings of the social world, the state is largely responsible for the creation of 
a political and social doxa, an accepted  ‘natural order of things’. 
This thesis posits that social movements challenge not just certain doxic beliefs or 
normative practices, but also the source or legitimacy of the symbolic power that 
maintains them. Social movement conflicts, it is suggested, bring into contention not 
just certain ways of seeing, judging and behaving, but also the institutions and 
authorities that naturalise and sustain them. From the converse perspective, it can be 
said that these conflicts bring into contention not just certain institutions and 
authorities, but also the ways of seeing, judging and behaving from which they 
derive their recognition and legitimacy.  
The kind of conflict in which social movements may be identified, as Melucci sees it, 
does not concern group privileges or concessions within the accepted ‘rules’ of the 
political apparatus or of the prevailing culture. They do not concern advocacy or 
reform. They concern, rather, the very system of ‘rules’ itself. Going beyond 
Melucci, we may note that this inevitably involves a concern with the sources of 
legitimacy for such a ‘system’. This is not to say that social movements are 
necessarily geared to undermining or capturing political power in the form of the 
state, even though some movements may indeed be revolutionary. It is, rather, to 
recognise that the primary concern of movements lies with the appropriation of the 
symbolic power that enunciates, codifies and legitimises the way the social world is 
organised both subjectively in perceptions and objectively in perceivable reality. 
Such power is predominantly, though never completely, held by the state.  
3.  Conceiving and recognising social movements 
The foregoing navigation through the theoretical terrain of both the PP and NSM 
approaches to social movements leads to the following concept of social movement 
that may be useful for tracing social movements, particularly those in the process of 
becoming. It also allows for a more inclusive view from which social movement may 
be seen as one mode of collective action.  
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3.1. The dual stakes of movement struggles 
This thesis conceives of social movements as organised networks of individuals in 
conflict with institutional authority in which there are two key stakes: the identity of 
the group for which the movement is champion, and a ‘model’ society that provides 
the objective conditions for the group to exist and prosper. 
A key feature of a social movement, this thesis contends, is the symbolic struggle for 
the recognition of a group, both subjectively in the self-identification of the group 
and objectively from the wider social environment. Yet, this symbolic struggle for 
recognition is entwined with a struggle for an alternative perception and 
understanding of social and political reality, underpinned with values and principles 
different from the prevailing ones. The vision of the group is never entirely separable 
from a vision of its place in the world, and, hence, a vision of the world. Social 
movements, as this thesis conceives them, endeavour to protect or establish and 
maintain a way of seeing, evaluating and living in the world. This aspect of the 
conflict can be traced in multiple fields of contention, each with its own dynamics 
and logic. These fields of contention may include those of politics, law, economics 
and education, as well as media, depending on the specific milieus in which social 
practices and cultural identity are perceived at risk. The envisioned way of life, 
however, cannot be seen separately from the vision of the group. 
In other words, social movements are comprised of two inter-linked collective 
struggles. On one side, there is a struggle relating to the basic, normative principles 
that structure social life, including political and economic organisation, ethical and 
aesthetic judgement, and scientific knowledge. These principles may be explicitly 
conceived in the course of struggle, but, fundamentally, they unconsciously guide 
perceptions and practices. On the other side, there is a struggle relating to group 
identity. Again, this struggle concerns the unconscious perceptions and practices of 
the group, though these may become explicitly conceived in the course of the 
struggle. These two struggles, or two aspects of a singular struggle, are connected: 
Group identity is contested with reference to the specific obstacles presented by 
social structures; and the contention of a model society is enacted with reference to 
the specific challenges to the group’s cultural and political identity. 
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3.2. The two aspects of authority contested by movements 
Social movements are concerned with both symbolic and practical authority. Implicit 
to the concept of social movement adopted in this thesis is not just a conflict 
regarding particular ways of seeing, evaluating and acting in the world, but a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the authority that determines and regulates them. 
Social movements, in this sense, do not merely resist and seek to change certain 
perceptions, judgements or practices, whether in relation to a specific group or 
society at large. They also challenge and tend towards the appropriation of the power 
structures that legitimise and naturalise them. This contestation targets the symbolic 
and practical authority held by governmental institutions, national or local. But as 
Tuğal demonstrates, it may also operate more subtly within the fabric of civil society 
in relation to other institutions, quasi- or non-governmental, targeting more 
molecular forms of authority.  
The state wields considerable symbolic power through an array of official 
classifications to impose a practical, taken-for-granted understanding of the social 
order. This is evident, for example, in the often unquestioned categories of 
‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ that are used in everyday, think tank and academic 
discourse, but which obviate more objective understandings of the phenomena of 
concern. However, symbolic struggles also occur within and between the different 
bureaucratic fields that comprise the state. The use of the terms ‘Islamist’ and 
‘jihadist’, for example, each have their own particular and recent history of 
contention (incorporating initial rejection followed by qualified acceptance) within 
and between different governmental agencies in Britain, as well as in the mainstream 
broadcast media. 
Bourdieu observes that authority—whether held by the state, an organisation or 
another kind of collective, or an individual—is only effective insomuch as it is 
recognised, that is, practically incorporated into the cognitive and bodily dispositions 
and actions of individuals and groups. Thus, the authority challenged by social 
movements is not just constituted by the institutions of government and civil society 
over a diverse range of fields. It is also constituted by the recognition given to such 
institutions, manifest in the regular ways of understanding and acting in the world 
that these institutions inculcate. Thus, any collective attempt to transform the taken-
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for-granted social and political doxa, including the way in which groups (for 
example, communities or nations) are classified and incorporated into it, confronts 
and challenges both the authority of the ‘external’ social and political institutions that 
perpetuate the doxic order and the concomitant ‘internal’ schemes of perception, 
evaluation and action upon which such authority depends. 
As Melucci says, social movements ‘challenge the dominant logic on a symbolic 
ground. They question definition of codes, nomination of reality’. But they seek to 
do this not just by challenging specific social classifications or practices—whether a 
given group is officially recognised and catered for in law or education, for 
example—but by challenging the very basis upon which classifications are made and 
by which practices are incorporated into social life. Social movements, as this thesis 
conceives them, are not equivalent to advocacy campaigns that seek change within 
existing social structures—for example in a given political, economic, legal or 
educational system. But neither are they necessarily revolutionary in seeking to 
overthrow such systems. Fundamentally, social movements are geared towards 
change that is inseparable from a transformation of existing social structures.  
Social movements, in this sense, are characteristically subversive. But, as Bourdieu 
reminds us, ‘political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of 
the vision of the world’.90 This resonates with the words of Frank Kitson, who, in 
1971, wrote: ‘Wars of subversion and counter-subversion are fought, in the last 
resort, in the minds of the people’.91 Whether in the first or last resort, this thesis 
begins with the position that social movements are subversive and must be 
understood in relation to the cognitive and social order against which they struggle. 
3.3. Social movements and other modes of collective action 
A social movement is a dynamic network comprised of social relationships that, as 
Melucci describes, persist beyond any particular instance of publicly visible 
mobilisation. All social movements are networks. But not all networks are social 
                                               
90 Bourdieu (1991), p.128. emphasis added. 
91 Kitson (1971), p.78. 
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movements because a movement is never simply a network. It is a network with the 
following features. 
Firstly, a social movement is a network that is organised. Social movements are 
constituted by and emerge from loose, informal social networks, but they require 
organisational structures through which professionals work for social change in the 
name of the groups they speak for. Social movements are not equivalent to 
organisations, including what have been described as ‘social movement 
organisations’, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they may be partly 
comprised of organisations—or of cross sections of them—movements are more 
open-ended and lack formal integration. As Emmanuel Karagiannis notes, 
movements may be comprised of multiple alliances of independently working 
groups.92 Social movements are not organisations, but they are organised.  
This criterion distinguishes movements not just from organisations; it also 
distinguishes them from networks whose members may identify themselves as 
belonging to a distinct group, but which lack representative organisation and, thus, 
the potential to collectively mobilise. For a network to be a movement, there has to 
be a practical and symbolic division of labour in the representation of the individuals 
and groups comprising it. But the movement’s organisational structure—the extent to 
which it is centralised or hierarchical, for example—ought not to be pre-empted, 
since this depends upon the structural and institutional form of the power it confronts 
and defines itself against. The institutionalised power a movement confronts, even 
the state as its typical adversary, is not necessarily restricted to the political field and 
may be dispersed across numerous fields, and so its organisational structure may 
reflect that dispersal. 
Secondly, a movement—an organised network—expresses collective identity or what 
Melucci refers to as a ‘specific solidarity’.93 This criterion separates movements from 
other forms of collective action, such as coalitions. Coalitions are organised 
networks, but they lack the collective identity that pertains to movements, which 
endures beyond the specific campaigns that coalition groups come together to work 
                                               
92 Karagiannis (2009). 
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on. An example is the Stop the War Coalition comprised of the Muslim Association 
of Britain (MAB) and the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP), which, in 2002 and 2003 
organised street protests against the allied invasion of Iraq. Whilst both groups 
campaigned together to influence British foreign policy, the interests of both groups 
in averting British involvement in the Middle East were related to different stakes 
and struggles, as well as divergent perceptions of human rights and social justice. Put 
succinctly and somewhat crudely, the solidarity between MAB and SWP was 
political, not cultural. It was issues-based, not identity-based. It was short-term, not 
long-term. 
Advocacy groups are similar to coalitions in the sense that the individuals 
comprising them share what might be termed as political, rather than cultural, 
solidarity. This kind of solidarity undoubtedly involves a shared understanding of 
certain political issues that need redress—for example, specific rights or legislation 
to be granted by the state—but is not necessarily driven by a shared cultural identity 
in terms of which individuals perceive themselves and, thus, the social world at 
large. The solidarity of individuals comprising a social movement, to the contrary, 
transcends all specific political rights issues, since it is inextricable from an 
alternative vision of the social and political order in which they perceive themselves 
to collectively belong. Examples of advocacy groups whose members share political, 
rather than cultural, solidarity include the various environmental pressure groups that 
lobby for changes in international or national law for the regulation or prohibition of 
certain practices, such as fishing, or for the protection of natural resources and 
habitats. 
Thirdly, a movement—an organised network of individuals with cultural 
connections—is conflictual. It is engaged in a conflictual relationship with political 
and cultural authority not just for extracting certain concessions in the name of its 
constituency, but over the power to determine an alternative social and political 
reality. Such power is both practical and symbolic, that is, it concerns both the 
capacity to regulate action, but also to shape perceptions and dispositions.  
This criterion separates movements from collective action that seeks representation 
within existing political or social structures without fundamentally altering them (see 
Table 1 below). Some identity based rights groups—for example, those concerned 
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with gender, sexuality or race—are not conflictual, as such, since they seek greater 
inclusion within existing systems. Others, however, that see the stakes of their 
struggle as bound up with a transformation of existing systems—those engaged in 
metapolitics—are conflictual in the sense described here. Ethno-nationalist groups, 
who envisage an alternative world order divided into separate territories based upon 
ethnic solidarity, exemplify this kind of conflict, at least in terms of their thinking if 
not their actual practices.94 
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Table 1: Modes of collective action 
So, the question as to whether a network of individuals is a social movement—the 
question posed by this thesis regarding the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain—
seeks knowledge not only of the networked nature of the individuals of concern, for 
it also seeks knowledge as to whether the network has a cultural basis and an 
organisational structure engaged in contentious collective action. Put succinctly, the 
recognition of a given movement depends upon the possibility of recognising 
organisational collaboration between the individuals and groups alleged to comprise 
                                               
94 Although separatist groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain’s Basque region and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, are commonly understood as ‘ethnic 
nationalist’ groups, ethno-nationalism may also be viewed as a form of political movement that seeks 
political autonomy not just within the accepted boundaries of a given state—in Spain or Sri Lanka, for 
example—but irrespective of contemporary political geography. Greg Johnson, a white nationalist, 
describes ethno-nationalism as ‘the idea that every distinct ethnic group should enjoy political 
sovereignty and an ethnically homogeneous homeland or homelands’. For him and others, ethno-
nationalism entails a transformation of the global political order. See Greg Johnson, ‘Frequently 
Asked Questions, Part 1’, Counter-Currents Publishing Blog, June 5, 2012. http://www.counter-
currents.com/2012/06/frequently-asked-questions-part-1/. 
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the movement; shared cultural solidarity between them; and a conflict of vision and 
values with institutional authority. The key stakes of this conflict are the 
determination of, on one hand, collective identity, and, on the other, the ‘legitimate 
vision of the social world’.95 The recognition of a movement depends upon 
recognising a struggle in which a transformation of social and cultural values are, in 
the final analysis, indistinguishable from a transformation of the political system. 
                                               
95 Bourdieu (1989), p.22. 
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Chapter 2 
Introducing the Global Muslim Brotherhood: Between 
Political Subversion and Religious Reformism?  
The ‘global Muslim Brotherhood’ in the title of this thesis refers to a transnational 
network of organisations and individuals associated with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun 
(The Society of the Muslim Brothers), established in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-
Banna, and Jama’at-i-Islami (The Party of Islam) established in colonial India in 
1941 by Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi. This chapter assesses the academic and think tank 
literature, as well as the relevant news media, that supports the view that the cluster 
of individuals and groups associated with these two groups amounts to a social 
movement with a presence in Britain. It also assesses the literature that denies or 
problematises the existence of such a movement.  
The chapter begins with an examination of the relevant literature on the 
organisations and individuals associated with the Ihkwan and Jama’at in the West. 
This provides a useful view upon how they are understood as a trans-continental 
network bonded by a shared ideology. Although the Ikhwan and Jama’at are 
typically deemed to be two distinct movements, they are often considered as forming 
a more general, overarching movement. The main reason for this, as a recent Pew 
Forum report contends, is that they are bonded by a ‘political ideology … that calls 
for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of government’.1 This is 
consistent with the original aspirations and methodologies of al-Banna and 
Mawdudi. The groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at in Britain, as this 
chapter shows, are similarly clustered. Although most analyses do not explicitly 
refer to a singular movement in Britain, they imply one in the way that they jointly 
classify these groups and individuals within the same Islamist taxonomy. 
                                               
1 Pew Forum (2010), p.20. 
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This literature observes that over the last half-century, activists linked to the Ikhwan 
and Jama’at have become increasingly interconnected in Europe and North America. 
Free from the particular challenges and historical contexts of their points of 
departure, and acknowledging that their presence in the West is long term, these 
individuals have established numerous organisations dedicated to pursuing their 
political ambitions in the Muslim-minority West. These organisations are viewed 
critically by many observers who see them as non-violent but ‘extremist’ or 
subversive. 
Other analysts more sympathetic to these groups contend that the new cultural and 
political terrain in the West has affected the continuity of al-Banna and Mawdudi’s 
ideals and aspirations for an Islamic state. Decades within the new Muslim-minority 
environment, they claim, has transformed Islamist goals into a more modest desire 
for social equality and has provoked a radical reinterpretation of the al-Banna and 
Mawdudi’s Islamist political programme. 
This chapter assesses both of these streams of analysis. It finds that most analysts 
who explicitly or tacitly affirm the existence of an Islamist movement comprised of 
Brotherhood- and Jama’at-related organisations and individuals do so without 
sufficient reflection on how the movement is constituted as a whole greater than its 
constituent parts. The clustering of these actors as ‘Islamists’ typically assumes a 
shared political ideology that remains unexamined to any level of sufficient detail.  
Much of the literature on Islamism in Britain is somewhat out of date. But along 
with the work on Islamism in the West, it provides the historical context important 
for identifying the relevant groups and individuals in Britain. Its account of the 
organisational networking of these actors serves as a useful starting point for an in-
depth study of participationist Islamism in Britain as presented in this thesis. 
The chapter also argues that the analysts who argue the case for a reformist or 
progressive Islam practiced in the West and Britain by Brotherhood- and Jama’at-
related groups highlight some important trends in Muslim activism, but that these do 
not amount to a coherent, direct or effective counter-argument against the existence 
of an Islamist movement in Britain. 
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1. The global Muslim Brotherhood in the West 
The individuals and groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at, in Britain and 
further afield, have been collectively referred to in various ways. Each classification 
has its own history and nuances, but all assume some measure of connectedness 
between the individuals and groups to which they apply. Some prominent Muslim 
activists and intellectuals, including those linked to Brotherhood- or Jama’at-related 
groups, refer to the ‘Islamic revivalist movement’ or, more simply, ‘the Islamic 
Movement’. The defining feature of the Movement for them is the collective 
dedication to what they view as a restoration or revival of Islam to the forefront of 
social and political life. 
Academic observers and critical bystanders tend to emphasise the political aspect of 
Islamic revivalism in referring to these groups and individuals as ‘Islamists’ of a 
certain kind. These appellations include ‘non-violent Islamists’ (which emphasises 
their eschewal of violent methods in the West), ‘gradualist Islamists’ (which 
emphasises their incremental approach through institution building), and 
‘participationists’ (which emphasises their willingness to participate in electoral, 
democratic politics).  
Lorenzo Vidino describes these actors in Europe and North America as the ‘New 
Western Muslim Brotherhood’. Steven Merley refers to them as the ‘global Muslim 
Brotherhood’. Both Vidino and Merley, as this chapter shows, contribute valuable 
insights to the understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a global phenomenon, 
but they disagree on the extent to which this is formally structured. What is less 
uncertain, from their work and that of others, is that for many decades dedicated 
activists with connections to the Ikhwan and Jama’at have established an extensive 
network of organisations in the West, including Britain, that transcend ethnic and 
nationalist lines. 
1.1. Historical origins and contemporary conceptions 
The Brotherhood and Jama’at are sometimes described as separate movements due 
to their particular historical origins and the national and ethnic composition of their 
original membership. But they are often grouped together, by both Muslim and non-
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Muslim commentators alike, as one overarching movement with a global presence. 
As mentioned above, some prominent Muslim figures sometimes refer to this as ‘the 
Islamic Movement’. Muhammad Abdul Bari, former chairman of the East London 
Mosque and former secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, for example, 
describes the Islamic Movement as 
a generic term for groups that do not restrict religion to personal piety but see Islam 
having its own unique social and political message. Examples include the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia. They are described by 
their detractors as ‘Islamist’ or ‘fundamentalist’. Their off-shoot groups in Europe 
have been active in community work, establishing mosques and research centres, 
publishing houses and journals.2 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egypt-born Muslim scholar and cleric best known for his 
popular Al Jazeera television programme ‘ash-Shari’a wal-Hayat’ (‘Shari’a and 
Life’), defines the Islamic Movement as 
the organised and collective work that is undertaken by the people, to restore Islam to 
the leadership of society and to the helm of life … The Islamic Movement has come 
into existence to revive Islam [tajid al-Islam] and reinstate it at the helm of life once 
again, after removing it obstacles from its path.3 
Al-Qaradawi distinguishes the Islamic Movement from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Movement, he asserts, is more ‘general and all-embracing’; the Brotherhood is 
one movement within the Movement.4  
Revivalist visionaries: al-Banna and Mawdudi 
The goal of reviving Islam ‘to the helm of life’ was expressed by Hasan al-Banna 
and Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi, the two most important figures of the Islamic Movement. 
Both al-Banna and Mawdudi, despite being focused on their respective countries of 
origin, aspired for an Islamic world order. Both emphasised a gradual, non-violent 
                                               
2 Abdul Bari (2013), p.11. 
3 al-Qaradawi (2002), pp.1, 6, emphasis added. 
4 Ibid., pp.xxii-xxiii. 
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strategy through education and institution-building that would culminate in Islam’s 
triumph over non-Islamic values, ideas and practices. 
Al-Banna, a schoolteacher, established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 to address 
what he saw as the corruption of Islam in his native Egypt. Al-Banna diagnosed the 
poor predicament of Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere not just as a result of the 
abolition of the caliphate or of Western colonialism. More fundamentally, he 
claimed, its demise was owed to the abandonment of Islamic values, and governance 
based upon those values, after the period of the first four caliphs (632-661).5 Al-
Banna declared the ultimate goal of the Brotherhood as the re-creation of a global 
Islamic order based on the shar’ia.6 He also believed firmly in, and taught, the 
importance of jihad, in line with the predominant classical (and juridical) conception 
of warfare for the hegemony of Islam.7 Jihad, asserted al-Banna, is a duty incumbent 
upon all Muslims for Islam to reach its zenith. He also extolled the rewards of 
martyrdom in the path of jihad, as expressed in a pamphlet he wrote in the late 
1930s.8 Al-Banna believed the basis for Islamic supremacy, and jihad as its means, 
was ‘supported in Qur’anic texts, the Traditions [hadiths], and the four schools of 
[Islamic] law’.9  
Al-Banna’s exaltation of jihad was not an empty formula. One of the few constants 
in the structure of the organisation, according to Richard Mitchell, was ‘the 
enrolment of members in various kinds of armed formations trained to perform 
espionage and to commit violence’.10 The Brotherhood initiated attacks against 
Egypt’s Jews and Copts; bombed secular cinema theatres and restaurants; and 
assassinated judges, businessmen, intellectuals and government officials, including 
                                               
5 The first four caliphs were Abu Bakr (r. 632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644), Uthman ibn 
Affan (r. 644-656), and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656-661). 
6 Mitchell (1993), p.234. 
7 al-Banna (1978). For a comprehensive treatment of the juridical doctrine and historical practice of 
jihad, see Cook (2005). 
8 See al-Banna (1978). 
9 Mitchell (1993), p.207. 
10 Mitchell (1993), p.206. 
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the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi.11 Amir Taheri notes that 
al-Banna’s ‘campaign of terror was to become a model for future fundamentalist 
movements’.12 These include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian 
Territories; al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad in Egypt; Abu Sayyaf in the 
Philippines; as well as the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and 
Combat in Algeria.13 Perhaps most importantly, Brotherhood members also played a 
key role in the birth of al-Qaeda.14 
Despite its history of violence, the most important aspect of the Brotherhood’s work 
was, and remains, its commitment to the gradual Islamisation of society from below 
using non-violent means. At the organisation’s 5th conference in 1939, al-Banna 
stated that the official focus of the Ikhwan was ‘the reform of society’, since before 
they could be ready for political power, ‘there must be a period during which the 
principles of the Brothers are spread’.15 The guiding thought was that ‘when the 
people have been Islamized, a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve’.16 To this 
end, al-Banna introduced a seven-stage strategy comprised of upwardly cascading 
goals: 
The first step is to educate and ‘form’ the Muslim person. From there the Muslim 
person would spread Islam and help ‘form’ a Muslim family. Muslim families would 
group together to form a Muslim society that would establish a Muslim government. 
The government would then transform the state into an Islamic one governed by 
Shari’ah, as voted by the Muslim society. This Islamic state would then work to free 
‘occupied’ Muslim lands [from apostate Muslim regimes] and unify them together 
under one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.17 
                                               
11 See Kramer (1996), p.144; Gold (2003), pp.55-56; and Taheri (1987), p.52. In retaliation to the 
murder of Nuqrashi, al-Banna was assassinated by Egyptian government agents the following year, in 
1949. 
12 Taheri (1987), p.51. 
13 See Phares (2005), p.65; and Rachel Ehrenfeld and Alyssa A. Lappen, ‘The Truth About the 
Muslim Brotherhood’, Front Page Magazine, June 16, 2006. 
http://www.alyssaalappen.org/2006/06/16/the-truth-about-the-muslim-brotherhood/. 
14 Filiu (2009). 
15 Mitchell (1993) p?? 
16 Ibid. 
17 Investigative Project on Terrorism (2008), p.7. 
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Mawdudi also advocated a bottom-up approach to the achievement of an Islamic 
society in the Indian subcontinent. His political life, as with al-Banna’s, began with a 
struggle against British colonial rule. He was a member of the pan-Islamic Khilafah 
movement, which combined support for the Ottoman caliphate with anti-colonial 
agitation.18 But like al-Banna, Mawdudi’s anti-colonialism was hitched to a higher 
purpose, the revival of Islam and its eventual global supremacy. In his early work, 
Mawdudi expressed his vision of an Islamic revival in strident revolutionary terms. 
In his first book, Jihad Fi Sabillilah (Jihad in Islam), written in the late 1920s, he 
wrote:   
Islam requires the earth—not just a portion, but the whole planet … because the 
entire mankind should benefit from … ‘Islam’ which is the programme of well-being 
for all humanity ... Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or 
a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution.19  
The achievement of the Islamic world system, he stated, requires Muslims to ‘press 
into service all [the] forces which can bring about a revolution … [The] composite 
term for the use of all these forces,’ he asserted, ‘is “Jihad”’.20 These forces include 
‘the power of the sword’, physical exertion, the expenditure of one’s wealth, and 
also the potency of speech and writing. Mawdudi viewed the ‘ideological’ jihad as 
the means to change people’s outlooks culminating in ‘a mental revolution’ that 
would signify Islam’s triumph over non-Islamic values, concepts and ideas. Such a 
triumph is especially pertinent given Mawdudi’s concept of the Islamic state as ‘an 
ideological state’, as opposed to a nation state.21 The ideological state, for Mawdudi, 
is defined by its acceptance of the shari’a, whose sphere of activity is not restricted 
to politics, or even law, but ‘coexistent with the whole of human life’.22 
In 1941, Mawdudi established Jama’at-i-Islami to realise his vision of an Islamic 
state on the Indian subcontinent as a prelude to an Islamic world order. Through 
Jama’at, he sought to produce a cadre of ‘Muslim administrators, Muslim managers, 
                                               
18 For an interesting study of the Khilafah movement, see Qureshi (1999). 
19 Maududi (1980), p.22, emphasis and italics added. 
20 Ibid., p.7, italics added. 
21 Bukay (2008), p.164. 
22 Mawdudi, quoted in Karsh (2006), p.208. 
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Muslim scientists, Muslim philosophers, Muslim economists, Muslim bankers, and 
jurists … [that would] act as the vanguard of the movement for the reconstruction of 
modern thought … [leading] the struggle against the prevailing secular ideologies 
and power structures’.23 As Mumtaz Ahmad observes, although Mawdudi described 
the goal of an Islamic world order in revolutionary terms, the bottom-up means he 
advocated were rather more ‘evolutionary’.24  
After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, which Mawdudi opposed, he became more 
pragmatic in approach and under his leadership Jama’at embraced Pakistani electoral 
politics. This reflected similar developments in the Ikhwan in Egypt, where some of 
its leaders, such as Umar al-Tilmisani, began to publicly eschew violence and adopt 
an accommodationist position regarding secular politics.25 From the 1960s, 
thousands of party activists and sympathisers were appointed in the civil service and 
educational institutions, exerting a mild influence on the Pakistani government and, 
under General Zia ul-Haq, its programme to Islamise the state and society.26 This 
included the 1974 state declaration of the Ahmadi sect as non-Muslims and Zia’s 
decree, ten years later, prohibiting the Ahmadis from describing themselves as 
Muslim and chanting the call to prayer.27 
Both the Ikhwan and Jama’at-i-Islami have failed to make in-roads in their respective 
countries as their founders had hoped for. Since President Nasser’s clampdown on 
the Ikhwan in the mid-1950s, the group has suffered state repression for decades. 
After the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, the Ikhwan’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice 
Party, won the country’s first democratic elections with Mohammed Morsi elected as 
president. But, in 2013, on the back of public protests against the Morsi’s rule, the 
military ousted Morsi and the Ikhwan is once again subject to harsh state repression. 
Jama’at-i-Isami has periodically been repressed by the Pakistani government, but 
                                               
23 Ahmad (1991), p.488. 
24 Ahmad, ibid. See also Ahmed (1994), pp.669-706. 
25 Vidino (2010), p.25. 
26 Hussain (2007), pp.18-19. 
27 The Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) who, in 1889, founded a religious 
order in modern-day India. Ahmad assumed the title of al-Mahdi, the divinely guided one, a messiah 
promised in Shi‘ite eschatology to restore Islam’s righteous place in the world. For more on the 
Ahmadis, see Valentine (2008).  
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when it has participated in elections, it has failed to capture the popular vote.  
Nonetheless, the success of the Ikhwan and Jama’at lies in their resilience and 
expansion beyond their respective home bases. The Ikhwan now has a global 
presence. According to Mohamed Mahdi Akef, a former Supreme Guide of the 
Egyptian Ikhwan, it is active in 70 countries.28 Jama’at, whilst less expansionary, has 
a significant presence in South Asia. Both have played a key role in establishing 
Islamic networks across Europe and America comprising mosques, charities, 
advocacy groups, and other organisations. 
‘Participationist’ and ‘rejectionist’ Islamists 
Western observers of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, and their legacy 
groups in the West, tend to refer to them not in terms of the Islamic Movement, but 
as Islamists. In doing so, they emphasise the political aspect of al-Banna and 
Mawdudi’s shared long-term vision of an Islamic social order. Typically, Western 
analysts consider the Ikhwan, Jama’at and their associated groups in the West as 
Islamists in aspiring for a global Islamic state, but distinguish them from other 
Islamists by the different means that they adopt to accomplish this goal. Patrick 
Sookhdeo, for example, writes,  
What sets non-violent Islamists apart from the violent groups is their doctrine of 
gradualism, which includes a tactical willingness to work within the legal system of 
their countries in order to further their strategic goals. Their tactical goals include the 
Islamization of Muslim societies at the grass-roots level, the building of a committed 
vanguard of elites and the mobilisation of the masses. Gradualist movements 
advocate a comprehensive multi-faceted system of jihad, which includes struggle on 
all fronts—economic, cultural, political—in order to mobilise Muslims and gather 
Islamic strength for the final struggle, which might include the use of force.29 
Sookhdeo refers to the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of the ‘gradualist 
mainstream’.  
                                               
28 ‘Speech of Mr. Mohamed Mahdi Akef, Ramadan Iftar Party’, IkhwanWeb, July 6, 2007. 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=911. 
29 Sookhdeo (2012), p.23. 
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Other analysts prefer a tripartite taxonomy. They divide Islamists between those who 
reject participation within democratic political systems and those, like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who are willing to participate in them. They place violent Islamists 
firmly within the ‘rejectionist’ camp and split non-violent Islamists between 
‘rejectionists’ and ‘participationists’. Jeffrey Bale, for example, distinguishes 
between the Islamist groups operating in the West as follows: 
1. ‘Rejectionists’ that openly disparage the institutions and values of Western host 
societies … [whose] ultimate aims [are] to destroy those societies. These rejectionist 
groups can be further subdivided into a) ostensibly non-violent groups (like Hizb al-
Tahrir al-Islami, which is awaiting the restoration of the Caliphate before initiating 
‘offensive jihad’), and b) violent jihadist groups [transnational, such as al-Qaeda, or 
nationally focused—at least in terms of immediate strategic priorities—such as 
Hamas], whether these are linked to wider networks or are so-called ‘self-starter’ 
cells; and 
2. Non-violent ‘participationist’ groups that engage in lobbying, organizing, and 
publishing and at times even run for elections (such as the representatives of groups 
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, South Asian Mawdudist networks, and Turkish 
groups linked to the AKP such as Milli Goruş).30 
Bale’s taxonomy builds upon the work of Anthony McRoy31 and resonates with the 
work of Lorenzo Vidino,32 as well as with that of the London-based counter-
extremism think tank, Quilliam.33 According to Bale, ‘it is not violence-prone 
jihadist groups that constitute the primary long-term threat to the West, but rather 
non-violent Islamists’ including those linked with the Ikhwan and Jama’at-i-Islami. 
Such activists, he asserts, present a threat to the social cohesion and national security 
of Western states.34 Although they do not present a direct threat of violence, these 
                                               
30 Jeffrey Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’, National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, December 21, 2009. http://www.start.umd.edu/research-
projects/militant-islamist-networks-west. 
31 See McRoy (2006), pp.194-6, 198, cited in Jeffrey M. Bale, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight: “Londonistan” 
as an Example of Islamist “Bases” in the West’, an unpublished, undated paper provided by Bale to 
the thesis author. This paper is an extended version of Bale (2007). 
32 Vidino (2009b), pp.165–176, and Vidino (2010), pp.15-16. 
33 Quilliam (2010). 
34 Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’. 
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groups may foster radicalisation, which can lead to terrorism, through the inculcation 
within Muslim communities of separatist values and a perception of a war on Islam. 
An ideological movement or a covert organisation? 
The notion of a participationist or revivalist Islamist movement in the West has been 
most explicitly conceived and written about most extensively by Lorenzo Vidino. In 
his view, such a movement exists ‘composed of the networks that trace their roots to 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups [including Jama’at-i-Islami] that, 
while publicly purporting to support democracy and the integration of Muslim 
communities within the European mainstream, quietly work to radicalise Europe’s 
Muslim population’.35 Vidino acknowledges that the ‘legacy groups’ of Jama’at-i-
Islami have a distinct cultural and historical trajectory from those of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but argues that they have been integral to the Ikhwan’s transformation 
from a nationally-focused organisation based in Cairo to ‘an informal transnational 
movement’ with a presence throughout Europe and North America.36  
In order to distinguish this movement in the West from the original Egyptian 
organisation, and to identify it as ‘an ideological movement that transcends formal 
affiliation’, Vidino refers to it as the ‘New Western Muslim Brotherhood’.37 He cites 
the statements of various Brotherhood leaders to support his view of the global 
Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological movement rather than an international 
organisation.38 Youssef Nada, formerly the Brotherhood’s chief finance officer, for 
example, describes the Brotherhood as a ‘common way of thinking’.39 Mohammed 
Akef, a former murshid of the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood, states, ‘We do 
not have an international organization; we have an organization through our 
perception of things’.40  
                                               
35 Vidino (2009b), p.165. 
36 Vidino (2010), pp.41-53, emphasis added. 
37 Ibid. p.41. See also Vidino (2011). 
38 Vidino (2010), p.52. 
39 Ibid., p.42. 
40 Ibid. 
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Vidino argues that ‘there is no formal Muslim Brotherhood organization in the West 
… The idea of creating a global movement rather than a formally structured 
organisation has been present since the early days’.41 The groups under the 
movement’s broad umbrella, he claims, ‘work according to a common vision but in 
complete operational independence’.42 He elaborates his understanding of the 
movement as follows: 
There are consultations and constant communication, but each is free to pursue its 
goals as it deems appropriate. Therefore the international Muslim Brotherhood is 
today most properly identified not as a group or even a loose federation, but simply as 
an ideological movement, in which different branches choose their own tactics to 
achieve their short-term goals in complete independence. What binds them together is 
a deep belief in Islam as a comprehensive way of life that, in the long term, they hope 
to turn into a political system using different methods in different times and places.43 
This characterisation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a global movement has been 
criticised by Steven Merley, founder and editor of The Global Muslim Brotherhood 
Daily Watch. Merley sees no evidence for the assertion that the Brotherhood is 
simply an ideological movement whose entities operate completely independently. 
‘[T]he Brotherhood,’ he counters, ‘is, at it heart, a covert organization and their [sic] 
are few reasons to accept and many reasons not to accept their statements about 
themselves at face value. Where actual evidence exists, it points to a far more 
sophisticated organizational structure than admitted to by the Muslim Brotherhood 
itself.’44  
The evidence that Merley refers to includes documents written in Arabic released as 
part of the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing trial in the United States, 
                                               
41 Ibid., pp.38-39. 
42 Ibid., p.40 
43 Ibid. 
44 Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, ‘ANALYSIS; The Global Muslim Brotherhood Is No 
‘Myth’’, March 6, 2011, emphasis added. http://globalmbreport.org/?p=4047. 
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which ended in 2008 with the conviction of five prominent American Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders.45 He argues, 
Prior to the release of the documents, it was clear that the various organizations and 
individuals comprising the U.S. Brotherhood were networking extensively with each 
other but the existence of leadership structures could only be the subject of 
speculation. Now however, three of the documents shed light on such structures, at 
least as they existed at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.46 
These leadership structures, Merley asserts, are comprised of both covert and public 
entities. The covert entities include the position of a General Guide for the entire 
U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, a Shura Council (advisory body) and various 
committees.47 These appear in a document dated December 1988, entitled 
Preliminary vision for preparing future leadership, along with a list of organisations, 
which Merley says includes ‘almost all of the known Brotherhood organizations 
such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the North American Islamic 
Trust (NAIT) and the Muslim Student Association (MSA)’.48 Together, these covert 
and public entities are listed in the document as the ‘Apparatuses’, which, Merley 
says, is ‘a common word used by the Brotherhood for its organizations’.49  
Another of the documents Merley refers to, written by Mohamed Akram and dated 
May 22, 1991, is entitled An Explanatory Memorandum, On the General Strategic 
Goal for the Group in North America. It contains a similar list of organisations, 
explicitly referred to as belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Brotherhood’s 
‘friends’. These are acknowledged in the document as part of ‘the global Islamic 
Movement’ working towards the goal of a ‘global Islamic state’.50 It also describes a 
strategy for the Brotherhood in North America to attain this goal in terms of a 
                                               
45 Investigative Project on Terrorism, ‘HLF Founders Sentenced to Long Prison Terms,’ May 27, 
2009. http://www.investigativeproject.org/1046/hlf-founders-sentenced-to-long-prison-terms. 
46 Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, ‘ANALYSIS: Holy Land Documents Point to Covert 
Muslim Brotherhood Structure In The U.S.’, August 29, 2007. http://globalmbreport.org/?p=184. 
47 Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, ‘ANALYSIS; The Global Muslim Brotherhood Is No 
“Myth”’. 
48 Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, ‘ANALYSIS: Holy Land Documents Point to Covert 
Muslim Brotherhood Structure In The U.S.’. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Akram (1991), pp.7, 5, emphasis added. 
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‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ for establishing Islam as a ‘civilization alternative’. It 
states: 
The Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a 
kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from 
within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the 
believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion [Islam] is made victorious over all 
other religions.51 
Seemingly in support of Merley’s contention, this document states that the ‘heart and 
core’ of the Brotherhood’s strategy for the United States is a shift from the 
prioritisation of ideas to that of organisations.52 But the claim that these documents 
demonstrate a covert leadership structure to the Muslim Brotherhood in the United 
States or globally is not as evident as Merley maintains. 
Akram’s memorandum makes a clear distinction between, on one hand, a desired 
structure of organisations, including specific roles for each organisational 
component, and, on the other, already existing public Brotherhood organisations—
referred to as ‘seeds’—which may or may not come to function within this desired 
structure as its components in their respective roles. The document concedes that 
‘the global Movement has not succeeded yet in “distributing roles” to its Branches’ 
and acknowledges that the Brotherhood organisations are not working ‘according to 
one plan’. As such, the strategy outlined for non-violent jihad in America resembles 
not so much an executable programme for an established organisational entity—a 
‘covert organization’—than an expression of desire for the construction of precisely 
such an entity, referred to in the document as a ‘Group of organizations’. 
1.2. The ‘westward expansion’ of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Merley’s claim that the global Muslim Brotherhood is a covert organisation may not 
be supported by the evidence he presents. But this does not undermine the notion of 
the Brotherhood as a movement since, as this thesis will argue, the struggle to 
establish a vanguard to promote an alternative vision of society is a key stake in 
                                               
51 Akram (1991), p.7, emphasis added. 
52 Ibid., pp.6, 11-12. 
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social movement conflicts. Additionally, a high degree of organisation and 
coordination dating back to the early 1970s between cadres from the Ikhwan and 
Jama’at in Europe and North America, resulting in the creation of numerous 
institutions, supports the view of a movement in the West. This trans-ethnic 
networking, the plans that were produced through such networking, the consistency 
of the goals and methods these plans expressed, and the fruits of such plans, all 
testify to the emergence of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement across the 
United States and Europe, including Britain. 
Johnson provides the most illuminating account of this networked ‘westward 
expansion’ of the global Muslim Brotherhood, incorporating Jama’at-i-Islami, in a 
series of articles and a book, A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA and the Rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the West.53 The first meeting dedicated to ‘forming a 
framework for Islamism in Europe’,54 he observes, was held in London in 1973. 
Present at this meeting was Ghaleb Himmat, the newly appointed head of the 
Munich mosque—which Johnson says was to become ‘the most important Muslim 
Brotherhood mosque in Europe’—and Khurshid Ahmad, a senior figure in Jama’at-
i-Islami Pakistan who, in the same year, established one of Britain’s most prominent 
Islamic institutions, the Islamic Foundation.  
In 1977, a follow up meeting was held in Lugano, Switzerland, to ‘set up a structure 
to guide the growth of political Islam in Europe and the United States’.55 Amongst 
the 30 or so Islamist figures attending the meeting alongside Himmat and Ahmad, 
Johnson notes, were Yusuf al-Qaradawi, widely considered as the spiritual guide of 
the Brotherhood, Youseff Nada and Isamail Faruqi. To give the nascent Western 
Brotherhood movement some ‘ideological firepower’, Johnson says, the group 
                                               
53 See Ian Johnson, ‘Islamic group’s ties reveal Europe's challenge’, The Wall Street Journal, 
December 29, 2005. http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05363/629642.stm; Ian Johnson, ‘Big 
Brotherhood is Watching’, Foreign Policy, May 26, 2010, 
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quickly established a number of Islamic think tanks, the most important being the 
International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), established by Faruqi in 1981.56 
Vidino writes that during the 1970s, building on the initial organisational efforts of 
the Mawdudists in the 1960s and early-1970s, an Islamic revivalist network 
transcending ethnic lines began to form across Britain and continental Europe.57 In 
1973, the same year that the Islamic Foundation was established, Europe’s first 
‘umma-centric’ Islamist organisation was created in London, with the support of 
Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states: the Islamic Council of Europe (ICE). Several 
years later, in an early sign of collaboration between Ikhwani and Jama’ati activists, 
Ahmad served on the executive board of ICE alongside Hasan al-Banna’s son-in-
law, Said Ramadan. Further consolidating the relationship between the Ikhwan and 
Jama’at groups, in 1982, Ahmad and another Jama’at activist and Islamic 
Foundation colleague, Khurram Murad, joined the governing council of the 
Brotherhood-dominated Munich mosque, which Johnson says played a key role in 
the growth of the European Brotherhood network.58 
David Rich, in a 2010 article entitled The Very Model of a British Muslim 
Brotherhood, observes that ICE organised a number of meetings and conferences 
throughout the 1970s to bring Islamist thinkers and activists of various nationalities 
together to create, in ICE leader Salem Azzam’s words, a ‘theoretical basis for an 
Umma-wide political movement’.59 For some analysts, the basis of this movement 
consisted not merely in the theoretical justification for the global politicisation of 
Islam, but also in the development of practical plans for the ‘Islamisation’ of the 
West, beginning with the insulation of Muslim communities. Patrick Sookhdeo, for 
example, notes that in July 1978, ICE organised a conference on Muslim minorities 
in non-Muslim states where ‘a careful and deliberate strategy by certain Muslim 
leaders’ was presented that urged Muslims to resist assimilation and organise 
themselves according to Islamic principles. Sookhdeo states, ‘The ultimate goal of 
                                               
56 Johnson (2008), p.78. 
57 Vidino (2010), pp.32-34. 
58 Johnson (2008), pp.72, 76; Johnson (2010), p.197; and Vidino, ibid., p.34. 
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this strategy is that the Muslims should become a majority and the entire nation be 
governed according to Islam.’60  
Some observers, such as Alyssa Lappen, note a continuity of such strategies for 
Islam’s conquest of the West, including a plan detailed in documents seized by the 
Swiss police in November 2001 from the home of Nada in Lugano, where he was 
director of the Brotherhood-created al-Taqwa Bank.61 Self-described as ‘a global 
vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy’,62 The Project, as it became 
known in counter-terrorism circles, dates back to 1982.63 It amounts to a fairly 
comprehensive blueprint for ‘civilisational’ jihad with the long-term goal, expressed 
in its own words, of ‘establish[ing] an Islamic power [government] on the earth’.64 
Consistent with the Brotherhood’s gradualist approach, as described by Sookhdeo 
above, this document states that its goal of establishing an Islamic state must be 
worked towards ‘in parallel with gradual efforts aimed at gaining control of local 
power centers through institutional action’.65 
The Project’s contents resonate with both the 1991 document and with al-
Qaradawi’s writings, particularly a treatise published in 1990 entitled Priorities for 
the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, which Vidino describes as ‘the most 
recent manifesto of the Islamist revivalist movement’.66 In this document, al-
Qaradawi calls for a reinstatement of the Islamic caliphate and introduces a modus 
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operandi for the movement, which includes strengthening the umma intellectually 
and politically towards this long-term goal. 
Al-Qaradawi is considered by many observers, including Vidino and Merley, as the 
most important intellectual figure of the global Muslim Brotherhood. Vidino 
describes him as ‘the undisputed spiritual leader of the global and Western 
Brotherhood’.67 ‘[C]onsistent ideological references and any organizational link to 
him,’ writes Vidino, ‘are good indicators of an affiliation’ to the movement.68 For al-
Qaradawi, Muslim settlement in the West is a religious necessity and obligation for 
the global ‘Islamic Movement’, leading to the unification of the umma and, 
ultimately, the global supremacy of the shari’a. An organised voice, he urges, is 
important to convince Western leaders that Muslims in Muslim-majority countries 
have a right to live by shari’a values and tenets.69 But settlement in the West, for al-
Qaradawi, is not just a vehicle for the ‘true’ Islamisation of Muslim-majority 
countries—it is also a vehicle for the Islamisation of the relatively new host 
societies. 
The ultimate goal of al-Qaradawi’s strategy in Muslim-minority lands, to which 
Vidino refers, is nothing less than Islamic conquest.70 ‘We will conquer Europe, we 
will conquer America,’ the cleric exclaims, ‘not through the sword but through 
Dawa. Dawa will work through Islamic groups set up by Brotherhood supporters.’71 
Al-Qaradawi does not merely advocate the ‘preservation’ of Muslim identity and 
influence upon Western governmental policy in the interests of the umma. He calls 
for a new kind of jihad relevant to the predicament of Muslims living as minorities 
in the West, making it clear that no form of jihad, including the non-violent type, 
can be detached from the overall effort to universalise the shari’a.72 
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Vidino and Johnson characterise the Muslim Brotherhood in the West as 
pragmatically focused on its short- and medium-term goals of, in Johnson’s words, 
‘dominat[ing] the West’s Muslim communities’, rather than its long-term goal of 
‘Islamiciz[ing] mainstream society’, since the latter is simply ‘too ambitious a task at 
this point’.73 Its primary means to do this, they argue, has been through institution 
building. 
Indeed, what appears to demonstrate the existence of the global Muslim Brotherhood 
as a movement in the West is not just an uncanny continuity in aspirations and 
methods expressed in The Project, in al-Qaradawi’s Priorities and in Akram’s 1991 
memorandum. It is also the recognisable correspondence between what these 
documents advocate and what has actually taken place on the ground in Europe and 
North America in recent decades. Vidino notes that the aforementioned plans ‘seem 
to perfectly describe what has been the modus operandi of the New Western 
Brotherhood over the last twenty to thirty years’.74 He observes that the Brothers 
have ‘created a sprawling network of Islamic organizations devoted to all the 
possible needs of the Western Muslim population, from the purely religious to the 
more mundane’.75 The most important of these in Europe include the Federation of 
Islamic Organizations in Europe—widely considered as the Brotherhood’s key 
institution in the West—as well as the European Council for Fatwa and Research, 
led by al-Qaradawi, which dispenses legal guidance for Muslims living in the 
Muslim-minority context of today’s Europe. 
 2. The global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain 
Some of the key literature that addresses participationist Islamism in Britain refers to 
two separate but related movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Jama’at-i-Islami. Michael Whine, for example, identifies two ‘streams of Islamist 
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ideology’ related to these groups as having the most active foreign influence upon 
‘British Islam’.76 In a 2009 Policy Exchange report critical of the British 
government’s engagement with certain Muslim organisations, its authors Shiraz 
Maher and Martyn Frampton analyse Islamism in Britain along similar lines: 
Broadly speaking, Islamist groups currently operating in Britain originate from two 
major revivalist networks that emerged in the early twentieth century: the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which started in Egypt, and the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose origins lie in 
colonial India.77 
Maher and Frampton identify a number of organisations in Britain as part of each 
movement. Under the heading of Jama’at-i-Islami, they include the Islamic 
Foundation, which they say was established by Jama’at activists to promote ‘Islamist 
ideas throughout the West’ and support ‘the Jamaat’s global political activism’.78 
They also include the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE), which they 
describe as operated by the Foundation to ‘develop the Jamaat’s political ideas’.79 
Under the heading of the Muslim Brotherhood, Maher and Frampton include the 
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), established in 1997 by the former 
Brotherhood spokesman in Europe, Kamal al-Helbawy; the Cordoba Foundation, 
established in 2005 and directed by former MAB secretary general, Anas Altikriti; 
and the British Muslim Initiative, formed in 2006 by a group of former MAB 
leaders, including Altikriti.80 
Whine, Maher and Frampton are not alone in dividing Islamism in Britain into two 
streams. Other observers similarly observe the historical and organisational 
connections between certain actors in Britain and the Ikhwan or Jama’at. These 
observations are detailed below. Following this is an examination of the extent to 
which these two distinct streams of Islamist activism comprise one, overarching 
movement in Britain. For, some analysts have recognised the collaboration between 
individuals and organisations across Ikhwan-Jama’at lines as indicative of a singular 
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movement. Although such a movement comprised of Ikhwan- and Jama’at-
associated activists and groups is not commonly written of in explicit terms, it is at 
least suggested in how these groups are jointly classified. 
2.1. The Mawdudists 
Jørgen S. Nielsen identifies four British Muslim organisations as developed by 
Jama’at-i Islami. In addition to the Islamic Foundation, these are the UK Islamic 
Mission (UKIM), founded in 1962; the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), created by 
UKIM in 1966; and Young Muslims UK (YM), an offshoot of the Foundation, 
established in 1984.81 Gilles Kepel similarly describes the Islamic Foundation, 
UKIM and YM as ‘belonging to Mawdudi’s Jama’at-i Islami movement’ in 
Britain.82 Nielsen describes the four organisations as ‘Jama’at-related’ to emphasise 
a lack of formal ties to the Pakistani parent organisation.83  
Ron Geaves supports this view, adding, ‘These organizations have close informal 
links with Jamaat-i Islami in the [Indian] sub-continent but their allegiance is 
increasingly given to the “Islamic Movement” worldwide’, which he recognises as 
being comprised from both Jama’at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.84 In 
addition to those listed by Nielsen, Anthony McRoy describes the ‘Mawdudist 
network in Britain’ as including the East London Mosque, which Vidino describes as 
the network’s headquarters;85 the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB); Islamic Forum 
Europe (IFE); and the Young Muslims Organisation (YMO).86 Each of these 
individual organisations has been described by political observers as Islamist or 
having Islamist connections.  
UKIM, for example, has been described by McRoy as the ‘parent Mawdudist group 
in Britain’,87 and by Vidino as the ‘original embryo of the Mawdudist network’.88 
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Kepel refers to the organisation’s literature in describing its goals and methods: 
UKIM, he notes, defines itself as ‘an ideological organization. It believes that Islam 
is a comprehensive way of life which must be translated into action in all sphere of 
life’.89 The purpose of UKIM, according to its constitution, he observes, is ‘to 
establish [an] Islamic social order in the United Kingdom’.90 Geaves acknowledges 
the practical constraints upon the organisation to transform Britain into an Islamic 
state and suggests that for this reason it focuses upon education and da’wa within 
Muslim communities aimed at the preservation of Muslim identity.91 
In order to widen its appeal, Kepel writes, UKIM established MET and the Islamic 
Foundation. Geaves observes that MET ‘is the oldest national Muslim educational 
organization in Britain dealing with the concerns of Muslims in regard to the 
education of their children’.92 Kepel describes MET as engaged in the ‘Islamization’ 
of education in state schools.93 MET has been active in providing teachers for 
Islamic studies in state schools, producing literature for use by teachers around the 
world. ‘Its many publications,’ Kepel writes, ‘define the content and form of 
education designed to perpetuate a specific Islamic cultural identity and to prevent 
the assimilation of Muslim children into British society’.94 MET is led by Ghulam 
Sarwar, who Kepel recognises as devoting ‘his energies to the propagation of Islam 
throughout the world’.95 
Kepel describes the Islamic Foundation as the ‘secular arm’ of ‘the Islamist 
movement inspired by Mawdudi’s Jama’at-i Islami’ and as ‘one of the most 
important centres for the propagation of militant Sunni Islamist thinking in the 
world’.96 The Foundation—in addition to housing MIHE, which offers degrees and 
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diplomas as an Associate College of the University of Gloucestershire—incorporates 
a think tank, The Policy Research Centre, which aims to shape government policy on 
matters relating to Muslims in Britain, and a publishing house, currently 
incorporated as Kube Publishing Ltd. Since 1976, the Foundation has also housed an 
Islamic Economics Unit for the promotion of Islamic economics, finance and 
banking as both a topic of academic study and as a commercial practice. 
The Foundation’s production and dissemination of pro-Mawdudi and pro-Qutb 
material, Kepel asserts, has exerted a significant influence on the development of 
Muslim identity in Britain, particularly amongst Muslim youth.97 Following Kepel, 
Vidino describes the Foundation as the ‘crown jewel’ of the ‘Mawdudist network’ 
and ‘a beacon for the spread of Islamist thought in the West’.98 Whine writes in 
similar terms of the Foundation as ‘the UK center’ for Jama’at-i-Islami.99 Kepel 
remarks that the training courses provided by the Foundation for public officials, 
‘constitute a vital element in the [Islamist] movement’s strategy aimed at achieving 
hegemony in the Islamic field’.100 He notes that the first two directors—including 
Khurshid Ahmad—were officers of Jama’at-i-Islami. Today, Ahmad is Vice 
President of Jama’at-i-Islami Pakistan and remains the chair of the Foundation. As 
noted above, he is seen as a key figure in the development of the global Muslim 
Brotherhood in Europe. 
Another key figure of the Islamic Foundation recognised in the literature as having 
played a significant role in the development of Islamism in Britain and Europe is the 
late Khurram Murad, referred to by Vidino as a ‘Brotherhood dawa strategist’101 and 
by McRoy as ‘the main ideologue of da’wah in Britain’.102 In 1978, Murad, became 
the director general of the Foundation, which, he asserted, ‘perpetually aims at 
Islamic resurgence in the world’.103. He is considered to have written some of the 
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most important works on Islam’s place in Europe, including The Islamic Movement 
in the West: Reflections on Some Issues and Dawah Among Non-Muslims in the 
West.104  
According to Nina Wiedl, Murad shared with the Muslim Brotherhood an 
understanding of da’wa as an ‘inherently political activity … leading to the eventual 
establishment of an Islamic state’.105 She observes Murad’s description of da’wa as 
having two objectives. These are, she writes, firstly, to preserve Muslim identity in a 
secular society whose values are deemed threatening to Islam as a ‘way of life’, and, 
secondly, to spread Islam beyond Muslim communities to the West’s native non-
Muslim population.106 Wiedl recognises the broad correspondence between these 
two objectives and al-Qaradawi’s vision for the West. These objectives also align 
with the two-stage strategy for Muslims in Europe expressed by M. Ali Kettani at 
the ICE conference held in 1978, referred to by Patrick Sookhdeo as a plan for the 
Islamic control of Europe’s social structures.107  
In the words of Zahoor Qureshi, Murad established YM as the vehicle to carry out 
the mission of ‘present[ing] Islam to the British population as an alternative way of 
life’.108 Its founding committee, McRoy notes, was trained at the Islamic 
Foundation.109 McRoy observes from the organisation’s own literature that it 
supports jihad, seen as a war against the kuffar,110 in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir 
and Palestine, as well as the restoration of the caliphate.111 YM’s national leader was 
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Murad’s son, Farooq, a founding member of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 
of which he was director general between June 2010 and June 2014. 
The Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) was created in 1988, by the Bangledeshi wing of 
Jama’at-i-Islami.112 Journalist Andrew Gilligan describes IFE a ‘secretive, 
fundamentalist political network.’113 The blog Harry’s place refers to IFE as the 
‘British section’ of Jama’at-i-Islami.114 Located at the East London Mosque, IFE is a 
politically active organisation and, as revealed by Gilligan, was instrumental in 
Respect Party George Galloway’s 2005 election in the London Borough of Bethnal 
Green and Bow.115 Gilligan claims to have obtained IFE documents that explicitly 
state its strategic objective as ‘the establishment of a global society, the Khilafah 
[caliphate] … comprised of individuals who live by the principles of … the 
Shari’ah.’ In these documents, IFE states that it is dedicated to changing the ‘very 
infrastructure of [British] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its 
creed … from ignorance to Islam.’116 
IFE’s ‘parent organisation’, the East London Mosque (ELM), is also considered by 
numerous analysts as a key institution within the Mawdudist stream of the global 
Muslim Brotherhood. It was the meeting place for the Mawdudist intellectuals who 
formed the first Islamist organisation in Britain, UKIM.117 In recent years it has 
courted controversy over its invitation of radical preachers, including the now-
deceased al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki.118 It is one of a number of mosques 
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allegedly controlled by the Mawdudist movement, which Vidino claims to host 
sermons and lectures proclaiming ‘the superiority of Islam and the need to turn 
Britain, as well as the rest of the world, into an Islamic state’.119 
Arguably the most important Muslim organisation in Britain, the Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), was established in 1997 in the wake of the Rushdie affair. Designed, 
in founder Iqbal Sacranie’s words, to present ‘a united Muslim voice’, MCB was 
embraced by Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard and, after Labour’s 
victory in 1997, his successor Jack Straw as the key interlocutor for Muslims in 
Britain.120 McRoy states that it is not accurate to designate MCB as a ‘pro-Jama‘at 
front’ due to the diversity of its affiliates.121 However, its formation, he writes, 
should be seen as the ‘means to secure the dominance of Mawdudist ideology in 
British Islam’.122 Vidino concurs, noting that ‘the leadership of the organization has 
traditionally been dominated by individuals from the Mawdudist network whose 
political and organizational skills have allowed them to overshadow other trends’.123 
Other analysts agree. Journalist Martin Bright, for example, writes that the MCB 
leadership and some of its affiliates ‘sympathise with and have links to’ Jama’at-i-
Islami.124 Bright quotes Abdul-Rehman Malik, contributing editor of Muslim 
magazine Q-News, as saying that, ‘Many of the affiliates of The Muslim Council of 
Britain are inspired by Maududi's ideology’.125 In written evidence submitted to the 
Home Affairs Select Committee, The Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think 
tank, states that the MCB is ‘closely aligned’ to Jama’at-i-Islami.126 It also refers to a 
Communities and Local Government document from March 2009, which asserts that 
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Jama’at-i-Islami ‘helped to create and subsequently dominate the leadership of the 
MCB’.127 
2.2. The Ikhwanis 
Similarly to how Britain’s ‘Mawdudist movement’ is written about independently 
from key Arab Muslim figures and their associated organisations, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Britain is sometimes written about as an Arab Islamist movement 
distinct from the Mawdudists, albeit connected to them, comprised of specific 
organisations. This is a narrower concept of the Brotherhood than that of Vidino’s 
‘New Western Brotherhood’, for it emphasises connections to the original 
organisation of the Ikhwan in Cairo.  
According to Michael Whine, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood operates 
through ‘a series of interlocking companies’ of mainly Arab origin. These, he says, 
include the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the Muslim Welfare Trust, 
Interpal, the Palestine Return Centre, and the Institute of Islamic Political Thought 
(IIIT).128 Whine describes MAB as the most important of these organisations. He 
also refers to MAB as ‘in effect the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] of Britain’.129 Vidino 
prefers to describe MAB as ‘a quintessentially New Western Brotherhood 
organization in its origins, connections and ideology’, which highlights its 
operational independence from the original organisation whilst acknowledging its 
historical and ideological relationship with it.130 He notes that MAB is a ‘key 
member’ of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), ‘the Western 
Brothers’ Brussels-based pan-European organization’.131 
MAB’s founders and leading figures are recognised by Whine, Vidino, and others as 
related to the original Muslim Brotherhood organisation, including its founder and 
first president, Kamal al-Helbawy. Described by one young activist as the ‘grand 
sheikh of the Islamic movement in the UK’, al-Helbawy arrived in Britain in 1994 to 
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establish a media and communications centre for the Cairo-based group.132 
According to John Ware, al-Helbawy came with a political vision, which he 
expressed in typical Islamist terms, stating, ‘This religion that is Islam shall govern 
the whole universe, the Islamic civilisation should rule and govern and direct people 
in every walk of life, but not be governed by others.’133 After a disagreement with 
the Ikhwani leadership in Egypt, al-Helbawy abandoned the media centre project to 
establish MAB, which David Rich says ‘has retained a strong Arab influence and 
has come to be regarded as the British branch of the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] in 
all but name’.134 Rich writes that, through MAB, al-Helbawy has done more than 
any other to push the Brotherhood ‘into the public arena’.135 One of the MAB’s most 
commonly acknowledged successes was its role, as part of the Stop the War 
Coalition, in the organisation of public protests in 2002 and 2003 against the allied 
invasion of Iraq. 
Another of MAB’s former leaders is Anas Altikriti, the son of Omar Altikriti, a 
prominent Ikhwan leader in Iraq. As Maher and Frampton observe, during Altikriti’s 
tenure as president of MAB in 2004, MAB issued a statement that acknowledged its 
respect for the ‘humane notions and principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, who [sic] 
has proven to be an inspiration to Muslims, Arab and otherwise for many 
decades’.136 The statement also acknowledged MAB’s independence from the 
‘opinion and line of the Muslim Brotherhood’ organisation. In line with Vidino’s 
notion of the global Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological movement, Maher and 
Frampton stress that whilst MAB and other groups do not follow the orders of ‘an 
Islamist equivalent of the Comintern’ centred in Cairo, they may nevertheless be 
considered as ‘in step with a broader movement, which adheres to Islamist 
ideology’.137 Rich concurs with this view, writing: 
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They are not yet at the state advocated by Kamal Helbawy of operating as an open 
organization under the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] name, but there is little attempt to 
disguise the fact that MAB, BMI, and other similar groupings are aligned with the 
MB school of thought, although not, it is often stressed, under its organizational 
direction.138 
Altikriti established and currently directs the Cordoba Foundation, described by 
David Cameron in March 2008 as a ‘front for the Muslim Brotherhood’.139 Merley 
describes Altikriti as a ‘UK Muslim Brotherhood leader’.140 The Telegraph’s 
Andrew Gilligan refers to Altikriti as ‘the key political lobbyist for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Britain’.141 Cameron, Merley and Gilligan’s characterisations invoke 
a concept of the Brotherhood in the West that is more formally structured than that 
of the Brotherhood as ideological movement shared by Vidino and Maher and 
Frampton. In any case, the Cordoba Foundation is conceived as Islamist in negative, 
critical terms: Gilligan describes it as an ‘extremist’ group that seeks ‘the creation of 
an Islamic dictatorship, or caliphate, in Europe’.142 Maher and Frampton describe the 
organisation less dramatically as an ‘Islamist pressure group’.143 
Journalist Innes Bowen writes that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s British story’ is a 
‘tale of how a group of mainly Arab Islamist intellectuals attempted to win the 
leadership of Britain’s predominantly South Asian, working-class Muslim 
population’.144 Again, the Muslim Brotherhood is conceived as an organisational 
actor with its own historical trajectory, rooted in the politics of Arab North Africa, 
separate from but connected to Jama’at-i-Islami.  
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It is worth mentioning, as Bowen notes, that prior to the creation of MAB, the 
Cordoba Foundation and other Arab-led organisations in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
first generally-acknowledged Brotherhood organisations in Britain were established 
decades before. These include the Muslim Students Society, established in 1961 and 
the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), formed the year after. Both still 
exist today. Said Ramadan, writes David Rich, was a regular visitor to FOSIS in the 
1970s. The organisation, he asserts, ‘has been courted constantly’ by the Muslim 
Brotherhood.145 James Brandon and Rafaello Pantucci, citing FOSIS’s website, state 
that Ramadan co-founded the organisation.146 
2.3. Islamism in Britain: two streams, one movement 
Although the Brotherhood and Jama’at are sometimes written about independently 
as two distinct movements, ideological and organisational connections are often 
drawn between the individuals and groups associated with them. Vidino explicitly 
conceives of a movement in such terms. According to Vidino, these connections, 
forged in the new milieus of Europe and North America, constitute the two 
movements into one overarching, ‘multiethnic’ movement that has become 
deterritorialised from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent.147 The Jama’at-i-
Islami network, he writes, acts ‘in close cooperation, if not almost complete 
symbiosis’ with the European Brotherhood, of which, he asserts, it is a ‘fully-fledged 
member’.148 A similar view is expressed in the summary document of the British 
government’s review of the Muslim Brotherhood, which clusters Ikhwani- and 
Jama’ati-associated groups together in what it calls ‘the UK Brotherhood 
movement’.149 The document doesn’t elaborate beyond this passing comment, 
however. In contrast—because of his view of the global Muslim Brotherhood as a 
covert organisation rather than an ideological movement—Merley describes the 
                                               
145 Rich (2010), p.118. 
146 Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.19. 
147 Vidino (2012), p.63 
148 Ibid., p.64 
149 House of Commons (2015), para.28, p.5. 
  99 
Mawdudist organisations such as the Islamic Foundation and MCB in terms of 
‘acting in concert with’ the global Brotherhood.150   
In other analysts’ work, the notion of a singular, participationist Islamist movement 
is not explicitly conceived, but ideological and organisational links between 
individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-
Islami are often referred to, implying an overarching movement. Whine, for 
instance, acknowledges an ‘alliance’ between these two ‘ideological streams’ as ‘a 
major influence on the Muslim community’.151 Maher and Frampton, after a 
discussion of the two strands of Islamism, imply a singular movement in their 
evaluation of the British government’s engagement with MCB and MAB: ‘At the 
heart of the Islamist strategy,’ they write, ‘is a clear agenda: to mould the future 
direction of British Islam and the Muslim community in Britain.’152 Bowen, despite 
placing Arab Islamists as the central protagonists of ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
story in Britain’, as just mentioned, writes of ‘the Islamic Movement’, invoking an 
Islamist collective incorporating both the Mawdudist-dominated MCB and the 
predominantly Arab MAB.153 The Henry Jackson Society similarly clusters MCB 
and MAB, since they both ‘espouse a narrow form of political Islam inspired by the 
Islamist parties JI and MB’.154 
Supporting the view of an Islamist movement in Britain beyond specific associations 
with Mawdudi or al-Banna’s original organisations, Gilles Kepel cites Ashan 
Manazir, the long-time director of the Islamic Foundation, as stating, ‘We belong to 
the international Islamic movement, neither to Jamaat nor to Ikhwan nor to the 
Refah Party in Turkey—but all of them are our friends.’155 Manazir played a key 
role in the two precursor organisations to MCB, firstly, the United Kingdom Action 
Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), which lobbied Thatcher’s government to 
ban Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. Following UKACIA’s dissolution after 
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the Rushdie affair, he was also involved in the group that sprang from it, the 
National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU), which met in 1994 with 
the explicit intention of creating ‘an organization that Whitehall might find 
appealing’.156  
Alongside Manazir in NICMU, as a founding committee member, was a young 
activist, Abdullah Faliq, who today plays a leadership role in a number of allegedly 
Islamist organisations, including IFE and the Cordoba Foundation. Faliq’s role as 
head of research for Altikriti’s organisation, as well as his involvement in al-
Helbawy’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism, is an example, writes David Rich, of 
collaboration between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, whose 
activities, he says, ‘often complement each other or merge into one in Britain’.157  
According to Vidino, trans-ethnic networking is a key characteristic of the global 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, as described in the European context earlier. 
Additional examples in Britain include al-Helbawy’s involvement in helping 
establish MCB, and his status as a trustee of the Islamic Foundation.158 Bowen notes 
that in the 1980s and 1990s, al-Helbawy led a group called the ‘Coordination 
Committee between Islamic Movements’ and worked closely with the Islamic 
Foundation’s Khurshid Ahmad ‘to bring together leading representatives of the 
Islamic Movement from around the world’.159 From 1988 to 1994, al-Helbawy also 
worked as an adviser at Ahmad’s Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad.160 A more 
recent example is former MAB leader and Palestinian activist Azzam Tamimi’s 
tenure as lecturer at the Markfield Institute of Higher Education from 2000 to 
2004.161  
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Not only have certain individuals worked across ethnic divides within the network of 
Islamist organisations in Britain and abroad. Certain organisations have too. The 
Brotherhood’s European body, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, 
was located for some years with the Islamic Foundation at Markfield, ‘the UK 
centre’ for Jama’at-i-Islami.162 This appears for some observers as further evidence 
of the blurring of the Brotherhood and Jama’at movements in the West into one. ‘In 
this fashion,’ writes Whine, ‘the two organizations have advanced the ideological 
link made between them after the Second World War by [Brotherhood ideologue] 
Said Qutb and Mawlana Maududi.’163  
3. Religious reform and ‘post-Islamism’ 
Contrary to the notion that a participationist Islamist movement exists in Britain, 
some academics and other observers of Islam-inspired activism in Britain contend 
that the organisations often said to comprise the movement are undergoing a 
transformation in values, ideology and goals. This, they claim, is a result of exposure 
to the liberal democratic political and social environment in which they have 
developed for decades. It is particularly evident, they say, in a generational shift as 
young activists begin to take leadership positions in these organisations, replacing 
(or working alongside) the founder members who were (or are) more attached to the 
Islamist politics of the Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, from where they came. 
One variant of this line of reasoning postulates a development in Muslim politics 
termed ‘post-Islamism’. Another refers to the creation of a ‘European Islam’ or 
‘British Islam’ in line with the continent’s liberal democratic values.  
There are several other lines of thought that appear to undermine the notion of an 
Islamist movement in Britain. These include one that sees a fragmentation of 
Islamist groups and a dilution of doctrinaire orientations resulting from the Arab 
Spring. They also include one that doubts the political continuity between al-
Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood and the contemporary organisations typically 
considered as its offshoots. Another considers such organisations as comprising an 
ethical, rather than a political, movement. 
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3.1. The indigenisation of Islam and a transformation in values 
Sara Silvestri claims that ‘Europe’s Islamist groups, which were once focused on 
their home country or region, are becoming ever more Europeanised and engaged in 
a process of integration.’164 She acknowledges the existence of a Muslim 
Brotherhood network in Europe, embodied by the Federation of Islamic 
Organisations in Europe (FIOE), which she says, is seriously engaged in a ‘process 
of “Islamising” European culture, though without erasing it’.165 Citing FIOE’s call 
for full Muslim participation within European social and political life, as expressed 
in its Muslims of Europe Charter of 2008, Silvestri claims that 
the types of activity initiated by the European branch of the network in this first 
decade of the new millennium seem to mark a new direction for the movement’s 
presence in Europe … it seems as if the original political ideology of the movement 
lost its significance once it had been transplanted to an alien environment, and needed 
to be re-elaborated in the light of the new context of Muslims being citizens of 
Europe.166 
From this hesitant position on the effects of the European environment on the 
ideology of the Brotherhood, Silvestri makes the point more assertively, stating, 
‘there is no doubt that thirty years of the Muslim Brothers’ presence in Europe have 
… modified the views and the objectives of the organisation’.167  
Silvestri’s contention connects to a debate on the emergence of a distinctly European 
Islam, a concept originally expressed by Bassam Tibi in 1992.168 Tibi advocates a 
secularised, ‘progressive’ form of Islam, compatible with the West’s liberal 
democratic culture and institutions. This idea of a European Islam relates to that of a 
‘British Islam’, for underlying both concepts is the notion that Islam, in a Muslim-
minority environment, is in the process of adapting to liberal, democratic values. It 
should be said that the literature is important here not insofar as it raises the question 
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of a general trend within Islamic doctrine or practice in Britain—there are plenty of 
interesting examples of ‘progressive’ Islam. It is important, rather, insomuch as it 
relates to the extent to which allegedly Islamist organisations in Britain—
specifically those who are considered to comprise an Islamist movement—have 
transformed their values and strategies. 
For instance, a recent Pew report states that in Britain,  
two groups that were originally inspired by the Jama’at-i Islami—the Islamic Society 
of Britain and its youth wing, Young Muslims UK—are now, at least to some extent, 
its rivals. These newer organizations strive to promote a distinctly ‘British Islam’ that 
combines mainstream civic engagement with, as they see it, a robust and confident 
Muslim public identity.169  
This notion of a ‘British Islam’ is supported by McRoy. He states that the ideologies 
of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), Islamic Forum Europe and their youth wings, 
as well as Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) ‘originally derive from the 
teachings of the Jama’at-i-Islami and the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim 
Brotherhood)’, but adds that ‘their ideologies have been contextualised for the 
British situation’.170 
ISB, McRoy states, ‘has played a major role in the indigenisation of Islam in the 
UK’.171 The evidence he provides to substantiate this claim is rather thin, but goes 
some way to illuminate what he means by contextualisation. He cites the 
organisation of a convention ‘which proposed a way of harmonising Islam with 
British life’ and the brochure for it that quotes the Tunisian émigré, Rashid al-
Ghannushi on the compatibility of Islam with democracy and on the need for 
Muslim participation in the British political system.172 McRoy applies the same 
perspective to MAB: 
Many MAB founders were connected to the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood], but they 
have contextualised their beliefs and praxis for the UK situation. It is vital to 
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recognise this to understand their policy and strategy … MAB has a dynamic attitude 
to ideology that is also governed by its concern to contextualise Islam in the British 
sphere.173  
McRoy supports this contention by citing a MAB statement, signed by then-
chairman Anas Altikriti, which distances itself from the thinking of the Muslim 
Brotherhood ideologue Said Qutb. He also cites the work of the former MAB leader 
and Hamas spokesman, Azzam Tamimi. McRoy describes the ‘current strategy’ of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, in Tamimi’s words, as the ‘gradual reform of society and 
state’. It is one, Tamimi asserts, that ‘considers democracy compatible with Islam, 
and accepts the principle of power sharing’.174 McRoy omits to mention Tamimi’s 
contention that Islam cannot be secularised and that ‘Islam loses its purpose’ without 
‘shari’ah, the body of laws and regulations’.175 
Along similar lines, Sophie Gilliat-Ray suggests that in recent years the Islamic 
Foundation, as part of the Islamist movement in Britain, has adopted a more 
progressive and liberal stance. In 2010, Gilliat-Ray claimed that in the past decade 
there has been ‘a gradual transition towards a “reformist Islamism”’ resulting from 
generational changes in the staffing of institutions such as the Foundation’.176 To 
support her contention, she refers to an article of Seán McLoughlin, who asserts, 
‘Islamic intellectuals and activists in the West are increasingly evolving innovative, 
cosmopolitan and self-critical reformulations of their tradition.’177 McLoughlin’s 
statement is, in fact, a summary of Peter Mandaville’s position, which is based upon 
interviews with staff members of the Islamic Foundation. McLoughlin cautions that, 
‘Mandaville perhaps overstates the widespread acceptance of such a trend in Britain, 
for any transformations at the IF [Islamic Foundation] are still, in my opinion, very 
much in transition.’ Nevertheless, he argues—without qualification—that ‘a critical 
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mass hospitable to such perspectives has undoubtedly begun to emerge at the 
institution’.178  
McLoughlin notes the recognition in the academic literature of the Foundation’s 
transition from being inspired by ‘first generation’ Islamism, i.e. by the ideas of 
Mawdudi and Jama’at-i-Islami, to ‘the values and experiences of a “second 
generation” more aware of the global interdependency of “Islam” and the “West”’, 
such as that allegedly expressed by the Foundation’s director general, Khurshid 
Ahmad. He adds that it is necessary to talk of a ‘“third generation” of (diasporic) 
intellectual-activists’. These are the ‘“thirty somethings” of, British-Asian heritage’ 
and converts to Islam, he says, that are particularly visible in the Foundation’s 
research units. For these young activists, he writes, ‘concepts such as “the Islamic 
movement” and “da’wa”, are all now “up for grabs”’, though how this is manifest 
within the organisation, strategically or operationally, is not explored in 
McLoughin’s work.179 
McLoughlin acknowledges that ‘unlike many of his younger colleagues, Ahmad is 
still committed to “Islamization from below” and does not exclude the non-Muslim 
state from such transformation’.180 In terms typical of Mawdudi and al-Banna’s 
strategic vision, Ahmad, notes McLoughlin, sees the route to the transformation of 
the state ‘through the individual, community and civil society’.181 But Ahmad’s 
view, McLoughlin argues, is increasingly forced to inhabit the same space as views 
to the contrary. In the 1990s and 2000s, McLoughlin, observes, the Islamic 
Foundation began to de-emphasise ‘its original concern for da’wa and counter-
cultural Islamization’.182 This was evident, he writes, in the launch of the Markfield 
Institute of Higher Education and in the conduct of ‘a Home Office-endorsed 
cultural awareness training programme on Muslims in Britain for non-Muslim 
professionals’.183 But McLoughlin does not explain how education and training 
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couldn’t possibly be, or be seen as, instruments for ‘da’wa and counter-cultural 
Islamization’. 
According to McLoughlin, the Islamic Foundation is experiencing a transition from 
‘counter-cultural da’wa’ to what Gerd Baumann calls ‘multicultural convergence’, 
that is, seeking ‘same point of agreement [with others]; but … from its own point of 
origin, and by its own route’.184 This is exemplified, McLouglin says, in a document 
produced by Nadeem Malik, an ISB member and former Citizen Organising 
Foundation trainer based at the Foundation. Malik, McLoughlin notes, draws upon 
Islamic principles and concepts to promote ‘civic consciousness and active 
citizenship by British Muslims’, and the ‘common’ (rather then the ‘communal’) 
good, emphasising ‘common’ (rather than ‘Islamic’) values.185 Although 
McLoughlin’s view of the changes within the Islamic Foundation is admittedly 
modest, the value he places upon Malik’s document as a measure of the 
transformation of values in the organisation is certainly overstated.  
The former president of ISB, an associate of Malik, is Dilwar Hussain. Seemingly 
supporting the aforementioned Pew report and McRoy’s claim that ISB has 
undergone a transformation away from Islamism, Innes Bowen notes that Hussain 
‘describes a drift towards what he describes as “post-Islamism”’.186 Whereas, in the 
1990s, Hussain found the works of Qutb inspiring, he came to find them dangerous 
after 911. Bowen also notes that in 2009, when it was drawn to ISB’s attention that 
six years previously the organisation had hosted the al-Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar 
al-Awlaki, it was quick to acknowledge the preacher’s increased ‘extremism’ and 
disown him.  
Hussain is also cited by James Brandon and Rafaello Pantucci as an example of a 
‘post-Islamist’ for his expressed rejection of formerly-held Islamist positions on 
matters such as the need for an Islamic state. They refer to Hussain’s writings, where 
he calls for ‘a shift towards a post-Islamist paradigm among activists in the West’.187 
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In addition to his former role at ISB, Hussain was the long-time director of the 
Policy Research Centre at the Islamic Foundation (2007-2013). Perhaps 
McLoughlin’s work on the Foundation would have benefitted from including 
Hussain’s shifting political perspective. In their 2009 report for Policy Exchange, 
Maher and Frampton note that senior government officials have suggested to the 
think tank that Hussain’s ‘positive comments represent a gradual, generational shift 
within the Islamic Foundation’.188 
3.2. The ‘Arab Spring’ and the fragmentation of British Islamism 
According to Brandon and Pantucci, for Hussain and other ‘post-Islamists’, such as 
Muslim convert Sarah Joseph, ‘doctrinaire Islamism has become increasingly diluted 
by pragmatic considerations and influenced as well by a range of secular, liberal and 
democratic ideas, sometimes to the point of no longer being recognizably 
Islamist’.189 One of the key catalysts for this transformation within British Islamism, 
write Brandon and Pantucci, has been the so-called Arab Spring. For Hussain, they 
observe, the Arab uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East—and the practical 
need to accommodate a plurality of political voices in the new governmental 
arrangements—were a sign of the demise of Islamism and its inherent, long-held 
objective of an Islamic state. They also quote Inayat Bunglawala, former spokesman 
for MCB, who, in response to the events in Egypt and Tunisia, wrote, ‘An “Islamic 
state” which does not respect the human rights of all its people including freedom of 
religion and gay rights would necessarily be an unjust state.’190  
Brandon and Pantucci portray an ‘increasing trend toward moderation’ in Britain 
encouraged by the Arab uprisings, particularly amongst ‘post-Islamists’, but they 
make the broader point that the events of 2011 have ‘shak[en] Islamist ideas and 
sharpen[ed] divisions within the Islamist movement’ in Britain: ‘[T]he Arab 
uprisings have clearly shaken up the often stagnant waters of British Islamism, 
catalyzing change and accelerating existing trends; sometimes triggering new 
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moderation and pragmatism, in other instances reinforcing existing extremist 
views.’191 By ‘Islamist movement’, it should be said, they include not just 
organisations or individuals linked with the ‘participationist’ Muslim Brotherhood 
and Jama’at-i-Islami, but also those associated with the ‘rejectionist’ Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and al-Muhajiroun. It is, thus, unsurprising to note that the divisions in the 
movement that the authors describe in terms of diverse reactions to the Arab 
uprisings pre-existed these events abroad.  
The divisions are less stark when only participationist individuals and organisations 
are considered, at least as far as their attitudes towards the role of Islam in the new 
governments of the region are concerned. According to Brandon and Pantucci, they 
generally appear more open-minded than the ‘extremist’ activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and al-Muhajiroun. However, the authors note some significant divisions between 
the participationists, triggered by the uprisings, in terms of their political interests 
and investments directed outside Britain to North Africa and the Middle East. A 
number of key Arab figures in British organisations associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood have returned to their original countries to become actively involved in 
the new political arrangements of the region, or have become involved whilst 
maintaining a base in Britain. Because of this, Brandon and Pantucci state, ‘the 
leadership of some UK-based Islamist movements—most notably those connected to 
the Tunisian and Egyptian Brotherhoods—have been weakened or hollowed out’.192  
These figures include Rashid al-Ghannushi, a former Head of Policy, Media and 
Public Relations at MCB and frequent speaker at FOSIS events, and Kamal al-
Helbawy. Al-Ghannushi, who founded and leads Tunisia’s al-Nahda party, returned 
to his home country in 2011 to participate in Tunisia’s transition to a democratically 
elected government. The ‘veteran Muslim Brotherhood member’ al-Helbawy, 
likewise, became involved in the post-Mubarak political developments of his native 
Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to participate openly in the 
country’s democratisation process following decades of being officially banned, 
even though he then renounced his support for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party. Other British-based Arab Brothers whose original countries did not 
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undergo democratic uprisings, note Brandon and Rafaello, have also seized upon the 
opportunity to advance political causes particular to their countries of origin. Azzam 
Tamimi, for example, has been ‘visibly invigorated’ by the uprisings, seeing them as 
a chance to advance the Palestinian cause. 
Although Brandon and Pantucci do not claim that there is no global Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in Britain, they paint a fragmented picture of 
‘participationist Islamism’ within the country, exacerbated by events abroad, which 
might support such a claim. The fragmentation of the putative movement appears 
most prominently in the diverse political causes outside Britain to which the political 
capital of key Brotherhood figures has become directed. The involvement of these 
activists in the national politics of North Africa and the Middle East does seem to 
undermine the unity of purpose or orientation that the global Muslim Brotherhood in 
Britain, with which they are associated, is assumed to possess. It may not offer 
conclusive evidence that no such movement exists, for there are Muslim 
Brotherhood-associated activists, other than the few figures referred to by Brandon 
and Pantucci, that remain engaged in Britain-focused activism. But it certainly raises 
the question of the extent to which an Islamist movement comprised of the global 
Muslim Brotherhood may be said to exist in Britain whilst some of its key activists 
are channeling their energies to multiple and separate national causes.  
3.3. Doubting political lineages and aspirations 
In addition to the analysts that portray a transformation in the values and goals of 
allegedly Islamist organisations, such as McRoy and McLoughlin—and to Brandon 
and Pantucci, who observe a fragmentation in the ‘Islamist movement’ made more 
apparent by the Arab uprisings—others seem to question whether these 
organisations were ever Islamist and doubt their links to the original Muslim 
Brotherhood or Jama’at-i-Islami organisations. Jytte Klausen, for example, in her 
study of Muslim elites in Europe, implies that there is no global Muslim 
Brotherhood movement: 
A common misperception is that today’s national Muslim associations are direct 
descendants in new clothing of an earlier generation of exile organizations from 
Islamic countries. Muslim organizations that link faith with political advocacy are 
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often described as the offspring of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, but the label lumps 
together groups and individuals who have little in common.193 
A final perspective that appears to undermine the notion of the global Muslim 
Brotherhood as an ideologically-driven Islamist movement is offered by Brigitte 
Maréchal. Unlike Klausen, she does not claim the Muslim associations in Europe 
have no relation to the original Muslim Brotherhood organisation. Yet neither does 
she see the Brotherhood as an Islamist movement working to introduce the 
principles of Islamic law into Europe’s social fabric ultimately leading to an Islamic 
state. ‘As for their relationship to European society,’ she asserts, ‘the brothers do not 
oppose the nation state, nor do they advocate establishing an Islamic state.’194 Unlike 
Silvestri, Maréchal does not assert that the Muslim Brotherhood has become 
‘Europeanised’. She remarks, rather, that ‘the movement struggles to insert Islam 
into European society’, but doesn’t see this struggle as political.195 This is not to say 
that she does not see it as politically engaged—it advocates, says Maréchal, active 
Muslim participation in the state and society—but that the fundamental struggle in 
which it is engaged is cultural and ethical rather than political. ‘Above all,’ she 
states, ‘the Brotherhood appears to be a moral movement’.196 What the Brotherhood 
proposes, she asserts, ‘is an ethos. This is understood as an Islamic ethical practice 
involving a concrete way of acting, rather than an ideology understood as a seamless 
body of doctrines and dogmas’.197 
4. Assessing the debate for identifying a movement 
Chapter one outlined a concept of social movement for assessing whether the 
organisations and individuals in Britain that are often portrayed as Islamists 
collectively constitute a movement. To recap, the three elements of this concept are, 
firstly, an organisational structure of networked individuals and groups; secondly, 
cultural affinities, including shared values, perspectives, attitudes and practices, 
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which form the basis for the network’s organisation; and, thirdly, involvement in a 
double-sided conflict in relation to established authorities that concerns, on one 
hand, the identity of the group for which the movement is champion, and, on the 
other, control of the dominant vision and appreciation of the social order. The 
academic and think tank literature that explicitly or implicitly portrays a cluster of 
organisations and individuals in Britain as comprising a participationist Islamist 
movement—the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain—does not reflect an 
awareness of these interrelated conceptual elements. Nevertheless, the literature 
presents some valuable insights and information that may be useful for tracing out a 
movement in Britain in line with them. 
Of the three elements, the organisational aspect of the movement—at least as it 
appears across Europe—is perhaps most comprehensively illustrated by the 
literature. Organisational connections between the groups and individuals alleged or 
assumed to comprise the movement are fairly clearly presented, although the 
existence of a leadership structure, and the extent to which this is formally 
organised, is not adequately established. Contrary to Jytte Klausen’s claim that the 
organisations ‘often described as the offspring of the “Muslim Brotherhood”… have 
little in common’, the literature rather clearly confirms the existence of a politically 
active, collaborative network of organisations and individuals across Europe, as well 
as some striking continuities in the themes, ideas and aspirations expressed by them 
at certain times and places.  
The question, however, is how to make sense of this network and these continuities 
with regard to identifying a movement in Britain. The observations of the personal, 
organisational, financial and other links shared between the various groups thought 
to comprise the movement, particularly in the work of Lorenzo Vidino and Steven 
Merley, are indeed important and useful for tracking the various collaborations of 
these groups within the contours of the network. But the literature doesn’t really 
answer the question as to whether and how this network constitutes a movement in 
Britain. 
The work that explicitly describes or implicitly invokes a participationist Islamist 
movement in Britain is generally united in characterising it as composed from two 
separate ‘streams’ related to al-Banna and Mawdudi’s original organisations. But it 
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is divided over the extent to which the broader movement in the West within which 
it is situated is formally structured. This difference is most stark between the work 
of Merley and Vidino, as previously illustrated. Yet, apart from Merley’s criticism 
of Vidino’s perspective cited earlier, it is not discussed in the literature.  
This might appear to present a lack of consistency in what is being described—a 
covert organisation in Merley’s formulation or an ideological movement in 
Vidino’s. However, this difference might charitably be interpreted as a matter of 
degree or emphasis, since Merley acknowledges the importance of ideology, and 
Vidino, whilst eschewing the notion of a central command structure, recognises the 
importance of organisational links between the groups comprising the movement 
and even acknowledges what he refers to as a Muslim Brotherhood ‘superstructure’ 
in the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe.198  
However, the difference of view regarding the formality of the Brotherhood is 
evident in other treatments of Islamic revivalism in Britain that less explicitly 
invoke the existence of a global Muslim Brotherhood movement as the sum of the 
two aforementioned ‘streams’. In some of these analyses—in the work of Michael 
Whine, for example—the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as ‘represented’ in Britain by 
the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Whilst not going so far as to explicitly 
endorse Merley’s claim of a covert leadership structure in the West, this supports 
the notion of the Brotherhood as an internationally structured organisation, contrary 
to Vidino’s claim that the New Western Brotherhood is essentially an informal 
ideological movement. Maher and Frampton’s analysis, on the other hand, portrays 
the Muslim Brotherhood ‘stream’ in Britain, including MAB, as having the kind of 
operational independence from the Cairo-based organisation that Vidino perceives. 
This lack of clarity on the formal or informal structure of the global Muslim 
Brotherhood network is accompanied by a lack of analytical rigour regarding how 
the movement is constituted as a movement. The analyses that explicitly 
characterise or tacitly assume an overarching Islamist movement in Britain and 
abroad comprised of individuals and organisations associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami take for granted the issue of how such 
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organisations and individuals can collectively comprise a movement, something 
greater than the sum of its parts. Vidino and Merley both list criteria for identifying 
organisations with the global Muslim Brotherhood—they are possibly the only 
analysts of the Brotherhood to do so—but ignore the matter of how the movement 
itself may be identified.  
Vidino’s criteria, for example, which includes a group’s historical ties with Muslim 
Brotherhood members and reverence for al-Qaradawi, relate to the identification of 
certain organisations with the movement, not to the identification of the movement. 
Merley takes the same basic approach. Whilst he asks the pertinent question, ‘How 
is the Global Muslim Brotherhood identified?’, his answer relates to the question 
that Vidino’s analysis is geared towards, namely, of how a given group is identified 
as part of the movement.199 ‘Useful criteria,’ writes Merley, echoing Vidino, 
‘include the origins and founding of the organization and its leaders, contact and 
links to other organizations, ideology, and conferences sponsored and/or 
attended’.200 For both, a global movement is implicitly conceived as the sum of a 
number of organisations, the inclusion of which is based upon the observation that 
each shares common historical, ideological and organisational links with an original, 
forerunner organisation, al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood—or with two if we 
include Mawdudi’s Jama’at-i-Islami. 
For Merley, a covert leadership structure is the lynchpin of the movement. But as 
noted earlier, the evidence he cites to support this contention relates only to the 
Brotherhood in the United States, is aspirational rather than demonstrative, and quite 
dated. For Vidino and almost all other analysts affirming a global Islamist 
movement with a presence in Britain and the West—regardless of their different 
perspectives upon the formal or informal structure of the movement—the key trait 
consistently referred to for identifying specific organisations and individuals as part 
of the Brotherhood movement is ideology, along with a political participatory 
methodology. 
                                               
199 Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, ‘FAQ’. http://www.globalmbwatch.com/faq/. 
200 Ibid. 
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Vidino is explicit that ideological affinities—and a ‘common vision’ as ‘outlined by 
al Qaradawi’—are what holds the various groups together in the global Muslim 
Brotherhood as an ‘ideological movement’.201 Although he emphasises the 
‘heterogeneity’ of the movement he considers each constituent organisation to share 
the same fundamental ideology and ‘a foundation of commonly accepted principles 
and goals [that] unites them all’.202 This ideology, Vidino asserts, concerns a desire 
to apply Islam as a divine ethical code to every aspect of personal and social life, 
ultimately culminating in an Islamic state. The most important of their shared goals, 
he observes, at least in the short- to medium-term, are to preserve the Islamic 
identity of Muslims in the West, and to become the official or de facto interlocutors 
for Muslims in the organisations’ respective countries.203  
This claim is important and incisive, though at face value it is not entirely accurate. 
As this thesis will show, Muslim identity is not something Brotherhood groups 
merely seek to preserve. It is something that they seek to define. And it is not true 
that all Brotherhood groups in Britain seek an interlocutionary role. The Muslim 
Association of Britain, for example, does not. But it does strive to present the 
‘correct’ understanding of Islam and represent Muslims’ needs within Muslim 
communities. The claim that all Brotherhood groups aim to preserve Muslim 
identity and act as interlocutors may not be exactly accurate, but it touches on some 
key aspects of the Brotherhood as a movement as conceived in this thesis. It 
highlights, albeit without explicit reflection, a symbolic struggle for the legitimate 
definition of a constituency and the legitimate authority of a vanguard—key stakes 
in social movement conflicts. However, the extent to which this struggle for 
legitimacy is observed in Britain in Vidino’s work, and that of others, is limited.  
The analyses and arguments that might be used to support the notion of a 
participationist Islamist movement in Britain do not offer an unequivocal picture 
regarding the existence of this movement, but they do provide some useful 
information. Most importantly, they highlight the connections and activities of the 
individuals and organisations alleged to comprise it. It is evident from the literature 
                                               
201 Vidino (2010), pp.68, 40. 
202 Ibid., p.53. 
203 Ibid., pp.80, 85. 
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that there has been a history of institution building and collaborative networking in 
Muslims’ collective interests, although this is illuminated most clearly across 
Europe, leaving plenty of scope for mapping out networks in contemporary Britain, 
a task taken up in the next chapter. It is also evident from the literature that there 
have been a number of resounding concerns and themes expressed relating to 
Muslim identity and needs, but, again, this has been written about most extensively 
as a European phenomenon. 
The work that exists on the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain is actually quite 
limited or dated. Both Vidino and Merley’s work on the movement in Britain 
comprises a limited slice of a wide-angled look at the movement in the West, rather 
than an in-depth treatment. Whine and Rich, whilst explicitly addressing the 
Brotherhood in Britain have each only written a few articles on the subject and 
these, like McRoy’s book, From Rushdie to 7/7: The Radicalisation of Islam in 
Britain, are now almost ten years old. Innes Bowen’s more recent book, Medina in 
Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam, is indeed a useful reference, but 
only contains two relevant chapters—one on Jama’at-related organisations and 
another on Arab Muslim Brotherhood-related ones. Pre-supposing their historical 
and ethnic origins as the most important manner of classifying these groups, it does 
not examine the issue of a singular network or movement. Like much work on 
Islamism in Britain, it presents a journalistic history of organisations, pre-
categorised within sectarian or ethnic lines. 
The arguments that might be amassed to counter the notion of such a movement are 
equally inconclusive, since they not really concerned with a movement as such, but 
they likewise provide some useful insights. Sara Silvestri is one of a few academics 
prepared to make sweeping generalisations about the political aspirations of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a movement in Europe. But her contention that it has 
departed from its Islamist origins in terms of its ideology and objectives is dubious. 
It is founded upon an analysis of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe 
(FIOE), rather than an analysis of a network of individuals and groups. Even then, 
her analysis is focused on FIOE’s written statements, not on its activities. To be 
more precise, it is focused on the content of its statements, not on their production or 
practical role in the relevant fields of social struggle. Silvestri uses the terms 
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‘movement’, ‘network’ and ‘organisation’ interchangeably, indicating a lack of 
analytical clarity. 
Most studies of Islam-inspired activism that might undermine the notion of the 
global Muslim Brotherhood as a movement with a presence in Britain are more 
focused upon specific organisations, such as the Islamic Foundation or the Islamic 
Society of Britain. As illustrated, these either paint a picture of Islamism as 
transforming towards Western liberal values or as fragmenting in the aftermath of 
the Arab uprisings of 2011: One line of reasoning observes a re-evaluation of 
Islam’s place in politics, involving a rejection of the need for an Islamic state, and 
another notes a breakdown of the movement in Britain as a number of key 
organisations’ leaders have returned to their original home countries to become 
involved in the new politics of the region.  
However, there has not been a discussion concerning the relative strength of the 
organisations allegedly reforming within the network of Islamist organisations, and 
the possible effects of this reformation upon the movement as a whole. And, 
likewise, there has been no discussion of the possible impact upon the overall 
movement of a fragmentation of organisations along nationalist lines. The possible 
tension between a transnational umma-centred politics and multiple national politics 
has not been addressed at either the organisational or movement level. 
It may also be said that these arguments are focused upon select individuals within 
these organisations. Yet, there is no reflection on the relative roles and power of the 
individuals who are allegedly developing a reformist or British Islam in relation to 
their colleagues who may remain committed to al-Banna and Mawdudi’s vision of 
an Islamic society and state. It is unclear, for example, what influence the several 
‘thirty-somethings’ in the Islamic Foundation’s research unit have upon the 
organisation’s strategic direction or its choice of activities and alliances. The recent 
departure from the Foundation of Dilwar Hussain—a ‘thirty-something’ when he 
established its research unit—suggests that their influence is not great. Hussain left 
after many years, in part, because he felt his ability to effect change from within was 
limited.204  
                                               
204 Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015. 
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McLoughlin’s claim that the Foundation is moving away from ‘counter-cultural 
da’wa’ may be correct, but it relies heavily upon one document written by Nadeem 
Malik, who is not even a member of staff at the organisation and whose influence 
within it is undemonstrated. Such evidence cannot be held to be reliable. That the 
Foundation’s new approach of civic engagement may be a form of da’wa serving 
Islamist interests, albeit a very subtle one, is a possibility that McLoughlin fails to 
entertain. 
Likewise, there is no reflection upon the relative influence within particular 
organisations, or in the overall movement, of the handful of individuals, such as 
Rashid al-Ghannushi, who have left Britain to participate in the national politics of 
the Middle East. Such individuals are actually few within the broader network of 
Muslim activist organisations and in recent years have not even played a key role in 
them. Moreover, even if it is true that there has been a transformation of values or 
aspirations in certain organisations, or that some key activists have diverted their 
energies to nationalist struggles in the Arab world, this doesn’t refute the notion of a 
participationist Islamist movement as a whole. 
Despite falling short of providing a conclusive picture over whether or not an 
Islamist Brotherhood movement exists in Britain, the arguments that might be 
mustered to support or undermine the existence of such a movement serve as the 
critical context from which this thesis emerged. They also serve as its point of 
departure. They are important because they identify many of the key individuals and 
groups of interest to this thesis ad make the question of an Islamist movement in 
Britain possible: Without identifying politically active Muslim individuals and 
organisations—whether progressive, subversive or otherwise—it is unclear how the 
existence of a movement could be explored. They make the question of a movement 
interesting too: If the organisations often linked to the Ikhwan and Jama’at-i-Islami 
comprise a movement at all, it is significant whether it is potentially subversive of or 
supportive to liberal, democratic norms, i.e. Islamist, ‘post-Islamist’ or otherwise. 








Organisation and Leadership:  
Informal Networks and Formal Bodies 
Chapter 1 presented a concept of social movement as combining three interrelated 
characteristics, namely, organisational networking, shared cultural solidarity, and a 
conflict of vision and values with institutional authority. The current chapter 
examines whether or not the key individuals and groups identified from the academic 
and think tank literature, as well as the news media, as comprising a participationist 
Islamist movement in Britain possess the first characteristic. That is, it examines the 
way in which, and the extent to which, these individuals and groups are networked 
organisationally.  
This chapter builds on the literature presented in Chapter 2, which provided a useful 
illustration of some of these organisational relationships. But it incorporates 
additional insights gleaned from original interviews conducted by the thesis author 
with some of the leading Muslim activists within the network, as well as some more 
recent primary source data, to present a more complete picture of the organisational 
dimensions of this network.  A unique visualisation of the network—comprised of 
relationships between individuals, between organisations, and between individuals 
and organisations—using the software application Gephi is provided in section three 
of the chapter. This chapter—novel in its explicit and detailed attention to the 
question of organisational links between two ‘streams’ of Islamist activism in 
Britain—concludes that there is a dynamic and enduring network comprised at 
several interrelated levels. 
Although the cultural basis and conflictual aspects of this network are respectively 
explored in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5, the relevant organisational parameters 
of the network that are traced out in the current chapter are marked internally by 
culture and externally by conflict. This is to say that the kind of organisational 
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connections and collaborative activities that matter for the purposes of this chapter 
are not merely political, such as those embodied by coalitions and partnerships 
working on specific campaigns. They are also cultural, in bringing together 
individuals with similar ways of perceiving and appreciating the social and political 
reality beyond any particular issue upon which coalition partners may be in 
agreement. For this reason, non-Muslim groups are excluded from consideration. The 
Socialist Workers Party, for example, is not considered part of the network, despite 
their connection with the Muslim Association of Britain in the Stop the War 
coalition. 
The kind of connections and collaborations that are pertinent for the purposes of this 
chapter are also conflictual in their orientation to transform social and political 
realities. This is because such an orientation inevitably brings these individuals and 
their associated groups into a contentious relationship with authority, whether that is 
in the form of ways of thinking, regularised practices or the institutions that support 
them. Muslim groups that are clearly supportive of the social and political status quo, 
even if some of their staff have previously been involved in groups related to 
Jama’at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan, are not considered as part of the network. New 
Horizons in British Islam, a new organisation dedicated to the reform of Muslim 
thought and practice, for example, is not included, despite the former involvement of 
its founding chair, Dilwar Hussain, in a number of Jama’at-i-Islami associated 
organisations, including the Islamic Foundation. This is because Hussain, included in 
the network diagram because of his former roles, has made an explicit break with 
Islamism and New Horizons has no apparent contentious orientation to social and 
political life in Britain.  
It is worthy to note these two parameters, since there are numerous organisational 
and collaborative relationships that might be observed starting with the individuals 
and groups of concern, not all of which would qualify as constituting a movement.  
This chapter observes the working relationships between the relevant individuals and 
organisations in terms of collaborative activities and intermeshing leadership 
structures, formal and informal. As this chapter will show, in addition to instances of 
inter-organisational collaboration are the complex webs of interpersonal relationships 
between an elite cadre of individuals. Even when these interpersonal relationships 
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appear indistinguishable from inter-organisational relationships—as is most apparent 
when a given individual or group exercises clear control over a specific 
organisation—it is most useful to view them as forming an organised network that 
cuts across the formalised structures of named organisations. These interpersonal 
relationships form what may be called a meta-organisational network: an informal 
and decentralised network of individuals nested within and inseparable from the 
organisations that form a broader network viewable in more formal terms.  
The elements of this network are not synonymous with organisations, but neither are 
they simply individuals: They are individuals that have authoritative roles within 
organisations or influence upon them, but they do not simply communicate and 
collaborate as representatives of specific organisations. In numerous instances these 
individuals have roles in multiple organisations, so even when they are officially 
representing one organisation in a given meeting or communicative exchange, the 
others for which they also play a key role have a direct, albeit invisible and only 
latent, involvement. Their connections, even public collaborations, are inseparable 
from—and fundamentally based upon—informal associations and shared histories. It 
is these associations and histories that enable the visible, formal structure of an 
overall network in the shape of organisations, but they are also what guarantee its 
fluidity. It is these associations and histories that enable the creation of new 
organisations and campaigns. 
The interpersonal relationships of these individuals may be observed not just at the 
level of co-involvement in activities and events, but also at the level of planning and 
coordination beyond visible, public collaboration. This might suggest the existence 
of a vanguard, an elite or core group, driving the overall network, although if there is, 
its influence within this network is questionable. The core group within the broader 
network does not comprise a central command structure, but it is clear that the 
network possesses the basic characteristic of organisational collaboration 
characteristic of a social movement. This is evident in the co-implementation of 
activities and, more importantly, in overlapping leadership structures, both formal 
and informal, despite the absence of a singular command centre. 
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1.  Networking and collaboration 
Networking through collaboration may be observed between individuals and 
organisations in Britain associated with Jama’at-i-Islami, between those associated 
with the original Muslim Brotherhood, and—most importantly for the recognition of 
a singular Islamic revivalist network—between individuals and organisations across 
the Jama’at-Ikhwan divide. The relevant literature discussed in the previous chapter 
acknowledges the emergence of a trans-ethnic network in Europe, including Britain. 
But the literature leaves plenty of room to illuminate trans-ethnic working 
relationships in Britain. Lorenzo Vidino’s work is arguably the most insightful on the 
subject of revivalist Islamist groups in the West. This includes British Jama’at-
related organisations within what he sees as a broad ideological Brotherhood 
movement spread across Europe and the United States. But it does not extensively 
explore this movement in Britain beyond one chapter in his book on the subject.  
There are, in fact, few explicit references in the literature to trans-ethnic networking 
in Britain where specific examples are provided. One exception is in an article, as 
noted earlier, by David Rich that refers to the work of Abdullah Faliq, who is 
involved in both Ikhwan-associated organisations, such as the Cordoba Foundation, 
and Jama’at-associated organisations, including the East London Mosque and the 
Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE). Faliq’s portfolio, Rich asserts, demonstrates how the 
activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami ‘often complement each 
other or merge into one in Britain’.1 This chapter provides additional examples of 
such trans-ethnic networking with reference to campaign work, speaking events and 
publications. Although this does not undermine the importance and strength of 
ethnic- and linguistic-related networking amongst revivalist individuals and groups, 
it does, at the very least, question the notion of two distinct movements and suggests 
a singular network whose present concerns and future orientations are at least as 
important as its multiple historical lineages. 
 
 
                                               
1 Rich (2010), p.132, emphasis added. 
 123 
1.1.  Campaigns and other events 
Collaborative working relationships between individuals and groups associated with 
the Ikhwan and Jama’at may be seen in a number of campaigns and other events 
concerned with the perception and treatment of Muslims as a community—expressed 
in Quranic terms as the Muslim umma—or the perception of Islam itself. These 
campaigns involving the various revivalist individuals and groups have been 
spearheaded to raise awareness of social or political issues affecting Muslims or to 
raise funds to support Muslims suffering from hardship or persecution. Key themes 
include the predicament of the umma and Islamophobia in Britain, Palestine, and the 
plight of the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar. These working relationships may also 
be seen in other events, such as speaking engagements and skills development 
workshops, and in the sharing of resources, such as venues for events. 
Islamophobia is an issue that has for some years brought Muslim groups together in 
awareness-raising initiatives, sometimes with the purpose of lobbying government 
for changes in law to protect Muslims from religious discrimination and hatred.2 As 
Chapter 5 will show, Islamophobia also features strongly in their symbolic struggle 
with the British government over the authority to establish a way of seeing and 
evaluating social and political reality: Islamophobia blurs the line between anti-
Muslim bigotry and the legitimate criticism of what the government refers to as 
Islamist ‘non-violent extremism’. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the 
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)—two key organisations respectively 
associated with the Jama’at and Ikhwan streams of the global Muslim Brotherhood in 
Britain—were both official supporters of an event held in London in December 2014 
organised by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) entitled, ‘Institutional 
Islamophobia: A conference to examine state racism and social engineering of the 
Muslim community’. Just a month earlier MCB and MAB representatives attended a 
meeting together in Parliament dedicated to tackling Islamophobia.3 
                                               
2 ‘Secretary General’s Report’, report from MCB Eighth Annual General Meeting, May 14, 2005, 
pp.10-11. Available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20111105153148/http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/Secretary_General_2
005.pdf. 
3 ‘Tackling Islamophobia – UAF Roundtable event at Parliament’, MCB website, November 24, 2014. 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/tackling-islamophobia-uaf-roundtable-event-parliament/. 
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MCB and MAB have both been active in campaigning against Islamophobia for 
many years. Both organisations were official supporters of a national rally organised 
in November 2006 by the Ikhwan-associated British Muslim Initiative and the human 
rights group Liberty to combat the ‘demonisation’ of Muslims and ‘defend freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion’. Other supporters included IFE, the Cordoba 
Foundation, IHRC, the Islam Channel, and Dawatul Islam UK and Eire.4 The rally 
marked the beginning of the 13th annually-held Islam Awareness Week, a 
programme initiated by the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB). In February of the same 
year, a ‘who’s who’ of British revivalist groups spanning the divide between 
Jama’at-i-Islami and the Ikhwan organised a public rally to demonstrate against 
Islamophobia in the wake of the publication in Denmark of cartoons depicting the 
prophet Muhammad. The organisers included MAB, IFE, UK Islamic Mission 
(UKIM), Dawatul Islam, the Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS), and 
ISB. Coordinating partners included the East London Mosque’s London Muslim 
Centre, Young Muslims UK (an offshoot of UKIM), Young Muslims Organisation 
UK (an offshoot of IFE), and Muslim Welfare House. The event was supported by 
MCB and sponsored by the Islam Channel.5 
Islamophobia is an important theme for MCB and MAB, as well as other 
organisations in the revivalist network in Britain, though the two haven’t often 
worked jointly to address to it. This is partly due to the different organisational 
environments that they inhabit, and their different everyday roles and working 
partners. MCB, as Britain’s ‘national representative Muslim umbrella body’, has 
understandably taken a more proactive advocacy role in relation to the British 
government. MAB, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with providing services 
to its members and spreading what it deems as the correct understanding of Islam.6 
MCB and MAB most certainly share close links, but this is less in the form of 
                                               
4 ‘Mayor of London to speak at cross party rally to defend religious freedom’, Mayor of London’s 
website, 17 November 2006. https://www.london.gov.uk/media/mayor-press-releases/2006/11/mayor-
of-london-to-speak-at-cross-party-rally-to-defend. 
5 ‘Rally against incitement & Islamophobia’, IFE website, February 7, 2006. 
http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=eventitem&itemId=69; ‘Muslim Students 
Prepare for Rally in London’, FOSIS website, February 10, 2006. http://new.fosis.org.uk/fosis-
media/press-releases/194-muslim-students-prepare-for-rally-in-london. 
6 Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012. 
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collaborative activities or campaigns and more in the form of personal connections 
and shared leadership roles within other structures.  
MAB’s president, Omer El-Hamdoon, for example, is an elected National Council 
Member of MCB,7 alongside former secretary generals Iqbal Sacranie, Muhammad 
Abdul Bari and Farooq Murad, as well as the Islamic Foundation’s director general, 
Manazir Ahsan.8 MCB and MAB are also two of the four founding groups of the 
Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), established in 2006 to set 
standards and establish a system of self-regulation for mosques. As the founding 
representative of MAB, El-Hamdoon is the vice-chair as well as a trustee of 
MINAB,9 working alongside Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra, MCB’s assistant secretary 
general and current MCB secretary general, Shuja Shafi. These associations have 
occasionally resulted in collaborations on events.  
In December 2011, for example, MAB organised an event in Birmingham with 
MCB’s official support, entitled, ‘Creating Hope’, aimed at a British Muslim 
audience.10 The event featured a number of key speakers from across the Jama’at-
Ikhwan divide. These included Rashid al-Ghannushi, co-founder of Tunisia’s al-
Nahda party; Anas Altikriti, director of the Cordoba Foundation; Zahid Parvez, then 
director of the UKIM; and Farooq Murad, then secretary general of MCB. Others 
included Faisal Hanjara of MCB; Mohamed Ali Harrath, director of the Islam 
Channel; Batool Al-Toma of ISB; and Nabil Ahmed, then president of FOSIS. 
According to El-Hamdoon, the event aimed to galvanise British Muslims’ greater 
participation in society at all levels, including politics, education and the media.11 
Several other examples of Jama’at-Ikhwan collaboration addressing the issue of 
Islamophobia and the perception of Muslims may be provided. In January 2012, 
                                               
7 ‘Muslim Council of Britain Elects New Leadership and Discusses British Values’, MCB website, 
June 15, 2014. http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-
discusses-british-values/. 
8 ‘Governance’, MCB website, April 16, 2014. http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/. 
9 ‘The Executive Board’, MINAB website, web capture from June 5, 2014. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140605083636/http://minab.org.uk/about-us/executive-board. 
10 ‘MAB Conference: Creating Hope’, event listing on Eventbrite website, undated. 
http://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/mab-conference-creating-hope-tickets-2364646722?aff=event. 
11 Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012. 
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Harrath’s Islam Channel initiated an ‘alternative Leveson inquiry’ to investigate 
‘widespread and systematic discriminatory practices in reporting on Muslims and 
Islam in the British media’.12 Based on a public opinion poll that found that people 
believe the media are responsible for ‘whipping up a climate of fear of Islam in the 
UK’, the inquiry set out to examine the possible causal effect between media 
coverage and social attitudes towards Muslims. In addition to Harrath, a number of 
key individuals associated with Jama’at and Ikhwan legacy groups signed an open 
letter published in The Guardian, identifying themselves as ‘supporters of the 
alternative Leveson inquiry’.13 These included Murad, on behalf of MCB; El-
Hamdoon, for MAB; Massoud Shadjareh, the director of IHRC; Altikriti, 
representing the Cordoba Foundation; Faliq, representing IFE; Ahmed, for FOSIS; 
and Daud Abdullah, on behalf of the Middle East Monitor (MEMO). 
Several months earlier, in October 2011, the Cordoba Foundation and MEMO 
headed by Abdullah, a former deputy secretary general of MCB, jointly hosted the 
launch of a SpinWatch-authored report on the spread of Islamophobia in Britain 
entitled, The Cold War on British Muslims: The Instigators and Funders.14 The 
event, held in the House of Commons, presented the main findings of the report, 
which amounted to an attack on the two London-based think tanks that have been 
most critical of Islamism in Britain, Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social 
Cohesion. 
In addition to protests against Islamophobia, revivalist groups have sometimes 
collaborated on workshops to develop Muslims’ engagement with the media. Whilst 
MCB deputy secretary general in 2009, Abdullah and the Cordoba Foundation’s 
Altikriti jointly hosted a workshop entitled, ‘Muslims and the Media: Positive 
Engagement from the Whole Community’. The event included a panel discussion ‘on 
how individuals, organisations and Mosques can better engage with the media, to 
                                               
12 ‘Background’, Alternative Leveson Inquiry website, captured on March 24, 2012. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324163906/http://www.alternativeleveson.org.uk/?page_id=13. 
13 ‘We need an inquiry into anti-Islam press’, The Guardian, January 23, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press. 
14 Samira Quraishy, ‘Event Review: The Cold War on British Muslims - The Instigators and Funders’, 
MEMO website, October 12, 2011. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/media-review/event-
review/2935-event-review-the-cold-war-on-british-muslims-the-instigators-and-funders. 
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promote positive stories’.15 This built upon an earlier workshop, held in December 
2007, jointly run by the Cordoba Foundation and MCB that aimed to improve the 
media and communication skills of ‘young Muslims involved in faith and BME 
groups, including charities, Mosques, local campaigns, voluntary and social-welfare 
organisations’.16 The event was part of the Muslim Media Empowerment Project, 
initiated by the Cordoba Foundation and the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. 
MCB was one of the partners and publicised it on its website.17 
These examples demonstrate active collaborative relationships between individuals 
and groups linked with the Jama’at and Ikhwan-associated streams of Muslim 
activism in Britain centred on the shared concern over the public perception of 
Muslims and Islam. It may be argued that, taken collectively, these events comprise 
an ongoing campaign to assert control over how Muslims and Islam are perceived. A 
related and equally important concern for them is how Muslims view themselves. 
Although this may be more apparent when looking at the work of individual 
organisations, as subsequent chapters will show, representatives of Jama’at and 
Ikhwan-associated groups have sometimes collaborated in events targeting Muslims 
that address issues of Muslim identity.  
In August 2013, for example, the then-secretary general of MCB, Farooq Murad, and 
the Cordoba Foundation’s Anas Altikriti were both key speakers at an event at the 
Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre entitled, ‘Rethinking the Muslim Community’. The 
event sought to address ‘the challenges of inspiring and instituting a communal 
spirit’ within Muslims in Britain.18 Contention over the public perception of Muslims 
and Islam, and over Muslim collective identity, are an important bonding factor for 
the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, and will be explored in greater depth in 
                                               
15 ‘Muslims and the Media: Positive Engagement from the Whole Community’, event listing on 
Cordoba Foundation website, June 4, 2009. 
http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/events.php?id=1&art=22. 
16 ‘FREE TRAINING: Introduction to Media’, event poster on Cordoba Foundation website, 
December 12, 2007. 
http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/images/MuslimMediaTrainingProjectFlyer_03.pdf. 
17 ‘FREE Media & Public Relations Training for Young Muslims’, MCB website, January 3, 2008. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080113205413/http://www.mcb.org.uk/features/features.php?ann_id=16
71. 
18 ‘Rethinking the Muslim Community’, event listing on FRF website, August 5, 2013. 
http://www.thefrf.org/component/zoo/item/rethinking-the-muslim-community-2. 
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the following chapters. Here it suffices to note specific instances of organisational 
collaboration that touch on those themes.   
In addition to protesting against certain perceptions of Muslims and Islam, and 
galvanising a particular self-perception of Muslim identity, Jama’at- and Ikhwan-
associated groups have occasionally collaborated to directly influence the public 
perception of Muslims and Islam. In September 2014, for example, MCB officially 
supported another Cordoba Foundation-organised event entitled, ‘Peace-Building in 
the 21st Century: Celebrating Achievements and Hopes, Confronting Real Issues’.19 
To commemorate the UN International Day of Peace, in addition to an event with 
discussions between different religious and community leaders, the Cordoba 
Foundation helped to co-ordinate an ‘open door’ day for the general public at 
mosques around the country. This opportunity to present Muslims and Islam to the 
broader society was coordinated through a network of Islamic centres and 
organisations including MCB, the Jama’at-associated East London Mosque, and 
MINAB, represented on the official promotional material by its current chairman, 
Maulana Sarfraz Madni, a former president of UKIM. This endeavour to build a 
bridge to Islam for the general public was collectively organised across ethnic lines. 
Trans-ethnic collaboration that fuzzes the Jama’at-Ikhwan division is also evident in 
recent campaigns focusing on the plight of Muslims outside Britain. An issue that for 
many years has been an effective rallying point for British Muslims is that of 
Palestine. In May 2013, the London Muslim Centre at the Jama’at-associated East 
London Mosque hosted a fundraising event for the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign, 
entitled ‘An Evening of Palestinian Solidarity’.20 The event was supported by 
Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated groups, including IFE, MAB, the Cordoba 
Foundation and FOSIS. Several years earlier, in February 2009, a number of such 
groups sent representatives to the Turkish Ambassador in London in gratitude of 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s remarks lambasting Israeli actions in Gaza. These 
representatives included Abdullah, then MCB deputy secretary general; Said Ferjani, 
then head of policy and public relations for MAB; Dilwar Hussain Khan, then IFE 
                                               
19 ‘Peace Conference: Peace-Building in the 21st Century’, event listing on MCB website, September 
4, 2014. http://www.mcb.org.uk/peace-conference-peace-building-in-the-21st-century/. 
20 ‘An Evening for Palestine Solidarity’, event promotional poster, IFE website, March 2013. 
http://islamicforumeurope.com/images_uploaded/2013/03/img3542.jpg. 
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secretary general; Faisal Hanjra, then FOSIS president; Harrath, Islam Channel’s 
CEO; and Mohammad Sawalha, British Muslim Initiative president. Other groups 
represented included Dawatul Islam, the Palestinian Return Centre, and the 
Palestinian Forum in Britain.21 In Steven Merley’s words, all of these individuals 
and/or organisations ‘are known to have ties to the U.K. Brotherhood’.22 
Another recent fundraising event for Muslims in need abroad focused on the plight of 
the Rohingya in Myanmar. Involving speakers from IFE, the Cordoba Foundation 
and the East London Mosque, a ‘Charity Dinner in Aid of Muslims of Burma’ was 
held in September 2012 in collaboration with the charity Muslim Aid, an 
organisation that, as this chapter will show, serves as a nexus for numerous 
individuals involved in other revivalist groups.23 
A final example of Jama’at and Ikhwan-associated groups collaborating may be 
provided on the theme of their characterisation as ‘participationists’. According to 
Abdullah Faliq, IFE, MAB and UKIM worked together on a campaign to encourage 
civic engagement and voting. This was in conflict with the rhetoric of Hizb-ut Tahir, 
which had labelled participation in the democratic system as haram, Islamically 
forbidden. ‘We brought in a lot of literature supporting participation published by 
IFE,’ remarks Faliq. ‘I produced that. Scholars included al-Qaradawi, al-Ghannushi, 
Khurshid Ahmad, as well as Salafis and Tablighis. ISB produced similar literature. 
This provided Muslims with the argument as to why they ought to be politically 
engaged.’24 This campaign to encourage voting was not designed to promote 
participation per se, however. It was put behind George Galloway’s Respect Party in 
the 2005 general election and, it may be argued, was a significant factor in the 
                                               
21 ‘British Muslims to deliver letter of thanks to Turkish Government’, IFE website, February 6, 2009. 
http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=428. 
22 ‘Global Muslim Brotherhood Thanks Turkish Prime Minister Over Gaza Remarks’, Global 
Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. February 8, 2009. 
http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2009/02/08/global-muslim-brotherhood-thanks-turkish-prime-
minister-over-gaza-remarks/. 
23 ‘Charity Dinner in Aid of Muslims of Burma’, event promotional poster, IFE website, September 6, 
2012. http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=imageview&type=event&itemId=201. 
24 Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. See also ‘Voting in Islam: Guidance to Muslims 
in Britain from the Scholars of Islam’, leaflet on IFE website, April 2010. 
http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/images_uploaded/2010/04/img3205.pdf. 
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election of Galloway as MP for Bethnal Green and Bow in East London.25 
Galloway’s appeal for these groups was his active role in the Stop the War Coalition, 
in which MAB was a key partner, as well as his ongoing support for the Palestinians, 
which includes funding Hamas, in its conflict with Israel.26  
MCB publicly lauded the efforts of IFE and MAB in promoting Muslim political 
participation. And in the run-up to the 2005 general election, it launched its own 
strategy aimed at urging British Muslims ‘to participate more actively in mainstream 
politics’.27 It published a brochure, ‘Electing to Deliver’, and a ‘Voter Card’ that 
highlighted ‘the ten key questions that Muslims had to ask of all prospective 
parliamentary candidates’. It promoted this campaign on the Islam Channel and 
through other media outlets. More recently, Muslim Engagement and Development 
(MEND)—linked to MCB through the involvement of Inyat Bunglawala in both 
MCB and MEND’s precursor organisation iEngage—organised a campaign to 
encourage Muslims to vote in the 2015 general election.28 
1.2.  Publications 
Collaborative networking between participationist or revivalist groups is also 
evident, albeit to a limited extent, in the publication of books and reports. The 
Islamic Foundation is one of Britain’s most established and prolific publishers of 
Islamic books. As many observers have noted, in the first few decades after its 
founding in 1973, the Islamic Foundation published numerous works of both 
Jama’at-i-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, including al-Banna and 
Mawdudi. Some of Mawdudi’s books were edited by the Islamic Foundation’s 
chairman, Khurshid Ahmad and its then-director general, Khurram Murad. In recent 
years, the Foundation has broadened the scope of its publications, including works 
on matters of greater contemporary significance, but despite its increasingly diverse 
                                               
25 Peace (2013), p.313. 
26 Shiraz Maher, ‘UK: George Galloway Funds-- Surprise! – Hamas’, Gatestone Institute, April 29, 
2010. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1175/uk-george-galloway-funds---surprise----hamas. 
27 ‘Secretary General’s Report’, report from MCB Eighth Annual General Meeting, pp. 8-9. 




catalogue it still publishes a significant number of books by Mawdudi, in addition to 
Mawdudi-inspired authors and activists including Ahmad, Murad and Vice-
Chairman Abdur Rashid Siddiqui. 
In 2003, the Foundation edited and published a two-part series called, Islam: The 
Way of Revival, which collated the works of al-Banna, Mawdudi, Said Qutb, Ahmad, 
Murad, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Said Ramadan and others widely considered as revivalist 
or participationist Islamist writers. In a clear endorsement of the presentation of 
Islam as ‘an integrated, comprehensive way of life’, the editors, Riza Muhammad 
and Dilwar Hussain, write that although Islam is essentially concerned with a 
relationship with Allah, it is through organised activism in line with an Islamic socio-
political vision that this relationship is given its ‘deepest meaning’.29 The production 
of the series involved collaboration with FOSIS, established in 1962 by members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami,30 which provided many of the 
selected texts that originally appeared in its magazine, The Muslim.31 
More will be said in subsequent chapters about the shared ideas and beliefs of the 
above-mentioned figures and other key individuals within the Jama’at-Ikhwan 
network in Britain. Here it is suffices to note some of the working collaborations 
involved in publishing. In addition to working with individual authors for the 
publication of their works, such as former UKIM president Zahid Parvez, the Islamic 
Foundation has institutional partnerships with other publishers whose works it 
distributes. These include the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), established by 
UKIM in 1966 to ‘Islamise knowledge’ in Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood-
associated International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which, whilst based in 
the United States, has an office in London. The Foundation is the only distributor for 
IIIT’s publications other than IIIT itself. 
These relationships, however, appear rather limited. MET is a small and rather 
inactive publishing house, although, as discussed later, it has played a significant 
                                               
29 Mohammed and Hussain (2003), p.xiv. Since the publication of this book, Hussain’s understanding 
of Islam, its meaning as a ‘way of life’ and its role in relation to the state has undergone quite a 
transformation. For more on this, see Chapter 4. 
30 Bowen (2014), p.103 
31 Mohammed and Hussain (2003), p. xxi. 
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advocacy role in Britain for the education of Muslims in line with Islamic principles. 
It has published less than ten books, mostly written by its director, Ghulam Sarwar. 
In contrast, IIIT’s London office, headed by Anas al-Shaikh-Ali, has been very 
actively engaged in publishing, as well as organising conferences across Europe, 
working closely with the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) UK, of 
which al-Shaikh-Ali is also chairman. But despite what might appear to be a 
potentially fruitful overlap of thematic concerns between IIIT and the Islamic 
Foundation—for example, the impact of globalisation upon Muslims in Europe—the 
two organisations have not collaborated over joint-publications or co-organised 
events. The reason for this, suggests Dilwar Hussain, the former head of research at 
the Foundation and former president of ISB, is that although there was a ‘reasonable 
relationship’ between IIIT and the Foundation, ‘there were also personality conflicts’ 
and ‘differences of view’ between the leadership of the two organisations.32 
Nonetheless, there have been some noteworthy organisational connections between 
the Islamic Foundation and IIIT/AMSS. Such connections are the topic of the next 
section of this chapter, but links between these particular organisations can be 
mentioned briefly here. Khurshid Ahmad, the Islamic Foundation’s chairman, is a 
member of AMSS-UK’s advisory board.33 Mohammad Siddique Seddon, a former 
research fellow at the Islamic Foundation, which publishes his books, is an executive 
committee member of AMSS-UK.34 A member of the Islamic Foundation’s Board of 
Advisers, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, is a fellow at the American branch of AMSS.35 
Another former researcher at the Islamic Foundation, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, was 
also an executive committee member of AMSS-UK.36 Noteworthy too, but perhaps 
less importantly, Islamic Foundation staff have appeared as speakers at IIIT/AMSS 
events. Former Islamic Foundation research fellow, Sughra Ahmed, now president of 
                                               
32 Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015. 
33 ‘About us’, AMSS-UK website, webpage captured on September 11, 2011. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110911192237/http://www.amssuk.com/aboutus.html. 
34 Ahmad and Seddon (eds.) (2012). 
35 ‘MEF Advisory Board’, Muslim Education Foundation website, undated. http://www.mef-
ca.org/mef-ad-board.html. 
36 Conference booklet for ‘Muslim Education In Europe Conference’, p.3, available on AMSS-UK 
website, October 2002. 
http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20MEiE%20Conf%20Sep2002%20-%20booklet.pdf. 
 133 
ISB, was one of numerous speakers at a 2009 conference entitled, ‘Muslim Youth: 
Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations’, co-organised by AMSS UK.37 Hussain, 
then also representing the Foundation as a research fellow, was a speaker at a joint 
IIIT/AMSS UK conference held at the University of Westminster in 2004, which 
sought to address the issue of the practice of Islamic law within a Muslim minority 
context.38 
Aside from the Islamic Foundation and IIIT, the most active publisher within the 
network of Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations is the Cordoba Foundation. 
The organisation produces a quarterly magazine called ‘Arches’; toolkits, including 
guides to conducting effective lobbying and media; policy papers; and reports. These 
materials feature the work of Muslim and non-Muslim contributors on a range of 
topics most of whom, whilst broadly sympathetic to the organisation’s ethos, are not 
associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood. One significant collaboration, 
however, that cuts across Jama’at-Ikhwan lines is the report, Meet the Challenge, 
Make the Change: A Call to Action for Muslim Civil Society in Britain, authored by 
the former chairman of the East London Mosque and former MCB general secretary, 
Muhammad Abdul Bari. In this report, Bari decries what he sees as the ‘collective 
under-achievement’ and a lack of effective leadership of Britain’s Muslim 
community, and calls for Muslims to become more engaged ‘in neighbourhood and 
community works, social activities, economic exchanges, culture and politics’.39 
 2.  Leadership structures 
The collaborations observed above provide a glimpse of active networking between 
individuals and groups associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. 
The overriding theme of these partnerships, reflected most clearly in events such as 
the MAB-organised conference, ‘Creating Hope’, and Bari’s report, Meet the 
Challenge, Make the Change, is Muslim identity and unity. But such collaborations 
                                               
37 Conference programme for ‘Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations’ event, 
p.11, available on AMSS-UK website, February 2009. 
http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20Chester%202009%20Conference%20Briefing.pdf. 
38 AMSS-UK Newsletter No. 7, 2006, p.5. 
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39 Abdul Bari, Muhammad (2013), p.38. 
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do not adequately capture the extent to which these individuals and groups are 
networked, since they are typically engaged in work within different fields and with 
stakes that are different, at least in the short term. The potential for practical 
partnerships between organisations is limited somewhat by their respective official 
missions and areas of interest, as well as their practical expertise and organisational 
ability. But between the individuals working for these organisations is a fluid 
network of relationships.  
The Islamic Foundation, for example, has not collaborated publicly with the Cordoba 
Foundation. The two organisations operate in two different fields, the former in 
publishing and academia, with a focus on higher education and economics, the latter 
mainly in advocacy and public policy with an eye to international affairs. However, 
they are connected in terms of personal networks. The Islamic Foundation’s director 
general, Manazir Ahsan, is a former colleague of the Cordoba Foundation’s Abdullah 
Faliq. Along with Iqbal Sacranie, Ahsan and Faliq were key players in the 
establishment of MCB and its pre-cursor, the National Interim Committee on Muslim 
Unity. Ahsan and Faliq remain linked through MCB. Ahsan is an elected council 
member and Faliq is a member of the Europe and International Affairs Committee. 
Through MCB, Faliq is also linked to the Islamic Foundation by his relationship with 
Foundation trustee and former MCB secretary general, Farooq Murad. Another 
example is with Muslim Aid. Whilst it has collaborated on some charity-related 
events in Britain, its public collaborations with other Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated 
Muslim organisations are scarce. Yet, Muslim Aid, as detailed below, informally 
connects numerous organisations through its board of trustees. Despite a lack of 
official partnerships between certain organisations, there are a multitude of personal 
connections that link them. 
To more fully appreciate the network of relationships between Jama’at- and Ikhwan-
associated individuals and groups it is important to look beyond public collaborations 
and regard the personal connections between the key figures, as well as the 
leadership structures of these groups, both formal and informal. The personal 
connections between the key players in the network, it is argued, are inseparable 
from organisational roles, but these roles are fluid and often overlapping.  
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In an interview with the thesis author, Abdullah Faliq provides an invaluable insight 
into the ways in which Muslim activists and groups of Ikhwani and Jama’ati heritage 
are networked in Britain.40 He identifies three ways: Firstly, there is the formal body 
of MCB. Secondly, there is a coordination committee made up from the leaders of 
key organisations, called The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations. 
And, thirdly, there are loose, informal social connections comprised of working 
friendships. These three ways or modes of networking are each explored and 
elaborated below. In addition to these, it is important to look more holistically at the 
overall network, for there are numerous other connections beyond Faliq’s 
involvement in the network in the three ways he describes. In some cases, for 
example, the trustees of a given organisation are directly involved in the work of 
other organisations that are Jama’at- or Ikhwan-associated. In other cases, the 
founding organisations of a certain organisation are Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated. 
2.1.  The Muslim Council of Britain 
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was founded in November 1997, according to 
its first secretary general, Iqbal Sacranie, to present ‘a united Muslim voice’.41 The 
event that galvanised its founding was the Rushdie Affair in 1988. The publication of 
Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, was deemed offensive to many 
Muslims in Britain for its scandalous portrayal of the prophet Muhammad. The 
United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was hastily set up 
to express Muslim discontent and protest the government to ban the book and to 
extend the existing blasphemy laws to include Islam. UKACIA was dissolved shortly 
after the Rushdie affair, but a small number of activists involved in UKACIA, 
including Manazir Ahsan and Islamic Foundation trustee Hashir Faruqi, saw a longer 
term need for national Muslim representation. In consultation with the then home 
secretary, Michael Howard, who recommended that Muslim leaders form a 
‘representative body’ that he could ‘support and recognise’,42 they established the 
                                               
40 Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. 
41 Iqbal Sacranie , quoted in Vidino (2010), p.122. [check] 
42 Kenan Malik, ‘take me to your leader’, April 23, 2009. 
http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/hp_fatwa_extract.html. 
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National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU). The blueprint for MCB 
was sketched at a NICMU meeting in 1994. 
Anthony McRoy suggests that the formation of UKACIA ‘was an attempt not only to 
unite British Muslims on a specific issue of concern, but also to unite them behind 
the pro-Jama’at element’.43 He acknowledges Gilles Kepel’s argument that by being 
the first to launch the campaign, ‘the Mawdudites had a real chance of taking over 
the leadership of a movement which promised to mobilise large numbers and this 
considerably extend their influence over British Islam’.44 According to McRoy, 
MCB is ‘the result of longstanding plans by pro-Jama’at forces to take over the 
leadership of British Muslims’. McRoy acknowledges the Rushdie Affair as the 
watershed moment for the emergence of an umma-centric, Muslim political identity 
in Britain, consolidated by the first Iraq war (1990-1991) and the Bosnian war (1992-
1995).45 These fed the perception, commonly preached in radical mosques 
throughout Britain in the 1990s, of an attack on Islam. Yet, he notes, calls for the 
formation of a federation of Muslim organisations in Britain were made as far back 
as 1980 by the late Jama’at-i-Islami activist and Islamic Foundation director, 
Khurram Murad, and others.46 
MCB is, in its own words, ‘a national representative Muslim umbrella body’. Shaykh 
Ibrahim Mogra, MCB’s assistant secretary general, describes MCB as ‘the most 
representative Muslim umbrella organisation in Britain’. But he concedes that it ‘has 
failed to attract some groupings’.47 A number of polls suggest a bigger failing. As 
Kenan Malik observes,  ‘An NOP/Channel 4 poll of Muslims in 2006 found that less 
than 4 per cent thought that the MCB represented British Muslims, and just 12 per 
cent felt it represented their political views. This is in line with many other surveys. 
An NOP poll for the conservative think tank Policy Exchange found only 6 per cent 
of Muslims thought the MCB represented their views.’48 
                                               
43 McRoy (2006), p.12. 
44 Kepel, (1997), p.133. 
45 McRoy (2006), pp.7-79. 
46 Ibid., p.12. 
47 Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012. 
48 Kenan Malik, ‘take me to your leader’. 
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Nevertheless, from its inception until around 2005, MCB served as the British 
government’s primary interlocutor for Britain’s diverse Muslim communities. Its 
well-documented fall from government favour is usually linked to two events. The 
first was it’s boycotting of the Holocaust Memorial Day, first in 2005. The second, 
more decisive event was the signing of the Istanbul Declaration by its deputy 
secretary general, Daud Abdullah, in 2009. Exhorting the Muslim umma to wage 
jihad against Israel ‘until the liberation of all of Palestine’, this document defined as 
a ‘declaration of war’ any country’s support for Israel or deployment of forces in the 
‘Muslim waters’ facing Gaza preventing the smuggling of arms and supplies.49 Since 
the British government was considering deploying naval forces to the Gaza coastline, 
it viewed this as an unwarranted provocation and suspended ties with MCB. 
Although this decision was reversed in January 2010, the new coalition government 
under David Cameron has not granted MCB any special partnership status.50  
The loss of MCB’s monopoly of engagement, lamented by Mogra as a denial of 
Muslim political representation,51 was consolidated by ‘the growing array of 
different claims from groups such as the British Muslim Forum, the Al-Khoei 
Foundation, Progressive British Muslims, British Muslims for Secular Democracy 
and others’, including the Sufi Muslim Council and Quilliam.52 But despite the 
growing multiplicity of Muslim voices in British civil society, according to 
Mohammed Abdul Aziz, a former adviser to Sacranie during his time as secretary 
general, MCB has become more Jama’at-dominated since Sacranie’s departure in 
2005. ‘A large part of the influential part of the organisational structure,’ he notes, 
‘consists of people who come from a Jama’ati-Ikhwani background of some sort.’53 
                                               
49 For the text of the Istanbul Declaration, see ‘A statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers 
(du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza’, available 
at: http://hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/istpdf.pdf. 
50 See Alan Travis, ‘Hazel Blears’ standoff with Muslim Council overshadows new anti-terror 
launch’, March 25, 2009, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/25/muslim-
council-britain-hazel-blears; and Nicholas Watt, Government restores links with biggest Muslim 
group’, The Guardian, January 15, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jan/15/government-
relations-muslim-council-britain-mcb. 
51 Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012. 
52 Stephen H. Jones, Therese O’Toole, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer, A 
‘system of self-appointed leaders’?, Public Spirit, August 20, 2013. http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/a-
system-of-self-appointed-leaders/. 
53 Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012. 
 138 
Regardless of how representative or influential upon government it may or may not 
be, MCB remains an important body within the broader network of Jama’at-Ikhwan-
associated individuals and groups.  
Daud Abdullah describes MCB as a concerted effort to connect and unite British-
based Muslims organisations. The mosques and other institutions that make up 
MCB’s affiliates each pursue their own agendas, he explains, but work through MCB 
on national issues. ‘The parameters,’ he says, ‘are clearly defined.’54 Yet, it would be 
a mistake to think of MCB as the sole body within the global Muslim Brotherhood 
network in Britain advocating for Muslims’ interests at the national level. Some of its 
affiliates, connected by association with a Jama’at-Ikhwan heritage, also have an 
interlocutionary role and advocate for changes in government policy. 
The Muslim Educational Trust, for example, set up by the Mawdudi-inspired UKIM 
in 1966, has a long track record of working with government. In 1993, it was 
instrumental in obtaining government approval for an Islamic studies syllabus in 
secondary schools, for which it has provided teachers and teaching materials. It states 
it has also persuaded local educational authorities to recognise and accept the 
‘special needs’ of Muslim pupils in schools. For some years it was one of the main 
interlocutors between Muslim communities and the government with regard to 
educational matters. Today, this role has been taken over by the Association of 
Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), established in 1992. One of its core roles, it asserts, 
is to represent the views and interests of 150 or so Muslim schools in Britain to the 
Department for Education (DfE), statutory bodies and the private sector. DfE 
officially recognises its interlocutionary function and contracts AMS-UK to conduct 
inspections of state-funded Muslim schools regarding their religious designation.55 
Whether or not MCB is understood as the main institutional interlocutor for Muslims 
on national matters, its greatest importance perhaps lies beyond its interlocutional 
function. MCB is a central hub within the network of Jama’at- and Ikhwan-
associated individuals and groups. Whilst a hierarchical organisation with a formal 
leadership structure and clear mandate to advocate on behalf of its listed affiliates, 
                                               
54 Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012. 
55 AMS-UK brochure, December 2013. http://ams-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/AMS-
Brochure.pdf. 
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MCB also functions as a meshwork of interaction through which numerous 
individuals, and hence organisations, are informally connected. Immanent to but also 
far exceeding the formal structure of MCB is a network of related individuals that 
can only be observed with regard to their multiple associations and shared histories 
both within and outside MCB. Most observers note MCB’s declining influence as a 
government partner. But MCB’s far greater significance, it may be argued, even at 
the height of its popularity with the government, is its facilitation of numerous 
connections that traverse various fields of social activism, including public policy, 
education, law, and finance. Some of these connections are explored in the last 
section of this chapter. 
2.2.  The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations 
In addition to MCB, states Faliq, there is a less hierarchical but semi-formal 
committee through which some of the key organisations associated with Jama’at-i-
Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood meet. ‘Within the mainstream Islamic groups,’ 
he discloses, ‘there is a coordination committee, where the leaders of these groups 
meet every now and then to discuss strategies, their achievements and what to focus 
on. It is called “The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations”.’56 
Faliq identifies the organisations that comprise this committee as the Islamic 
Foundation, IFE, MAB, UKIM and Dawatul Islam UK and Ireland. It is significant 
that in the academic and think tank literature with a focus on Muslim activism, all of 
these groups are associated with Jama’at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. The individual 
committee members, Faliq explains, are from the shuras—the management—of the 
organisations represented on the committee, which meet occasionally, sometimes on 
camps and residentials. Attendees include the leadership of the member 
organisations, plus other colleagues. Usually, around four or five people attend from 
each organisation. Along with Dilwar Hussain Khan—not to be mistaken for Dilwar 
Hussain formerly of the Islamic Foundation and ISB—Faliq represents IFE at these 
meetings. MAB, he notes, is represented by Omer El-Hamdoon. UKIM is 
represented by Maulana Muhammad Sarfraz Madni. Committee members have to be 
a representative of an organisation, informs Faliq, but, ‘beyond the leaders of the 
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organisations, you have some other key leaders, including Khurshid Ahmad and 
Muhammad Abdul Bari’. The Cordoba Foundation and IIIT are not involved in this 
committee, explains Faliq, because they are not community-oriented groups. The 
committee is mainly comprised of community-focused membership organisations. 
The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations is a discreet and hitherto 
unreported mechanism for the networking of Jama’at and Ikhwan-associated 
individuals and groups in Britain. In an interview with Innes Bowen, the former 
spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, Kemal al-Helbawy, says he 
led a group in the 1980s and 1990s almost identically named, called the 
‘Coordination Committee between Islamic Movements’, and worked closely with the 
Islamic Foundation’s Khurshid Ahmad ‘to bring together leading representatives of 
the Islamic Movement from around the world’.57 It is unclear if this is the same 
committee. But, if so, it is likely to have undergone some changes, since the 
committee Faliq describes is comprised mostly of British citizens and focused on 
Britain. In any case, this coordination committee, as it functions today, is absent from 
all of the literature on Islamism in Britain. 
Despite being involved in MCB and the coordination committee, Faliq is candidly 
critical of both, referring to them as overly bureaucratic. He describes MCB as ‘too 
statesmanlike’ and the committee’s leadership as mostly aged and inflexible.58 A 
different line of criticism directed at the committee is voiced by Dilwar Hussain, the 
former president of ISB. According to Hussain, ISB was a member of the 
coordination committee, but under his leadership formally withdrew in 2011, 
participating with a gradually increasing sense of detachment from the other 
committee members’ ideas and values from around 2003 to 2004. Questions that 
were raised by Hussain and his colleagues in ISB at this time, he says, included, 
‘What sort of social transformation do we want? Are we advocating social 
transformation in the name of Islam? What is our relationship with terms like 
“shari’a” and “Islamic state”?’59 Their answers to these questions, he notes, made 
them realise that they were at a ‘radically different place’ than other committee 
                                               
57 Bowen (2012), p.115. 
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members such as MAB, UKIM and IFE. Hussain’s description of the coordination 
committee underplays its function as a forum for effective strategic planning and 
coordination. ‘If these meetings were effective, ‘ he says, ‘you’d see many more 
programs and activities with these organisations doing things together—and you 
don’t. You hardly see any activities where you’ve got UKIM, MAB, IFE and ISB 
working on the same platform.’  
Regardless of how effective the coordination committee was in the past and is today, 
some of the connections facilitated by it, as with those facilitated by MCB, are worth 
noting simply for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of an organised network 
in Britain. Indeed, these connections comprise such a network of dedicated activists 
inspired by Islamic principles working, in their eyes, for the betterment of Britain’s 
Muslim communities and the society at large. The coordination committee member 
organisations are linked to numerous other Islamic organisations, including Jama’at- 
or Ikhwan-associated ones, chiefly by virtue of the committee member 
representatives’ authoritative roles in organisations both within and outside the 
committee.  
The coordination committee, for example, is linked to the Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board (MINAB), whose membership, like the committee, is 
comprised of organisations. El-Hamdoon represents MAB in both structures. Whilst 
Safraz Madni represents UKIM on the committee, he represents MCB in MINAB. 
Formerly occupying MCB’s allocated vice-chair position on MINAB’s executive 
board, he is currently MINAB chair. In addition to being linked to MCB in terms of 
Sarfraz Madni’s role within MCB, the committee is linked to MCB through Faliq’s 
membership of its Europe and International Affairs Committee and El-Hamdoon’s 
membership of its National Council. Dilwar Hussain Khan, whilst the central 
president of IFE,60 is also linked to the East London Mosque (ELM), which houses 
IFE offices and for which he is the executive director.61 His link with Muhammad 
Abdul Bari on the coordination committee is strengthened by their respective roles in 
ELM, where Abdul Bari was for many years its chairman and is currently a trustee, 
                                               
60 ‘Islamic Forum of Europe -- Shoora and presidential elections’, IFE media release, September 22, 
2013. http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=536. 
61 ‘Management’, East London Mosque website, updated on August 5, 2015. 
http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/content/management. 
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and in IFE, of which Abdul Bari is a former president. A final example of how the 
coordination committee is linked to Islamic organisations external to it is with 
Dawatul Islam UK and Ireland’s connection to Britain’s national Islamic Sharia 
Council network: The president of Dawatul Islam, Maulana Abu Sayeed, is also the 
chairman of the Islamic Sharia Council and involved in the creation of a national 
federation of shari’a councils, the UK Board of Sharia Councils. 
This glimpse of connections between the coordination committee and other Islamic 
organisations provided above is limited to some of the main organisations associated 
with the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. But most of the individuals on the 
committee are also involved in smaller, more local organisations, including mosques 
and schools. The revivalist network of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain 
extends to local communities via these organisations and grassroots initiatives, 
although these connections are rarely discussed or explored in the academic and 
think tank literature or news media that is concerned with Islamism in Britain. It is 
through these local groups that the leadership network of most concern to observers 
in academic and think tank circles extends to what Alberto Melucci refers to as 
‘submerged networks’. 
For example, in addition to his role in IFE, Dilwar Hussain Khan, is vice-chair of the 
Faiths Forum for London. According to his biography, he has been director of 
Islamic community centre, finance manager of a housing association, and manager of 
a special educational needs organisation in East London, the Asian Parents 
Association for Special Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets. Madni is actively 
involved in the Blackheath Mosque in Birmingham. He represented the mosque as a 
signatory on an open letter, signed in July 2014 by over 100 imams, urging Muslims 
not to go to Syria and Iraq to fight in the conflict there.62 A teacher by profession, 
Madni was also the interim headteacher and head of the Parents Teachers and 
Friends Association Steering Committee at Al-Hirjah School in Birmingham, after it 
was placed in special measures in 2013.63 Muhammad Abdul Bari’s involvement in 
                                               
62 ‘Over 100 UK imams unite to sign open letter urging British Muslims not to travel to Syria and 
Iraq’, Imams Online website, July 4, 2014. http://imamsonline.com/blog/over-100-uk-imams-unite-to-
sign-open-letter-urging-british-muslims-not-to-travel-to-syria-and-iraq/. 
63 ‘In the Wilderness Together …’, Faithful Neighbourhoods Centre website, January 17, 2014, 
http://www.faithfulneighbourhoods.org.uk/wordpress/?ai1ec_event=in-the-wilderness-together; Al-
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community work is extensive. He is the founder director of Amana Parenting, which 
publishes books and provides workshops, as well as consulting services, on 
parenting. He is a founding member of The East London Communities Organisation, 
part of the Citizens UK. Abdul Bari is also a patron of Anchor House, a homeless 
charity, the Ramphal Institute, and the educational charity, the Nida Trust. 
2.3. Informal personal connections 
In addition to MCB and the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations, Faliq 
identifies an informal network of friendships as the ‘third front’ in which he and his 
associates collaborate.64 Within his personal network, he says, is Anas Altikriti, 
Dilwar Hussain Khan, Daud Abdullah, Muhammad Abdul Bari, and Mohammad 
Kozbar. He describes this group as more informal and ‘advanced’, since it is less 
burdened with formalities and more actively involved with the organisation of 
various campaigns. This network of friends meets more regularly and 
communication is frequent. This group partially overlaps with the coordination 
committee and has strong connections with MCB. 
All of the individuals in Faliq’s personal network named above are or have been 
involved in organisations with Jama’at-i-Islami or Muslim Brotherhood associations, 
and all are actively involved in Islamic activism or advocacy work today. Altikriti, 
whose father was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing in Iraq, was 
a founding member of MAB prior to establishing the Cordoba Foundation. He set up 
MAB alongside Kemal al-Helbawy, Azzam Tamimi, a former activist in the 
Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, and Mohammed Sawalha, a former Hamas 
operative. After a stint as MAB president, Altikriti left MAB, along with Tamimi and 
Sawalha in 2006 to form the British Muslim Initiative (BMI), which government 
records state was dissolved in September 2014.65  
                                                                                                                                     
Hirjah School Parents Teachers and Friends Association launch invitation letter, June 3, 2013. 
http://www.alhijrahschool.co.uk/Docs/PTFA_Launch12613.pdf. 
64 Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. 
65 Companies House website. http://wck2.companieshouse.gov.uk. 
 144 
Kozbar is the vice-president of MAB,66 a national council member of MCB,67 and 
was a listed director and spokesperson for BMI.68 Steven Merley identifies him as ‘a 
well known leader in the U.K Muslim Brotherhood’ who ‘has been an officer in 
numerous U.K. Brotherhood organizations including BMI and the MAB, the 
Finsbury Park Mosque, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), and the Muslim 
Welfare House’.69 Kozbar is also a project director for IslamExpo, an Islamic 
cultural festival and political conference established by Sawalha in 2004. Khan, as 
mentioned above, is a key figure in both IFE and the East London Mosque, as well as 
the London Muslim Centre, where Abdul Bari has held senior leadership positions. 
Daud Abdullah, in addition to his former role in MCB worked as a senior researcher 
for the Palestinian Return Centre and currently directs the Middle Eastern Monitor, a 
pro-Palestinian media research organisation. 
This informal network is inseparable from the multiple formal roles that each of 
these individuals has in their respective organisations. This is not just a circle of 
friends. The friendships between these individuals are shaped in part by shared, 
religiously-conceived values and perspectives, and shared histories of association, 
but, equally importantly, they are also shaped by a shared commitment to social 
activism enabled by their positions of authority. Collectively, they comprise a web of 
latent working partnerships that may be actualised in response to specific emerging 
issues. This network extends to other contacts, including similarly-minded Muslim 
colleagues and friends—some of whom are not in equivalent leadership positions, 
but active as volunteers and interns—and non-Muslim partners who share concerns 
on particular issues.  
The informal network that Faliq describes as the third way in which he and others 
collaborate is not really a distinct alternative to the organisation-to-organisation 
                                               
66 ‘Tackling Islamophobia – UAF Roundtable event at Parliament’, MCB website, November 24, 
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68 British Muslim Initiative listing on Company Check website. 
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Brotherhood Daily Watch, March 15, 2012. http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2012/03/15/u-k-
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approach of the coordination committee, or to their everyday official work within 
these organisations. It is not an informal as opposed to a formal way of working. It is, 
rather, an informal mode of organisation that is in a sense dependent on these formal 
structures—particularly for the recognition and contacts that they provide—whilst 
being unconstrained by them. The formal roles of Faliq and his close associates 
within his informal network facilitate collaboration on projects, campaigns, and other 
events, but the organisations for which they officially work are not always formally 
recognised in these activities as coordinators or hosts. Their formal roles have 
endowed them with contacts, reputation amongst these contacts and, thus, their 
ability to organise new initiatives and establish new coalitions or organisations 
through informal channels. 
Faliq’s role in the formation of the Rohingya Minority Crisis Group (RMCG) in 
August 2012 exemplifies this blurring of formal and informal networking. Faliq was 
the key instigator of RMCG, but did not play this central role on behalf of the 
Cordoba Foundation or IFE where he holds senior positions. ‘I’ve got most of the 
people together, most of them are my contacts,’ he says. ‘This is what I’ll do. I’ll just 
bring them to the table and let them run with it. I did the same thing with Syria and 
Palestine.’70 In convening this group and coordinating a series of related events, 
Faliq drew upon his close, informal connections: The charity dinner mentioned 
earlier was co-hosted by IFE, where he and Khan have official leadership roles, and a 
related conference was held at the London Muslim Centre at the East London 
Mosque, where Khan is the executive director; Altikriti was one of the key speakers. 
Yet, although the Cordoba Foundation is listed as a founding partner of RMCG, 
Faliq didn’t convene RMCG on behalf of the Cordoba Foundation. ‘I don’t do it with 
a certain organisational hat on,’ explains Faliq, ‘but the people involved know where 
I’m from.’71 
Faliq’s personal network ought not to be seen in isolation from the connections each 
one of his close associates has outside it, particularly those to other Jama’at- or 
Ikhwan-associated individuals. Each individual within Faliq’s close network has his 
own network with expected overlaps but also new nodes. As with any politically-
                                               
70 Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. 
71 Ibid. 
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active social network, global Muslim Brotherhood figures in Britain and abroad are 
not all directly connected by personal acquaintance or organisational collaboration. 
But their overlapping connections provide a fuller picture of their organisational 
network as a whole. The following section seeks to provide such a picture—although 
not an exhaustive one—with regard to connections between individuals, between 
individuals and organisations, and between organisations. 
2.4. Overlapping organisational structures 
The connections between revivalist individuals and groups are both extensive and 
complex. In addition to collaborative links (some of which have been described in 
this chapter), the coordination committee (which has been detailed here for the first 
time in an academic study), and informal personal links (of which Faliq’s are but one 
example), there are numerous other connections between individuals and 
organisations that help collectively comprise an organised network. This section of 
the chapter maps out some of these other connections. There is no ideal starting place 
to do this, so it will focus on several hubs or clusters. 
A significant hub that connects a number of key individuals within the revivalist 
network is the charity established by Yusuf Islam in 1985, Muslim Aid. The 
individuals involved in its strategic management include leaders associated mostly 
with Jama’at-linked groups, whilst its controversial connection with the Union of 
Good (UG), an umbrella group of charities led by al-Qaradawi that is dedicated to 
serving Hamas, places it within the ambit of the Brotherhood. These individuals, by 
virtue of sharing an active collective role in Muslim Aid whilst being involved in 
other organisations, informally link MCB, the Islamic Foundation, UKIM, the 
Muslim Educational Trust (MET), MAB, the Cordoba Foundation, IFE, the East 
London Mosque, the Islamic Sharia Council, Muslim Welfare House, and two other 
organisations headed by al-Qaradawi, the European Council for Fatwa and Research 
(ECFR) and the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS). 
Manazir Ahsan, the director general of the Islamic Foundation, is the chairman of 
Muslim Aid’s board of trustees.72 He is also a trustee of the Islamic Foundation 
                                               
72 ‘Governance’, Muslim Aid website, June 25, 2014. https://www.muslimaid.org/about-
us/governance/. 
 147 
alongside Khurshid Ahmad and Muhammad Abdul Bari.73 Muslim Aid’s vice 
chairman is Suhaib Hasan, the secretary of the Islamic Sharia Council. Hasan is also 
an active member of ECFR and IUMS. Abdul Bari, a former MCB secretary general 
and former president of IFE, is Muslim Aid’s secretary. Another Muslim Aid trustee 
is Farooq Murad, a director of the Islamic Foundation who completed his term as 
MCB secretary general in June 2014.74 A fellow trustee of the charity, Zahid Parvez, 
is the director of the Islamic Foundation’s Markfield Institute of Higher Education,75 
of which Murad is a trustee.76 Parvez is also a trustee of both the Islamic 
Foundation77—along with Ahsan, Ahmad and Abdul Bari—and UKIM.78 Riyadh al-
Rawi, yet another trustee of Muslim Aid, is also the director and a trustee of Muslim 
Welfare House, a founding organisation of the Islamic Sharia Council.79 Other 
Muslim Aid trustees include Iqbal Sacranie, MCB’s founding secretary general; 
Ghulam Sarwar, a former Muslim Aid treasurer and the longtime director of the 
MET; and Syed Tanzim Wasti, a former Muslim Aid secretary and a founding 
member of UKIM. 
Each of these individuals, in addition to being involved in multiple organisations, has 
his own trajectory through various other connected organisations. Ahsan’s role in 
NICMU and the founding of MCB has been noted. Sacranie and Murad were also 
founding MCB members alongside Ahsan. The involvement of Adbul Bari and 
Wasti in other organisations has been described briefly above. Additionally, Parvez 
is a former president of Young Muslims UK (YMUK), the Islamic Society of Britain 
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(ISB), and UKIM; Murad, who was the chair of Muslim Aid, is also a former 
president of both YMUK and ISB; and al-Rawi is a former president of FOSIS. 
Besides these senior figures, other Muslim Aid staff have historical connections with 
other Brotherhood- or Jama’at-associated organisations. The former Muslim Aid 
country director for Sri Lanka, Amjad Saleem,80 for instance, was the head of 
communications for the Cordoba Foundation as well as a member of MCB’s central 
working committee.81 
Muslim Aid is a key node within the overall network of revivalist organisations in 
Britain, although perhaps it is more accurate to describe it as a network nested within 
the overall network. But the most significant node or nested network is undoubtedly 
MCB. As noted earlier, MCB acts as a web of communication and interaction 
through which numerous individuals and organisations are informally connected. It 
has been noted by numerous observers that many of its affiliate organisations have 
their origins in Jama’at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. These include the Islamic 
Foundation, UKIM, MET, the East London Mosque, IFE, Young Muslim 
Organisation-UK (YMO-UK), Dawatul Islam, YMUK, the Islamic Sharia Council, 
Muslim Aid, MAB, FOSIS, and Muslim Welfare House. They also include some 
other smaller organisations, such as the Association of Muslim Schools UK and the 
Association of Muslim Lawyers. But for the purposes for ascertaining the existence 
of an organised network and understanding how it is comprised, more interesting 
than these organisational affiliations are the numerous overlapping roles that the key 
leadership of MCB share in these organisations as well as others. 
Many of the senior figures actively involved in MCB today are also involved in other 
organisations associated with Jama’at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. Some of these have 
been mentioned above in relation to Muslim Aid. For example, in addition to being 
the chairman of Muslim Aid and director general of the Islamic Foundation, Ahsan is 
a member of MCB’s National Council. He was also the chair of MINAB’s 
Membership Committee. Abdul Bari is still involved in MCB as the chair of its 
                                               
80 Amjad Saleem, ‘Going beyond the Rhetoric: The Muslim Aid/UMCOR Partnership in Sri Lanka’, 
Inter-Religious Studies website, December 2010. http://irdialogue.org/wp-
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 149 
National Council. Alongside Ahsan and Abdul Bari, both Murad and Sacranie are 
members of MCB’s National Council. Parvez is a former member of MCB’s Central 
Working Committee.  
Other current MCB figures similarly have multiple roles within other revivalist 
organisations. Azad Ali, for instance, is a member of MCB’s Central Working 
Committee and the chair of its Membership Committee. He is also a member of the 
East London Mosque, the community affairs co-ordinator for IFE, a presenter on the 
Islam Channel, the head of community development and engagement for Muslim 
Engagement and Development—the current incarnation of iEngage—and the 
founding chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum. The CEO of iEngage was Inayat 
Bunglawala, the long-time media secretary for MCB who now heads Muslims4UK. 
Faliq, as mentioned, is a member of MCB’s Europe and International Affairs 
Committee. He is also the head of research for the Cordoba Foundation, the director 
of media and public relations for IFE, a trustee of IFE and the East London Mosque, 
the director of training at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, which was founded 
by Kemal al-Helbawy, and a former president of YMO-UK. Both El-Hamdoon and 
Kozbar are, as mentioned, members of MCB’s National Council and have senior 
roles within MAB. Kozbar is also a listed director for BMI alongside Mohammad 
Sawalha, a former member of MCB’s Central Working Committee and director for 
Muslim Welfare House, of which both El-Hamdoon and al-Rawi are trustees. 
Other active MCB figures include Iqbal Asaria, Maulana Muhammad Abu Sayeed, 
and Ibrahim Mogra. Asaria is the special adviser to the secretary general on business 
and economic affairs. He is also a member of the Islamic Foundation’s advisory 
board and a lecturer at MIHE. According to some reports, Asaria was the webmaster 
for the websites of Muslim Aid, IHRC and Tamimi’s IIPT. Alongside Sacranie he is 
a guest speaker for the Ramphal Institute, where Abdul Bari is a patron. Abu Sayeed 
is a member of MCB’s National Council as well as the president of Dawatul Islam 
and the chair of the Islamic Sharia Council, where he works closely with Suhaib 
Hasan. Both Abu Sayeed and Hasan are members of ECFR and IUMS, strengthening 
the connection between al-Qaradawi and the Islamic revivalist network in Britain. 
Mogra is MCB’s assistant secretary general and a member of its National Council. 
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He is also a trustee and the vice-chair of MINAB, as well as a trustee of the Al-Aqsa 
School Trust, alongside Ibrahim Hewitt, a former MCB assistant secretary general. 
Former MCB senior figures such as Hewitt also help comprise the network of 
individuals and organisations in Britain associated with Jama’at-i-Islami and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Hewitt is the chairman of Interpal, the Palestinian Relief and 
Development Fund, which the US government classified as a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist organization in 2003 due to allegations of funding Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip.82 He is also a senior editor at MEMO, where he works alongside former 
MCB assistant secretary general Daud Abdullah. He is a founder and former 
executive committee member of the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), 
the former assistant director of MET, where he worked alongside Ghulam Sarwar, 
and a former public affairs committee member at MINAB. Additionally, Hewitt is a 
trustee of the International Board of Educational Research and Resources (IBERR), 
founded by Yusuf Islam in 1996, in its own words, ‘to “Islamise” the provision of 
educational services’.83  
IBEER, although based in South Africa, is linked to several British organisations that 
connect a number of individuals and groups in Britain’s Muslim Brotherhood 
network. IBEER and the Nida Trust have worked together on events and educational 
training. IBERR’s former CEO, Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema was a keynote 
speaker at the Nida Trust’s Education Fair in March 2012. Together with the Islamic 
Shakhsiyah Foundation, IBERR and the Nida Trust have collaborated in the design 
and provision of teacher training for Muslim teachers in Britain.84 The venue they 
have regularly used, the Regent’s Park Mosque, is a founding organisation of the 
Islamic Sharia Council. Amongst the listed advisers of the Islamic Shakhsiyah 
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Foundation is Edris Khamissa of IBERR and Ibrahim Hewitt.85 The Nida Trust also 
has working relationships with MAB and the Islamic Foundation. The Nida Trust 
was invited to run MAB’s annual leaders training camp in May 2012. It has also 
worked with the Islamic Foundation’s Markfield Institute of Higher Education 
(MIHE) for the provision of courses delivered by MIHE senior lecturer Abdullah 
Sahin on ‘Qur’anic pedagogy’ and Islamic education, the latter of which was 
sponsored by Muslim Aid.86 
In addition to Hewitt, other former MCB figures with overlapping roles in the 
revivalist network include Tahir Alam and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. Alam was 
assistant secretary general in 2006-2008, as well as the chair of MCB’s Education 
Committee during the same period, and was also involved in AMS-UK as an 
executive committee member. Additionally, until his resignation in July 2014, Alam 
was the director and chair of the Parkview Educational Trust, responsible for the 
management of three schools at the centre of the Trojan Horse affair. Mohammed 
Abdul Aziz was also involved in MCB as its representative on the Department of 
Trade’s Equality and Diversity Forum in 2006 and as the former adviser to MCB 
secretary general Sacranie. He was, as mentioned, a former researcher at the Islamic 
Foundation and an executive committee member of AMSS-UK, as well as an 
honorary trustee of the East London Mosque and a former executive committee 
member at YMO-UK. 
The networked individuals identified in the preceding section all share a connection 
to MCB or Muslim Aid. Yet, there are other connections that also form part of this 
network that are worth noting. The Islamic Sharia Council, for example, is linked to 
the Association of Muslim Lawyers (AML) through Ahmad Thomson. AML was co-
founded in 1993 by Thomson, who is the deputy chair. He is also a member of the 
Islamic Sharia Council committee.87 The Islamic Sharia Council also has a 
connection with MCB, in addition to its affiliation to MCB. Although MCB has no 
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formal role with shari’a, since it abstains from being associated with any particular 
school of Islamic law, informally it does: Ibrahim Mogra explains that although 
MCB does not issue fatwas (religious rulings) it does ‘signpost people to shari’a 
councils and to shari’a bodies and the like’.88 The Islamic Sharia Council is also 
informally connected to the Muslim Research and Development Foundation 
(MRDF), since Haitham al-Haddad, a senior judge and trustee of the council, is a 
trustee and former chairman of MRDF. Furthermore, Suhaib Hasan, the Islamic 
Sharia Council secretary, links the council with the Islam Channel, for which he is 
the presenter of the show, ‘Journey Through the Qur’an’.89 
3.  Visualising a network of networks 
The numerous overlapping positions in organisations associated with Jama’at-i-
Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood described above, in addition to the collaborative 
relationships between them described earlier, form a complex network, referred to in 
this thesis as the ‘revivalist network’.  
This network may be termed meta-organisational, since it cuts across the formal 
structures of named organisations. Certainly, it encompasses collaborative 
partnerships and official affiliations between registered companies and charities. 
More importantly, however, the network also includes informal relationships 
between numerous organisations that are inseparable from the personal relationships 
between the leaders of these organisations. Informal organisational links are 
furthermore implied in the multiple and overlapping leadership roles that numerous 
individuals within certain organisations have in various other organisations. Thus, 
the network described in this chapter is not, strictly speaking, a network of 
organisations, since it is the individuals within organisations that drive them and 
make connections. In some organisations, it is only certain individuals within them 
that are part of the network. Yet, it may be described as organised: All individuals 
within the network are related to at least one organisation. They are all engaged in 
what al-Qaradawi terms as ‘organised work’. 
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It should be noted that the individuals comprising this network come from a variety 
of ethnic backgrounds. In addition to those with family origins in the Indian 
subcontinent and the Arab Middle East, the network also includes white converts, 
such as Ibrahim Hewitt, Yusuf Islam, and Ahmad Thomson, and black converts, 
including Daud Abdullah, who have taken up prominent roles in particular 
organisations. The involvement of converts is unsurprising given the broadly trans-
ethnic composition and orientation of the network. Although there are some groups 
that serve a particular ethnic or linguistic Muslim community (such as UKIM) and 
others whose activism is focused on the politics of a particular Muslim region or 
state (such as the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund), these are all connected 
within a web of groups that are dedicated to Islamic affairs transcending parochial 
lines. 
The revivalist network may be visualised in two dimensions using the open-source 
network analysis and visualisation software programme, Gephi. Figure 1 below is a 
network diagram produced in Gephi, including all the individuals and organisations 
identified in this chapter as forming the network, plus some others. 
The data used to generate this diagram is comprised, firstly, of a list of ‘nodes’, 
which are either individuals or organisations, and, secondly, of ‘edges’, i.e. the 
relationships between these nodes. Such relationships may be between individuals, 
between organisations, or between individuals and organisations. They include close 
personal connections, collaborations, affiliations, and leadership roles within 
organisations, such as director or trustee. The list of relationships was collated with 
reference to open source material, including the publications of the organisations in 
the list, plus interviews with key leaders of some of these organisations. Some of the 
relationships are historical and some current. The full list of nodes and edges, with 
notes, including descriptions of collaborations and job titles, and sources, is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
Figure 1 below shows the complex web of connections between Jama’at- and 
Ikhwan-associated groups and individuals in Britain. 
Figure 1: Diagram of Islamic revivalist network in Britain. Colour key for nodes: 
yelow = individuals, blue = organisations. See Appendix 2 for the ful names of the 
individuals and organisations as wel as descriptions of the relationships between them.
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In the literature on Islam and Islamism in Britain, these two ‘strands’ are typically 
written about as two distinct constellations of personalities and groups, albeit with 
some connections. Innes Bowen’s 2014 book, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in 
Brent, exemplifies this approach by dedicating separate chapters to Jama’at-i-Islami-
related groups and those connected to the Ikhwan. But, whilst there are close 
relationships between individuals and groups with Arab connections that cluster on 
the issue of Palestine, and whilst there are tight relationships between those with 
connections to the Indian subcontinent, these two strands within the network are 
thoroughly interlinked. Even clusters of individuals and organisations at the outer 
edge of the network, such as the Palestine Return Centre, are just several connections 
away from the central region of the network where MCB is situated. The key hubs in 
this trans-ethnic network, as described in this chapter, include MCB and Muslim Aid, 
as well as the Islamic Foundation and MAB. They each play an important role in 
connecting the various other smaller groups and associated individuals, as well as 
fostering trans-ethnic Muslim solidarity. 
This network diagram has some limitations. It is not exhaustive, for there are sure to 
be other ‘nodes’ and ‘edges’ that are missing. There are most certainly numerous 
other individuals involved in the work of the organisations featured in the network, 
though these have been omitted to allow focus upon the key figures identified in the 
literature and others with recognisable multiple roles within various groups. As 
mentioned earlier, activist groups that are connected to the network via coalitions and 
collaborations but which do not share a Muslim identity have also been omitted, even 
though they may play an important role in the work of revivalist groups. And, 
likewise, organisations that are identifiably Muslim but which have clearly moved 
away from an ‘Islamist’ orientation—for example, in rejecting a role for Islam as the 
fundamental principle for state governance—have not been included, even when 
their leaders have previously been involved in Jama’at- or Ikhwan-associated groups.  
Furthermore, the ‘nodes’ as depicted in this diagram are clearly of two kinds, 
organisations and individuals, which suggest a level of independence not borne out in 
reality. The building blocks of this network are not, in fact, synonymous with either 
organisations or individuals in vacuo: They are either individuals that have 
authoritative roles within organisations or influence upon them, or organisations that 
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are driven by specific individuals. Nevertheless, the diagram serves a practical 
purpose. Bearing in mind Bourdieu’s warning not to mistake ‘the model of reality for 
the reality of the model’, the diagram establishes that there is an organised network 
between the individuals and organisations named within it.90 
To conclude this chapter, the interpersonal and inter-organisational relationships 
comprising this revivalist network may be observed in terms of co-involvement in 
activities and events, and in terms of various leadership structures. Such structures, 
as this chapter has shown, includes MCB, as Britain’s most important umbrella 
organisation for representing Muslims’ interests; the Coordination Committee of 
Islamic Organisations, a hitherto unreported, semi-formal group comprised of key 
leaders of Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations; and informal friendship 
networks, exemplified by Abdullah Faliq’s circle of associates. It also includes 
informal overlapping organisational structures, particularly evident in the multiple 
leadership positions of key individuals in MCB, Muslim Aid and other organisations.  
The individuals that feature prominently in the network are involved in organised 
work, but do not constitute a clear vanguard in the sense of a unified front with 
control over the strategic direction of the network. There are multiple leadership 
clusters but, whilst these overlap somewhat, they do not amount to (or enable) a 
central command structure. Nevertheless, it is clear that the groups and individuals of 
concern collectively comprise an organised network characteristic of a social 
movement. It remains to be seen to what extent this network is bonded in terms of 
cultural solidarity, including shared ways of seeing and evaluating the world, the 
subject of the next chapter, and in terms of a shared conflictual relation with social 
norms and political authority, the subject of Chapter 5. 
                                               
90 Bourdieu (1990), p.39. 
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Chapter 4 
The Basis of the Bonds of Brotherhood: 
Cultural Solidarity, Habitus and Ideology 
This chapter seeks to answer the question as to whether the organisations and 
individuals comprising the revivalist network identified in Chapter 3 share the bonds 
of cultural solidarity. In much of the academic, think tank and news media literature, 
the individuals and groups of concern are characterised as sharing a ‘political 
ideology … that calls for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of 
government’.1 This chapter, however, does not regard the key factor likely bonding 
the network as ideology, in the sense of an explicitly formulated doctrine. Rather 
than seek to establish the ‘ideology’ of the network and ascertain whether this 
includes the goal of an Islamic state, this chapter seeks to establish whether or not a 
bonding factor in the network is an identifiably similar set of classifications, 
concepts and dispositions. This particularly relates to the individuals’ sense of 
themselves as members of a group and their concern with the social world they 
inhabit, including but by no means restricted to matters of politics and governance. 
Accordingly, this chapter shows how the individuals comprising the network 
identified in Chapter 3 share cultural solidarity in terms of how they classify 
themselves as a community and the environment or territory within which they live. 
It regards their conception of communal identity and solidarity through certain 
Islamic concepts, such as the Muslim umma, and Islamic principles implicit to their 
work, including that of ‘Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong’. It shows 
the extent to which they share a common understanding of themselves as a 
community, of their place in the world, and of their work and its purpose. This 
chapter contends that although there is some variation in the way in which 
                                               
1 Pew Forum (2010), p.20. 
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individuals understand their collective identity and certain key Islamic concepts and 
principles through which they understand their work, there are nevertheless grounds 
to assert that the network identified in the previous chapter embodies cultural 
solidarity characteristic of a social movement. 
1.  Communal and territorial classifications 
Individuals and groups in the revivalist network share a way of seeing themselves as 
part of a religious community, the umma, and as part of humanity, within which the 
umma is nested. Although these forms of identification are not mutually exclusive, 
the Muslim umma takes precedence because of its perceived possession of divine 
knowledge and its duty to share Islam. Also common within the network is a 
perception of the territory in which they reside, understood in terms of reformed 
Islamic concepts. 
1.1.  Community: the Muslim umma and humanity 
The umma is an Islamic concept that derives from the Qur’an. As Frederick Denny 
observes, ‘in the Qur’an the ummah concept itself develops from a general one, 
applying to non-Arab groups, too, toward a more exclusive one which is limited to 
the Muslim community’.2 By regarding the appearance of the term umma as it 
appears in the Qur’an according to the order in which the verses were allegedly 
revealed, Denny notes that the meaning of the term changes from religious 
communities, including Christians and Jews, to Muslims as the ideal religious 
community. He writes that in the latter part of the Qur’an, the term seems to apply 
exclusively to Muslims ‘as the Ummah par excellence, a concept and reality which 
possess an ontological status’.3  
This concept of the umma as the community or nation of Muslim believers is a basic 
feature of the perceptual schemata, and thus the cultural solidarity, shared by 
members of the revivalist network in Britain. A sense of religious fraternity is 
certainly not exclusive to these individuals, or Muslims more generally, but a 
                                               
2 Denny (1975), p.36. 
3 Ibid., p.55. 
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specific sense of the umma, along with other ways of seeing and evaluating their 
position in the world, connects them to a distinct social and politically oriented 
habitus. The notion of belonging to the umma as a singular community involves a 
bonding in terms of shared beliefs and a collective Islamic identity. This may be 
compatible with other forms of identification, such as ‘Britishness’, but may not be 
subordinate to them. Yet, importantly, it also involves an obligation to share Islam, 
principally its ethical code, beyond this community within the broader society.  
Such a concept is clearly expressed, explicitly or implicitly, by prominent leaders 
within Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations in Britain. For example, 
Muhammad Abdul Bari, the former MCB secretary general, writes in a report for 
the Cordoba Foundation that the term umma ‘is commonly used to mean the 
collective community of Islamic peoples. It can be used to mean the concept of a 
commonwealth of the Believers’.4 Elsewhere he writes, ‘Muslims are one ummah’, 
a ‘community of people bonded by their desire to surrender to the will of God’.5 
Ibrahim Hewitt, senior editor at the Middle Eastern Monitor and the former assistant 
director of the Muslim Educational Trust, defines umma as ‘Community; in 
particular, the global Muslim community’.6 Zahid Parvez, the director of the Islamic 
Foundation’s Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) and a former 
president of UKIM, similarly defines umma as ‘the Muslim world community’ 
which is ‘connected into one brotherhood and sisterhood by the Islamic faith and 
vision’.7  
Acknowledgement of the umma as the Muslim community or nation, and of the 
importance of the solidarity of the umma, has been expressed at numerous events in 
Britain or involving Muslim activists based in Britain. Such an acknowledgement 
was expressed by numerous figures in the revivalist network in Britain at the 
‘Muslims in Europe Conference’, held in Istanbul in July 2006. These included 
Khurshid Ahmad, chairman of the Islamic Foundation; Manazir Ahsan, the 
Foundation’s director general; Iqbal Sacranie, then the secretary general of MCB; 
                                               
4 Abdul Bari (2013), p.8, fn.1. 
5 Adbul Bari (2005), p.84. 
6 Hewitt (2004), p.59. 
7 Parvez (2007), pp.266, 54. 
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Mohammed Abdul Aziz, Sacranie’s then adviser; Iqbal Asaria, MCB’s finance 
director; Said Ferjani, then the head of public relations for the Muslim Association 
of Britain (MAB); Wakkas Khan, then the president of the Federation of Islamic 
Student Societies (FOSIS); Mohamed Mukadam, the former chairman of the 
Association of Muslim Schools UK; Anas Shaikh-Ali, the director of the London 
branch of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT-UK); and Ahmed Al-
Rawi, then the president of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. 
Assuming a fundamental social reality designated by the term umma, but concerned 
with its manifest cohesiveness, the conference delegates declared, 
We recognise that [the] solidarity of the Ummah is a key priority for all Muslims—
both in Europe and throughout the world … We call for solidarity between us and the 
upholding of Islam’s universal vision of peace, fraternity, tolerance and social 
harmony.8 
A similar invocation of the umma as a unitary Muslim community was made in June 
2011 at MCB’s fourteenth Annual General Meeting by Maulana Shahid Raza, then 
the chairman of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). He 
stated, ‘despite our diversity, we are one Muslim ummah (nation) and there are 
fundamental beliefs and practices that make us one’.9 He added that ‘MCB is one of 
the strongest expressions of that unity in this country’. The same sense of the term 
umma was expressed in the Cordoba Foundation-supported event held in 2012 
entitled, ‘Staging the Ummah’, which addressed the issue of a ‘culturally relevant 
Islam’.10 Other, earlier events focused on the concept of the umma as a singular 
Muslim community, and upon rousing Muslim solidarity based upon this concept, 
include those held by FOSIS. In 2003, for example, Zahid Parvez and Azzam 
                                               
8 ‘The Topkapi Declaration’, Amman Message website, July 2, 2006. 
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=34. 
9 ‘Muslims in Britain Come Together and Confirm their Commitment to Unity, and Working for a 
Just and Fair Society for all’, MCB website, June 15, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslims-in-
britain-come-together-and-confirm-their-commitment-to-unity-and-working-for-a-just-and-fair-
society-for-all/. 
10 ‘Staging the Ummah: An Evening with Wajahat Ali’, event listing, Cordoba Foundation website, 
September 24, 2012. http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/events.php?id=1&art=81. 
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Tamimi both gave presentations on the topic of the Muslim umma at the 
organisation’s annual summer conference.11 
For revivalists, a sense of brotherhood amongst Muslims is central to being a 
Muslim. Daud Abdullah, the former assistant secretary general of MCB, expresses 
this as follows: ‘The Qur’an says, “All of the believers are brothers,” and there are 
so many traditions [hadiths] on this subject of brotherhood that you cannot be a 
sincere Muslim and not take these teachings seriously.’12 Citing from the hadith 
collection of al-Bukhari, the director of the Muslim Educational Trust, Ghulam 
Sarwar, writes, ‘Believers are like parts of a building to one another—each part 
supporting the others’.13 He cites another hadith, adding, ‘None of you can be a 
believer unless he loves for his brother what he loves for himself’.14 
However, the Muslim umma is perceived by members of the revivalist network not 
simply as a source of identity or solidarity, but more specifically as a vanguard for 
ushering in Allah’s divine will within the entirety of human society. The director of 
the Islamic Foundation’s Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Zahid Parvez, 
describes the umma’s responsibility as ‘uphold[ing] morality, truth and justice’ and 
‘lead[ing] Mankind [sic] from the depths of ignorance to the true knowledge: 
Islam’.15 IIIT-UK declares it is ‘dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic 
thought and its methodology in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with 
present challenges’ and bestow divine ‘guidance’ upon human civilisation.16 This 
duty of guiding humanity is similarly expressed by the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars (IUMS), which is connected to the Islamic Sharia Council and the 
UK Board of Sharia Councils by the overlapping roles of Suhaib Hasan and 
Maulana Muhammad Abu Sayeed in these organisations. ‘IUMS does not follow a 
                                               
11 Maréchal (2008), p.322. 
12 Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012. 
13 Sarwar (2006), p.198. 
14 Ibid., p.199. 
15 Zahid Parvez, ‘The Crux of the Matter’, Trends, Vol. 2, No. 3., 1988, p.14. 
16 ‘About Us’, IIIT-UK website. http://www.iiituk.com/about.htm. 
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certain country, group, or sect,’ it asserts, ‘it is only proud of belonging to Islam and 
its transnational community - Ummah’.17 It adds: 
We have been taught by the Quran as well as by the Sunnah that this Muslim Ummah 
will never agree to commit an error, whereas the Quran says: ‘And of those whom 
We have created, there is a community who guides (others) with the truth, and 
establishes justice therewith’.18 
Numerous individuals in the revivalist network, particularly in the field of inter-faith 
work, articulate a notion of the umma as embracing all humanity, including Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. The director of the Islamic Foundation, Irshad Bacqui, for 
example, expresses this view. ‘The whole world is umma,’ he states, ‘because its the 
umma of humanity’.19 This is, however, by no means an alternative notion to that of 
the Muslim umma. The umma as humanity and the umma as the nation of Muslim 
believers may, in fact, be viewed as inter-related social classifications within a 
distinct perceptual schemata shared by individuals within the network. What 
connects them is a perception of Islam’s universal mission to embrace the whole of 
human society.  
Anas al-Shaikh Ali, the director of IIIT-UK, Ibrahim Mogra, assistant secretary 
general for MCB, and Anas Altikriti, director of the Cordoba Foundation, all 
support this view. ‘The umma,’ says al-Shaikh Ali, ‘is both Muslim society and 
humanity, since Muslims are part of humanity. Whatever we do, its not only for the 
betterment of Muslims, its also for the betterment of humanity in general’.20 Mogra 
similarly explains: ‘The umma is the global umma,’ he states. ‘It is not just about 
Muslims. If we say Muhammad was a universal messenger and then exclude non-
Muslims, where’s the universality?’21 Altikriti echoes this, asserting that because of 
the universality of Islam, the umma includes both Muslims as a community and, 
                                               
17 ‘Introducing IUMS’, IUMS website. http://iumsonline.org/portal/en-US/introduction/37/. 
18 Ibid., emphasis added. 
19 Interview with Irshad Bacqui, February 22, 2012. 
20 Interview with Anas al-Shaikh Ali, January 17, 2013. 
21 Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012. 
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more widely, non-Muslims.22 ‘The message of Islam,’ he states, ‘does not resonate 
to the borders of the Muslim community. It resonates far beyond … and that is why 
people are turning to Islam.’23 For these prominent individuals, the term umma 
denotes different but related communities, with the Muslim umma nested within the 
more general umma of humanity. In Mogra’s words: 
When we talk of the umma we should be thinking globally. But sometimes you have 
to bring it closer to home. When you have Muslims in Burma being persecuted, then I 
would say, yes these part of our umma, these are brothers and sisters in Islam, that is 
our umma, and when one part of the body aches, every part of the body is restless.24 
The metaphor Mogra uses is derived from canonical hadiths.25 It is one that is 
commonly referred to by other revivalist Muslims. Abdul Bari, for example, writes, 
‘According to the traditions [hadiths] from Prophet Muhammad, “You see the 
believers … as if they were a single body; when one of its members is ailing, the 
rest of the body joins it in sleeplessness and fever”.’26 Manazir Ahsan, the director 
general of the Islamic Foundation and elected council member of MCB, similarly 
observes, ‘In a Prophetic Hadith (Traditional saying) Muslims have been compared 
to the body—if one part of it aches, the whole body feels its effect and rushes to its 
relief.’27 It seems that despite expressions of humanity as one umma, the notion of 
the Muslim umma takes precedence when Muslims are enduring hardship, and that 
this is inextricable from a scripturally-informed religious perspective. 
This conceptual precedence—to see Muslims as part of the Muslim umma prior to 
seeing them as part of the broader umma of humanity—sometimes expresses an 
unconscious bias towards Muslims over non-Muslims. Such a bias was expressed by 
                                               
22 ‘RESPONSE TO THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES-BR ANAS AL TIKRITI’, YouTube, 
December 25, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KkWltn07VE. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012. 
25 This metaphor appears in the two most popular collections of hadiths, in Sahih Bukhari (number 
5665) and Sahih Muslim (number 2586). See Abu Amina Elias, ‘Hadith on Brotherhood: The 
believers are like one body in their love, mercy, and compassion for each other’, Daily Hadith 
website, March 3, 2012. http://dailyhadith.abuaminaelias.com/2012/03/03/hadith-on-brotherhood-the-
believers-are-like-one-body-in-their-love-mercy-and-compassion-for-each-other/. 
26 Abdul Bari (2005), p.85. 
27 Ashan (1977), p.22. 
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the former MCB general secretary Iqbal Sacranie in his explanation of MCB’s 
boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day in 2005 and its campaign to have it replaced 
with a more ‘inclusive’ event. Sacranie claimed that a new, ‘EU genocide memorial 
day’ would be able to commemorate ‘other ongoing genocide and human right 
abuses around the world’. The examples he gave in his letter to the Home Office 
were all concerned with Muslims (and questionable as genocides): ‘the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir’.28 Only when the story broke in the 
news media did he add Rwanda and Vietnam as examples.29  
This bias is inseparable from a distinctive religious habitus in which the Muslim 
umma is perceived—and indeed referred to in the Qur’an, verse 3:110—as the ‘best 
community’. Its special value lies in its piety. In Abdul Bari’s words, within 
humanity, the Muslim umma is ‘blessed’ because of its wilful submission to ‘the 
will of God’.30 His view that only the possession of ‘God-consciousness’ 
distinguishes some people as superior to others implicitly portrays the Muslim 
umma as a superior community over others.31 The Muslim umma is also deemed 
special because of its responsibility towards humanity of sharing the message and 
way of life of Islam. This sense of responsibility is what connects the concept of the 
umma as humanity with that of the Muslim umma. The latter, gifted for its 
possession of divine revelation and right guidance, is seen to be the vanguard 
community at the cutting edge of a social transformation for the benefit of all 
towards Islam: The umma as humanity forms the broader, global community within 
which Islam’s universal mission is yet to be realised. Sacranie expresses this view in 
suggesting that although the concept of the umma marks a communal Muslim 
identity, this does not entail an isolated community, since ‘Islam is a universal 
religion’ and ‘engagement and exchange’ is necessary for Islam to benefit humanity 
as a whole.32 
                                               
28 ‘MCB and the Holocaust Memorial Day’, MCB website, January 23, 2005. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050211155329/http://www.mcb.org.uk/archivenews.php. 
29 ‘Programme transcript’ (for ‘A Question of Leadership’ documentary), BBC website, 16 September 
16, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/4171950.stm. 
30 Abdul Bari (2005), p.84. 
31 Ibid., p.81. 
32 Sacranie (2006), p.29. 
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Sacranie’s claim that Muslim identity does not engender a mentality of separatism 
was voiced in a political environment where a perceived ‘hardening of attitudes’ 
towards Muslims after the July 2005 London bombings put MCB on defensive 
footing. But it may also been seen in relation to an Islamic point of view in which 
non-Muslims are yet to be ‘awakened’ to the reality of their ‘forgotten’ Muslim 
identity. According to an orthodox Islamic belief based upon Muhammad’s sunna, 
each child is born a Muslim, but many are raised in ignorance of this status. Ahsan 
expresses this view clearly. Islam, he declares, ‘teaches that every man is born 
naturally a Muslim’.33 This view is explicitly supported by other leading figures in 
the network, including Adbul Bari.34 In acknowledgement of this original status, 
Muslim converts are sometimes referred to as ‘reverts’. This perspective, 
popularised in the works of the late Khurram Murad, is reflected in some of the 
initiatives for new converts established by revivalist organisations, such as UKIM’s 
Revert Support Programme.35 In Glasgow, UKIM also has a Revert Coordinator.36 
Other leading figures in the revivalist network similarly express a broad concept of 
community in which Muslims and non-Muslims, distinguished only by their 
embrace of their ‘true’ Muslim identity, are connected as one family. Farooq Murad, 
the director of the Islamic Foundation and former MCB secretary general, asserts, 
‘In the Qur’an it is said that all of mankind is one umma—one people. Some 
recognise that they are members of this family. Some may not.’37 Muslims are 
viewed as those who readily acknowledge themselves as part of God’s family and 
non-Muslims are viewed as those who are yet to do so. Non-Muslims, Murad 
believes, need to be drawn ‘back into the family’ of God. The method of doing 
this—and a duty incumbent upon Muslims—is, Murad says, da’wa. Non-Muslims 
are thus seen as part of God’s family that, by virtue of failing to recognise this, have 
gone astray. And da’wa is seen as the dutiful means by which Muslims are to bring 
                                               
33 Ashan (1977), p.22. 
34 Abdul Bari (2005), pp.78-79. 
35 ‘Dawah Report 2012’, UKIM website, August 7, 2012. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130810090143/http://www.ukim.org/ukimdata/256/UKIM-DAWAH-
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36 ‘UKIM Outreach Services’, Alfurqan Mosque website, August 2, 2014. 
http://www.alfurqanmosque.com/index.php/departments/outreach. 
37 Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013. 
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them back into the fold of Islam, a return to their original, ‘natural’ status. Such a 
return ultimately dissolves the barrier between the Muslim umma and the umma of 
humanity which it lies within. Framing this view of the relationship between 
Muslims and the rest of humanity, and the importance of da’wa, is the perception of 
Islam, expressed in Ahsan’s words, as ‘the universal religion meant for mankind of 
all races, colours and times’.38 
Abdul Bari likewise sees Islam as a ‘universal religion’ and da’wa as ‘the most 
important duty of Muslims’.39 He asserts that although serving ‘the Muslim 
community’ is the core of MCB’s work, this ‘community focus’ does not absolve it 
of its ‘greater societal responsibilities’.40 Abdul Bari invokes the idea of qawm as 
equivalent to the British nation which includes all British citizens, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. Addressing a Muslim audience, he says non-Muslim British citizens 
‘may not be part of the “Muslim Ummah”, but they are our “Qawm”.’41 Drawing 
attention to the social challenges that affect all people regardless of religious 
identity, Abdul Bari takes a practical view of ‘working for the common good’.42 
Yet, the notion of qawm also delineates the broader community within which the 
Muslim umma in Britain is part and with which it is obliged to share the message of 
Muhammad for the benefit of all. Thus, there are both practical and religious 
motivations underlying Abdul Bari’s concern for the ‘common good’. 
The Muslim umma, in one sense, is not perceived as a community apart from the 
more inclusive community of the British qawm or even humanity. There are several 
factors that have prompted MCB’s leaders and other prominent Muslim figures to 
articulate this publicly. Their expressions of Muslims’ willingness to be an integral 
part of Britain are inseparable from public concerns and fears relating to Muslim 
radicalisation and terrorism. They are also inseparable from a perceived need to 
                                               
38 Ahsan (1977), p.42. 
39 Abdul Bari (2005), pp. 124, 127. 
40 Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘Secretary General’s Address To the Annual General Meeting of the 
General Assembly’, p.6, MCB website, June 16, 2007. 
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41 Ibid. 
42 ‘Working for the common good’ is the motto of MCB. See ‘MCB Constitution’, p.6, available at 
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distinguish themselves and their organisations from ‘quietist’ groups, such as 
Tablighi Jama’at, which advocate a withdrawal from politics and the mainstream 
non-Muslim culture, and ‘rejectionist’ groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which 
consider political participation haram, Islamically forbidden. Public announcements 
regarding the inclusive character of the umma and the pro-integration attitude of 
British Muslims, such as Sacranie and Abdul Bari’s, no doubt occur in a field of 
contention in which the public perception of Muslims and Islam is a key stake.  
But it is important to note that this is not purely defensive, since what is at stake are 
distinctive perceptions and positively conceived notions of the Muslim umma in 
relation to non-Muslims and Muslim-minority culture: The Muslim umma is 
perceived as a distinct brotherhood united by its possession of an ethics and a mode 
of knowledge rooted in the divine and, importantly, its obligation to share these 
universally. As Adbul Bari writes, ‘Muslims belong to a global family and they are 
commanded to remain united in the pursuit of Islam, as “all believers are 
brethren”.’43 And as Zahid Parvez articulates it, ‘The purpose and mission of the 
Muslim world-community (Ummah) … is no other than to align individuals and 
society to the natural way shown by Allah through the glorious Quran.’44 This sense 
of the umma’s ‘purpose and mission’ was similarly articulated by the late Khurram 
Murad, the former vice president of Jama’at-i-Islami and secretary general of the 
Islamic Foundation. A hugely influential figure for his son, Farooq Murad, and 
others including Parvez, he wrote: 
[T]he Muslim Ummah has not been constituted to become just another nation among 
nations, to compete with others to advance its interests. No, it has been ‘raised for all 
mankind’. It is the ‘best community’ [a reference to the Qur’an, verse 3:110] only if it 
serves their [i.e. mankind’s] interests, their foremost interest being that they should 
find guidance to the right path [i.e. to Islam].45 
 
                                               
43 Abdul Bari (2005), p.85. 
44 Zahid Parvez, ‘Why Fasting?’, UKIM Facebook page, July 29, 2012.  
https://www.facebook.com/UKIMBfd/posts/392971687419445. 
45 Murad (1986), p.16. 
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1.2.  Territory: dar al-Islam and dar al-harb 
Individuals of the revivalist network express a similar sense of the terrain in which 
they live and practice their faith. Traditionally, Islamic legal thought classified 
territory into dar al-Islam (the abode of peace or submission to Allah) and dar al-
harb (the abode of war).46 Contemporary revivalist thinkers, including Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and Khurram Murad, began to question the applicability of this 
classification when it became clear, from the late 1970s, that Muslims in Europe 
were not temporary residents but permanent citizens. Europe could not be 
considered dar al-harb, since it was now the home of some millions of Muslims 
who were more or less free to practice Islam, though it could not be considered dar 
al-Islam, since shari’a was not fully applied. Thus, a new legal category was 
devised for it, dar al-da’wa (the abode of the call to Islam). Al-Qaradawi also 
speaks of Europe as dar al-ahd (the abode of contact), whilst Tariq Ramadan 
describes it as dar al-shahada (the abode of testimony).47 These alternative 
conceptual categories are explicitly or implicitly endorsed by some members of the 
revivalist network, indicating a shared perspective of their relationship with their 
social and political environment. 
Abdullah Faliq, for example, notes that from the early 1980s, organisations such as 
the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) and MAB, continued the trend established by 
other organisations, including the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) and FOSIS, to serve 
Muslims’ interests and protect Muslim identity, but also began to view Britain as 
home. Their activities began to be directed to Muslims as British citizens. He 
contends that events such as the Rushdie Affair not only helped galvanise a trans-
ethnic sense of Muslim solidarity amongst British Muslims, but also made clear that 
the classical Islamic definitions of territory were irrelevant to Muslims’ 
contemporary situation in Britain. ‘This is a place where Islam can be practiced,’ 
asserts Faliq, ‘so it is not dar al-harb. Britain is home to me, so I consider it “land of 
peace”.’48 Other leading figures in the network seem to agree. Citing the influence 
                                               
46 This distinction was first legally codified by Abu Hanifa (d. 767), founder of one of the four schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence, as recorded by Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani in his Kitab al-Siyar 
al-Kabir. See Nyazee (2002), p.172, and Khadduri (1955), pp.52-53. 
47 Ramadan (1999). 
48 Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. 
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of his late father upon his thinking, Farooq Murad rejects the relevance of the idea 
of dar al-Islam versus dar al-harb. ‘Islam is not a geographical idea,’ he states, ‘it is 
a universal message.’49 Muslims, he believes, should integrate and participate in 
Britain though democratic means. ‘There is no idea of isolation, withdrawal or 
rejection.’ This is not merely his father’s teachings, he insists, since ‘it comes from 
the Islamic concept of da’wa. This is invitation, interaction. We have a message and 
we should share it’.  
The rejection of traditional, dichotomous Islamic notions of space was similarly 
articulated in a report, Contextualising Islam, published by the University of 
Cambridge. Authored by a group including some individuals identified as playing 
key roles in the revivalist network, such as Mohammed Abdul Aziz, Anas al-Shaikh 
Ali, Ibrahim Mogra and Mohamed Mukadam, the report states that it is ‘important 
to move away from the terminology of the “dar al-Islam” and “dar al-harb” 
dichotomy,’ which, it says, is not found in the Qur’an, but ‘developed by classical 
jurists in an era before globalisation’.50 The report claims that the concept of dar al-
Islam was equivalent to dar al-amn—‘land of security’—as opposed to a ‘land of 
insecurity’. It also states that security means the ‘freedom to perform public acts of 
worship, including the five prayers, giving alms (zakah), performing pilgrimage to 
Makkah, performing the fast of Ramadan, slaughter of animals for halal food, 
building mosques, giving the call to prayer (adhan), wearing appropriate dress and 
avoiding the cardinal sins’.51 In Britain, the report notes, there is freedom to do all 
of these things, the implication being that Britain may be considered in this sense as 
dar al-Islam or, at the very least, not as dar al-harb. Mogra concurs with this view. 
‘Britain for me is the best place in Europe for Muslims,’ says. ‘We have everything 
we would wish for in this country. I can dress as I like, we have halal shops, you 
can call out the call to prayer from the minarets, we have every freedom within the 
parameters of the law.’52  
                                               
49 Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013. 
50 Suleiman (2009), p.36. 
51 Ibid., p.35. 
52 Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012. 
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The perception of Britain beyond the dichotomous terms of dar al-Islam and dar al-
harb is not unique to revivalists who seek a transformation of society towards the 
universalisation of Islam. Whilst revivalists who perceive Islam’s rightful place as 
comprehensively embedded throughout the entire social fabric reject an attitude of 
hostility towards Britain and non-Muslim fellow citizens, there are others who 
likewise view Britain in non-confrontational terms but see Islam as needing to find a 
home within a mostly secular society and a liberal democratic political system. Both 
groups of individuals view Islam and the Muslim-minority environment of Britain in 
compatible rather than antagonistic terms. But what distinguishes these two groups 
is how Islam is viewed as best at home in Britain. Whereas revivalists see no limit to 
the applicability of Islam within Britain’s social and political structures—and in fact 
sees such change in the long term as the will of God—Muslim secularists see a need 
for a clear separation of religion and the state, and a need to re-interpret the 
fundamentals of the religion within the contemporary context of today’s liberal 
democratic, human rights framework. 
Classifications of Britain or Europe more broadly as dar al-da’wa, dar al-ahd or dar 
al-shahada, certainly separate their proponents from the ‘rejectionist’ groups such 
as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who eschew any third possible classification of territory beyond 
dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. But what separates them internally is whether or not 
Islam is viewed as a universal religion and whether or not the umma is seen as 
having a ‘purpose and mission’ to guide humanity through da’wa to a 
comprehensive social transformation in the name of Islam. What distinguishes 
Islamic revivalists is not just a non-confrontational sense of the territory in which 
they live, but—as the next section aims to show—a certain sense of the nature, 
purpose and meaning of their work, as well as a certain orientation to the future. 
 2.  Missionary concepts and perceptions 
In addition to a shared sense of themselves as part of a religious community, the 
umma, and a sense of the terrain upon which they live, individuals and groups in the 
revivalist network share a sense of their work and its purpose. This section of the 
chapter identifies three ways in which this manifests. Firstly, in terms of an effort to 
educate Muslims on their faith; secondly, as a call to non-Muslims to Islam, 
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understood through the Islamic concept of da’wa; and thirdly, in terms of a 
proactive moral duty to ‘enjoin good and forbid wrong’. These are all inter-related, 
and together amount to a collective tendency to define and classify Islam, but for the 
purposes of elucidation are introduced separately.  
2.1.  Speaking for Muslims and Islam 
Many of the individuals and groups of the revivalist network are involved in 
classificatory work that acts to influence Muslims’ own understanding of their faith. 
They are connected by a similar approach, adopted consciously or unconsciously, to 
shape the perceptions and realities of Muslims in line with a particular way of 
seeing and appreciating the world—a particular Islamic habitus. There is some 
variation between individuals’ practical or reflexive understanding of Islam, 
including certain key religious concepts, but this does not undermine the basic 
observation that there is a shared concern to represent what is deemed to be the true 
understanding of Islam. There is a collective effort, albeit largely uncoordinated and 
distributed, to classify the ‘correct’ and, thus, the ‘incorrect’ practice of the religion. 
At the nexus of the revivalist network, MCB’s official aims include working ‘for a 
more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslim in the wider society’ and 
promoting ‘cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK’.53 
However, as the former advisor to Iqbal Sacranie, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, admits, 
the constitution of its leadership and organisational affiliates is dominated by 
Jama’at or Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups.54 Ostensibly, MCB seeks to 
build consensus and represent the broad range of Islamic viewpoints on policy 
matters, though in practice the views it expresses belie a certain outlook that is 
difficult to separate from the specific background of its leadership. The 
distinctiveness of this outlook is not just marked by certain views or concepts—for 
example, the umma as a community with a universal mission to share Islam—but by 
the perception of its own mission to speak on behalf of Islam. In speaking for 
Muslims, MCB adopts a significant role in presenting a specific understanding of 
Islam to the government and the wider public, as well as to Muslims themselves.  
                                               
53 ‘MCB Constitution’, p.6. 
54 Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012. 
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Former secretary general Farooq Murad states, ‘On many issues we have tried to 
build consensus. It is not easy, I accept, but we feel that there are issues that we 
need to make provision for. This includes the education of our faith’.55 Whilst 
presenting itself as an interlocutionary agent for the diversity of Muslim views—a 
conduit for different Islamic perspectives—MCB no doubt sees as part of its 
mission the education of Muslims and non-Muslims on what Islam is. Murad states, 
‘We try to build consensus within the [Muslim] community, try to articulate what 
Islam is for the majority of the community.’ Murad’s assertion that MCB seeks to 
express the understanding of Islam held by the majority of Muslims is highly 
contentious. It is possibly based upon a belief that most British Muslims adhere to 
what he and his associates deem to be orthodox Islam, rather than any systematic 
study of what British Muslims perceive their faith to consist of. It certainly appears 
more aspirational or prescriptive than descriptive.  
This is supported by some of the events MCB has organised. For example, in 
September 2004, MCB held a seminar at the East London Mosque’s London 
Muslim Centre, which marked the launch of the publication of MCB’s ‘Guide to the 
British Media’. The media guide and the seminar aimed ‘to develop the skills 
needed by British Muslims to ensure a better and more accurate representation of 
their faith and values in the print and broadcast media.’56 MCB is not the only 
organisation that sees itself as speaking on behalf of Islam. Manazir Ahsan, the 
director general of the Islamic Foundation, acknowledges that the organisation, 
particularly its publication arm, is dedicated to portraying Islam in authentic terms. 
‘Since its inception,’ he notes, ‘the Islamic Foundation has been engaged in bringing 
out works which may enable readers to gain a better, sharper understanding of 
things Islamic.’57  
The current executive director, Irshad Bacqui supports this view. When the 
Foundation was established, he says, ‘it was about how to present Islam to 
                                               
55 Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013. 
56 Iqbal Sacranie, ‘Secretary General’s Report’, p.11, MCB website, May, 14, 2005. 
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society’.58 In the 1970s, there was hardly any literature from the perspective of 
Muslims living in a Muslim-minority country. The Foundation tried to fill this gap, 
he says, by providing guidance on ‘the roles and responsibilities’ of Muslims in this 
different context. Initially focusing on children’s literature, Bacqui states, it was 
important to help create a new mindset, of ‘how to live according to Islamic values’ 
in a new environment. The authoritative presentation of Islam continues to be 
important to the Foundation’s work today. ‘We want to present Islam to the Muslim 
community and the wider society,’ says Bacqui, ‘to create awareness, so that people 
become aware.’ He adds that this is important in order to combat 
‘misunderstandings that occur from ignorance about each other. The Muslim 
community is as guilty of that as any other community. We try to explain, interpret 
and raise awareness about each other so we can live better together’.59 
Other individuals and groups in the network similarly see themselves as working to 
increase the understanding of Islam. Omer El-Hamdoon, the president of MAB, for 
example, explains MAB’s work as targeting three distinct groups, namely, Muslim 
members, Muslim non-members and non-Muslims. Amongst members, El-
Hamdoon describes MAB’s work as promoting a ‘better understanding of Islam, 
better knowledge’, as well as developing greater awareness of local and global 
issues affecting Muslims. Amongst Muslim non-members, he states, ‘We try to 
promote the correct understanding of Islam’. Explaining what he means by this, he 
says: ‘The people who have deviated in Islam are the people who have deviated 
from the texts. If you really want to understand Islam you have to go back to the 
texts of Islam, the Qur’an and the sunna, the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad.’ 
El-Hamdoon summarises MAB’s aspirations as follows: 
We hope that the Muslim Association of Britain tries to correct Muslims’ 
understanding of Islam, so they are not narrow minded … At the same time we try to 
reach out to non-Muslims and say to them, ‘This is Islam, these are the ideals of 
Islam, this is what Islam talks about’.60 
                                               
58 Interview with Irshad Bacqui, February 22, 2012. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012. 
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UKIM and IFE—described by IFE’s press secretary, Abdullah Faliq, as the two 
‘strongest’ Muslim organisations in Britain—also view themselves as working to 
enhance Muslims’ understanding of Islam, as well as educating non-Muslims about 
Islam through da’wa, or outreach work. More will be said shortly on da’wa, since it 
is a key element of their modus operandi to attain an Islamic society. Here it 
suffices to observe that both organisations regard their work as beginning with 
disseminating the right understanding of Islam amongst Muslims. This is at least 
partly because only Muslims with the right understanding of Islam may engage in 
da’wa.  
Like the Islamic Foundation, IFE sees itself as speaking for Islam through the 
facilitation of ‘an enlightened appreciation of Islam that is relevant to the context 
and realities of our time’.61 Such an appreciation is fostered by a range of activities, 
including formal and informal courses, retreats, workshops and seminars, including 
training programmes in leadership development for imams. UKIM likewise has a 
grassroots connection with over 40 branches and around 30 mosques. It similarly 
targets local communities with a range of social programmes, including youth clubs 
and cultural events. According to its website, around 5,000 children annually 
receive an Islamic education through its madari system.62 UKIM states that it is 
important for its members to acquire a ‘basic knowledge and understanding of the 
Islamic faith and values’. This includes ‘knowing what is obligatory (fard and 
wajib) and prohibited (haram)’.63 UKIM has a very clear concept of Islam that it 
deems authentic and for which it sees itself as struggling to comprehensively revive 
throughout British society. 
Both UKIM and IFE, as with the Islamic Foundation, MCB and others, are involved 
in an effort to define and classify Islam. This can take the form of educating 
Muslims on their faith in the context of competing Islamic interpretations, 
particularly secular liberal ones, or challenging mainstream public perceptions of 
Islam, particularly those critical (or perceived to be critical) of Islamic beliefs and 
                                               
61 ‘About Us’, IFE website. http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=intro. 
62 ‘Education Proejcts’, UKIM website. http://www.ukim.org/education/. Madari refers to evening 
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practices. Some groups speaking on behalf of Muslims and Islam in recent years 
have taken a rather strident tone against what they see as government-led 
‘Islamophobia’. Implicit to this is a certain understanding of Islam that requires 
protection. Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), for example, states, 
‘The desperate need to challenge the status quo, to present Islam and Muslims in a 
more balanced light and to defend civil liberties has never been more acute.’64  
These groups appear united in having a vision of their work as providing the ‘right’ 
understanding of the religion, even though they may differ upon some of the details. 
What this understanding consists in may be elaborated through several concepts, 
including da’wa, and doctrines, such as Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the 
Wrong, that characterise their work. 
2.2.  Da’wa: the call to Islam 
Related to the efforts to present an authentic vision of Islam to Muslims are the 
efforts to present Islam to non-Muslims. These efforts are entwined within a 
tendency to control the legitimate classification of Muslim identity and the Islamic 
faith. Indeed, for Islamic revivalists, what it is to be a Muslim is in part comprised 
of a commitment to conduct da’wa, to present Islam to non-believers.  
The special significance of da’wa is related to the importance placed upon a genuine 
embrace of Islam—a willing rather than a coerced submission to God—for the 
universalisation of the religion. The propagation of Islam, it is believed, cannot be 
done effectively through the isolation of Muslims from the surrounding Muslim-
minority culture, nor through violent means. The importance of da’wa underlies 
revivalists’ active participation in democratic politics and their condemnation of 
violent jihadists, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This is exemplified by 
MCB’s campaign to encourage Muslims to vote65 and its condemnation of the 
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Islamic State as unIslamic.66 Thus, revivalists may be distinguished from militants 
who seek an Islamic world order through military-driven territorial expansion, and 
from ‘quietists’ who wish to isolate themselves in communities of putative spiritual 
purity.  
The characterisation of groups such as the Islamic Foundation and MCB as 
‘participationist’ accurately highlights the importance they place upon Muslims’ 
active involvement in Western social and political structures. However, it obscures a 
more fundamental conviction underlying their willingness to participate in politics, 
which concerns the importance of sharing Islam, or from their perspective reviving 
it, through willing submission. For this reason, the term ‘dawa-ist’ might be more 
accurate, though ‘revivalist’ is maintained throughout this thesis due to its relative 
ease of use. 
Prominent individuals and groups in the revivalist network of the global Muslim 
Brotherhood consistently characterise da’wa as a religious duty. IFE’s website 
states, ‘Islam obligates Muslims to share and discuss their faith with those around 
them, as directed by the Qur'an: “Invite people to the way of your Lord, with 
wisdom and beautiful speech”. [Qur’an,16:125].’67 It adds, ‘This principle, known 
as Da’wa, requires Muslims to undertake dialogue and discourse about our faith in a 
manner that resonates with the people around us.’ Through the principle of ‘Islamic 
Dawah,’ states IFE’s website, the ‘responsibility of promoting Islam is a duty placed 
on us all’.68 IFE meets this perceived duty by organising ‘Islam awareness’ projects, 
producing audio-visual resources and hosting exhibitions, mosque open days and 
interfaith events.  
Other groups that are similarly involved in da’wa activities likewise see da’wa as an 
Islamic duty. FOSIS, for example, runs an annual Islam Awareness Week in 
collaboration with the Islamic Education and Research Academy (iERA). In its 
guide for the event organisers, FOSIS states that the ‘first and foremost reason’ for 
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conducting such an event is ‘that it is obligatory upon to Muslims to call others to 
Islam. It is narrated that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said “convey Islam to the 
people even if it were by a single ayah”. By organising an Islam Awareness Week,’ 
it states, ‘you will have something to show Allah on the Day of Judgement. This is 
without doubt the most important reason to participate in dawah’.69 iERA itself is a 
very active organisation dedicated to da’wa work. It conducts training courses and 
develops resources for da’wa under its Mission Dawah initiative, and has a 
programme aimed at supporting new Muslims with the fundamentals of their new 
faith. Another organisation, the Islam Channel is conceived by its founder, 
Mohamed Ali Harrath, as a powerful modern vehicle for da’wa. The channel was 
established as a part of Harrath’s Dawah Project, the website of which states: 
‘Dawah’ (inviting others to Islam) is an obligation upon all Muslims. Thus, it is our 
duty to educate people about Islam, subsequently to have a better understanding of 
the Muslim way of life.70 
The conception of da’wa as a duty is shared by key figures in the revivalist network, 
including Muhammad Abdul Bari, Suhaib Hasan, Omer El-Hamdoon and Anas 
Altikriti. Adbul Bari writes that ‘the most important duty of Muslims is to create 
awareness, bearing witness to God’s message among people’.71 Consistent with this, 
Hasan asserts that, 
Da’wa, which means the propagation of Islam, the word of Allah, is a duty upon 
every Muslim. According to his means and abilities, he should do da’wa. Because as 
long as I think that Islam is good for everyone, and as long as I think that it is a way 
of your salvation on the day of judgment, then I should not hold it, I should not 
confine it to myself, I should propagate it.72 
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El-Hamdoon also sees da’wa as a duty for Muslims, but emphasises that it is 
something that ought to be conducted from the heart. ‘The message has not been 
clear,’ he says, ‘because when people talk about da’wa, inviting others to Islam, 
they always talk it about it as a duty. At MAB, however, we want to take it to a 
different level, where its not just your duty, but it is something that you really do 
genuinely, sincerely.’73 He cites the Muslim scholar al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who 
criticised some Muslims’ worship of God as ‘the worship of traders or 
businessmen’, conducted because they calculate paradise will be rewarded to them 
in return. ‘The higher level of worship,’ says El-Hamdoon, ‘is conducted by people 
who worship God because He deserves to be worshipped. Even if there was no 
Paradise, if there was no Hellfire, they would still worship God because He is 
worthy of worship.’ 
This notion of the duty of da’wa is one in which it is conducted not merely from a 
rational acknowledgement of its importance or a calculation of its rewards, but from 
a natural inclination, an unconsciously embodied and ‘heartfelt’ understanding of its 
importance. It resonates with the view of da’wa expressed by Khurram Murad, who 
wrote, ‘Da’wah, prior to everything, is a state of mind, a world view, an attitude to 
life, indeed a kind of life.’74 In this sense, da’wa is more than just the conscious act 
of presenting and promoting Islam to non-Muslims, for example through organised 
activities. It is also a way of conducting oneself in every action. It is unsurprising, 
then, that this is how Khurram Murad’s son, Farooq Murad, views da’wa. Whilst 
conceding that MCB’s official remit does not include da’wa, he asserts:  
But da’wa is a very broad concept and can be done in many ways. If I live my values 
of Islam of decency, respect, kindness and generosity, I may be doing the best kind of 
da’wa possible. I think you are doing da’wa without consciously, actively doing 
da’wa. If you live Islam, you cannot but be doing da’wa.75 
Altikriti echoes these sentiments, emphasising the comprehensive nature of da’wa 
as permeating all of the various domains of human action. Social work, public 
relations, teaching and all other kinds of work, he states, may be classified into their 
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respective categories only from a practical point of view, but all of them fall into the 
one category of da’wa: 
All that we do, every single activity that we engage with, every single rhetoric that 
we issue, every statement that we publish, every person that we meet, every party that 
we hold an alliance with—everything—everything around us rotates around the 
central and focal meaning of da’wa.76 
From this point of view, da’wa involves a state of mind and a state of being, in 
which Islam permeates every conscious thought and unconscious action. According 
to this perspective, activities strategically dedicated to promote Islam, those 
consciously explicative of the virtues of Islam as a way of life, are considered to be 
but one form of da’wa alongside actions that unconsciously promote Islam by 
exemplary behaviour. Manazir Ahsan supports this interpretation, asserting, 
‘Witnessing by word, Shahadah bil qaul, and reinforcing it by action, Shahadah bil 
amal, are two sides of the same coin—both are complementary and necessary to the 
other.’77  
Da’wa is not a matter of rational advocacy seeking an intellectual conversion, but a 
holistic presentation of the faith, both consciously, through reflection and 
explication, and unconsciously, through embodied action. Yet, even strategic 
activities that seek to make explicit the appeal of Islam as a way of life, are 
required—as da’wa—to be conducted in a certain way that unconsciously embody 
the values of Islam. This is because da’wa is not considered merely as a means of 
changing people’s thinking, but a way of changing their unconsciously held 
attitudes and dispositions, as well as their behaviour. 
From a revivalist perspective, da’wa is fundamentally remedial in serving to combat 
‘incorrect’ ways of thinking concerning Islam as a way of life. One of the functions 
of da’wa, maintains Farooq Murad, ‘is to remove misconceptions’ about Islam.78 
Zahid Parvez concurs. He states that da’wa ‘helps in removing misconceptions, 
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builds respect and tolerance for Islam and Muslims’.79 The website for Harrath’s 
Dawah Project expresses a similar point of view, extolling the power of the media to 
‘dispel the misconception some have about Islam’. Under the auspices of the Dawah 
Project, Harrath plans to open an International Dawah Centre to fulfill what he 
describes as Muslims’ ‘obligatory duty of Dawah [to] counter the ever increasing 
misconceptions about Islam and to promote understanding amongst each other’.80   
However, da’wa is not just deemed as a corrective to wrong notions about Islam. It 
is also considered, more fundamentally, as a remedy to what Parvez refers to as 
‘false consciousness’ and ‘the influences of false gods and wrong ways’ that affect a 
person’s outlook on life.81 Thus, it is considered to address not just specific, 
incorrect propositions, but wrong ways of seeing things. It is deemed to transform, 
in Pierre Bourdieu’s words, the unconsciously held dispositions and orientations of 
the habitus. Parvez contends that, 
the purpose of sharing the message of Islam and offering a critique of wrong notions 
is to awaken people to the realities of life, to challenge their preconceived ideas and 
beliefs, to agitate their thoughts and attitudes and to support them in seeing the world 
and social issues from an Islamic perspective. Thus, the aim of dawa is to counteract 
the harmful social conditioning which a people may be under-going, to invite them 
into the fold of God’s Way and to help them discover their true purpose in life and 
the multiple dimensions of their existence.82  
Given Parvez’s former leadership role in UKIM for so many years, it is unsurprising 
that UKIM adopts an identical position on da’wa. In fact, much of the description of 
UKIM’s work on its website, including its aims, approach and programmes, appears 
to be derived from Parvez’s book, Building a New Society: An Islamic Approach to 
Social Change, published by the Islamic Foundation in 2000. Consistent with this 
book—which is without doubt the most comprehensive manifesto for Islamic 
revivalism in Britain—UKIM describes da’wa as one of the key components of its 
methodology for attaining an Islamic society in Britain. It is conceived not just as an 
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important means of changing the way people see and understand their social and 
political realities, but also as a crucial way of changing such realities by 
transforming social and political institutions. Its website asserts, ‘Without being 
actively engaged in calling people to the Islamic message and way of life, Islamic 
ideas and values will not be heard or appreciated by society, and positive changes 
based on Islam cannot be accomplished.’ 
A shared sense of the importance of da’wa—directed to both non-Muslims and 
Muslims—may be considered as a distinguishing feature of the revivalist network in 
Britain. The concept of da’wa as a duty for all Muslims is expressed consistently 
throughout the network, despite the varying ways individuals or groups may see 
themselves meeting this duty in practice. This is related to a shared sense of the 
purpose of da’wa—to present and propagate ‘authentic’ Islam through peaceful and 
non-coercive means—and a shared sense of Islam as a way of life that leaves no 
aspect of human existence untouched. Far from being merely concerned with ideas 
or ideology, da’wa, as revivalists see it, is a process of transforming people’s ways 
of perceiving, thinking about and evaluating social reality. It has perceptual, 
cognitive and moral dimensions. It affects not just what or how one sees, but how 
one judges what one sees. It affects not just what or how one thinks, but how one is 
disposed to certain ideas. It also concerns imparting the ‘correct’ morality to 
individuals and the society as a whole. 
2.3.  ‘Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong’ 
In addition to viewing themselves as dutifully educating Muslims on Islam as a way 
of life and inviting non-Muslims to ‘return’ to the fold of Islam, individuals and 
groups within the revivalist network share a common view of their work in terms of 
the Qur’anically-prescribed duty known as al-amr bi-l-ma ‘ruf wa-l-nahi ‘an al-
munkar, Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong (EGFW).83 This duty is 
often explicitly referred to as guiding their actions, yet it also seems to help form a 
set of dispositions and orientations that are shared within the network. These include 
a proactive stance towards social change. It also helps constitute a constellation of 
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inter-connected concepts—including da’wa, umma, shari’a and jihad—through 
which the world is seen and made sense of, and through which their actions are 
guided.  
Acknowledgement of the duty of EGFW was expressed in the joint statement made 
by numerous figures in the revivalist network in Britain at the aforementioned 
‘Muslims in Europe Conference’ held in Istanbul in July 2006. Attendees—
including Khurshid Ahmad, Manazir Ahsan, Iqbal Sacranie, Mohammed Abdul 
Aziz, Iqbal Asaria, Said Ferjani, Wakkas Khan, Mohamed Mukadam, Anas Shaikh-
Ali, and Ahmed Al-Rawi—declared: ‘Islam calls upon all Muslims to promote the 
common good and welfare (maslaha) of society as a whole and prevent what is 
wrong (munkar).’84 This duty is also acknowledged by individuals and particular 
groups in the network, including MCB, IFE, UKIM and MAB. 
In the pre-amble of its constitution, MCB states that its members aspire ‘to be a 
community “enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in 
Allah” (The Qur’an, 3:110)’.85 This verse is also one of three cited at the start of the 
document, reading, ‘You are the best community raised up for mankind—you enjoin 
what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in Allah’.86 All member 
organisations have to subscribe to this aspiration, in addition to MCB’s aims, in 
order to be eligible for membership. Considering that there are 6,236 verses in the 
Qur’an, its selection and prominent placement in MCB’s constitution is significant. 
It highlights not only a sense of vanguardism on MCB’s part, but also a strong sense 
of moral activism at the core of its raison d’être. This moral activism is inseparable 
from a sense of mission, however conceived as best implemented, to universalise 
Islam for the benefit of society at large.  
Farooq Murad, the former MCB secretary general, whilst acknowledging that 
MCB’s official remit does not include da’wa, recognises EGFW as a form of 
da’wa.87 This recognition suggests that MCB’s aspiration to be a proactive moral 
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authority—one that assumes its position to judge ‘right’ and ‘wrong’—is 
inseparable from a mission to present Islam to the broader society with a view to 
spreading the faith. Writing as president of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), 
Murad lauds this mission as ‘the establishment of deen [Islamic way of life]’ and 
laments its neglect amongst British Muslims. He also invokes EGFW, citing a 
hadith in which the prophet Muhammad exhorts social and political activism 
towards the fulfilment of this mission. Murad asks: ‘Did not the Messenger of Allah 
(saw) say, “If anyone of you sees an evil let him change it by his hands …” 
(Muslim)?’88 Zahid Parvez, the current director of the Markfield Institute of Higher 
Education, also invokes the term ‘changing by hand’, which, he concedes ‘is 
implied by scholars as possessing political power—the arm of the law, the ability to 
effect change; the power to enjoin good (maruf) and forbid wrong (munkar)’.89 
Murad and Parvez’s reference to the use of ‘hands’ to effect social change, in fact, 
has a rich history in Islamic literature. It is commonly understood as a kind of jihad, 
the effort or struggle towards the consummation of God’s will on Earth. According 
to Michael Cook, a scholar of Islamic history, EGFW is ‘an integral part of the 
mainstream scholastic tradition of Islamic societies’ and was frequently linked by 
the Muslim scholars with jihad. Some considered it a part of jihad, others 
considered jihad a part of it.90 ‘Jihad of the hand’ was just one kind of jihad linked 
to the doctrine, albeit the dominant one. Although this typically meant military 
force—both defensive and offensive—in modern times it seems to highlight the 
various ways it may be implemented physically. Another form of jihad—that ‘of the 
tongue’—highlights the importance of language and symbolic struggles for the 
legitimisation and naturalisation of Islam throughout society. This type of jihad is 
extolled by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who states: 
Jihad for the sake of God includes supporting His cause by writing, and speaking as 
much as by fighting. Jihad may be educational, journalistic, social, economic, or 
political jihad as much as military jihad. We must remember that in all kinds of jihad, 
the essential condition is that the action helps make God's word supreme on earth. 
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Thus, it is no coincidence that EGFW is referred to by Parvez as a form of jihad and 
a key component of the methodology required to usher in an Islamic revival in 
Britain. He writes, 
In Islamic terminology, jihad refers to well thought-out, strategic and organised 
actions, guided by Islamic values and principles, taken by an Islamic movement to 
enjoin good (maruf), forbid wrong practices (munkar) and remove obstacles in the 
way of advancing positive social change.91 
Ibrahim Hewitt similarly links EGFW with jihad in describing the latter as ‘[s]triving 
to establish Good and remove Evil from society, to gain Allah’s pleasure’.92 For 
Hewitt, Parvez and others in the revivalist network, jihad is primarily a non-violent 
effort or struggle to advance Islam within society through challenging ways of 
thinking and acting. Hewitt states that ‘any personal or communal struggle to 
establish an Islamic lifestyle is Jihad’.93 In Parvez’s words, jihad aims at 
‘[i]ntellectually challenging ideologies, beliefs and ways of life that conflict with 
God’s Way’. It also aims at ‘[i]nfluencing positive social, economic and political 
change in society according to Islamic ideals’.94  
EGFW is widely considered as a fundamental Islamic duty within the revivalist 
network by groups other than MCB and by prominent individuals, including 
Muhammad Abdul Bari, Omer El-Hamdoon, Abdur Rashid Siddiqui, and Ghulam 
Sarwar. Of EGFW, El-Hamdoon, president of MAB, asserts: ‘The doctrine itself is a 
Qur’anic doctrine. It is something that God tells us, we cannot reject it in any 
way.’95 Siddiqui, the vice chair of the Islamic Foundation and former secretary 
general of UKIM, states, 
Commanding good and forbidding evil is one of the most important injunctions 
imposed upon an individual Muslim as well as upon the ummah as a whole. Its 
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importance can be gauged by the fact that it is mentioned at least nine times in the 
Qur’an.96 
As with the concept of da’wa, with which it is intimately connected, Siddiqui 
asserts, ‘The duty of commanding good and forbidding evil is such an important 
part of Islamic teachings that it permeates all the affairs of a Muslim’s life’.97 
Furthermore, EGFW is seen as essentially concerned with addressing not merely 
one’s own moral righteousness but social morality. ‘Muslims are duty bound,’ 
claims Siddiqui, ‘to get actively involved in working for the social betterment of the 
society in which they live.’ Abdul Bari similarly understands EGFW as an 
obligation for social activism at the heart of Islam. He writes: 
[S]ocial activism … comes from Islam’s teachings that, as vice-regents of Allah on 
earth, human beings are accountable to Him on the Day of Judgement. Islam 
motivates its adherents to flourish spiritually and be active socially—to create a better 
world, with balance and harmony.  ‘Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is 
wrong’ (Al-Qur’an 3:110) has been the cornerstone of a Muslim social life.98 
From UKIM’s perspective, EGFW is one of the ‘most significant components’ of its 
methodology for achieving its stated aim of reviving Islam within British society.99 
The Qur’anic verse 3:110 cited by Adbul Bari, and more fully in MCB’s 
constitution, was selected and placed prominently on a banner at UKIM’s 50th 
anniversary event in September 2012.100 EGFW also features prominently in the 
work of UKIM Youth. The first of its four official aims is ‘To seek the pleasure of 
Allah by enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’.101 
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Other organisations in the revivalist network see their work in relation to EGFW. 
The Association of Muslim Lawyers, for example, refers to the doctrine in its 
description of the role Islam has allegedly played in the regulation of social morality 
through legal reform. ‘Based on divine revelation,’ it claims, ‘Islam has always 
acted as a filter—which retains what is good in a society while removing what is 
harmful … Part of this process of change and transformation is the review of 
existing laws and the introduction of new ones, particularly as regards those 
regulating religious discrimination’.102 Ghulam Sarwar, the longtime director of the 
Muslim Educational Trust, states that the second of eleven objectives of Islamic 
education is to ‘Ensure the promotion of Mar’af (good) and the prevention of 
Munkar (evil) in a society’.103 He conceives of EGFW as a religious duty that is 
required to achieve the goals of Islamic education, which include the spread of 
Islam throughout society. ‘This duty,’ states Sarwar, ‘is universal and must be acted 
upon for the benefit of human kind [sic]’.104  
Sarwar’s understanding of humanity as the ultimate beneficiary of Islam expresses a 
commonly held point of view within revivalist circles. UKIM, for example, 
describes Islam as ‘a mission and a social and political movement for establishing 
peace, justice and harmony in society and the entire world’. In addition to da’wa, it 
views EGFW as a duty required for the fulfilment of this mission: 
They must also enjoin good and forbid all forms of wrongs and injustices prevalent 
in society. Even a cursory reading of the Glorious Quran will indicate clearly that the 
Muslim community is charged with this noble and challenging purpose and 
mission.105 
UKIM then cites the Qur’an, verse 3:104, ‘And let there be [arising] from you a 
nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is 
wrong, and those will be the successful.’ This verse is cited by Abdul Bari in a 
report produced for the Cordoba Foundation to encourage Muslims in Britain to be 
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part of the group taking up this obligation.106 According to El-Hamdoon, this verse 
provides the basis for the collective nature of the duty to ‘enjoin good and prevent 
wrong’: As long as there are some from within the Muslim umma who are 
undertaking this duty, it is not an obligation for each individual.107 This 
interpretation is shared by Siddiqui, who writes that although EGFW ‘is the 
responsibility of the entire ummah, Allah, in His Mercy, has given this allowance 
whereby there must be at least a group of people who are exclusively devoted to this 
task’.108 This, he notes, has a basis in Islamic jurisprudence. 
However, some groups and individuals within the revivalist network appear to 
present EGFW as a duty applicable to each and every Muslim individual. IFE’s 
website, for example, states: 
In an Islamic society the individual cannot be indifferent. He is enjoined to play an 
active part in the establishment of sound social morals by way of inviting to the good 
and combating evil in any form with all lawful means at his disposal. In so doing, not 
only does he shun evil and do good but also helps others to do the same. The 
individual who feels indifferent to his society is a selfish sinner; his morals are in 
trouble, his conscience is in disorder, and his faith is undernourished.109  
Haitham al-Haddad, a judge at the Islamic Sharia Council, similarly asserts: ‘It is 
clearly evident to any Muslim who possesses a basic understanding of Islam that the 
greatest and most important aim of Islamic law is the deterrence of evil … and the 
attainment of good … [I]t is an obligation upon every Muslim to achieve this aim, 
whether in part or in its totality’.110 Thus, there is some difference of emphasis upon 
where the duty for EGFW lies, but common within the network is an understanding 
of the general applicability of the duty as well as its importance. 
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Most references to EGFW do not specify what is ‘good’ or ‘wrong’. Zahid Parvez, 
however, asserts that ‘Enjoining good includes the promotion of Islamic values in 
society’.111 These include, he says, ‘truth, honesty, chastity, family values, respect 
and care for the elderly, care and proper upbringing for the young, a moral and 
balanced education, just social policies, the equitable distribution of wealth, care for 
orphans and support for the poor’.112 Parvez’s list of Islamic values appear equally 
shareable by non-Muslims, though he adds that ‘efforts for change should be 
motivated by a strong faith in Allah, to win his good pleasure’.113  
Suhaib Hasan, chair of the Islamic Sharia Council, further emphasises the role of the 
framework of religious belief within which such values are given their meaning. 
Citing the Qur’an, verse 9:71, Hasan explains that ‘good’ (al-Ma ‘ruf) denotes 
‘Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do’ and that ‘wrong’ (al-
Munkar) denotes ‘polytheism and disbelief of all kinds, and all that Islam has 
forbidden’.114 Hasan thus emphasises not so much what is valued, but the value 
system itself, the structure of belief that gives specific values, such as care for the 
poor, their practical sense and ultimate worth. His view resonates with that of 
Siddiqui, who states ‘the criteria for ma ‘ruf and munkar is provided by the 
Shari’ah’.115 This is consistent with a shari’a manual lauded as reliable by El-
Hamdoon, which defines ‘good and bad’ strictly in terms of ‘Sacred Law’.116 
Within the revivalist network is a shared perception of the applicability of EGFW 
beyond the individual to society at large: It is generally a collective duty whose 
ultimate beneficiary is humanity. It is clear that, at least for some, this extends to the 
state too. As Zahid Parvez asserts, ‘acting on such good in one’s private life is not 
enough according to Islam. Public life and the state must conform to equitable and 
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moral principles’.117 He adds, ‘the followers of Islam are charged with a mission to 
realise the vision of Islam in social life and the state’.118 But not only is the state 
desired to conform to Islamic morality, it is also—if it becomes an Islamic state—
expected to enforce it. Siddiqui writes: ‘Due to the importance accorded to al-amr bi 
al-ma ‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar it is also one of the duties that an Islamic State 
is required to enforce … Hence, the Islamic State is duty-bound to see that its 
citizens are adhering to the code of life and behaviour required by Islam.’119 
Likewise, Sarwar writes that the implementation of EGFW is one of the functions of 
the Islamic state.120 The question then arises, dealt with in the final section of this 
chapter, regarding how the Islamic state features in the imaginations and aspirations 
within the revivalist network. 
Before addressing the critical issue of the Islamic state, however, it is worth noting 
that EGFW is not exclusive to revivalists. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir—which 
differs from revivalists in rejecting participation in democratic politics—also sees it 
as a duty. Outlining its ‘methodology for change’, it states: 
Enjoining Ma’rouf and denying Munkar is a duty upon Muslims in every situation, 
whether there is a Khilafah state [caliphate] or not, and whether the rules of Islam are 
implemented in the government or not. Both enjoining Ma’rouf and forbidding 
Munkar existed at the time of the Prophet and at the time of the Khulafah [caliph] 
after him, and the other Khulafah who followed, and it will continue to exist until the 
end of time.121 
For Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, whilst EGFW may help to revive Islamic morality 
within society, this is insufficient to usher in an Islamic way of life. What is 
required, from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s perspective, is a political revolution. ‘Resuming the 
Islamic way of life,’ it asserts, ‘would not be achieved except by establishing the 
Khilafah’.122 As will be shown, some revivalists share with Hizb ut-Tahrir a view 
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that Islam needs to be institutionalised in the state, though they generally differ from 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in their view of the state: Whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir see the Islamic 
state as a necessary tool to universalise an Islamic way of life, revivalists tend to see 
it as a natural and inevitable result of the widespread adoption of an Islamic way of 
life, and therefore not as something that needs to be aimed for in itself. These 
different conceptions of the Islamic state problematise, if not undermine, the 
categorisation of the Ikhwan and Jama’at as ‘participationists’ and Hizb ut-Tahrir as 
‘rejectionists’ under the broad banner of ‘Islamism’, united in the goal of an Islamic 
state but merely separated by strategy. 
3.  Social and political orientations 
The revivalist network, as this chapter has shown so far, is bonded by a shared sense 
of community and territory, as well as a perceived set of collective responsibilities, 
which include speaking for Muslims and Islam, calling both Muslims and non-
Muslims to the ‘right path’ of Islam, and taking a proactive moral stance towards 
social change expressed in the doctrine of Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the 
Wrong. These aspects of the cultural solidarity shared by members of the network 
are related to a cluster of social and political orientations hinged upon the central 
concept of an Islamic revival. This section of the chapter shows how this concept 
features strongly in their way of thinking. It shows how revivalists in Britain 
broadly share an understanding of their work in terms of fulfilling God’s divine will, 
from matters of personal conduct to those at the level of society at large. Revivalists 
share a perception of themselves as oriented towards a comprehensive 
transformation of society that, whilst not aiming for an Islamic state, will ultimately 
culminate in one as a reward for piety. A shared value placed upon non-compulsion 
is accompanied by a shared understanding of gradualism as the ideal approach, 
along with a shared perception of the future as belonging to Islam in line with 
religious prophecy.  
3.1.  The Islamic revival and the Islamic movement 
In September 2011, the Islamic Foundation organised a two-day meeting entitled, 
‘Islamic Revival in the UK: Past, Present and Future’. The purpose of the event, 
described in a Foundation newsletter, was to discuss the history and prospects of 
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‘Islamic revival in the UK, as well as the wider scene of Islamic activism’ with a 
view to gauging lessons for the Foundation.123 Present at the meeting were 
numerous revivalist figures, including Khurshid Ahmad, Manazir Ahsan, 
Muhammad Abdul Bari and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. The keynote speech, ‘Islamic 
Revival in the UK: Past, Present and Future’, was delivered by Ahmad, who sees in 
the Islamic revival a ‘reawakening of the Islamic faith and destiny’ for nothing less 
than an alternative world order.124 Asked to explain meaning of the phrase ‘Islamic 
revival’ in an interview for this thesis, Islamic Foundation executive director Irshad 
Bacqui fumbles uncomfortably with words before stating that it relates to the 
application of ‘Islamic values’ in contemporary Britain.125  
The Islamic revival may indeed be interpreted by key figures in the network as an 
application of Islamic values throughout society, but contrary to Bacqui’s denial that 
it has any ‘political agenda’, other individuals and groups in the network make clear 
that it does relate to politics, as this chapter will show. For them, it relates to politics 
since Islam is considered as the alternative basis for a complete way of life, 
including personal conduct but also matters of governance, including politics, 
education, law and economics.  
For example, according to journalist Andrew Gilligan, in the transcript of an IFE 
training course, Muhammad Rabbani—a trustee of IFE’s youth wing, the Young 
Muslim Organisation UK—informs IFE’s new members, 
Our goal is not simply to invite people and give da’wah. Our goal is to create the 
True Believer, to then mobilise those believers into an organised force for change 
who will carry out da’wah, hisbah and jihad. This will lead to social change and 
iqamatud-deen.126 
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In Islamic scholarly works, hisbah denotes the injunction to enjoin the good and 
forbid the wrong. In this context, jihad denotes the legal obligation upon Muslims to 
strive—through violent or non-violent means—towards the universal fulfilment of 
Allah’s divine will. And Iqamatud-deen, according to Jama’at-i-Islami itself, 
translates as the ‘Islamization of life’.127 Gilligan also obtained internal IFE 
documents which explicitly state its strategic objective as ‘the establishment of a 
global society, the Khilafah [caliphate] … comprised of individuals who live by the 
principles of … the Shari’ah’.128 They state that it is dedicated to changing the ‘very 
infrastructure of [Western] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and 
its creed … from ignorance to Islam’. Abdullah Faliq, IFE’s press secretary, denies 
that such aspirations represent IFE’s ‘corporate view’, though concedes that there 
may be some within IFE who hold this perspective.129 
Irrespective of how mainstream the desire for an Islamic revival is within IFE, there 
are other groups and leading individuals within the network who express the desire 
for it, for what they see as a comprehensive transformation of society based upon 
Islamic values. The London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), for 
instance, declares as one of its key aims the promotion of ‘a new social and 
international order’.130 The alternative nature of this order relates to an alternative 
understanding of human rights based upon Islam. IHRC states its foremost aim is to 
champion human rights—and duties—conceived as ‘divinely granted’ and ‘revealed 
for human beings’ by Allah. This suggests an affinity with the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (or the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights), rather than 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Cairo Declaration states that 
all rights and freedoms are ‘are subject to the Islamic Sharia’.131 
Ghulam Sarwar, the director of the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), whose 
lifetime work has consisted in the promotion of Islamic education in Britain, states, 
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‘Islamic education and a global Islamic revival are inextricably connected.’132 He 
writes, ‘The introduction of an Islamic education system should be an integral part 
of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as an all-encompassing way of life.’133 
Islamic education, for MET, is a tool in the service of a higher objective: the 
‘Islamisation of society,’ beginning with Muslim communities in Britain and 
culminating on a global scale.134 
Abdur Rashid Siddiqui states that Islam ‘aims for the transformation of human 
society and fashions it according to its unique ideology’.135 The Islamic revival, 
writes Siddiqui, will not be able to commence without the most valued sacrifice, the 
submission of individuals’ egos ‘to the dictates of the Shariah’.136 Such a social 
transformation was conceived by Siddiqui’s contemporary, the late Khurram Murad, 
as the calling of ‘the Islamic movement’, which he described as ‘an organised 
struggle to change the existing society into an Islamic society based on the Qur’an 
and the Sunna, and make Islam, which is a code for the entire life, supreme and 
dominant’.137 
The notion of the Islamic movement is shared by other revivalists. Ahmad, for 
example, states, ‘Islam is a movement for social change’.138 This movement, he 
believes, is responsible for establishing ‘a new world order’ based on Islam:139 
Islam also launches a social movement, an international movement requiring all those 
who accept these [Islamic] ideals and values to establish the new world order. Islam 
is eager to establish this new model in any part of the world … Once this model is 
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established somewhere in the world, the experiment can be shared with everyone 
else, just as sunshine is shared by all.140 
Zahid Parvez echoes this in describing Islam as ‘a global movement’.141 He writes 
extensively on the notion of the Islamic movement as a necessary, practical means 
to usher in such an order, dedicating an entire book chapter to its ideal 
characteristics.142 Demonstrating that this perspective is shared across ethnic lines, 
in a speech in July 2005 to a Muslim audience in Britain, Anas Altikriti asserts: 
‘Islam, and the da’wa of Islam, is by definition a reform movement, harakat al-
islah’.143 He laments that the Islamic movement, however, has come short of 
‘leading the way towards shaping events’ in line with Islamic principles and in 
response to the contemporary situation. 
Altikriti perceives the need for a comprehensive social transformation based upon 
Islamic values similarly to the other figures above. Altikriti, who established the 
Cordoba Foundation to address what he sees as a false dichotomy between Islam 
and the West, believes that because of a crisis of multiple dimensions—including 
politics, economics, science and morality—a comprehensive social transformation is 
required and that Muslims must play an active role in it. The message of Islam, he 
states, is about ‘transforming people’s realities’.144 To a young Muslim audience, he 
implores: 
It is vital that we fulfil our role as individuals that we work together with our 
brothers, with our sisters, within our community, within our societal structure, for the 
benefit not only of ourselves—we Muslims we are not selfish, we don’t do this just 
for ourselves. This is in order to create that transformation on a worldwide level.145 
This transformation, states Altikriti, is not just about politics, education, finance, or 
spirituality, but every aspect of human existence. ‘Every single part of life,’ he 
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insists, ‘needs to be touched, needs to be affected, needs to be changed, needs to be 
reformed’.146 In an interview with the thesis author, Altikriti plays down the Islamic 
character of the key values he deems needed in modern society, preferring to 
describe them as ‘universal’.147 This is because he sees them as not exclusive to 
Islam, but as shared by non-Muslims. In a talk given in 2005, however, he describes 
non-Muslims’ sharing of such values favourably as a pathway to them becoming 
Muslims.148 In another talk given in September 2011 to the Federation of Islamic 
Student Societies (FOSIS) in the wake of the Arab uprisings, he is clear in seeing 
Islam as the driving force behind the comprehensive social transformation he calls 
for: 
We need to touch on every single sphere and with that we can bring our message. 
When we say that Islam is a way of life, a comprehensive way of life, we would have 
acted it. We practice it, we don’t need to preach about it anymore. When we talk 
about the excellence, the perfection, the accuracy, the precision of Islam, we would 
have acted it, we don’t need to talk about it anymore, we don’t need to theorise 
anymore.149 
The belief that Islam is a comprehensive way of life and also a liberatory force for a 
civilisational crisis affecting mankind is shared by others including Manazir Ahsan, 
who writes that Islam ‘provides a complete and comprehensive code’ for human 
conduct ‘in all social, economic, political, moral and spiritual aspects of life’.150 He 
elaborates: 
Islam, being the universal religion meant for mankind of all races, colours and times, 
is as relevant today as it was fourteen hundred years ago. It has been a great liberating 
force in the past and has the potential for leading man out of the contemporary crisis 
of human civilization … In the context of contemporary spiritual and cultural crises, 
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Islam provides an alternative basis for the development of the human personality and 
the organization of human society.151 
Likewise, for Khurshid Ahmad, the world is experiencing a civilisational crisis. He 
states that ‘the dominant secular-humanistic civilisation of the West, despite its 
material affluence and military prowess, is in the throes of a serious crisis’. The 
solution, he proffers, is the ‘Islamic alternative’, a ‘new paradigm for life’, 
beginning with reform of the individual, passing through reform of society and 
culminating in reform of the world order.152 Parvez similarly bemoans today’s 
‘complex social, economic and political problems and global crisis’.153 An 
important component of this crisis is the perceived breakdown of morality and 
religiosity in the West. Ahmad argues that the predicament of Muslims in Western 
societies is not just about ‘socio-political and economic ills’.154 ‘[T]he Islamic 
resurgence,’ he insists, is not reducible to ‘the angry reaction of under-privileged 
Muslims against Western affluence’.155 It fundamentally concerns faith and 
morality. Such a view is expressed by IFE, which states that it ‘is in Europe because 
it is this continent, despite all the furore about its achievements, which has a moral 
and spiritual vacuum’.156 
Despite the perception of moral and spiritual bankruptcy within Britain and the 
West, and despite the understanding of the Islamic revival as addressing much more 
than political frustration, politics is nevertheless seen as a part of the problem and, 
thus, the solution. Ahmad gives voice to this sentiment, asserting, ‘It is part of our 
religious mission to harness political and economic power for the fulfilment of 
moral objectives … Islam wants to bring political power under the control of its 
moral ideals’.157 In an article penned whilst president of Young Muslims UK, 
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Farooq Murad writes that political power for Islam follows the people’s complete 
embrace of Islam as a way of life.158 Echoing this, Zahid Parvez declares: 
[I]n order to administer justice and establish a peaceful society, political power is 
essential in the eyes of Islam. In fact, Islam obligates its followers to engage with 
power and enjoins social and political participation. It sees power as a moral and 
civilising force if it is utilised in accordance with God’s law [shari’a]. A just social 
order cannot be established through sermons and preaching only.159 
Political power, states Parvez, is something to be ‘brought under God, and utilised 
for realising His Will in society and state; for reforming and transforming society 
and the state for the common good’.160 Understanding the role of politics, including 
the Islamic state, in the revivalist habitus is important to get a sense not just of their 
aspirations but also their way of thinking within which their aspirations are formed. 
This matter is the subject of the following and final section of the chapter. 
3.2.  Shari’a and the Islamic state 
The typical view in the academic, think tank and news media literature on what 
characterises Islamists is expressed by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, who writes, 
‘all want to create an Islamic state, but they are at odds with each other about how 
best to achieve this, and where they should start’.161 Bassam Tibi shares this view. 
He claims that there are two kinds of Islamism—‘institutional Islamism and 
jihadism’—which both ‘share the very same ideological goal of establishing an 
Islamic shari‘a state’.162 Only tactics, he claims, separates them. 
However, it is more accurate to say that all Islamists want an Islamic society 
organised according to Islamic principles and values and that they are at odds with 
each other about whether the state is primarily a tool to achieve this or the natural 
outcome of it. They are also at odds with each other about whether shari’a—Islamic 
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ethics and law—is to be adopted and enforced by the state prior to, or after, the 
attainment of a Muslim majority that demands as much. 
A distinguishing characteristic of Islamic revivalists is their understanding of Islam 
as a way of life that cannot be imposed through state structures but which, once 
adopted by a majority population, requires state institutionalisation for its protection 
and maintenance. The individuals and groups in the revivalist network mapped out 
in Chapter 3 broadly share this understanding. They also broadly share an 
understanding of shari’a, and of its importance, as an ethical code applicable to 
every aspect of Muslims’ lives and as a legal code to be adopted, eventually, by the 
Islamic state. 
Shari’a: from the personal to the political 
Islamic revivalists understand the shari’a as a code of conduct applicable at the 
levels of the individual, society and the state: It encompasses both a fixed set of 
laws, such as the prohibition of financial interest and alcohol consumption, and a 
number of ethical principles that may be codified into law in various ways 
depending on the time and place. To Islamic revivalists, the shari’a takes 
precedence over the Islamic state: The state merely facilitates and consummates its 
application.  
This is consistent with the orthodox Islamic position as explained by the late Majid 
Khadduri, who writes, ‘[Islamic] Law … precedes the State: it provides the basis of 
the State’.163 In describing the classical position, Khadduri explains that ‘the 
fundamental loyalty of the Muslim is given not to the imam [caliph] but to the 
shari’a’.164 This view extends back at least as far as the classical period. Ibn 
Khaldun (1332-1406), the ‘greatest of Islamic political thinkers,’ described ‘the true 
meaning of the caliphate [Islamic state]’ as bringing ‘the whole people to conform 
themselves to [the] ordinances [of Revealed Laws, i.e. the shari’a] in all matters of 
this world and the next’.165 For contemporary revivalists, allegiance to the shari’a 
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takes precedence over the establishment of an Islamic state, but such a state is 
generally seen as desirable and as a natural outcome of achieving a Muslim majority 
population. 
Shari’a is commonly understood as beginning with personal conduct, applying to 
Muslims’ each and every action. Ibrahim Mogra, in an interview with the thesis 
author, affirms, ‘Everything that a Muslim does is governed by shari’a. My sitting 
with you this morning also is governed by shari’a’.166 Likewise, Farooq Murad 
professes, ‘I live this term on a daily basis’,167 and Abdullah Faliq states, ‘It does 
govern my every activity and my every thought’.168 Omer El-Hamdoon highlights 
the personal dimension of shari’a in observing that, ‘The first things to appear in the 
books on shari’a concern purification. That’s a personal thing’.169 Consistent with 
this understanding, the application of shari’a to Muslims’ personal lives is the 
priority for the Islamic Sharia Council. Highlighting this priority, but intimating the 
possibility of broader application in the future, its chair, Maulana Abu Sayyed 
describes the personal aspect of shari’a, including marriage and divorce, as the 
‘bare minimum requirement’ for Muslims.170 
The Islamic Sharia Council’s secretary, Suhaib Hasan, likewise highlights Muslim 
personal law as the priority area within shari’a for application in Britain. But, like 
others in the revivalist network, he sees shari’a as far more comprehensive than can 
be currently implemented. ‘Shari’a covers all the aspects of a Muslim’s life’, he 
explains. But not only does it cover all matters of personal conduct, such as worship, 
eating and dress, it also covers all aspects of criminal and international law: 
‘Everything is covered by shari’a’, he says.171 This is because, in Abu Sayyed’s 
words, shari’a is ‘God’s revealed system of life’.172 Ibrahim Mogra agrees, noting, 
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‘Muslims see Islam as a way of life. That would mean that everything is lumped 
into that way of life, including politics’.173 In Murad’s words, shari’a is the ‘code of 
your conduct, your affairs: personal, social, political, your whole social conduct as a 
collective entity’.174 Ahmad Thomson, the deputy chair of the Association of 
Muslim Lawyers, similarly sees shari’a as applicable beyond personal conduct. He 
bemoans efforts to reform Islam into a secular religion that leaves the ‘political and 
economic spheres of human activity … unaffected and impervious to the way of 
Islam’.175 
El-Hamdoon recommends as an authentic guide to shari’a a book entitled Umdat al-
Salik (The Reliance of the Traveller).176 This tome, officially endorsed by the 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, clearly articulates rulings applicable 
within the realm of state politics.177 These include corporeal (hudud) punishments, 
such as the cutting of hands and feet for theft, as well as dictates for the conduct of 
warfare and state administration. Numerous prominent figures in the network, 
including El-Hamdoon, Hasan, Parvez, Mogra, Faliq and Anas Altikriti 
acknowledge and do not seem to reject such punishments, preferring to underplay 
their significance by noting that they constitute just a fraction of shari’a rulings.178 
‘We believe in God, and we believe in shari’a and we do not give up shari’a,’ states 
El-Hamdoon. ‘We don’t believe shari’a is discriminatory, that shari’a is 
prejudiced.’179 Mogra and Parvez both emphasise that prior to such punishments 
being applied, Islam has to be firmly embraced within society and shari’a 
established as lived morality.180 This aspect of shari’a is not applicable in Britain, 
explains Faliq: ‘When it comes to ruling, it doesn’t apply to us here. We don’t have 
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an Islamic system of government, so hudud punishments shouldn’t even arise as a 
question. You follow the law of the country, as long as it doesn’t make you 
compromise your Islamic faith.’181 
The Islamic state: a reward not an objective 
In academic, think tank and news media literature, Islamists are consistently 
characterised as bonded by their desire for an Islamic state. Peter Mandaville, for 
example, defines Islamism in fairly typical terms as ‘forms of political theory and 
practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the 
sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive 
directly from the shari’ah’.182 But the individuals and organisations in Britain who 
are typically classified as ‘non-violent Islamists’—whom this thesis prefers to refer 
to as Islamic revivalists—express a consistent understanding of the Islamic state as a 
matter of secondary importance in relation to the attainment of society in which 
Islamic values and principles prevail. The Islamic state, as several prominent figures 
explain, is not an objective but, rather, a promise in reward for piety and 
righteousness. Farooq Murad expresses this as follows: 
We forget that not once does the Qur’an make Khilafah [the Islamic state] the aim 
and the goal of Muslim struggle. Rather it promises the glory of political power, help 
and victory [only] when we invite and prepare people to live for complete Islam.183 
Suhaib Hasan provides additional clarity to this view of a promise. Firmly believing 
that Islam will one day become established as the dominant religion in the world, he 
writes: 
Succession on the Earth is Allah’s promise [to the Muslim umma] … but it is not the 
highest aim or objective … The implementation of [a] divinely ordained Caliphate 
[Islamic state] is only a part of Islam’s aggregated system not the objective itself … 
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Our view is that the objective should be kept as the objective and the promise as the 
promise.184 
In an interview with the thesis author, he elaborates: 
The main objective of a Muslim is to please Allah and to worship Allah … Now 
comes the secondary issue. When you are a group of people living at a certain place, 
you have to organise your matters. On what basis you are going to organise 
yourselves? [The Islamic state] comes as a natural outcome of a Muslim gathering at 
any place, as it came to Medina where the Prophet moved and then he was accepted 
as a ruler and he started implementing the shari’a of Allah. So, this comes as a 
gradual process, but it is not the objective. We have to differentiate between the 
objectives and the requirements of any community wherever they are living.185 
Mogra concurs with Hasan that the Islamic state is not an objective. ‘I don’t believe 
it is a requirement for Muslims to have an Islamic state,’ he says. Whilst not 
rejecting the notion of an Islamic state, he emphasises, ‘For me, it is more important 
that God’s law is lived by individuals in whichever political set up they are living 
in’.186  
El-Hamdoon shares this understanding of the primacy of the embrace of Islam 
throughout society over the creation of an Islamic state: ‘MAB does not look to 
establish a state here in Britain. As Muslims here in Britain we want to worship God 
and we want to introduce people to God’.187 He emphasises, ‘We want to make clear 
that we are not here in Britain to establish an Islamic state because the realisation 
[of Islam as a way of life] has to come from within’. Thus, according to El-
Hamdoon, MAB is not focused on establishing an Islamic state but, rather, on what 
may eventually lead to it, namely, the widespread adoption of Islamic beliefs and 
practice of Islamic values within society. Nevertheless, although claiming MAB 
doesn’t officially have any political objectives, he admits, 
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As a Muslim, irrelevant of where I am living, one of my objectives is to establish an 
Islamic state. Islam is comprehensive and since the problems are comprehensive, the 
solution has to be comprehensive.188 
Elaborating his position, he explains that establishing an Islamic state is not unique 
to Islam, since all people want some form of government to maintain order. ‘But 
when you ask me as a Muslim, “What kind of state do you want?”, I’m going to say 
to you, “An Islamic state”, a state which is ruled by God’s rules because God 
created us and knows what’s good for us’. Putting this back into the context of 
da’wa, he cautions, ‘If you just focus on the Islamic state and you don’t focus on 
changing the individual, the state will not survive because the state is made out of 
individuals’.  
In the rhetoric of some revivalists, the aspiration of a society organised according to 
Islamic principles is inseparable from that of an Islamic state. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
for example, links the goal of an Islamic society with that of the Islamic state 
proclaiming, ‘The most important form of jihad today is serious, purposive 
organized work to re-build the Islamic society and state and to implement the 
Islamic way of life in the political, cultural, and economic areas’.189 Zahid Parvez 
similarly connects the two in repeating the call for the fulfilment of ‘the vision of 
Islam in social life and the state’.190 He asserts, ‘all human beings have a God-given 
right to justice and an Islamic state is commanded by the Quran to ensure that this is 
rooted in all social and economic policies and fully implemented’.191 
However, consistent with the perspective taken by Hasan, El-Hamdoon and others, 
Parvez prioritises the attainment of a society based upon Islamic principles over that 
of an Islamic state. Such a state, he cautions, cannot arise except as an embodiment 
of religious, moral values: 
An effective Islamic change requires the cultivation of faith, God-consciousness, 
morals, correct attitudes and patience, and its systems of society evolve from these 
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seeds, and not the other way round. As a general principle, a legal, political or an 
economic system must be compatible with the social life which it is seeking to 
regulate and direct, otherwise it will inevitably be rejected by it.192 
Others in the revivalist network who idealise Islam as a way of life do not express a 
desire for an Islamic state or even doubt its relevance. For example, when 
questioned regarding al-Qaradawi’s bold claim that Islam will ‘conquer’ Europe 
through non-violent means, Mogra responds: 
Islam is not about conquering people. Islam is about people finding peace in a 
lifestyle, which is all about submission to God’s will. For me, it is more God 
conquering the hearts of his people than Islam as a religion conquering geographical 
pieces of land. It is not about the land. I don’t even believe we need an Islamic 
government, so to speak. It is about people living Islam.193 
Altikriti believes that calls of an Islamic state should ‘not scare us … or bring about 
a negative reaction’,194 but, like Mogra, he underplays its importance in an interview 
with the thesis author. ‘I don’t think the Islamic state even figures on the radar or 
priorities for Muslims,’ he opines. ‘But if it’s established, it’s established through 
the dominance of values’.195 Citing Rashid al-Ghannushi, Altikriti asserts, ‘Shari’a 
is justice’. He adds, ‘And if I have a state where justice prevails, that to me is an 
Islamic state’. Faliq echoes this sentiment, stating, ‘As long as Islamic values are in 
place—that the governor has to uphold justice, freedom et cetera—any system of 
government is fine’.196  
Several individuals who have been very active within the network more firmly 
dismiss the necessity of an Islamic state altogether. Mohammed Abdul Aziz, for 
example, concedes that he ‘probably held on to the idea of an Islamic state’ until as 
recently as 2007.197 The notion of the Islamic state as propounded by Mawdudi and 
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Qutb, he says, was coloured by their experiences of colonialism. An Islamic state, 
he adds, is not a Qur’anic requirement. Yet, Abdul Aziz still regards himself as a 
‘Jama’ati’ because of the social circles he moves within and because of the social 
welfare orientation of the Jama’at-associated organisations he works with. Abdul 
Aziz dismisses the goal of an Islamic state for Britain, but believes that the ideal 
purpose of such a state—to propagate Islamic values and deliver social welfare—
remains important and can be fulfilled within society governed by a secular state. 
Dilwar Hussain, a former president of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), also 
advocates a secular state as the best model for negotiating ‘the reality that there are 
[people of] other faiths and those with none’.198 Describing himself as a ‘post-
Islamist’, he emphatically rejects the goal of an Islamic state altogether. Under his 
leadership, ISB left the group of revivalist groups clustered in the Coordination 
Committee of Islamic Organisations, as described in Chapter 3, because of a 
transformation of values within ISB away from the revivalist aspirations held by the 
committee.199 After many years of involvement, Hussain has departed from 
organisations within the revivalist network, including ISB and the Islamic 
Foundation, and his perspective upon Islam’s place in contemporary Britain are not 
typical within the network. His personal journey is significant, however, along with 
that of Abdul Aziz, in showing that there is a degree of fluidity within the network 
in how the Islamic state is understood, particularly in relation to aspirations for 
Islam as a way of life in Britain. 
Non-compulsion and the matter of majority rule 
Given that shari’a is understood by individuals within the revivalist network as 
comprehensive and therefore inclusive of matters of governance, the question arises 
regarding the possibility that shari’a might remain restricted to personal matters and 
not be applied by the state: How can such a scenario fulfil God’s will? How can 
revivalists be content with this scenario? To this, they present a consistent response 
that Islam cannot be imposed.  
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Ahmad Thomson of the Association of the Muslim Lawyers states that ‘a system of 
law other than the Shari‘ah which incorporates some aspects of the Shari‘ah into it 
but not others’ is ‘unpalatable’.200 Yet, he affirms, ‘The Shari‘ah can only be 
established where it is the will of a community’s or society’s members to be 
governed in accordance with the Shari‘ah’. Abdul Aziz articulates a similar 
sentiment, as follows: 
Shari’a is God’s will from a Muslim perspective but God has also given every 
individual the right not to obey him. Islam is submission, but you choose to obey 
God, but God has given everyone the right to obey or not to obey him. For those who 
choose not to obey him, you cannot force them—‘there is no compulsion in 
religion’.201 
Farooq Murad echoes this, asserting, 
There is no compulsion in religion. This is a basic fact of the Qur’an. Islam is a 
voluntary idea of life. If God wanted to make all of us Muslims he could have done it. 
He decided not to. He wants to test us, check or see who wants to please him, who 
wants to come to his ways. This is absolutely a fundamental principle. So we begin 
from that.202 
Abu Sayeed concurs. Even though he perceives ‘man-made law’ as inferior to 
‘God’s law’, he emphasises that ‘Islam does not want to impose an Islamic system 
on people who are not in favour of Islam’.203 He contends, ‘In Muslim-minority 
countries, Muslims will not and should not try to implement Islam in centrality [sic], 
apart from [in] private life where worship and family aspects are concerned, because 
Islam believes in personal choice’. He adds, ‘A military coup for Islam would not 
do for an Islamic state’. Faliq, likewise, asserts: 
Any system of government has to be liked by the people, at least the majority. It has 
to come via elections. If a radical Muslim group imposes shari’a via a coup in Egypt 
or elsewhere, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Muhajiroun or al-Qaeda, I’ll go against them. 
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That’s not Islam for me. Those who put the system of government first, they don’t 
understand that that has to come by the will of the people, they have to willingly 
embrace it.204 
Although the issue of non-compulsion is clear-cut within the network, the issue of 
the conditions under which the state would become governed by and adopt shari’a 
principles is somewhat vague. A shared belief in non-compulsion doesn’t answer 
the question as to how a society may become comprehensively Islamic, including its 
system of government. Faliq says ‘at least the majority’ of people have to endorse a 
system of government. Similarly, Hasan contends that an Islamic system of 
government may emerge with a simple majority in favour. Abu Sayeed agrees, 
stating ‘it is the majority’s wishes that are to be fulfilled’. Regarding the Islamic 
state, he claims, ‘Once people have chosen Islam as their life system, then 
automatically it should come.’ El-Hamdoon, however, doesn’t think it is so 
straightforward. Although he doesn’t believe everyone has to have embraced Islam 
for the emergence of an Islamic state, he doesn’t think the emergence of such a state 
can simply follow majority support from the electorate or parliamentarians.205 
Gradualism and prophecy 
In addition to the assertion of non-compulsion, another response to the question of 
shari’a not being comprehensively applied in Britain, some individuals and groups 
emphasise that Muslims are under no obligation to apply shari’a beyond matters of 
personal conduct, since this lies beyond their capabilities. Related to this, some 
believe that a gradual approach will ensure that Islam will eventually be embraced 
as an alternative way of life. Hasan, for example, states that the Qur’an implores 
Muslims to implement shari’a only according to their ability.206 Abu Sayeed agrees, 
affirming that whilst Muslims are the minority in a society, they cannot promulgate 
shari’a in its entirety.207 This chimes with the statement of the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ECFR), of which both Hasan and Abu Sayeed are members: 
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According to Shari’ah, Muslims are not obliged to establish the civil, financial and 
political status of Shari’ah in non-Muslim countries, as these lie beyond their 
capabilities. Allah, Most High, does not require people to do things that are beyond 
their capacity.208 
Even though Muslims may not be in a position to establish shari’a beyond the level 
of personal conduct, there is a shared view that they must approach a more 
comprehensive application of shari’a incrementally. Al-Qaradawi exhorts such an 
approach as follows: 
If we want to establish a real Muslim society, we should not imagine that such an end 
can be achieved by a mere decision issued to that effect by a king or a president or a 
council of leaders or a parliament. Gradualism is the means through which such an 
end can be fulfilled. Gradualism here refers to preparing people ideologically, 
psychologically, morally, and socially to accept and adopt the application of the 
Shari’ah in all aspects of life …209 
IFE appears to endorse the same view. Its website includes an article that states, 
‘The Ummah is in a real need to … [r]e-introduce to the youth the Fiqh At-Tadarrug 
(Fiqh of Gradualism) in which people are trained bit by bit on how to lead a true 
balanced Islamic life.’210 Parvez articulates a gradual approach, citing the 
incremental changes in law at the time of Muhammad: 
… [A]ll the noble Prophets of Allah worked according to the set priorities of Islam 
and introduced change gradually so that it could become firm in people’s hearts and 
minds … Once people begin to respond to Islamic values and ideas, the door to 
change is opened.211 
Abu Sayeed shares Parvez’s long-term perspective of the Islamic mission, also 
referring to Muhammad’s example: 
                                               
208 Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (2002), p.164. 
209 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, ‘Gradualism in Applying the Shari`ah’, On Islam website, November 24, 2011. 
http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/shariah-based-systems/judiciary-and-police-
systems/169643-gradualism-in-applying-the-shariah.html?Police_Systems= 
210 Ahmed Saad, ‘Al-Wasatiyyah: The Lost Middle Path’, IFE website, December 30, 2006. 
http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=324. 
211 Parvez (2007), pp.163-164. 
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God did not make any kind of obligation on the Muslims to apply shari’a—full 
shari’a—in the early period. It took twenty-three years. The first wave of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s life at Mecca was just the stage of the purification of ideas.212 
Muslims in Britain, Abu Sayeed says, don’t feel restricted in Britain because they 
know that it took a long time for Muhammad to establish Islam. His reference to the 
precise number of years it took for Muhammad to consolidate Islam is also cited by 
Manazir Ahsan, who similarly warns, ‘Everything cannot be achieved at once. Was 
not the Quran revealed piecemeal over a period of twenty-three years so that people 
and society could adopt Islam step-by-step and become firmly rooted in it through a 
gradual process?’213 Indeed, Ahsan, Abu Sayeed and others in the revivalist network 
take a long-term view regarding Islam’s place in Britain. This appears connected to 
a firm conviction in Islam’s future triumph, based upon Islamic prophecy. Al-
Qaradawi expresses this vision most assertively as follows: 
Constantinople was conquered in 1453 by a 23-year old Ottoman named Muhammad 
ibn Murad, whom we call Muhammad the Conqueror. Now what remains is to 
conquer Rome. That is what we wish for, and that is what we believe in. After having 
been expelled twice, Islam will be victorious and reconquer Europe … I am certain 
that this time, victory will be won not by the sword but by preaching and [Islamic] 
ideology … The conquest of Rome and the spread of Islam East and West will be the 
fruit of the seed we plant and entail the return of the Caliphate, which treads the 
straight path [of Islam] and is based on the path of the prophets … [The Caliphate] is 
worthy of leading the nation to victory.214 
Abu Sayeed agrees with al-Qaradawi’s optimistic view of Islam’s future ‘conquest’, 
referring to the allegedly high rates of Muslim conversion in Britain.215 Altikriti, in 
an interview with John Ware, also expresses firm conviction in al-Qaradawi’s 
vision. ‘I believe in it because that is the prophecy of the Prophet,’ he admits. ‘It’s 
                                               
212 Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012. 
213 Ahsan (1989), p.15. 
214 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, cited in Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate 
Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
November 1, 2007. http://jcpa.org/article/the-muslim-brotherhood-a-moderate-islamic-alternative-to-
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215 Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012. 
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not an invention of Sheikh Qaradawi.’216 Suhaib Hasan likewise voices a firm 
conviction in the future triumph of Islam not just in Europe but worldwide. 
Regarding the return of the caliphate, Hasan contends, ‘It will come because it is 
prophecised by the Prophet’.217 
4.  Habitus and ideology 
This chapter has shown how individuals and groups in the revivalist network 
mapped out in the preceding chapter possess cultural solidarity in terms of shared 
ways of classifying themselves as part of a religious community and the territory in 
which they live; shared ways of understanding their work and its purpose; and 
shared ways of perceiving the moral and political dimensions of their faith. They are 
connected by their understanding of the role and responsibilities they see themselves 
possessing as Islam’s vanguard within British society. Their sense of distinction as a 
group is expressed in their perception of non-Muslims as part of the broader 
community of humanity to which they have a duty to deliver Islam. Their group 
solidarity is also expressed in their perception of other Muslims as either mistaken 
in isolating themselves from Britain’s non-Muslim mainstream or integrating 
themselves seamlessly within it. It is also expressed in their perceived distinction 
from yet other Muslims who place the goal of an Islamic state prior to the 
attainment of a society infused with Islamic beliefs and values. 
The cultural solidarity of the revivalist network is inseparable from certain concepts 
enabled by a vocabulary of terms rooted in Islamic tradition and expressed in 
particular theological doctrines. Most observers of the individuals and organisations 
comprising this network refer to this expression of religious notions, particularly 
where they have political implications, as ideological. Most observers describe the 
social activism of these people and groups, labelled ‘Islamists’, as motivated by an 
ideology that fuses religion and politics. They describe the goals of these individuals 
and organisations as determined to perpetuate such an ideology. Action is assumed 
to be both motivated by and dedicated to the reproduction of a certain consciously 
                                               
216 John Ware, ‘Time to Wise Up to the Muslim Brotherhood’, Standpoint Magazine, July/August 
2013. http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5082/full. 
217 Interview with Suhaib Hasan, June 11, 2013. 
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accepted framework of ideas, including diagnoses of social and political problems, 
as well as their solutions. 
Yet, what bonds the network is not ideology in the sense in which this term is 
typically used in academic and think tank literature. The network is not held 
together or driven by an explicitly articulated set of beliefs, values and ideas 
dedicated to pre-determined political ends. It is held together or driven, rather, by 
precisely what makes the explicit articulation of beliefs, values and ideas possible, 
namely, a collective habitus. The concepts that they share, their understanding of 
who they are, what they are working towards, and what rewards are in store for 
them, are dependent upon a shared perceptual schemata that is never fully 
transparent to conscious reflection and a related, unquestioned manner of evaluating 
social and political realities. Their shared way of classifying themselves and 
others—indeed, their way of proactively propagating such classifications, which 
constitutes a key mark of their cultural solidarity—is not the result of a conscious 
ideological commitment or of rational calculation. It is, rather, an expression of a 
shared habitus, a culturally inherited ‘socialised subjectivity’.218 
What connects the revivalist network—a similar way of perceiving and evaluating 
the social world—also forms the stakes of their struggle. What is at stake for 
revivalists is not just a social transformation, even less a political revolution, but a 
transformation in how the world is perceived and evaluated. This is contended, as 
the next chapter will show, not just in the external, ‘objective’ institutions 
comprising the social and political order, but also in the internal, ‘subjective’ 
categories of perception and cognition. 
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Chapter 5 
Contentious Politics and Symbolic Struggles: 
‘Non-Violent Extremism’ and ‘British Values’ 
Chapter 3 established the existence of a network in Britain of individuals and 
organisations associated with Jama’at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Chapter 4 established the existence of a sense of cultural solidarity between many of 
the network’s key protagonists, particularly in the form of shared ways of seeing 
themselves, their sociopolitical milieu and their mission as a vanguard community 
to disseminate what they deem to be ‘true’ Islam within and beyond Britain’s 
Muslim population. The current chapter seeks to show that, in addition to being 
organisationally networked and culturally bonded, the key figures and groups 
comprising the network are engaged in a political and cultural struggle, that is, a 
conflict concerning perspectives, values, and a way of life, as well as the authority 
to determine them. This chapter shows how the revivalist network is involved in a 
conflict concerning the power to determine an alternative social reality, and an 
alternative way of seeing social reality, both for Muslims and the broader 
population. In doing so, it shows how the network meets the third criterion for a 
movement as specified in Chapter 1. 
Certain aspects of this conflict, highlighted by recent events in Britain, have placed 
Islamic revivalists at the forefront of political debate. In particular, the media 
spotlight shone upon the numerous British Muslims that have joined the Islamic 
State (IS) has led some analysts to claim that revivalist groups play a key role in the 
‘radicalisation’ of British Muslims. Samuel Westrop, for example, writes that ‘“non-
violent” Islamist networks’, comprised of groups linked to Jama’at-i-Islami and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, impose an ‘extremist culture’ and ideology upon British 
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Muslims.1 Because of these groups’ influence in inculcating radical beliefs amongst 
Muslim Britons, he asserts, some have travelled abroad to fight for IS, whilst others 
who remain at home have developed a distrust of Britain, disdain for British liberal 
democratic values, and a victim mentality that serves to divide communities. 
Westrop asserts that these groups have, for a number of years, sought to impose a 
‘culture of extremist Islamic thought’ on British Muslims by exerting their influence 
within local government, schools, universities, charities, prisons and even interfaith 
groups. ‘By permitting Islamist groups to represent British Muslims, and then 
equipping them with funds and political recognition,’ he writes, ‘Britain has actually 
advanced intolerance—and for far too long’.  
The radicalising effect of revivalist groups upon British Muslims and the role of 
these groups in Muslim Britons joining jihadist groups abroad or in Islamist 
terrorism at home, as claimed by Westrop, the think tank Quilliam and others, is 
indeed a key issue for the British government to handle. Such concerns have 
prompted the government to create, for the first time, a strategy to counter both 
violent and non-violent ‘extremism’, as well as a new Extremism Analysis Unit 
located in the Home Office.2 On July 1, 2015, a statutory duty came into force 
requiring all public bodies, including schools, prisons and local councils ‘to take 
steps to identify and tackle radicalisation’.3 The causes of terrorism and the alleged 
causal relationship between non-violent and violent extremism are issues that lie 
beyond the scope of this thesis. But the debates concerning radicalisation are woven 
into a more fundamental question that is central to this thesis, namely, that of a 
conflict of values. 
Such a conflict may be seen to concern not just certain values, however, but the 
schemes of perception in which values make sense: It is not just a matter of what is 
right or wrong, but how what is right and wrong obtains its moral value. This 
involves different perceptions regarding the sources of authority for determining 
morality. Westrop’s phrase of a ‘culture of thought’ appears to capture this key 
                                               
1 Samuel Westrop, ‘How to Radicalize an Entire London Borough’, The Gatestone Institute, May 5, 
2015. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5677/tower-hamlets. 
2 HM Government (2015a). 
3 ‘PM statement on Tunisia and European Council’, British Government website, June 29, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-tunisia-and-european-council. 
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stake in the conflict, but it should be emphasised that what is contested is not just a 
particular set of thoughts or ideas, but the culture in which they form and resonate 
with meaning and value. In other words, this conflict of values is less a conflict of 
ideas or thoughts than one concerning a way of thinking. Yet, more than this, it 
concerns a way of seeing or, better still, a way of living in which such a way of 
thinking is nurtured and rewarded. 
This chapter focuses upon three areas in which revivalists have been most active in 
contesting a ‘culture of thought’, in engendering a conflict of visions and values. 
These include politics, in the sense of national and local systems of representation 
and governance, and education, in the sense of the institutional provision of 
teaching and learning, particularly as they relate to Muslim children. There are some 
clear links between these two fields where advocacy is concerned, for example in 
the representation of Muslims’ educational needs to government, but for the 
purposes of clarity, politics and education are treated as two separate fields. The 
third focus area is arbitration, in particular the network of shari’a courts. This is 
presented in the second section of the chapter after education, since both relate to a 
conflict of values occurring primarily within Muslim communities.4  
Although politics as it relates to policymaking is treated as a distinct field of 
contention in this chapter, it should be noted that contention in all three fields is 
political, in the sense that authority is contested across them. This concerns the 
power to represent Muslims and Islam within official discourse, policy and law, as 
well as within Muslim communities, in Muslim schools and shari’a courts. In 
Bourdieu’s terms, it concerns the possession of symbolic capital. This contested 
authority also concerns the power to shape the social order in which Muslims live 
and Islam is practiced, through institutionalising a certain understanding of Islam 
and Islamic values amongst Muslims and the wider population. Thus, the political 
dimension of this struggle relates to contention concerning the authority to structure 
the social world, as well as the perception and evaluation of it. This cuts across the 
                                               
4 It should be noted that these are not the only fields of contention where a clash of values are 
apparent. Universities, prisons and mosques present three other kinds of institution in which such a 
clash has been reported and recognised by the government. Because of limited space, however, this 
thesis has had to omit consideration of these arenas of cultural conflict. 
  215 
fields of politics ‘proper’, where government is concerned, and education, in 
relation to institutions of teaching and learning. 
1. Politics and governance: 
A conflict of values with the state 
The field of politics referred to in this section of the chapter relates to national and 
local systems of government. There are several ways in which Islamic revivalists’ 
activism within this field demonstrates their engagement in a conflict with political 
and cultural dimensions. The first involves the efforts of specific organisations to 
serve as interlocutors for Muslims’ needs and interests. There is a distributed but 
concerted effort to speak on behalf of Muslims at the interface with central and local 
government authorities. The second way involves the involvement or infiltration of 
certain individuals and organisations within local government authorities, 
exemplified by the Islamic Forum of Europe in the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets. The efforts of these interlocutionary groups are contentious not only for 
Muslims outside the revivalist network for determining Muslim identity, a common 
understanding of Islam and the needs of Muslims. They are also contentious for 
Britain more generally in influencing or seeking to influence government policy in 
support of a vision of society that, in the final analysis, clashes with that of a 
culturally secular liberal democracy.  
1.1.  Representation and advocacy: MCB and other interlocutors 
Some of the organisations and individuals comprising the revivalist network 
currently play, or have played, an active role in advocating for Muslims’ needs and 
interests at the interface with government authorities. There are two senses in which 
this work may be understood as constituting a conflict of values contesting cultural 
norms and political authority, and therefore as more than mere advocacy. The first is 
in vying to represent the entirety and diversity of Muslims in Britain by promoting 
and instituting a particular understanding of Islam that is contentious amongst some 
Muslims in contemporary Britain. The second is in challenging mainstream liberal 
democratic values in the public arena of policymaking. Thus, some revivalist groups 
and individuals, whilst appearing to advocate Muslims’ needs and interests, promote 
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a particular vision of Islam within British society to the detriment of alternative 
visions held by other Muslims. They also promote a particular understanding of 
‘common’ social values that clashes with their understanding in mainstream society 
and their articulation by the state.  
Put succinctly, the conflict of values in which revivalists are engaged has two sides, 
one facing Muslims, whom they claim to represent, and one facing society as a 
whole, represented by government authorities. But it also has two aspects that cut 
across these two faces, one that involves perception, belief and thought, and one that 
involves institutions (see Table 2 below). These might be thought of, respectively, 
as the ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ of Britain’s political culture. This conflict might be 
termed a ‘clash of narratives’, but it is more than a conflict over the meaning of 
words. The effort to control language—particularly as it relates to Islam, ‘British 
values’, and ‘extremism’—is the symbolic aspect of a conflict over how certain 
values are understood. But this is connected to the conflict’s practical aspect, which 
concerns how such values are most appropriately embedded within the social fabric 
and upheld by the state. 
         ASPECT OF      
       AUTHORITY 
 
 DIRECTION  
 OF STRUGGLE  
Symbolic 
 
(i.e. subjective or cognitive) 
Practical 
 
(i.e. objective or institutional) 
 
The Muslim Umma 
 
In-group (but 
secondarily part of 
the out-group) 
 
A struggle to embody an Islamic 
worldview and values in Muslim 
minds and to engender Muslim 
solidarity. Through education, 
training, sermonising and agitation. 
References to Islamic sources. A 
form of internal da’wa. 
A struggle to embody an Islamic 
worldview and values in Muslim 
institutions. In schools, mosques, 
sharia courts, Muslim advocacy 
groups within state bodies or civil 
society, etc., as well as national or 
local policies or laws that relate 
specifically to Muslims. 
 
Mainstream society  
(or humanity) 
 





A struggle to embody an Islamic 
worldview and values in the minds 
of the public in mainstream 
society, and a struggle to engender 
solidarity between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. References to secular, 
liberal democratic sources insofar as 
compatible with Islam. A form of 
external da’wa. 
A struggle to embody an Islamic 
worldview and values in 
mainstream social institutions. In 
schools, universities, local 
governments, advocacy groups 
within state bodies or civil society, 
etc., as well as national or local 
policies or laws that relate to both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Table 2: Symbolic and practical dimensions of authority contested by the revivalist 
movement within the Muslim umma and across mainstream society. 
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The Muslim Council of Britain 
A clash of values and government disengagement 
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was the primary interlocutor between British 
Muslims and the British government from its creation in 1997 until 2009. For over a 
decade MCB acted as the government’s key consultative partner, providing ‘the 
Muslim perspective’ on national policy matters. Its fall from government favour, 
which began whilst Labour was in office, was from the government’s point of view 
the result of a conflict of core values.  
The incident that provoked the then communities secretary, Hazel Blears, to 
formally suspend the government’s relationship with MCB was the signing of the 
Istanbul Declaration by MCB’s deputy secretary general, Daud Abdullah. The 
Istanbul Declaration exhorted the Muslim umma to wage jihad against Israel ‘until 
the liberation of all of Palestine’—in other words, to strive for Israel’s annihilation. 
As understood by Blears, it also ‘advocat[ed] attacks on Jewish communities all 
around the world’.5 Furthermore, it defined any country’s support for Israel or its 
deployment of forces in the ‘Muslim waters’ facing Gaza preventing the smuggling 
of arms and supplies as a ‘declaration of war’.6 Since the British government was 
considering deploying naval forces to the Gaza coastline, it viewed this as 
condoning attacks on British troops. Abdullah’s refusal to withdraw his signature on 
the declaration and MCB’s refusal to force Abdullah’s resignation marked the end 
of MCB’s special relationship with the government. 
However, there were numerous signs of a clash of values between MCB and the 
British government prior to Abdullah’s signing of the Istanbul Declaration. In 2001, 
for example, the MCB’s then secretary general, Yousuf Bhailok, instigated MCB’s 
boycotting of Holocaust Memorial Day. MCB claimed that the occasion ought to be 
replaced by one that commemorates genocides other than the Nazi genocide of 
                                               
5 Hazel Blears, ‘Our shunning of the MCB is not grandstanding’, The Guardian, March 25, 2009. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/25/islam-terrorism. 
6 For the text of the ‘Istanbul Declaration’, see ‘A statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers 
(du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza’ published 
online at http://hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/istpdf.pdf. 
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Jews, most notably what it dubiously referred to as ‘the Palestinian genocide’.7 
MCB lifted the boycott in 2008, but resumed it the following year in protest against 
Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. In 2010, it changed its position again, sending 
a junior representative, Shuja Shafi (the current MCB secretary general). MCB’s 
protest of the memorial event appears now to have been shelved. However, the 
initial boycott and the perceived attempt to extract political capital from it for the 
Palestinian cause raised concerns for some in government and the media that the 
MCB leadership was expressing an unacceptable antisemitic stance.8 
Another indication of a clash of values between MCB and the government came in 
August 2006, after the police arrested a group of British Muslims who planned to 
detonate liquid explosives on seven trans-Atlantic flights from Heathrow airport to 
American and Canadian cities.9 Despite the group leader’s video-recorded 
explanation of the plot’s rationale to ‘fulfill a covenant and promise with Allah the 
almighty, and to make his din [religion and way of life] reign supreme’,10 MCB 
solely blamed British and American foreign policy as the primary motivation behind 
it. As Martyn Frampton and Shiraz Maher observe: 
The MCB was felt to be legitimizing terrorism, drawing moral equivalences, while 
failing to directly confront the radicalization of some young British men. This raised 
fresh and troubling concerns about its suitability as a partnership organization. 
Subsequently, therefore, the government sought to rebalance its relationship with 
groups like the MCB by empowering alternative organizations at the grassroots. The 
new mantra in Whitehall was that it would only work with groups and individuals 
that accepted a set of ‘non-negotiable values’.11 
                                               
7 See MCB, ‘Holocaust Memorial Ceremony MCB Regrets Exclusion of Palestinian Tragedy’, MCB 
website, January 25, 2002, http://www.mcb.org.uk/holocaust-memorial-ceremony-mcb-regrets-
exclusion-of-palestinian-tragedy/; and MCB, ‘Holocaust Day: MCB regrets exclusion of Palestinian 
genocide’, MCB website, January 27, 2003, http://www.mcb.org.uk/holocaust-day-mcb-regrets-
exclusion-of-palestinian-genocide/. 
8 Vikram Dodd, ‘Muslim Council ends Holocaust memorial day boycott’, The Guardian, December 3, 
2007. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/dec/03/secondworldwar.religion. 
9 Duncan Gardham, ‘Airline terror trial: The bomb plot to kill 10,000 people’, The Telegraph, 
September 7, 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6153243/Airline-
terror-trial-The-bomb-plot-to-kill-10000-people.html. 
10 BBC News, ‘“Suicide videos”: What they said’, 4 April 4, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7330367.stm. 
11 Frampton and Maher (2013), p.38. 
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In fact, a month prior to this, Ruth Kelly, then communities secretary, had already 
announced that the government would work with a broader range of Muslim groups, 
including the newly formed Sufi Muslim Council, which she praised for 
condemning ‘terrorism in all its forms’.12 
Beginning under Labour and continued by the coalition and Conservative 
administrations, the British government has brought the question of values to the 
forefront of political debate. Moreover, it has explicitly articulated the sharing of 
non-negotiable ‘British’ values as a pre-requisite for official engagement with (and 
the funding of) community organisations. Since 2011, with the publication of the 
Conservative-led coalition’s revised counterterrorism strategy, Prevent, an explicitly 
values-led approach to community engagement and counterterrorism has been 
adopted.13 This is evident in the government’s definition of ‘extremism’ as the 
‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the 
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths 
and beliefs’.14 Its definition also includes calling ‘for the death of members of our 
armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’. MCB’s sidelining by Cameron’s 
successive administrations indicates that the government sees the group as failing to 
uphold these core British values. 
Contesting the notion of ‘British values’ 
MCB’s involvement in a conflict of values with the state is not just a matter of 
government perspective. Most evident in the policy areas of counterterrorism and 
community engagement, it is belied by its attitude to the Home Office’s introduction 
of fundamental values as a key criterion for moderation and partnership. Rather than 
expressing agreement and support for the government on this matter, MCB, under 
Farooq Murad’s leadership, dismissed the government’s definition of ‘extremism’, 
and thus of ‘British values’, as ‘arbitrary’ and devised by ‘neoconservative think-
                                               
12 Dominic Casciani, ‘Minister backs new Muslim group’, BBC News, July 19, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5193402.stm. 
13 Toby Helm, ‘Back British values or lose grants, Kelly tells Muslim groups’, The Telegraph, 
October 12, 2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1531226/Back-British-values-or-lose-
grants-Kelly-tells-Muslim-groups.html. 
14 Home Office (2011), p.107. 
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tanks’15 and ‘divisive pundits’.16 This view is often echoed by other groups in the 
revivalist network, including Muslim Education and Development (MEND), a group 
that campaigns for Muslims’ active political participation. MCB’s attitude to the 
government’s criticism of Muslim groups or individuals espousing non-violent but 
extremist beliefs is often similarly dismissive and conspiratorial. This was evident in 
2014 in its response to the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, which will be 
examined in detail later in this chapter. MCB’s response was to lambast critics of 
the Muslim individuals and groups involved as conducting a ‘witch hunt’.17 As 
journalist John Ware observes, MCB has ‘a reflex tendency to dismiss criticism of 
such [‘extremist’] beliefs as “Islamophobic” and motivated by a right-wing “neo-
con” agenda’.18 
This denial of Muslim non-violent extremism, as defined by the government in 
terms of a rejection of British values, may be interpreted as concealing certain 
realities, such as the preaching of enmity for non-Muslims in MCB-affiliated 
mosques and the unequal treatment of women at MCB-affiliated shari’a councils. 
But it may also be interpreted as a denial of the way in which such realities are 
classified and understood. Denials of non-violent but ‘extremist’ acts committed by 
Muslims are effectively a rejection of the government’s monopoly on the discourse 
of values. They express a symbolic conflict in which the stakes include the way in 
which Muslims and Islam are perceived, as well as how ‘Britishness’ may be 
understood. As former MCB leader Daud Abdullah opines, ‘It was a one-way, one-
track process: These are the rules, our values, you take it or leave it’.19 MCB and the 
government are not merely engaged in a conflict of values, but also a conflict of 
                                               
15 MCB, ‘Stigmatising Muslim civil society won’t avert terrorism – Prevent strategy still flawed’, 
MCB website, June 7, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/stigmatising-muslim-civil-society-wont-avert-
terrorism-prevent-strategy-still-flawed/. 
16 MCB, ‘Secretary General Calls for Fresh Thinking on Extremism at MCB AGM 2013’, MCB 
website, July 29, 2013. http://www.mcb.org.uk/secretary-general-calls-for-fresh-thinking-on-
extremism-at-mcb-agm-2013/. 
17 MCB, ‘Education and Muslims: End this Witch-Hunt of British Muslims’, MCB website, April 17, 
2014. http://www.mcb.org.uk/education-and-muslims-end-this-witch-hunt-of-british-muslims/. 
18 John Ware, ‘Inside The World Of “Non-Violent” Islamism’, Standpoint Magazine, March 2015. 
http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5936/full. 
19 Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012. 
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vision relating to the fundamental way in which the social world is seen and in 
which such values obtain their worth. 
MCB leaders have sometimes publicly endorsed ‘British values’, but done so by 
absorbing them into their own narrative as Islamic values. In January 2015, for 
example, MCB secretary general Shuja Shafi gave a talk at a conference organised 
by the 100 Group entitled, ‘British Values are Islamic Values’.20 Citing David 
Cameron’s description of British values as including belief in freedom, the tolerance 
of others, personal and social responsibility, and respect for the rule of law, Shafi 
stated that such values are ‘indeed Islamic values and we should champion them’. 
British values are thus re-classified as Islamic values. That the latter takes 
precedence in terms of providing the perceptual and moral framework in which the 
former make sense is suggested in Shafi’s statement that—whilst MCB has ‘no 
objection to British values’—what inspires Muslims ‘to seek the common good’ are 
‘the values of our faith’.21 Others in the revivalist network, such as Muhammad 
Abdul Bari, similarly conceive of British values as Islamic in the language of 
‘universal values’.22 Anas Altikriti, who also champions universal values, goes as 
far to say that the term ‘British values’ has ‘no meaning whatsoever’.23 
Contesting the notion of ‘extremism’ 
The concept of British values was introduced into political parlance in the context of 
security concerns and in this context is inseparable from a certain concept of 
extremism. In the same way that the notion of British values is a point of contention 
for the government and MCB, so is that of extremism. MCB associates extremism 
with violence and it therefore renounces and disassociates itself from it. But, it 
                                               
20 MCB, ‘Speech by Dr Shuja Shafi on British and Islamic Values’, MCB website, January 29, 2015. 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/shuja-shafi-speech-british-values-290115/. 
21 MCB, ‘Muslim Council of Britain Elects New Leadership and Discusses British Values’, MCB 
website, June 15, 2014. http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-
discusses-british-values/. 
22 Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘Who Does Not Agree With British Values That Are Universal?’, The 
Huffington Post, June 18, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/muhammad-abdul-bari/british-
values_b_5506138.html. See also AMS-UK, ‘Iqra Slough Governor discusses Islamic and British 
Values’, AMS-UK website, April 10, 2014. http://ams-uk.org/iqra-slough-governor-discusses-islamic-
and-british-values/. 
23  ‘Young and the Brave: Roles and Responsibilities By Brother Anas Altikriti’, YouTube, June 25, 
2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOnCEiFuL4M. 
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asserts, ‘Anyone who eschews violence and wants to engage by democratic means 
should be encouraged to do so, no matter how difficult their opinions may be for 
some’.24 MCB is ‘against the singling out of particular mosques, imams, charities, 
or student societies’, regardless of their possibly radicalising effects. Non-violent 
extremism is rejected as a principle, rather than an empirical matter. This is because, 
in Murad’s words, much of the prevalent vocabulary, concepts and theories in 
relation to terrorism and radicalisation ‘remain deeply muddled and misguided’.25  
MCB’s concept of extremism stems from a different intellectual lineage than the 
government’s. Using the terminology of the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual guide, 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MCB views itself as taking a ‘middle path’ between 
‘extremism’ and what it calls ‘rejection’. In March 2009, for example, MCB 
convened a meeting of over 200 Muslim activists and community leaders to discuss 
proposed changes to the government’s counter-terrorism strategy.26 In addition to 
contesting the government’s definition of extremism—which it declared was 
‘dictated by xenophobic commentators’—it stated that, ‘Islam is the religion of the 
middle way that rejects any form of extremism’. In May 2015, MCB organised a 
seminar to explore ‘the implications of increasing counter terror legislation and 
rising extremism, and how peaceful Muslims caught in the middle can navigate the 
terrain drawing on the middle path traditions of Islam’.27 Former MCB secretary 
general Muhammad Abdul Bari gave the keynote talk on the subject of ‘Islam’s 
Middle Path: Between Rejection & Extremism’.  
Abdul Bari articulates MCB’s notion of extremism succinctly as ‘rigidity, 
fanaticism, and radicalism’.28 Muslims may be extremists by ‘misunderstanding’ 
their faith either by committing violent acts or isolating themselves from the 
mainstream society. Neither may be condoned from this point of view because of 
                                               
24 MCB, ‘Secretary General Calls for Fresh Thinking on Extremism at MCB AGM 2013’. 
25 Ibid. 
26 MCB, ‘Muslims Unite for Civil Liberties: Consultation Meeting’, MCB website, March 23, 2009. 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslims-unite-for-civil-liberties-consultation-meeting/. 
27 MCB, ‘Seminar – Navigating Extremes: Muslims in the Middle’, MCB website, May 11, 2015, 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/navigating-extremes-muslims-in-the-middle/. 
28 ‘Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari - Between Ignorance and Extremism’, Radical Middle Way website, 
January 24, 2011. 
http://www.radicalmiddleway.org/uploads/assets/e83de8e1d63f0f3f2c1c8a2699a0b86c611dd3e8.pdf. 
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the belief that Islam ought to be spread beyond the Muslim population without 
coercion. Abdul Bari describes ‘rejection’, on the other hand, as a ‘libertarian 
attitude, laxity, or so-called liberalism’. In fact, both of these positions are viewed as 
extremes. Between what amounts to violence or self-segregation and secularism—
all of which are deemed extremist—he asserts, ‘we have to take the middle path, the 
path that Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala has given us’. This understanding of 
extremism, shared by the Islamic Forum of Europe,29 is inextricable from a certain 
Islamic perspective: What MCB deems as extreme is measured not in relation to 
what the government describes as British values, but in relation to the proper 
practice of Islam, which serves as the middle ground. 
Contesting the symbolic authority to speak for Islam 
For revivalist Muslims, contention over the concept of extremism is inextricable 
from contention over the understanding of Islam. Whilst the government has often 
expressed the view that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ and that Islam-inspired 
terrorism or extremism is a ‘misunderstanding’ of the faith—a view shared by 
MCB—the umbrella body sees itself in a struggle with the state to control the 
representation of Islam.30 MCB says that it agrees with the government that those 
who call for the murder of innocent civilians present ‘a distorted interpretation of 
Islam’, but it firmly rejects the government’s authority to classify Islam. Expressing 
concern ‘as to who will be the judge of what a “distorted interpretation of Islam” 
really is’, it professes that ‘the idea of the state or police arbitrating theological 
“distortion” is especially worrying’.31 Any effort by the government to classify what 
Islam is or isn’t, states MCB, amounts to the promotion of ‘state-sponsored 
sectarianism’. In response to Peter Clarke’s report on the Trojan Horse affair, MCB 
                                               
29 Ahmed Saad, ‘Al-Wasatiyyah: The Lost Middle Path’, IFE website, December 30, 2006. 
http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=324. 
30 See, for example, ‘PM speech at the UN General Assembly 2014’, British Government website, 
September 25, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-the-un-general-
assembly-2014. 
31 MCB, ‘Fear and Loathing is not the Best Response to Terrorism: Muslim Council of Britain 
Responds to Extremism Task Force Proposals’, MCB website, December 5, 2013. 
http://www.finsburyparkmosque.org/news/mcb-press-release-fear-and-loathing-is-not-the-best-
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contested the observation that ‘a hardline and politicised strand of Sunni Islam’32 
was being pushed in some Birmingham schools, asserting, ‘It is not for the state to 
define the theological boundaries of the Islamic faith and to create an “approved 
version of Islam”’.33 
MCB’s conflict of vision and values with government authority is inseparable from 
a symbolic conflict with other Muslims over the representation of their faith. This 
relates not just to the right to advocate changes in policy on behalf of British 
Muslims, but to the possession of the symbolic authority to influence the public 
perception and understanding of Islam. Murad states that ‘the MCB cannot represent 
anyone but its many affiliates’.34 But MCB clearly seeks to represent more than the 
500 or so organisations under its umbrella by presenting itself as the most authentic 
voice for British Muslims and by striving to establish an understanding of Islam—
one consistent with a long-term vision of a society in which it is willingly embraced 
by all—that is contentious from a variety of other Muslim perspectives.  
MCB’s engagement in a symbolic conflict with other Muslims is apparent in its 
consistent rejection of the association of violent acts with Islam by Muslims who see 
such acts as jihad for the sake of pleasing Allah. It is also apparent in Murad’s 
rejection of the practice of takfir, the declaration of Muslims as non-Muslim made 
most commonly by violent jihadists and non-violent rejectionist groups such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir.35 Decrying the ‘arrogance’ of those who ‘claim that they can pronounce 
on the relationship that any of the rest of us have with Allah’, he is blind to the irony 
of his own declarations that such Muslims have themselves misunderstood Islam 
and hijacked it for merely political ends.  
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Furthermore, under Sacranie’s leadership, MCB was adamant in classifying Ahmadi 
Muslims as non-Muslims, a position it has not publicly disavowed.36 In April 2016, 
responding to pressure to clarify its position, MCB stated that since ‘the Ahmadi 
community’ does not subscribe to the ‘cornerstone’ tenet of Islam that Muhammad 
is its final messenger, it could not represent the Ahmadis as Muslims.37 Stopping 
short of explicitly declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslim, it added that Muslims 
should not be obliged to classify Ahmadis as ‘Muslim’.  
MCB has also clashed with secular, reformist Muslim groups, such as Quilliam and 
the Sufi Muslim Council, for whom Islam ought to be a matter of personal worship, 
rather than a religious moral code arbitrated by the state in the public space, for 
example in schools.38 Such clashes have occasionally spilled out into the media.  
In 2008, for example, MCB initially supported a marriage contract produced by the 
Muslim Institute for use by Muslims wishing to have an Islamic marriage (nikah). 
As Ed Husain, co-founder of Quilliam, explains, ‘The new Muslim marriage 
contract sought to update and develop fiqh, or Muslim personal jurisprudence, by 
shifting the power balance in a marriage to empower women to trigger divorce, feel 
safe from rape or abuse, prevent husbands from taking second wives, and set up 
accommodation separated from a husband’s parents.’39 Traditionally, Muslim 
women require a wali, or male guardian, to oversee and consent to the marriage, 
plus male witnesses. The new contract waived the requirement for a wali and 
stipulated that witnesses can be women and even non-Muslims. MCB quickly 
withdrew its support for the contract, clarifying that it had misplaced its trust in 
those leading the initiative, whose attempts to ‘re-invent’ shari’a towards a 
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‘modern’ or ‘reformist’ view it described as ‘misguided’ and ‘incorrect’.40 MCB’s 
assistant secretary general, Ibrahim Mogra, defended the decision, asserting that 
shari’a is the domain of Muslim theologians and jurists, and that they are clear that 
Muslim brides-to-be are required in Islamic law to be represented by their male 
guardians.41 
Contesting the symbolic authority to represent Muslims 
MCB’s claim to represent a diversity of Islamic perspectives is dubious, as is its 
assumption that it provides the most authentic voice for Britain’s Muslims. Ignoring 
the other Muslim groups that the government has engaged with in recent years, 
Mogra portrays MCB as the necessary voice for British Muslims that is provided 
neither by Muslim politicians, who represent their constituents rather than Muslims’ 
needs, nor the mosques. In sidelining MCB, says Mogra, the government is denying 
Muslim communities of political representation.42 His view is echoed by others, 
including Saleem Kidwai, the secretary general of the Muslim Council of Wales. 
‘[Y]ou must talk to the Muslim Council of Britain,’ states Kidawi, ‘because it is the 
largest organization. You can talk to think-tanks but they are not the grassroots 
groups—the MCB has got the mandate from 500 organizations who represent 
Muslims from all walks of life’.43  
However, MCB’s representativeness is questionable in terms of how many mosques 
fall within its network and how many British Muslims view it as representing their 
interests. Research by Mehmood Naqshbandi—which heavily informs Innes 
Bowen’s book, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent—calculates that mosques 
managed by MCB affiliates total just 12% of all mosques in Britain.44 MCB 
represents half or more of all Jama’at- and Ikhwan-related mosques in the country, 
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but less than half of the mosques belonging to any other ‘faction’. Deobandi 
mosques comprise the largest number of MCB-affiliated mosques, but comprise a 
small proportion of the total in Britain. Perhaps more significant in indicating the 
representativeness of MCB as a national interlocutionary body, according to a 2007 
survey, only 6% British Muslims consider MCB as representing their views.45  
Humayun Ansari, in his comprehensive history of Muslims in Britain, The Infidel 
Within, states that MCB has ‘made no claim to be the “sole” representative of “true” 
Islam or the “whole” of the British Muslim community’.46 This is not quite accurate. 
Whilst it may not have publicly declared as such, MCB quite clearly views itself as 
speaking for Muslims as an entire group, rather than for just its affiliates. In the 
description of its aims and vision it consistently refers to ‘the’ Muslim community 
as the singular constituency it seeks to advocate for, unify and empower.47 The same 
assumption that it represents all British Muslims is apparent in the language it 
employs in official lobbying. ‘The Muslim community’, it has advocated in 
Parliament, ‘would like to see the early introduction of a law that makes it a 
criminal offence to vilify any religious belief’.48 
Furthermore, in deriding some Muslim groups as unrepresentative of British 
Muslims and presenting itself as the most authoritative alternative—without which 
Muslims would lack a political voice—MCB quite clearly seeks to speak for all 
British Muslims, rather than a select few. And in denouncing some Muslim groups 
as misrepresenting Islam and in judging what is a correct or incorrect interpretation 
of shari’a, MCB claims the authority to speak for Islam. The authority it vies for is 
both political, in seeking legal and policy changes, and symbolic, in seeking 
recognition for its point of view from both government officials and Muslim 
communities. As noted above, this authority has been challenged by the government 
as it casts MCB within a narrative of national values and non-violent extremism. It 
has also been challenged by observers who note its slim base of support within the 
overall Muslim population. 
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Other revivalist interlocutors 
MCB is not alone in having an interlocutionary role with the government regarding 
Muslims’ interests in Britain. Whilst not receiving media attention comparable with 
MCB, there are other, smaller organisations that specialise in certain sectors, 
including education, law and policing, which have a history of engagement with the 
authorities. Some of these are highlighted below. Each of these organisations brings 
to the interface with government a mode of advocacy that, whilst legal and non-
violent, is framed by a vision of society and a set of values that ultimately clash with 
Britain’s liberal democratic culture. 
The Muslim Educational Trust 
The Muslim Educational Trust (MET), an affiliate of MCB, began lobbying and 
advising central and local governments from the early 1970s for specific 
arrangements in schools for Muslim children and for revisions of the national school 
curriculum according to Islamic principles. In Britain, each Local Education 
Authority (LEA) is required by law to have a Standing Advisory Council on 
Religious Education (SACRE). MET representatives have served on SACREs all 
over Britain. In 1993, it obtained government approval for an Islamic studies 
syllabus in secondary schools, for which it has provided teachers and teaching 
materials. Urfan Khaliq notes that MET participates and assists in Islamic studies 
lessons ‘in the majority’ of schools in the Midlands.49 MET states that it has 
persuaded LEAs to recognise and accept the ‘special needs’ of Muslim pupils in 
state schools, including halal food, ‘appropriate’ dress for Muslim girls, dress for 
sports for Muslim boys and girls, exemption from mixed-sex swimming lessons, 
exemption from some aspects of sex education, facility for prayers, and the 
inclusion of its approved Islamic books in school libraries.50 Ansari concurs with 
this, attributing changes in schools, including the provision of Islamic religious 
education, to MET.51  
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Yet, in some respects, MET’s work is highly contentious in presenting a set of 
values and a vision of society that clearly conflict with that of the liberal democratic 
mainstream. In an introductory text on Islam—which, according to Ed Husain, is 
used widely in British Muslim schools—MET founder and director Ghulam Sarwar 
presents Islam as a ‘complete system of life’ in which politics of a highly 
contentious nature and religion are inextricable.52 This book, Islam: Beliefs and 
Teachings, commends the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami for working 
towards the ‘establishment of Allah’s law in Allah’s land’, confessing a hope that ‘a 
real Islamic state will emerge from these efforts’ for the benefit of the world.53 As 
Husain recalls, 
In my school, a Jamat-e-Islami activist named Abdul Rabb represented the MET and 
awarded us trophies and medals for our performance in MET exams. Ostensibly it all 
seemed harmless, but the personnel all belonged to Jamat-e-Islami front organizations 
in Britain. Their key message was that Islam was not merely a religion but also an 
ideology that sought political power and was beginning to make headway.54 
For Sarwar, ‘The introduction of an Islamic education system should be an integral 
part of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as an all-encompassing way of 
life’.55 In his book used in British schools, he describes such an ideal way of life as 
including the legal sanction of polygamy and arranged marriages and the prohibition 
of the ‘free mixing of grown-up boys and girls’. Children in British schools learning 
about Islam from this resource are taught that men and women have different duties 
defined by Allah, and that to aspire for ‘total equality between a man and a woman’ 
goes ‘against nature’.56 This teaching strikes a chord with Mawdudi’s view of the 
different roles of men and women assigned to them by nature, which he detailed in 
his book Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam.57 
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The Association of Muslim Schools UK 
In recent years, advocacy for Muslim education has become the domain of the 
Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), also an MCB affiliate. Unlike 
MET, AMS-UK is a national membership organisation. As such, it has been able to 
build on MET’s advocacy work by developing relationships with and representing 
the 150-odd independent Muslim schools throughout Britain. Its influence is 
suggested by its formal recognition by the Department for Education (DfE) as the 
national representative body for Muslim faith schools in the country. In 2005, it was 
given financial support by DfE’s precursor, the Department of Education and Skills, 
to the sum of £100,000, to assist 60 or so of its affiliated schools integrate into the 
state maintained sector.58 AMS-UK has played an active lobbying role for increased 
funding for its affiliate schools. Furthermore, along with the Christian Schools Trust 
(CST), it was successful lobbying the government for a separate inspections body 
for faith schools. In 2008, AMS-UK and CST jointly established the Bridge Schools 
Inspectorate, which until recently conducted inspections of their affiliate schools on 
behalf of the government. Some of AMS-UK’s leaders have enjoyed roles advising 
the government on other educational issues. In 2010, for example, AMS-UK’s 
former chairman, Mohamed  Mukadam, and its current chair, Ashfaque Choudhury, 
helped co-author a report for the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, entitled, The training and development of Muslim Faith Leaders: 
Current practice and future possibilities.59 
AMS-UK’s website claims that ‘British values’, ‘such as democracy, the rule of 
law, mutual respect, tolerance, freedom of speech and freedom of association’, are 
examples of universal values.60 But it suggests that such values derive from the 
‘traditional authentic Islamic values as taught in the Qur’an and through the 
example of the Prophet Muhammad’. And, although the organisation does not 
openly challenge the state, there are indications that its leadership sees itself as 
promoting a vision of society and a set of values that clash with those that the state 
upholds. Josephine Squires observes that AMS-UK claims the government ‘wishes 
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to maintain a Judeo-Christian monopoly in controlling the minds of youth in the 
state education system’.61 AMS-UK seems to view itself as fighting an ideological 
battle against the state and the liberal democratic culture of Britain not just for the 
minds of young Muslims, but also for their souls. Mukadam, states that Muslim 
children need to be ‘saved’ from a secular educational environment.62 The ‘first and 
foremost’ duty of Muslim parents, he asserts, is the transference of Islamic faith and 
values to their children, without which they would enter ‘the fire of hell’. For 
Mukadam, the prioritisation of Islam as a religion over the individual human rights 
of Muslims is further expressed in his belief that Muslim apostates in an Islamic 
state must be killed, since this is the penalty ordained by Allah and prescribed by the 
shari’a.63 
Mukadam is also the principal of an AMS-UK-affiliated Muslim school, whose 
website has stated—in terms inimical to ‘British’ values and social cohesion—‘If 
we oppose the lifestyle of the West, then it does not seem sensible that the teachers 
and the system which represents that lifestyle should educate our children’.64 In 
1999, under Mukadam’s leadership, the school was criticised by Ofsted for ‘its 
failure to prepare pupils to take their place in the wider society’.65 In another AMS-
UK school, undercover filming ‘discovered that Muslim children are being taught 
religious apartheid and social segregation’.66 Although AMS-UK cannot be held 
responsible for what goes on in a particular school, it has been accused of 
whitewashing such ‘extremism’ in its role within the Bridge Schools Inspectorate 
(BSI).67 These concerns appeared well founded when in June 2015 the government 
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announced its plans to close BSI in October 2015 for failing to identify ‘warning 
signs of extremism and radicalisation in school settings’.68 In 2014, The Sunday 
Times reported that AMS-UK was being investigated by the Department for 
Education ‘amid claims that some of their inspectors support fundamentalist Islamic 
beliefs’.69  
AMS-UK’s inspectors include its vice-chair, Tahir Alam. A former assistant 
secretary general of MCB, Alam is linked to the Trojan Horse scandal, which will 
be covered in the next section of the chapter. Another inspector—a co-founder and 
executive committee member of AMS-UK—is Ibrahim Hewitt. A former assistant 
director at MET and a former MCB official, Hewitt is the head of Al-Aqsa school in 
Leicester. He advocates that, in an ideal Islamic state, adulterers should be stoned to 
death and that homosexuals and fornicators should be lashed.70 Muslim schools, for 
Hewitt, are not just for educational purposes, but for safeguarding the future of the 
Muslim umma: Islam as a way of life takes priority over its Muslim adherents; the 
‘community’ or nation takes priority over individuals.71 Hewitt is also a trustee of 
IBERR, the International Board of Educational Research and Resources, which was 
established to implement the aims of the First World Conference on Islamic 
Education held in Makkah in 1977.72 The conference statement affirmed the 
‘complete submission to Allah on the level of the individual, the community and 
humanity at large’ as the ‘ultimate aim of Muslim Education’.73  
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The founder of AMS-UK, Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema, is also linked to 
IBEER. Until recently he was its chief executive. At the AMS-UK 2013 conference, 
consistent with a revivalist perspective in which Islam is viewed as an alternative 
way of life, he gave a workshop entitled ‘Islamification of the whole school 
curriculum’.74 Also speaking at this conference was Farah Ahmed, a founding 
trustee of the Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation (ISF) and former member of Hizb ut-
Tahrir. She has attacked the National Curriculum for ‘pushing the idea of religious 
tolerance’ and its ‘systematic indoctrination’ of Muslim children, whilst criticising 
‘attempts to integrate Muslim children’ into British society as an effort ‘to produce 
new generations that reject Islam’.75 
The Association of Muslim Lawyers 
The Association of Muslim Lawyers (AML) was established in 1993 to ‘promote 
the legal rights of Muslims and the availability of advice in accordance with the 
Shari’ah of Islam’.76 According to its own literature, it has worked with the 
Commission for Racial Equality, City Hall, the Home Office, the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords, as well as other Muslim organisations including 
MCB, of which it is an affiliate. Although neither as active as AMS-UK, nor as 
connected to government agencies as MSF has been, AML has played a key role in 
advocating changes in law in the interests of Britain’s Muslims. Most notably, it 
campaigned for an extension of England’s (now abolished) blasphemy law to cover 
Islam and a redefinition of the crime of incitement to hatred to protect Muslims. 
AML states that the government has a duty ‘to secure the basic rights of freedom of 
religion, freedom to practice one’s religion and freedom to educate one’s children in 
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accordance with one’s religion’.77 For AML, this duty entails the full incorporation 
of Muslim personal law into English law, so that the ‘decisions of properly 
constituted Shari’a courts will have to be recognised by the English civil courts as 
being legally binding and enforceable’.78  
Much of AML’s campaign work has been led by its co-founder and deputy chair, 
Ahmad Thomson, who is a committee member of the London-based Islamic Sharia 
Council. In 2002, on behalf of AML, he made written and oral representations to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences. These proposals clearly 
conflict with liberal democratic values, including the freedom of speech and 
equality before the law. Anti-blasphemy legislation, he urged, ought to be updated 
to criminalise behaviour that is ‘likely to shock and outrage the feelings of the 
general body of believers’.79 He added, ‘it is not just the people who follow the 
religion, but it is the religion itself which has to be protected’.80 This prioritisation 
of group rights over individual rights clearly conflicts with a fundamental tenet of 
liberal democratic law and culture.  
These lobbying efforts were part of a campaign involving MCB, ICHR, MSF and 
others, to criminalise the criticism of Islam, the Qur’an and Muhammad, with a 
prison sentence of up to seven years. Although new offences ‘involving stirring up 
hatred against persons on racial or religious grounds’ were created in the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, in the interests of free expression, clauses criminalising 
the insulting and abuse of religion were removed from the final draft of the act.81 
Under the act, religious hatred has to be shown to be intentionally stirred up. 
In his representations to the select committee, Thomson lobbied to have some 
aspects of shari’a incorporated into English law. These included the statutory right 
of Muslims to have prayer breaks at work and for Islamic marriages to be legally 
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recognised, as well as that of Muslim men to marry up to four wives.82 He also 
argued that the ‘freedom of religion’ trumps gender and sexuality equality: 
[W]here there is such a conflict of rights—for example, between the right to freely 
practice one’s religion on the one hand, and on the other hand, the right not to be 
treated less favourably because of one's gender or sexual orientation—there is a 
statutory requirement to pay particular regard to the former rather than the latter.83 
In other words, institutionalised discrimination against women and homosexuals can 
be legally sanctioned if it is part of religious practice. Furthermore, religious 
schools, he asserted, have the right to discriminate in not employing those who do 
not share their faith. The assumption is that religion ought to be taught not critically 
but doctrinally, that the teaching of religion itself ought to be religious rather than 
disinterested and educational.  
Thomson cites the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA) as the basis of the British government’s duty to protect the 
‘freedom of religion’ and incorporate the personal aspects of Islamic law into state 
law. He refers to Article 9 of the HRA to justify separate legal jurisdictions for 
different religious groups, including Muslims. Yet, paradoxically, Thomson views 
‘secular human rights law’ as an imposition ‘in the name of equality’.84 He 
considers ‘man-made’ law—which includes all Western legal systems and 
statutes—as inferior to Islamic law. He believes that the shari’a—which, he 
confesses, allows ‘humane slavery’85—is the final ‘legal modality’ of civilisation 
and one that his lobbying efforts are presumably directed to.86 Thomson views the 
legal changes that he has lobbied for in Britain on behalf of AML as practical ‘for 
the time being’ until ‘the democratic wish of the majority of its people’ is for British 
law to be fully compliant with the shari’a. 87 
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The Muslim Safety Forum 
The Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) was, until recently, ‘the key advisory body for the 
Police Service’, providing advice ‘on matters of safety and security from the 
Muslim perspective’.88 It was established, in its own words, to challenge the ‘unfair 
focus on the Muslim community when it came to policing activities and 
enforcement of anti-terror policing legislation’.89 As an indication of its influence, it 
met on a regular basis with senior representatives of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the Home Office, the Crown 
Prosecution Service and other official bodies. The agreement between the 
Metropolitan Police Service and MSF stated that the police will ‘use the MSF as a 
consultation body to help formulate policy or practice’.90 Comprised of numerous 
other revivalist organisations, including MCB, the Federation of Student Islamic 
Societies (FOSIS), the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) and the East London 
Mosque, MSF was accused of being ‘anti-establishment’ and unrepresentative of 
Britain’s diverse Muslim communities. Subsequently, in 2012, it was replaced by 
the London Muslim Communities Forum (LMCF).  
On The Islam Channel’s ‘Politics and Media Show’ in July of that year, MSF chair, 
Azad Ali, claimed not to know why MSF had been side-lined by the newly formed 
LMCF.91 Yet, his political views had for some years been troubling to government 
officials and other observers, who had noted his ‘strong track record of 
extremism’.92 He had praised the al-Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar al-Awlaki; denied 
that the Mumbai jihad terror attacks were terrorism; and quoted, apparently 
approvingly, a statement advocating the killing of British troops in Iraq made by 
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Huthaifa Azzam, son of the architect of the global jihad, Abdullah Azzam, upon he 
has also lavished praise.93 For these comments, he was suspended from his job as a 
civil servant in January 2009, but returned to work in June of that year after being 
cleared in an internal investigation. Ali, a senior member of IFE, addressed a 
Muslim readership on the organisation’s website, stating, ‘we are all working our 
socks off, in different ways, for the resurgence of the Khilafa [caliphate]’.94 Writing 
on the political blog, Harry’s place, David Toube states that Ali’s ‘politics are as 
great a threat to our democratic, liberal and pluralist system as any white fascist or 
far left extremist’.95 
Although MSF has been marginalised by the government, Ali remains its chairman 
and is very active in numerous other groups. According to the website for Muslim 
Engagement and Development (MEND), in which he plays a leading role, he also 
sits on the National Accountability Board for Schedule 7 Stops with the police and 
Home Office. He is a member of the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s 
Community Advisory Group and the Home Office’s Trust and Confidence 
Community Panel.96 As detailed in Chapter 3, he is also a member of MCB’s 
Central Working Committee and the chair of its Membership Committee. 
The National Association of Muslim Police 
The National Association of Muslim Police (NAMP) was launched by MCB in 2007 
to support Muslim officers and staff within the police service. Like other 
organisations in the revivalist network, it has a dawa role. It seeks to ‘promote 
understanding and awareness of Islam’ within the police by advising on cultural and 
religious issues. Yet, similarly to MSF, NAMP’s aspirations include ‘bridging the 
gap between the police and the Muslim community’, as well as tackling 
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‘Islamophobia’.97 Prior to MSF’s marginalisation, the two organisations 
collaborated on some issues. According to Azad Ali, the two organisations worked 
together to improve the recruitment and retention of Muslim police officers. NAMP 
has also collaborated with LMCF, which appears to some extent to have taken 
MSF’s concern with Islamophobia forward.  
Comprised of local police associations and serving police officers, NAMP, unlike 
the other organisations highlighted in this section of the chapter, is situated within 
the institutional structure of the state. Perhaps because of this, it has a less 
contentious relationship with the government. However, its choice of organisational 
partners and attitudes towards government policy, particularly regarding 
counterterrorism, suggest it is at least sympathetic to a view that contests both the 
authority of the state to determine the national values upon which British society is 
based and the mainstream understanding of Islam in Britain.  
One of NAMP’s key organisational partners is MEND. In November 2014, the two 
organisations held a joint conference, ‘Challenging Islamophobia: Building 
Communities’, at which NAMP’s president, Asif Sadiq, was a keynote speaker.98 
LMCF promoted the event. Sadiq was also a speaker at MEND’s re-branding launch 
earlier in the year.99 In its previous incarnation as iEngage, notes Andrew Gilligan, 
MEND ‘consistently defended fundamentalist organisations such as the East 
London Mosque and the Islamic Forum of Europe’.100 It also undermined and 
discredited spokespeople for secular interpretations of Islam, ‘defended the right of 
radical Muslim preachers to come to Britain … and opposed the ban on extremist 
group Hizb-ut-Tahrir from university campuses’.101 MEND’s founder and managing 
director, Sufyan Ismail, is a promoter of Haitham al-Haddad, a preacher and a judge 
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at the Islamic Sharia Council.102 Al-Haddad states that women are inferior to men 
and that wives ought to obey their husbands; that homosexuality is a ‘crime against 
humanity’; that adulterers found guilty ought to be stoned to death; and that once an 
Islamic state is in place, it is obliged to wage ‘proactive’ jihad to establish Islam as a 
global force.103  
NAMP has also a close relationship with the London-based Islamic Human Rights 
Commission (IHRC), recommending British Muslims to report crimes to it.104 
However, for its alleged links to the Iranian regime it has been described as a 
‘promoter of Khomeini jihadism in the UK’.105 IHRC openly supports Hezbollah 
and holds an annual Al-Quds Day, where protesters call for the annihilation of 
Israel. Some of its advisers, including Hamid Algar, are advocates of jihad for 
Islam’s eventual global hegemony.106 IHRC is also a loyal supporter of Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, who advocates suicide bombings in Israel and calls for the Muslim 
conquest of Europe through non-violent jihad. At the time of the cleric’s visit to 
Britain in 2004, the metropolitan police commissioner passed a dossier on al-
Qaradawi’s sermons to the Crown Prosecution Service with a view to prosecution. 
Raza Kazim, an IHRC spokesman and trustee of its charitable trust, considered this 
as an ‘insult’ and in protest walked out of a meeting with the police, with which it 
used to meet regularly regarding ‘the treatment of Muslims at the hands of the 
police and others’.107 
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Both MEND and IHRC encourage a perception in Britain that Muslims are under 
siege. NAMP’s relationship with these groups suggests that it is not just policy that 
it seeks to change, but also a public mind-set. Clearly indicating its involvement in a 
symbolic struggle to speak for Islam, NAMP denies the documented religious 
inspiration for terrorism in Britain committed by Muslims in the name of their 
faith.108 Instead, echoing the narrative of MEND and IHRC, it blames the 
government’s foreign policy and Islamophobia for these attacks and plots. In accord 
with these groups, it also condemns the government’s preference to engage with 
Muslim organisations other than MCB, such as Quilliam. 
1.2.  Local government: the Islamic Forum of Europe 
True to their characterisation as ‘participationists’, some of the groups in the 
revivalist network—including MEND, MCB, the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), 
and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)—have campaigned for Muslims’ 
active participation in electoral politics. The Electoral Commission made MEND an 
‘official partner’ for registering Muslim voters for the 2015 general election, despite 
its endorsement of Muslim clerics, such as Abu Eesa Niamatullah and Haitham al-
Haddad, who, whilst condoning democratic elections, preach against secularism and 
liberal democratic values.109 At least 10 Labour and Conservative MPs joined the 
launch of the MEND’s ‘Muslim manifesto’ in the House of Commons in March 
2015.110 That wasn’t the first time that the organisation has been embraced by the 
government. Its precursor, Engage, led by MCB’s Inyat Bunglawala, was invited to 
be the secretariat of a new All-Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, whose 
inaugural meeting was held in the House of Commons in November 2010. 
Some groups have been more directly involved in politics by supporting the election 
of local government councillors, mayors and members of parliament. IFE, for 
example, was instrumental in the success of George Galloway’s Respect Party in the 
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2005 general election,111 where Galloway—a supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah—
won the seat for the London Borough of Bethnal Green and Bow.112 At a dinner 
shortly after his victory at the East London Mosque, the home of IFE, he was 
recorded as saying, ‘I am indebted more than I can say—more than it would be wise 
for them for me to say—to the Islamic Forum of Europe.  I believe they played the 
decisive role.’113 Some of MAB’s leading activists were also involved in the 
Respect Party. Anas Altikriti, for instance, gave up his MAB presidency to stand for 
Respect in Yorkshire and Humberside in the 2004 European Parliamentary 
elections. IFE was also involved in a group called ‘Muslims 4 Ken’, which 
unsuccessfully campaigned for Ken Livingstone’s re-election as the mayor of 
London in 2008. The group was run by Azad Ali, IFE’s community affairs co-
ordinator, and Altikriti, an ‘IFE ally’.114 
But the most significant involvement of revivalist Islam in British politics was with 
IFE’s infiltration of the Labour Party within the London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
and its involvement in Lutfur Rahman’s successful campaign to become the mayor 
of the borough.115 Whilst it is difficult to measure the precise extent of the impact of 
IFE and Rahman’s involvement in Tower Hamlets’ local government, it has 
certainly empowered and encouraged groups whose values conflict with Britain’s 
liberal democratic culture.  
Rahman was elected as a Labour party councillor in 2008 and soon after won the 
leadership of the borough council. In October 2010, he became the borough’s mayor 
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after running as an independent candidate. Labour had dropped him as its party 
candidate over ‘serious allegations’ over both ‘the eligibility of participating voters’ 
and his ‘conduct’.116 Rahman governed the borough for five years until he was 
removed from office in April 2015 when a High Court hearing found him guilty of 
electoral fraud. Throughout this time, evidence emerged of his links with IFE, 
whose literature describes its commitment to change the ‘very infrastructure of 
[Western] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed … from 
ignorance to Islam’.117  
In his court judgement, Richard Mawrey QC asserted that the court had ‘not heard a 
shred of credible evidence linking Mr Rahman with any extreme or fundamentalist 
Islamist movement’.118 But if the court understood ‘extreme’ or ‘fundamentalist’ as 
connected with violence, then it is no surprise that it did not consider IFE in such 
terms. IFE is a revivalist, dawa-oriented organisation that operates within the law. 
The notion of and concern about non-violent extremism, which the Cameron-led 
government has begun to incorporate into government policy, is not necessarily 
shared throughout the political and legal establishments. Because of its legality, it 
was probably not a concern for the High Court. 
However, despite Mawrey’s dismissal of the claim that Rahman was linked to an 
‘extremist’ movement, there are indications that Rahman was linked to IFE. 
Rahman was said by seven serving and former councillors to have gained his post as 
council leader with the help of IFE. The petition that led to the establishment of a 
directly-elected mayor for Tower Hamlets was organised by the IFE activist Abjol 
Miah, who subsequently took a leading role in Rahman’s 2010 campaign for 
mayorship. The manager of Rahman’s campaign to become mayor, Bodrul Islam, 
admits Rahman enjoyed a ‘strategic relationship’ with IFE.119 Most of his 
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campaigners, he states, were ‘either Respect or IFE activists’. Prior to Rahman’s 
success in becoming mayor, another IFE activist, Abu Talha, confessed to an 
undercover reporter for Channel 4’s Dispatches programme that IFE was planning 
to get ‘one of our brothers’ into that position.120 He named Azad Ali, community 
affairs coordinator for IFE and a member of MCB’s central working committee, as 
one possible candidate. 
Independently of the relationship between IFE and Rahman, there were indications 
that the organisation had infiltrated the council. In the Dispatches programme 
broadcast in March 2010, Abjol Miah, then a Tower Hamlets councillor as well as 
an IFE leader, was caught boasting on secret camera, ‘We’ve consolidated ourselves 
now. We’ve got a lot of influence and power in the council, councillors, 
politicians’.121 His IFE colleague, Abu Talha, claimed, ‘Our brothers have gone into 
positions of influence, council positions’. These may include up to 30 councillors, 
the number of Muslim councillors in Tower Hamlets according to IFE’s head of 
media and public relations, Abdullah Faliq.122 IFE activists Miah and Talha, 
recorded by undercover reporters, described Tower Hamlets council—with its 
15,000 staff and £1.1 billion budget—as their most impressive political 
achievement.123 Such entryism was confirmed by Jim Fitzpatrick, then the 
Environment Minister and MP for Tower Hamlets. Interviewed by Andrew Gilligan 
for Dispatches, Fitzpatrick claimed that IFE had become, in effect, a secret party 
within Labour and other political parties: ‘They are acting almost as an entryist 
organisation,’ he said, ‘placing people within the political parties, recruiting 
members to those political parties, trying to get individuals selected and elected so 
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they can exercise political influence and power, whether it’s at local government 
level or national level.’124  
Rahman wasn’t the only IFE-linked individual to secure an elite political position in 
the borough council. In 2008, Lutfur Ali was appointed its assistant chief executive, 
the second highest civil servant position in the council with responsibility for grant 
funding. Ali’s appointment was controversial, since he was hired by Rahman despite 
apparently lacking the proper credentials for the job. In this role, Ali oversaw a 
marked re-direction of funds from a variety of Muslim community organisations, 
including secularists such as Udichi Shilpi Ghoshthi, to those with ties to IFE.125 
These included Blyda and Elite Youth, which were closely linked to IFE in sharing 
numerous trustees and staff. Under Ali’s leadership, the council decided to hand 
over its entire youth service for the west of the borough to a consortium in which 
Blyda and Elite Youth were to play a key role. Gilligan’s reporting on these matters 
helped prompt Ali’s resignation in March 2010. 
Rahman too channelled millions of pounds into sympathetic groups, including ‘IFE 
front organizations’. Gilligan reports that ‘there was a clear diversion of funding 
away from secular bodies serving the whole community to faith-based or religious 
groups serving only sections of the community’.126 Whilst Muslims make up only 
34.5% of the borough’s population, Muslim organisations received £858,500 (70%) 
of the £1,235,000 grants for community and economic engagement, and £334,500 
(64%) of the £526,000 grants for children, schools and families. A similar pattern 
was evident in the allocation of grants for a community faith buildings support 
scheme, study support schemes, mother tongue classes, youth and career advice 
services, and lifelong learning. Throughout his mayorship, Rahman never appointed 
one non-Muslim to a cabinet post, despite Muslims being a minority in the borough. 
According to Gilligan, Rahman was ‘hostile or indifferent’ to the non-Muslim 
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heritage of the borough, one example being the attempted sell-off of the local 
history library, which was prevented by a backlash of protest.127 
The beneficiaries of Rahman’s Muslim favouritism—what Home Secretary Theresa 
May has referred to as ‘divisive community politics’—included a number of ‘IFE 
fronts’ including the Osmani Trust.128 Created from the merging of Blyda and Elite 
Youth, the Osmani Trust runs weekend schools, organises workshops in primary 
schools and works to ‘help young people into education’.129 Through this work, 
however, it likely that government money has helped pay for the dissemination of a 
worldview and moral values in young Muslims that clashes with Britain’s liberal 
democratic culture. One of the managers at the trust, Muhammad Rabbani, trained 
recruits for IFE, informing them: 
Our goal is not simply to invite people and give da’wah [the call to Islam]. Our goal 
is to create the True Believer, to then mobilise those believers into an organised force 
for change who will carry out da’wah, hisbah [enforcement of Islamic morality] and 
jihad [struggle for Islam].130  
He added that this will lead to ‘social change and iqamatud-deen’, which is 
translated by Jama’at-i-Islami as the ‘Islamization of life’.131 Rabbani now leads 
CAGE, an organisation that campaigns for Muslim prisoners, including convicted 
terrorists, and espouses the view that Islam is under attack in Britain. 
Another IFE-related beneficiary of Rahman’s largesse was the London Muslim 
Centre, which is closely linked to the East London Mosque (ELM) and serves as 
IFE’s base. The centre and mosque has a documented history of promoting speakers 
who espouse a vision of the world and ethical values antithetical to liberal 
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democracy and universal human rights.132 These include Anwar al-Awlaki, al-
Qaeda’s late chief ideologue, alleged to have mentored the Fort Hood jihadist, Nidal 
Hasan, and the Detroit Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.133 Al-Awlaki 
espoused the view that the goal of Islamic jihad is not just victory in Palestine, Iraq, 
or Afghanistan, but the collapse of the ‘system of kufr [unbelief] with global 
reach’.134 Other speakers include Bilal Philips, an unindicted co-conspirator in the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, who advocates death for homosexuals and 
‘defends child marriages, wife beating, polygamy and killing apostates’;135 Abdullah 
Hasan, an IFE activist who praises Osama bin Laden and describes Jews as ‘devil-
worshippers’;136 Murtaza Khan, a primary school teacher and a keen advocate of the 
shari’a, including the punishment of stoning to death for adulterers;137 and Abdul 
Rahman al-Sudais, a Saudi cleric who believes Muslims are locked in ‘a war of 
faith, identity and existence’ with Jews, who he describes as the ‘worst of 
mankind’.138  
The supremacy of Muslim over non-Muslim culture, misogyny, homophobia and 
antisemitism have been recurrent themes in many of the sermons of these and other 
speakers at ELM, which is intimately connected to IFE through overlapping trustees 
and staff. In March 2015 the Home Secretary Theresa May noted these as serious 
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concerns across Tower Hamlets, the only borough referred to by name in her speech 
that made explicit the government’s new thinking on extremism.139 Dean Godson of 
the think tank Policy Exchange describes IFE as ‘a key ideological influence in 
Tower Hamlets’.140 Without further research, however, it is difficult to ascertain the 
impact of IFE’s political influence in the council upon local Muslim attitudes. But it 
is less problematic to observe both IFE’s entryism into council politics and a 
conflict of vision and values that its activists and associates have often expressed.  
This conflict is apparent in some of the borough’s schools, including the London 
East Academy, which is managed by ELM. The school was warned by Education 
Secretary Nicky Morgan in November 2014, along with five other Muslim private 
schools in Tower Hamlets, to make urgent changes or face closure.141 She claimed 
the schools were ‘failing to prepare children for life in modern Britain’. This came 
in the wake of Ofsted chief Sir Michael Wilshaw’s report, following unannounced 
inspections, that pupils were ‘vulnerable to extremist influences and 
radicalisation’.142 This was borne out in March 2015, when it was reported that 
Zubair Nur, a graduate of the London East Academy, had joined the Islamic 
State.143 
2. Education and arbitration: 
A clash of values within Muslim communities 
Within Muslim communities, education and arbitration are two key fields of 
contention  where a conflict with Britain’s liberal democratic values, championed by 
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the state, can be observed. In the classrooms of Muslim schools and in the court 
rooms of shari’a councils, a worldview and associated set of values are being taught 
or implemented that conflict with liberal democracy and human rights legislation.  
The British government recognises these two domains, in addition to universities 
and prisons, as problematic in the fight against ‘extremism’. In a speech in March 
2015, Home Secretary Theresa May identified the ‘Trojan Horse plot’ in 
Birmingham schools as an example of how ‘extremists use entryist tactics to 
infiltrate legitimate organisations to promote their own agendas’.144 She also singled 
out shari’a councils’ use of shari’a law to discriminate against women as an 
example of the rejection of ‘British values’. To address these two issues, she 
announced that the newly formed Extremism Analysis Unit in the Home Office will 
develop a counter-entryist strategy for ‘government, the public sector and civil 
society as a whole’, and commission a independent investigation into ‘the 
application of Shari’a law in England and Wales’.145 The government’s Counter-
Extremism Strategy, published in October 2015, reiterates this dual commitment.146 
This section of the chapter details this conflict of values in these two key fields of 
contention where Muslims’ lives are being directly affected. It shows how a key 
stake in this conflict is the authority to legitimise competing visions of an ideal 
society and the values associated with it, both in the minds and institutions of British 
Muslims. 
2.1. Muslim schools: influencing Muslim minds 
According to Michael Whine, of all the campaigning issues of concern for Islamist 
groups in Britain, the education of Muslim children is the most important.147 For 
such groups, schooling is seen as the most effective way of inculcating religious 
belief and safeguarding Muslim identity against the pernicious influences of 
Britain’s decadent, secular society. There have been numerous reports in recent 
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years demonstrating this. They show that in some British Muslim schools a 
worldview and set of values antagonistic to liberal democracy is being propagated. 
For example, John Ware reported in November 2010 that some 40 British Muslim 
schools are teaching the Wahhabi-Islamist curriculum of Saudi Arabia to around 
5,000 children.148 He showed how young Muslim children are being taught to regard 
Britain as an enemy of Islam and to hate non-Muslims, especially Jews about whom 
these children are taught conspiracy as fact, and homosexuals for whom the death 
penalty is taught in accordance with the shari’a. For Andrew Gilligan and other 
observers, the spread of illiberal and anti-integrationist ideology in Muslim schools 
is ‘the single most worrying aspect of Islamist and radical activity in Britain’.149  
This part of the chapter does not consider the influence of Wahhabi Islam in 
Britain’s schools, but limits its focus to individuals and groups within the revivalist 
network and their role in a clash of values in the field of education. It first regards 
the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, what Sam Westrop refers to as ‘a concerted 
attempt by Islamist groups to infiltrate and Islamize British schools’.150 It then 
details how this may be viewed as part of a long-term strategy within a wider 
network of Islamic activists to ‘Islamise knowledge’ for a global Islamic revival. 
The Trojan Horse Affair 
In November 2013, a document was sent anonymously to Birmingham City Council 
describing a strategy it alleged was being implemented for the take-over of a 
number of schools and their governance according to ‘strict Islamic principles’. The 
strategy involved identifying target schools in predominately Muslim areas, 
selecting groups of ‘Salafi’ parents to join governing bodies, identifying key staff to 
‘disrupt’ schools from within, and removing non-Muslim teachers from positions of 
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influence. The information contained in the document, which had no addressee and 
no signature, demonstrated a detailed knowledge of events in certain schools. The 
document came to be known as the Trojan Horse letter. After receiving the letter 
from the Home Office, the Department for Education instigated an investigation into 
the schools of concern to understand the implications for the school system in 
Birmingham and more widely. Former deputy assistant police commissioner, Peter 
Clarke, was appointed to the task, whilst Birmingham City Council began its own 
investigation headed by Ian Kershaw. By June 2014, five of the schools were placed 
in special measures. 
Clarke’s report concluded there had been ‘co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained 
action’ by a number of individuals to introduce an ‘intolerant and aggressive Islamic 
ethos’ into a number of Birmingham schools.151 This had been achieved, he wrote, 
by such individuals gaining influence on the governing bodies, installing 
sympathetic head teachers and senior staff, appointing like-minded people to key 
positions and removing heads who were not compliant with their religiously-
inspired agenda. There is clear evidence, he asserted, that ‘there are a number of 
people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and 
governing bodies, who espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist views’.152 
Clarke identified a ‘disconcerting pattern reaching across a number of schools’, 
which included ‘the reinforcement of Muslim identity to the exclusion and 
disparagement of others’, ‘the introduction of conservative Islamic practices into 
school life’, and changes in the curriculum by governing bodies taken over by ‘like-
minded’ people.153 The agenda that Clarke found being pursued, however, went 
beyond mere religious conservatism, and was clearly in conflict with the liberal 
democratic vision and associated values of universal human rights: 
In the context of schooling, it manifests itself as the imposition of an aggressively 
separatist and intolerant agenda, incompatible with full participation in a plural, 
secular democracy. Rejecting not only the secular and other religions, but also other 
strands of Islamic belief, it goes beyond the kind of social conservatism practised in 
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some faith schools which may be consistent with universal human rights and 
respectful of other communities. It appears to be a deliberate attempt to convert 
secular state schools into exclusive faith schools in all but name.154 
In March 2015, the House of Commons Education Committee produced its own 
report into the Trojan Horse affair. The report asserted, ‘All our witnesses also 
accepted that they had found no evidence of extremism in schools’.155 This is 
incorrect, however. Although Clarke—a key witness—reported no evidence of 
‘terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism’, he reported clear evidence of ‘a 
number of people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in 
schools and governing bodies, who espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist 
views’.156 Supposedly supporting its claim, the committee report cited Education 
Secretary Nicky Morgan’s admission to the House of Commons in July 2014 that 
there had been ‘no evidence of direct radicalisation or violent extremism’. Yet, 
whilst conceding that there was no evidence of children becoming radicalised or of 
violence being promoted, she added that ‘there is a clear account in the [Clarke] 
report of people in positions of influence in these schools, who have a restricted and 
narrow interpretation of their faith, not promoting British values and failing to 
challenge the extremist views of others’.157 
The report also cites Ofsted chief, Michael Wilshaw, who stated: ‘We did not see 
extremism in schools. What we did see was the promotion of a culture that would, if 
that culture continued, have made the children in those schools vulnerable to 
extremism because of … the disconnection from wider society and cultural 
isolation’.158 Thus, claims the committee report, whilst the promotion of a culture 
that may lead to extremism was evident in some schools, extremism itself was not. 
This is a curious distinction for it places extremism at the far end of a sequence in 
which cultural disconnection, and prior to that the promotion of such disconnection, 
precedes it: The assumption is that practices that express a disconnection from 
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British mainstream culture do not constitute extremism, and neither does the 
advocacy of such practices.  
However, this is not consistent with the government’s view that extremism is not 
confined to violent acts but includes the ‘vocal or active opposition’ to the values 
that underpin British society, as first articulated in the revised Prevent counter-
radicalisation strategy in 2011.159 Such values, it says, include ‘the mutual respect 
and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.160 And yet Wilshaw himself has 
criticised Birmingham City Council for its ‘failure to support schools in their efforts 
to keep pupils safe from the risk of extremism’, noting that in some schools 
‘children are not being encouraged to develop tolerant attitudes to other faiths and 
other cultures’.161 As Morgan remarked, ‘Teachers have said they fear children are 
learning to be intolerant of difference and diversity’.162 Wilshaw also noted that 
boys and girls are being treated unequally and that in one school, an extremist 
preacher was invited to address schoolchildren. 
Other behaviours equally interpretable as extremist according to the government’s 
thinking have been observed at Trojan Horse schools—none of which are 
designated as faith schools—as documented by Peter Clarke. These include the 
teaching, in sex and relationships education (SRE) lessons, that rape is permissible 
in marriage; the alteration of the curriculum along Islamic lines prohibiting music, 
drama and the figurative arts; the banning of Christmas, Easter and Diwali 
celebrations; and misogynistic attitudes towards women expressed in the lack of 
training opportunities and promotion, as well as disparaging comments by teachers 
and governors. Attitudes expressed by senior staff, stemming from ‘a shared 
ideological basis to their faith’, espoused anti-Western and homophobic views; 
divided the world between ‘us’ (Muslims) and ‘them’ (non-Muslims or Muslims 
who disagree); and perceived ‘a worldwide conspiracy’ against Islam.163 Whether 
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these behaviours and attitudes constitute ‘extremism’ may be debated between 
supporters of the government’s position and others who dissent from it. In any case, 
they certainly indicate a conflict of vision and values with the British liberal 
democratic mainstream.  
Such a conflict also involves the authority to legitimise competing visions of an 
ideal society and the values associated with it. The governance and management of 
schools is the ideal battleground for such authority. The education committee’s 
report, however, seems to obfuscate this. It states, ‘we have seen no evidence to 
support claims of an organised plot to take over English schools’.164 Upon the 
publication of this report in March 2015, and leaning heavily upon its conclusions, 
the BBC incorrectly stated that a ‘series of official investigations’ found as 
‘groundless’ claims that ‘extremists had tried to take over several schools in 
Birmingham to advance radical interpretations of Islam’.165 These assertions have 
been taken by certain groups in the revivalist network in Britain to declare that there 
has been no collectively organised effort to Islamise schools in Birmingham. For 
example, Islam21c, a project of the Muslim Research and Development 
Foundation,166 stated, ‘there was no evidence of any “radical” or “extremist” 
plot’.167 MEND similarly stated that ‘the “plot” has been declared a sham idea’.168  
But both the committee’s report and the BBC have ignored what Morgan recognised 
in Clarke’s report as ‘compelling evidence of a determined effort by people with a 
shared ideology to gain control of the governing bodies of a small number of 
schools in Birmingham’ and introduce within them ‘the segregationist attitudes and 
practices of a hardline and politicised strand of Sunni Islam’.169 This effort, Clarke 
reported, has been ‘co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained’ by a network of 
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individuals.170 ‘The tactics used,’ he wrote, ‘are too similar, the individuals 
concerned too closely linked’ and their behaviour ‘too orchestrated for there not to 
be a degree of co-ordination and organisation behind what has happened’.171 
Wilshaw also acknowledged the reports of numerous head teachers ‘that here has 
been an organised campaign to target certain schools in Birmingham in order to 
impose a narrow faith-based ideology and alter the school's character and ethos’.172 
The Telegraph conducted its own inquiry into the controversy and concluded, 
similarly to Clarke, that ‘there is indeed an organised group of Muslim teachers, 
education consultants, school governors and activists dedicated to furthering what 
one of them describes as an “Islamising agenda” in Birmingham’s schools’.173  
According to Clarke, ‘At the centre of what has happened are a number of 
individuals who have been, or are, associated with either Park View School or the 
Park View Educational Trust’ (PVET), the latter of which he described as ‘the 
incubator for much of what has happened and the attitudes and behaviours that have 
driven it’. The most important of these individuals is Tahir Alam who, until his 
resignation in July 2014, was the director and chair of the trust. In this role, Alam 
was responsible for the management of three schools at the centre of the Trojan 
Horse affair, including Park View, which ‘appeared to act as a blueprint for [other 
schools], exhibiting all the behaviours which cause concern’.174  
Alam—which the Trojan Horse letter describes as having ‘fine-tuned the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ [operation] so that it is totally invisible to the naked eye and allows us to 
operate under the radar’—is also linked to MCB.175 He was the organisation’s 
assistant secretary general between 2006 and 2008 and the chair of its education 
committee during the same period. He co-authored MCB’s 2007 paper, Meeting the 
Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools, which critics have described as a blueprint 
for the Islamisation of British schools. Alam was also an executive committee 
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member of AMS-UK. Furthermore, as The Sunday Times revealed, Alam was ‘the 
leader of HISAM, an organisation which believed in imposing Islamic law and 
promoting gender segregation’.176 In September 2015, Education Secretary Morgan 
banned Alam from having any involvement with schools. The barring decision was 
made on the grounds that he had been involved in activities aimed at ‘undermining 
fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and 
mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’.177 
Alam’s successor as chair of the board of directors and governors at Park View 
School, Waheed Saleem, also has links to Islamic groups who seem to share views 
and values that conflict with Britain’s liberal democratic culture. Saleem was 
banned from holding public office for a year after leaking commercially sensitive 
information to the Abu Bakr Trust about a bid in a tender process for a council 
property. The Abu Bakr Trust, as The Birmingham Mail reported, ‘adheres to the 
strict Salafi version of Islam and also runs a mosque and schools in Walsall’.178 It 
has embraced figures many consider radical, such as Muhammad Taqi Usmani.  
Speaking at the trust as recently as November 2014, and echoing the sentiments of 
Hewitt and Mukadam, Usmani told the audience that, ‘looking at the flood of 
disbelief and the threat of atheism, it is clear there is so much still to be done in 
order to save our children from going astray’.179 Usmani is also an unapologetic 
advocate of the global supremacy of Islam and, under the right conditions, of 
offensive jihad against non-Muslims towards this end. In an interview with The 
Times in 2007, Usmani asserted that ‘Muslims should live peacefully in countries 
such as Britain, where they have the freedom to practise Islam, only until they gain 
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enough power to engage in battle’.180 It should be noted that Usmani is part of the 
revivalist network in Britain through his connections with the Islamic Foundation. 
In 2006, Usmani led the ‘first Shariah Finance Course in the UK’ hosted by the 
Islamic Foundation, which lauded him as an ‘eminent scholar’.181 
Alam and MCB have both maintained that the Trojan Horse letter is a hoax and 
deny the existence of a plot. However, as Clarke wrote in his report, whether the 
letter is a hoax ‘misses the point. The important issue is not who wrote it or whether 
it is a genuine extract from a letter between co-conspirators, but whether the events 
and behaviours have actually happened’.182 He noted that ‘the behaviour described 
in the “Trojan Horse” letter has been seen at a number of schools over a long period 
of time and particularly more recently’, and that allegations about a plot to Islamise 
schools pre-existed the letter.183  
MCB has stated that failures in governance and procedures do not equate to a 
‘khalifate-takeover’.184 The implicit distinction drawn here between bad governance 
and the promotion of an extremist religious agenda in schools is supported by the 
education committee report, which states that the Trojan Horse affair ‘is less about 
extremism than about governance’.185 But this is a contrived distinction that doesn’t 
acknowledge the religious motivations behind the numerous cases of governance 
malpractice or the religious basis of the behaviour and attitudes documented that 
clearly clash with Britain’s liberal democratic, human rights-based culture. 
This clash of values is inextricable from clashing perceptions regarding the social 
order and humanity’s place within the universe, as well as the nature of truth, 
knowledge and morality. Such clashing perceptions inevitably relate to how the 
Trojan Horse affair itself is understood. MCB’s response to it—that it is a 
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fabrication that amounts to an Islamophobic attack—indeed exhibits signs of 
cognitive dissonance, but also demonstrates that it is involved in a conflict over the 
authority to establish a way of seeing social and political reality. This is most 
apparent in its denial of the government’s authority to pronounce on matters relating 
to Islam. In an effort to control the language and conceptualisation of the matters at 
hand, MCB stated: 
We are however concerned about the phrase ‘particular strand of Sunni Islam’: given 
how diverse our Muslim communities are, it is unwise for any of us to pass 
judgement on the acceptability of certain strands of Islam over others. It is not for the 
state to define the theological boundaries of the Islamic faith and to create an 
‘approved version of Islam’. Such an aim is contrary to the spirit of our free society 
and beyond the scope of debate on education of children in school. We are troubled 
that Mr Clarke delves into intricacies of Muslim theological debate raising serious 
allegations against a number of national Muslim organisations including the MCB.186 
It should be noted that Clarke’s report was not representative of the state’s view and 
made no judgement of what constitutes authentic from inauthentic Islam, merely 
noting that an understanding of Islam implicitly or explicitly informed much of the 
thinking behind the actions and attitudes he observed. MCB, assuming for itself the 
symbolic authority to determine the religious nature of what Clarke had seen, passed 
off such behaviour as mere religious conservatism rather than an ‘ideology and 
agenda to “Islamise” secular schools’.187 This may be a deliberate attempt to conceal 
the truth but, regardless, it reflects a conflict of vision with the state, in trying to 
impose an understanding that certain actions and attitudes belong within the 
acceptable limits of the social and political order, and are not thus ‘extremist’ or 
subversive. This clash of perceptual schemas—in which, for example, the nature of 
education or the role of men and women means something quite different—escapes 
the government’s definition of extremism. But such a clash is what underlies the 
‘vocal or active’ undermining of values that extremism is defined by. 
The government’s response to the Trojan Horse affair, despite the education 
committee’s report, demonstrates an explicitly-held understanding that it is involved 
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in a conflict of values. The most wide-reaching of all new measures taken by the 
Department of Education is the active promotion of ‘British values’ in maintained 
schools, academies and nurseries. Morgan has stated that ‘actions which undermine 
fundamental British values should be viewed as misconduct’ resulting in teachers 
being ‘barred from the profession’.188 Implicit to the values the government 
struggles to articulate and defend, however, is a way of seeing the world, a cognitive 
framework comprised of a set of unquestioned assumptions, including those that 
relate to human nature, political organisation and scientific knowledge. 
The Islamisation of knowledge 
The Trojan Horse affair may be viewed as part of a global Islamic revivalist 
phenomenon that contests the Western, liberal democratic understanding of the role 
of education. Clarke argued that the Trojan Horse agenda ‘appears to stem from an 
international movement to increase the role of Islam in education’, supported by 
AMS-UK and the International Board of Educational Research and Resources 
(IBERR), both of which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as 
MCB. ‘The movement,’ he stated, ‘provides practical advice and religious 
legitimisation to those who, in the words of the IBERR, seek to “Islamise the 
provision of educational services”’.189 Clarke did not elaborate on this point, but it is 
worth doing so, since the actions and attitudes he observed in Birmingham indeed 
have historical origins and national, as well as global, dimensions. 
As noted, MCB produced a paper in 2007 entitled, Meeting the Needs of Muslim 
Pupils in State Schools.190 Co-authored by Alam, this document advocates what may 
be described as the voluntary Islamisation of education in British schools. It 
proposes that Muslim pupils ought to be separated from their non‐Muslim peers in 
numerous areas of the curriculum. It also advocates that schools adjust numerous 
classes according to Islamic principles—including music, dance, drama, art, sports, 
and sex education—or grant Muslim parents the right to withdraw their children 
from them. Religious education, the report urges, ought to include greater attention 
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to Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Remarkably, the report states that the 
adoption of a policy where religion is treated as a private matter ‘makes it more 
difficult for schools to appreciate and respond positively to meeting some of the 
distinctive spiritual, moral, social and cultural needs of Muslim children’.191 It 
appears that the provision of special arrangements in schools are proposed not 
merely to meet the allegedly distinct needs of Muslim children—which MCB treats 
homogeneously—but to inculcate such needs. 
MCB’s paper recommends for schools a book, Islam: Beliefs and Teachings, by the 
director of the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), Ghulam Sarwar. This book 
describes Islam as a code of conduct for ‘personal and private affairs, including 
social, political, economic, moral and spiritual activities’.192 As noted earlier, it 
praises Jama’at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood for working to establish a 
global Islamic state, condones polygamy, and states that men and women have 
different roles in society due to their different natures. Sarwar believes Islamic 
education ought to be ‘an integral part of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as 
an all-encompassing way of life’.193  
In 2004, MET published a paper, ‘A Programme for Muslim Education in a Non-
Muslim Society’, by Sahib Mustaqim Bleher.194 This states that critical thinking can 
occur ‘only on the basis of knowledge from the original sources’, namely the Qur’an 
and Muhammad’s sunna.195 Bleher describes Islamic education as a tool to secure 
the permanence of the Muslim community in a non-Muslim environment. What is 
needed, he states, ‘is much more of an Islamic socialisation process, rather than 
simply Islamic teaching’.196 This theme was echoed at a European conference 
convened by the AMS-UK in 2002 by Musharraf Hussain, who asserted, ‘The 
raison d’être of Muslim schools is vigorously stated by its founders as follows: to 
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prevent the assimilation of the new generation’.197 The problem identified by 
Hussain was the secular National Curriculum that is compulsory for all schools 
including Muslim ones. His proposed course of action is to embed the National 
Curriculum within an ‘Islamic milieu’ by instilling an Islamic ethos in schools, and 
then by gradually working to Islamise its contents.198 This approach is strikingly 
similar to what Clarke observed in Birmingham schools.  
This concept of Islamic education, which elevates the Muslim social collective 
above the Muslim individual, conflicts with the liberal democratic principle of 
individual liberty by devaluing the independence of mind and inhibiting the spirit of 
rational inquiry. It is based upon orthodox Islamic precepts. J. Mark Halstead, who 
has written at length about Islamic education, observes that, ‘Independence of 
thought and personal autonomy do not enter into the Muslim thinking about 
education, which is more concerned with the progressive initiation of pupils into the 
received truths of the faith’.199 Islamic education, he affirms, is a vehicle for helping 
children become fulfilled adults, but such fulfilment hinges upon a particularly 
Islamic notion of human nature in which humanity is geared towards the ‘realization 
on earth of divinely ordained moral imperatives’.200 
The Islamisation of education can be understood as a cultural and political strategy, 
employed within the arc of the global Islamic revivalist movement, to dissolve the 
separation of the secular and religious spheres of human society, by subordinating 
rational inquiry and the pursuit of scientific knowledge in schools to the dogma of 
divine revelation. Halstead describes it as ‘a key process in countering the influence 
of western secularism and purging Muslim institutions of insidious western 
influences’.201 This is borne out by the attitudes expressed by key individuals in the 
revivalist network in Britain, including Ibrahim Hewitt, Ghulam Sarwar and 
Mohamed Mukadam. This strategy as it applies in Britain and the West more 
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generally is decades old and can be traced back to the First World Conference on 
Muslim Education held in Mecca in 1977.  
The conference statement affirmed as the ‘ultimate aim of Muslim Education’ the 
‘complete submission to Allah on the level of the individual, the community and 
humanity at large’.202 This aim appears verbatim in the mission statement of one of 
the first Muslim schools to receive state funding in Britain, the Islamia Primary 
School, founded in 1983 by Yusuf Islam. IBERR, also established by Islam, 
describes its origins in the late 1990s as ‘the natural outcome of the deliberations of 
a core group of Muslim educationalists committed to implementing the aims and 
objectives’ of the 1977 Mecca conference.203 Attended by over 300 scholars and 
statesmen, this conference convened to address a perceived crisis facing the umma 
relating to the encroachment of Western, secular values in education upon Muslims 
in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. One of the speakers, S. N. al-
Attas, asserted that the ‘confusion and error’ in knowledge resulting from the 
detachment of education from Qur’anic principles and Muhammad’s sunna, was the 
ultimate cause of the difficulties experienced by contemporary Muslim 
communities.204 This had to be addressed, he declared, by a global programme 
dedicated to ‘the Islamization of knowledge’.  
The Islamisation of knowledge was a key theme taken up in the writings of Ismail 
Raji al-Faruqi, who ‘saw no hope for the revival of the umma unless the dualism in 
Muslim education that separates Islamic and secular aspects be abolished once and 
for all’.205 In 1981, al-Faruqi founded the International Institute of Islamic Thought 
(IIIT) in the U.S. in order to advance the Islamisation of knowledge project. Ian 
Johnson informs us that IIIT was initiated at a meeting in Lugano, Switzerland, also 
held in 1977, which brought together a much smaller number of Muslim leaders 
from around the world, including al-Faruqi, to lay the foundations for a Islamic 
revivalist network in Europe and the U.S.206 IIIT has an office in London. Although 
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it is not involved in children’s education in Britain, it sees its work as contributing 
to the revival of Islamic knowledge and the Muslim umma. By supporting research 
projects, organising academic conferences and publishing scholarly works, it seeks 
to contribute to the reform of Islamic thought and ‘help Muslims regain their 
intellectual and cultural identity’.207  
The Islamisation of knowledge project, despite its official conception at the Mecca 
conference and further formalisation in the work of IIIT, appears to have developed 
informally, without centralised coordination, in several directions. In Britain, whilst 
the key concern of IIIT-UK is the academic reflection upon the key concepts and 
methods for a revival of Islamic thought, the practical work of promoting Islamic 
knowledge is the focus of numerous other organisations, linked within the revivalist 
network, including MET, AMS-UK, IBERR and the Nida Trust. The outcome of 
their work within schools appears to have engendered a conflict with the very liberal 
democratic culture which has enabled them to operate.  
This conflict has manifested in Tower Hamlets. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
Michael Wilshaw, the head of Ofsted, recently noted that hundreds of children in six 
of the borough’s private Islamic schools are at risk of ‘extremist influences and 
radicalisation’.208 In an advice note to Education Secretary Nicky Morgan in 
November 2014, he wrote, ‘All schools focused intensively on developing Islamic 
knowledge and understanding at the expense of other important areas of the 
curriculum’. Wilshaw noted that all the schools had failed ‘to provide an 
appropriately broad and balanced curriculum’. Consistent with MCB’s paper on the 
needs of Muslim pupils, music, art and drama were rarely taught. In all six schools, 
he warned, ‘pupils’ physical and educational welfare is at serious risk’. Despite this, 
Muhammad Abdul Bari—the founding chairman of IFE and the former chair of the 
borough’s East London Mosque—describes Islamic knowledge as the ‘antidote to 
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extremism’.209 Such knowledge, if taught properly, he insists, ‘increases belief in 
human goodness, patience and wisdom, and a belief in God's mercy’. 
2.2.  Shari’a councils 
Shari’a courts have been operating unofficially in Britain since the 1980s, but the 
first recorded demand for the introduction of Islamic law into the domestic legal 
structure for British Muslims came from the Union of Muslim Organisations and the 
UK and Eire in 1975 in a petition to Parliament.210 Officially, they have been 
operating since August 2007 as Muslim Arbitration Tribunals (MATs) under the 
1996 Arbitration Act.211 What sparked the media’s interest in these courts in 2008, 
and brought to light some of the pertinent issues raised by them, was their public 
endorsement by Rowan Williams, then Archbishop of Canterbury. Williams said 
that it was a fact that aspects of the shari’a were already being implemented in 
Britain and that the formal incorporation of the shari’a ‘seems unavoidable’.212 
Shari’a courts in Britain are of two types. Firstly, are the MAT courts whose rulings 
are legally enforceable under the Arbitration Act on certain conditions. Their 
judgements must not contravene British law and all parties must agree voluntarily to 
have their disputes arbitrated by them. Since criminal issues cannot be dealt with by 
any tribunal under the Act, these courts deal mostly with family matters, such as 
Islamic marriages, as well as mosque and commercial disputes. Operating under the 
Act since August 2007, initial reports stated that there were five such courts, in 
London, Birmingham, Bradford, Nuneaton and Manchester.  
The London court is run by the Islamic Sharia Council, headed by Suhaib Hasan and 
Maulana Abu Sayeed, who are both networked with Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s European 
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Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR). The council has sought charitable status 
for a national federation of shari’a councils, the UK Board of Sharia Councils, 
which is designed to serve as ‘a representative and supervisory body of individual 
Sharia Councils’ that will look to it ‘for advice and expertise in matters of Sharia 
law’.213 Abu Sayyed describes a key function of the federation as providing ‘a 
common formula and set of principles’ which local shari’a councils must adhere to 
in dispensing verdicts.214 This is considered as achievement since, although there 
isn’t much variation across councils, ‘some aren’t as strict as we are’. Via this 
federation, shari’a councils across the country are now networked to ECFR, which 
provides guidance on the application of shari’a more widely across Europe.215 
Constituting the second type of shari’a court are the more numerous unofficial 
courts littered around the country that, according to British law, can at most provide 
mediation, not arbitration, where an agreement, rather than a legal judgement, can 
be made.216 Denis MacEoin, in his report for the think tank Civitas, Sharia Law or 
‘One Law for All’?, claimed that there are at least 85 shari’a courts, including both 
types, in Britain.217  
Both kinds of courts are supported by MCB. According to Ibrahim Mogra, MCB 
does not have a formal role to issue religious edicts, but it does ‘signpost people to 
shari’a councils and shari’a bodies and the like’.218 However, there are four main 
issues with these courts that demonstrate a conflict with liberal democratic 
principles, including, most prominently, equality of all under the law. Underlying all 
of these is a conception of shari’a as a complete legal and ethical system, applicable 
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to all aspects of human existence, which is superior to ‘man-made’ law and destined 
to replace it in the long-term.219 
Firstly, shari’a courts are providing discriminatory verdicts on disputes that would 
not be supported in the civil courts. Such disputes include those relating to 
inheritance. Under the shari’a, women are discriminated against since they are 
entitled to just half of what their male siblings are able to inherit. Suhaib Hasan says 
his court does not get involved in the division of property after separation.220 But in 
September 2008, it was reported that the Nuneaton court had ruled in exactly this 
way, dividing the estate of a Midlands man between three daughters and two 
sons.221 In theory, the rulings of shari’a courts must be enforceable in English civil 
courts, but the civil courts are unlikely to support a ruling in an inheritance dispute 
on the discriminatory basis of the shari’a. The likely reason that shari’a courts can 
make these rulings in practice is because they are rarely sent to civil courts for 
enforcement.  
Secondly, shari’a courts are issuing rulings on areas that lie outside their legal 
remit. These include criminal matters, such as domestic violence and assault.222 In 
2007, for example, a stabbing case involving Somalian youths was apparently 
decided upon by an unofficial shari’a court in Woolwich, southeast London.223 
Cases of domestic violence have also apparently been settled without justice being 
served to women in England’s criminal courts.224 Divorce and child custody are also 
specifically excluded under the Arbitration Act, since under English law the best 
‘interests of the child’ must be ensured in such cases and, accordingly, decisions in 
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these areas are the legal domain of the civil Family Courts.225 But both MAT courts 
and the many more unofficial shari’a courts are issuing legal judgements in these 
areas. Divorce possibly constitutes the vast majority of the cases handled by the 
network of MAT courts.226 Yet, whereas for a Muslim man a divorce is automatic, 
for a Muslim woman complicated legal procedures are required with no guarantee 
of divorce. The Islamic Sharia Council makes clear that Islamic divorce is the right 
of a man, but available to a woman only with her husband’s permission.227 
The third problematic aspect of shari’a courts in Britain is the likely coercion of 
Muslim women to use such courts. The director of the UK-based think-tank Civitas, 
David Green, claims that ‘there is a good deal of intimidation of women in Muslim 
communities’, which prevent us from safely assuming that women use shari’a 
courts on a genuinely voluntary basis.228 The prospects and reality of coercion are 
testified by the One Law for All Campaign, which reported that ‘women are often 
pressured by their families into going to these courts and adhering to unfair 
decisions and may lack knowledge of English and their rights under British law’.229 
The refusal to settle a dispute in a shari’a court, it warned, can lead to threats, 
intimidation and ostracisation. There have also been reports of Muslim clerics’ 
willingness ‘to conduct sharia marriages involving child brides as young as 12’.230 
In 2012, The Times reported that, ‘Almost one in seven of the estimated 8,000 
forced marriages of Britons each year are believed to involve girls of 15 or under’. 
The fourth troubling aspect of these courts is the risk of the creation of parallel legal 
systems and societies, divided along Muslim and non-Muslim lines. The possible 
retort that shari’a courts’ rulings, in theory, have to be consistent with British law 
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does not begin to address the problem that, in practice, rulings are issued that 
directly contravene basic human rights, and in most cases such rulings are not 
referred to secular courts for formal legal sanction. It is simply not in the interests of 
any shari’a court to seek approval within the English legal system to uphold a ruling 
when it is unlikely to be approved under English law. This is especially so when 
‘man-made’ law is conceived as inferior to shari’a, as made explicit by Sheikh 
Maulana Abu Sayeed, president of the Islamic Sharia Council, and Ahmad 
Thomson, the founder of the Association of Muslim Lawyers, who states that the 
demise of ‘man-made’ law is inevitable.231 
The dichotomy in English legal system that is opened up by the presence of a 
network of shari’a courts and tribunals is strikingly illustrated by the starkly 
different conceptions of crime in English secular law and the shari’a. What is 
clearly a criminal matter under English law is, in certain important instances, not 
considered so from a shari’a perspective. Rape is a key case in point. Demonstrating 
a point of view that clearly conflicts with a liberal democratic, human rights 
perspective, Abu Sayeed states that rape is impossible in marriage: ‘In Islamic 
sharia’, he affirms, ‘rape is adultery by force. So long as the woman is his wife, it 
cannot be termed as rape’.232 Haitham al-Haddad, a judge at the Islamic Sharia 
Council, shares this view, referring to such an act as ‘so-called rape against your 
wife’, bemoaning the prison sentence against a husband who rapes his wife as an 
infringement upon his liberty.233 
This is not just their shared personal view. It is based on shari’a precepts.234 It has 
also appeared in edicts issued from online fatwa services.235 Although the number of 
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rape cases seen by shari’a courts may be small, this view of the legal status of rape 
is likely to ensure that justice for some Muslim women will never obtained in 
English courts. The issue here is that these cases will be dealt with as non-criminal 
matters in shari’a courts. One of the fundamental conditions upon which shari’a 
courts have obtained their approval in England—that they will not handle criminal 
matters—rests upon a shared understanding of what constitutes a crime, yet this is 
lacking on a key area where women’s human rights are concerned. 
Notwithstanding the shari’a’s inhumane penal code—which can include the death 
penalty for apostasy, homosexuality and adultery, amputation for theft, and flogging 
for a range of other offences—its civil code is comprised of numerous tenets that 
contravene basic human rights. The One Law for All Campaign, pioneered by 
Maryam Namazie in response to the discriminatory nature of shari’a courts in 
Britain, provides sufficient examples: 
Under Sharia law’s civil code, a woman’s testimony is worth half that of a man’s; a 
woman’s marriage contract is between her male guardian and her husband and a 
Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-Muslim. A man can have four wives 
and divorce his wife by simple repudiation, whereas a woman must give justifications 
for requesting a divorce, some of which are extremely difficult to prove. Child 
custody reverts to the father at a preset age, even if the father is abusive; women who 
remarry lose custody of their children even if the child has not reached the preset age; 
and sons are entitled to inherit twice the share of daughters.236 
Furthermore, according to orthodox interpretations of the shari’a, a Muslim cannot 
renounce Islam without facing the prospect of a death penalty.237 The criticism or 
mocking of Muhammad, Allah, the Qur’an, or the shari’a itself, is likewise 
forbidden, incurring the same punishment. Thus, some basic human rights taken for 
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granted in Britain—including the freedoms of conscience, expression and 
movement, and equality of all under the rule of law—are outlawed by the shari’a. 
The incompatibility between the shari’a and human rights has, in fact, been 
confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the upper house of 
the United Kingdom’s national legislature, the House of Lords. In 2003, ECHR 
stated: 
Sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is 
stable and invariable ... It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and 
human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it 
intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts.238 
In October 2008, in determining the asylum claim of a Lebanese woman who, in 
accordance with shari’a principles, risked handing over custody of her 12 year old 
son to an abusive husband if returned to Lebanon, the House of Lords described the 
Islamic legal code as ‘wholly incompatible’ with human rights legislation and 
granted her asylum.239 Recognising the problems with shari’a courts in Britain, 
Baroness Cox, an unaffiliated life-peer in the House of Lords, authored a report in 
March 2015 that condemns what she calls ‘the emergence of a rapidly developing 
alternative quasi-legal system, which not only promotes systematic gender 
discrimination, but also undermines the fundamental principle of one law for all’.240 
In June 2014, she introduced a Private Members’ Bill to the House of Lords—the 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill—to address these matters. 
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3. Political and cultural conflict 
This chapter has demonstrated that organisations and individuals in the revivalist 
network in Britain are engaged in a conflict of values with Britain’s liberal 
democratic culture, particularly as represented by the state.  
This conflict has both practical and symbolic dimensions. The stakes of this conflict 
include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews—Islamic and liberal 
democratic—and related values within the structure of civil society, as well as in 
government policy and state law. This practical dimension of the conflict is evident, 
as this chapter has shown, in the fields of political advocacy and local governance, 
as well as education and arbitration, particularly where Muslim communities are 
concerned. It concerns the institutional and legal structures that regulate peoples’ 
lives. Inseparable from the practical dimension of this conflict, there is also a 
symbolic or cognitive dimension. The stakes thus also include the 
institutionalisation of competing worldviews and related values within the minds of 
people, whether they are policymakers, British Muslims or the general public. This 
dimension of the conflict is evident in competing efforts to classify—and to 
command the authority to classify—the ‘correct’ understanding of fundamental 
social values (‘British’ or ‘universal’ values), and Islam. 
The practical and symbolic dimensions of this conflict overlap. The attempt to 
influence the minds of children and foster an Islamic identity in Muslim schools, for 
example, is inseparable from attempts to influence government policy in the area of 
educational provision for Muslims, as well as the structure of schools’ governing 
boards. The arbitration of disputes in shari’a courts does not just have practical 
consequences for people’s lives, it also establishes the symbolic authority of the 
courts to establish an understanding of Islam in Muslim communities. This 
overlapping may also be seen in revivalist groups’ efforts to undermine the 
government’s counter-extremism strategy both symbolically, where concepts such 
as ‘extremism’ are contested, and practically, where changes in government policy 
is sought through protest, advocacy or testimony. 
A clash of values has been discernible in a practical sense since the Rushdie Affair 
in 1989, when MCB’s pre-cursor organisation initiated a campaign to criminalise 
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what it perceives as the ‘vilification’ of Islam and its prophets, what its liberal 
opponents see as their right to criticise, satirise or even insult religion. Other groups, 
such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and MEND, have supported 
MCB’s effort.241 This campaign has been unsuccessful, but it conflicts in principle 
with a key tenet of liberal democracy, that of the freedom of speech, as well as its 
bedrock assumption of individual rather than group rights. 
MCB fell from government favour after it’s boycotting of Holocaust Memorial Day 
and Daud Abdullah’s signing of the Istanbul Declaration in 2009. Whilst these acts 
were understood by the government as a betrayal of ‘non-negotiable’ values, the 
clash they underline may also be understood in terms of conflicting perceptions of 
social and political reality. Rather than arguing for the legitimate value of the 
declaration, MCB contested the government’s understanding of it. Vigorously 
denying Communities Secretary Hazel Blears’ view of it as endorsing attacks on 
Jews, MCB called such a view ‘outrageous’.242 MCB added that it is ‘completely 
opposed to all forms of prejudice’. MCB does not perceive as prejudicial its support 
for shari’a councils and its rejection of the model marriage contract produced by the 
Muslim Institute, despite evidence to the contrary. 
This indicates not a straight-forward clash of values in the sense that it is contested 
whether a certain act or kind of act may be classified as good or bad. It indicates 
clashing perceptual and evaluative frameworks where it is contested whether or not 
a given act has taken place at all, or whether a kind of act may be considered as such 
in the first place. A more striking example of this contention is how rape within 
marriage is understood by the leaders of shari’a councils: There is simply no such 
thing. In a clash of worldviews and their related moral frameworks, there is no 
shared understanding of the key terms to allow for an agreement to disagree. Terms 
are shared, like ‘extremism’ and ‘universal values’, but their meanings are different 
because they are situated in different perceptual schemes informed by different 
cultures of knowledge. 
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As this chapter has shown, the practical aspects of this clash of values is evident in 
the fields of political and legal advocacy in relation to central government, where 
MCB and other revivalist interlocutors have sought to influence domestic and 
foreign policy in line with an Islamic revivalist worldview. Some groups in the 
network have taken a more activist approach to challenge the government over 
foreign policy, either through street demonstrations or protest campaigns. The 
Muslim Association of Britain, for example, played a key role in the anti-war 
demonstrations in 2002 and 2003, but in recent years its activism has been eclipsed 
by other, newer groups such as MEND and CAGE. However, more often than not, 
government policy has been contended quietly through advocacy work by sector-
specific groups working in various fields, most importantly, education. Whilst 
appealing to Britain’s equality legislation to justify their causes—for example, for 
the right of Muslims to have more state-maintained schools—the worldview and 
values that fundamentally guide such efforts are clearly antagonistic to the liberal 
democratic basis of Britain’s society and mode of government. 
Beyond such advocacy work, the practical aspects of this clash of values is evident 
in local government, as observed in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets where 
individuals connected to the revivalist Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) played an 
important role in directly obtaining or influencing political power. The IFE-linked 
mayor, Lutfur Rahman, has been deposed, but other, less prominent revivalists 
possibly remain in office in the borough. Their influence is difficult to gauge 
without a thorough investigation. But it is also difficult to disassociate the cultural 
dispositions and long-term political aspirations of IFE—which are clearly 
antagonistic with liberal democratic values and its secular model of government—
and the fact that hundreds of children in six of the borough’s Islamic schools are 
recognised by the government of being at risk of ‘extremist influences and 
radicalisation’.243  
The symbolic dimension of the conflict has become more apparent in recent years, 
as the British government has become increasingly clear regarding the importance 
of targeting what it refers to as the ‘ideology’ of ‘Islamist extremists’. From the 
revision of the Prevent counter-radicalisation strategy in June 2011, which first 
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defined ‘extremism’ as the ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British 
values’,244 to the publication of Britain’s first Counter-Extremism Strategy in 
October 2015,245 the government has increasingly sought to confront what it deems 
as an ideological challenge to the values that underpin the British way of life.  
Since 2011, the government has explicitly viewed the key battleground for 
combatting terrorism as ideological. The first of the three objectives of the revised 
Prevent strategy is to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the 
threat we face from those who promote it’.246 But, whilst countering ‘extremist’ 
ideology remains at the heart of the government’s counter-terrorism programme, it 
has also begun to view the ideological problem it faces beyond its function as a 
precursor to violence, as a matter affecting social cohesion and institutional 
entryism. 
The government’s concern with the extent to which extremist ideology has spread 
throughout various public institutions was made clear in December 2013 in a report 
by the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism. This report identified 
schools, universities and prisons as vulnerable to ‘the ideology of Islamist 
extremism’.247 Drawing on the recommendations of the report, Home Secretary 
Theresa May delivered a speech in March 2015 in which she noted ‘increasing 
evidence’ of a rejection of British values amongst some British people.248 
Highlighting some of the problems with non-violent extremism beyond its link to 
terrorism, she warned of the dangers of segregated communities and discrimination 
on the basis of sex, sexuality and race. She cited ‘the Trojan Horse plot’ as an 
example of the infiltration of extremism within British public institutions and 
singled out Tower Hamlets as a borough with ‘extremist’ issues.  
In July 2015, Cameron delivered an address setting out the four pillars of the 
government’s new counter-extremism strategy. Highlighting the first pillar—
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countering ‘extremist ideology’—he stated, ‘What we are fighting, in Islamist 
extremism, is an ideology’.249 The new strategy is the first of its kind that aims to 
tackle both violent and non-violent ‘extremism’. Importantly, it lays out an approach 
to combat ‘non-violent extremism’ not just as a pathway to terrorism, but also as a 
contributing factor to a range of other issues, which were touched on in May’s 
March 2015 speech. These include ‘isolated communities’ (which can lead to 
‘alternative values, structures and authorities’); ‘alternative systems of law’ 
(including shari’a) that discriminate against women; the non-participation in or 
rejection of democracy; and ‘harmful and illegal practices’ (such as Female Genital 
Mutilation, Honour Based Violence and Forced Marriage).  
Also in 2015, indicating its firm commitment to combating the ideological basis of 
terrorism and these kinds of ‘non-violent extremism’, the government established 
the Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) in the Home Office. Significantly, the EAU is 
the first body of its kind in the world that pools resources for the study and 
combatting of violent and non-violent manifestations of ‘extremism’. According to 
May, it will ‘inform the development of a counter-entryism strategy’ to protect key 
British institutions, and is likely to play a role in an independent investigation into 
shari’a courts in England and Wales.250 
The reaction of Islamic revivalist groups to these developments has been hostile, 
casting the government as intent on dividing British society between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. MCB, for example, has suggested that, for the government, ‘Muslims 
and Islam are inherently apart from British society’.251 Contesting the terms 
‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’—as MCB has done—IHRC produced a statement 
in March 2015 against the ‘ongoing demonisation of Muslims in Britain’ and ‘their 
values’, which was signed by numerous revivalist groups and individuals.252 It 
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described the government’s inclusion of ‘non-violent extremism’ within its revised 
counter-terrorism strategy as the ‘criminalisation of Islam’. IHRC proclaimed that 
the government’s criticism of shari’a councils—which it says are ‘an essential 
institution in the Muslim community’—was an assault on Islam: ‘In our view the 
focus on Shariah councils is part of a wide, insidious and relentless attack on the 
whole Muslim way of life under the pretext of security and anti-terrorism’.253 Other 
groups, such as MEND, defended shari’a councils in similar terms.254 MEND has, 
in fact, become one of the most ardent critics of government policy within the 
revivalist network, eclipsing MAB, which now defers to MEND’s work in 
articulating its own dissent.255 Another very vocal critic of the government is 
CAGE. Echoing MCB’s point of view described earlier, it has stated: 
The British government, advised primarily by those who are inclined toward 
neoconservatism, are re-defining what constitutes genuine Islam. This idea that a 
British government can interfere with, define and regulate the Islamic faith and 
ideology is insulting to Muslims.256  
Asim Qureshi, CAGE’s research director, declares of Prevent, ‘It’s always been a 
social engineering programme to legitimise the government sponsored version of 
Islam only’.257 He describes the government’s counter-extremism approach as 
‘criminalising thought’. Standing side-by-side with CAGE is the Federation of 
Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS). At a CAGE event in March 2015, its vice 
president of student affairs, Ibrahim Ali, described the work of FOSIS and CAGE as 
part of a ‘broad coalition’ on university campuses dedicated to disseminating the 
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message that, ‘Prevent in itself is a racist agenda; its an Islamophobic agenda’.258 
The government has recognised universities as important sites in this clash of 
values, but is yet to effectively evaluate and confront it. Similar sentiments have 
been expressed by Ibrahim Hewitt, a prominent figure within the revivalist network, 
who states that the government’s targeting of non-violent extremism amounts to a 
war on Islam: 
Claims that the government is pursuing an ‘anti-extremism’ agenda are wearing thin; 
it is anti-Islam, period. It’s fine for Muslims to have their faith as long as they keep it 
to themselves and out of the public domain. In other words, the neo-conservatives 
want Islam to be shorn of its ‘complete way of life’ guidelines. This is dangerous 
territory.259 
Islamophobia is perceived as an attack on Islam as a way of life carried out not just 
through government policy, but throughout a variety of social institutions. Iqbal 
Sacranie encapsulates this view, asserting, ‘Islamophobic prejudice is prevalent in 
the mainstream on display in political life, in the media and in the attitudes of the 
police and the courts.’260 In particular, journalists and think tanks that highlight the 
detrimental effects of Muslim organisations and individuals upon civil liberties and 
social harmony in Britain are commonly attacked as being ‘Islamophobic’. Targets 
include journalists John Ware and Andrew Gilligan and the think tanks Policy 
Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion.261 
According to a former Islamic activist, the term ‘Islamophobia’ was invented by the 
International Institute for Islamic Thought to stifle the criticism of Islam, 
particularly its political, revivalist interpretations.262 Abdur-Rahman Muhammad, a 
former member of IIIT, has stated, ‘This loathsome term is nothing more than a 
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thought-terminating cliché conceived in the bowels of Muslim think tanks for the 
purpose of beating down critics’.263 This claim is difficult to ascertain. However, 
whether intentional or not, the widespread use of the term effectively blurs the 
distinction between the legitimate criticism of Islamic doctrines and practices—
including those that undermine liberal democratic values and human rights—and the 
bigoted discrimination against Muslims. Revivalist organisations have never 
articulated this distinction, let alone defended it. The government has so far not 
demanded them make this distinction, perhaps because it has consistently claimed 
that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ and does not wish to be seen as critical of Islam 
for fear of inciting further social division along lines it cannot control. 
Indeed, commanding the authority to speak on matters of social division—to 
determine the principles of such division—is a key arena of conflict in which 
Islamic revivalists and the government, as the most powerful representative of 
Britain’s liberal democracy, clash: Islamic revivalist groups claim the government is 
sowing the seeds of social division with its counter-extremism policies, branding 
non-violent, law-abiding Muslims as ‘extremists’ (or ‘the other’).  
This trend was observable in MCB’s response to the government’s announcement 
that it was developing a counter-extremism strategy. It voiced its over-riding 
concern as the possibility that all Muslims will be labelled ‘extremist’ and the 
perpetuation of ‘a deep misunderstanding of Islam’.264 When the strategy was 
published, in October 2015, MCB’s secretary general, Shuja Shafi, stated that was 
based on a ‘flawed analysis’.265 He said it risked alienating Muslim communities 
and restricting the freedom of thought and expression. ‘For over 10 years,’ he 
added, ‘we have had to contend with a misguided “conveyor-belt theory” analysis 
that conflates terrorism with subjective notions of extremism and Islamic practices’. 
On the government’s plans to close mosques hosting ‘extremist’ speakers, Shafi 
questioned the government’s authority to classify any mosque as ‘extremist’. 
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The government, on the other hand, claims that MCB and other revivalist groups 
inculcate a victim mentality amongst British Muslims, exacerbating the problem of 
radicalisation. As it has begun to articulate a problem with non-violent extremism—
not just as a potential stepping-stone to terrorism, but as a threat to civil liberties and 
social cohesion—revivalist groups have become increasingly vocal in their 
opposition. The struggle to distinguish an ‘in-group’—whether it be model British 
citizens or Muslims—from an ‘out-group’ is inextricable from a clash regarding the 
authority to establish social values. This couldn’t have been more clearly articulated 
than when Theresa May stated: 
Extremists often talk about a ‘them’ and ‘us’—often described as a war between the 
West and Islam—and we do not challenge that successfully or often enough. 
Promoting the values we believe in will allow us to define the ‘them’ and ‘us’ on our 
terms …266 
Both the government and the revivalist groups use the language and concepts of the 
other to accrue symbolic authority. On one hand, the government, whilst 
characterising extremism as a rejection of British values, uses the notion of a 
‘genuine’ Islam to identify its enemy: Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ that extremists 
have hijacked for their violent ends. But MCB and other revivalist groups, whilst 
making exactly the same claim, deny the government the authority to pronounce on 
this.267 On the other hand, revivalist groups, whilst characterising Islamophobia as a 
rejection of Islam and Muslims’ freedom to practice it, use the liberal notions of 
bigotry and racism to identify an enemy, an oppressor. This most importantly 
includes the government and its policies, which are characterised as breaching 
human rights and the liberal democratic principles of equality and justice.  
Yet, this use of each other’s terminology is somewhat asymmetrical due to an 
imbalance in symbolic power in favour of the state. Whilst revivalist groups 
explicitly deny the government the symbolic authority to represent Islam—even 
when it disassociates Islam from violence—the government does not explicitly deny 
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MCB and other revivalist groups the authority to determine what constitutes bigotry. 
Instead, it simply asserts its own authority to do so most clearly in the language of 
British values and extremism, as well as in legal reform, most notably in the area of 
counter-terrorism. 
MCB’s explicit attack on the state’s authority to classify Islam is in part a reflection 
of its weakness: If the government has the symbolic authority to classify Islam as 
non-violent—even though MCB agrees with this view—then it is a short step to it 
possessing the authority to classify Islam as non-extremist. The government so far 
has not taken this step to classify Islam as such, although revivalist groups assume 
the contrary. Doing so would exacerbate the symbolic aspect of this clash. It would 
cast what MCB and its allied groups consider as ‘conservative’ Muslim practices to 
be unIslamic and perhaps even illegal. It would render groups that support such 
practices, including MCB and numerous others, beyond the pale of engagement, if 
not the law. Moreover, it would also undermine MCB’s authority to command 
respect and recognition within the Muslim population for its particular vision of 
society, its understanding of Islam and of the task of Muslims to usher in an Islamic 
revival. 
§ 
To conclude this chapter, it suffices to note that, in addition to being connected by 
the bonds of organisational networking and cultural solidarity, the key figures and 
groups comprising the network are engaged in a conflict with the state as the key 
representative of liberal democratic values and an associated way of viewing the 
world. This conflict of vision and values is both cultural and political. It concerns 
communal identity and a way of life, which includes how children are educated and 
how government policy is conducted, as well as the authority to articulate it and 
protect it by law. This conflict of values concerns the institutionalisation of 
competing worldviews within the structure of society and, ultimately, the state. 
Islamic revivalism presents to the British state not mere advocacy for change within 
its liberal democratic framework, but a programme for a peaceful transformation of 
it. In this sense, it may be described as metapolitical, a term introduced in Chapter 1. 
This conflict may be considered as a form of political subversion, but not in the 
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sense conceived in the Security Services Act of 1989, as the undermining or 
overthrowing of  ‘parliamentary democracy’.268 The political subversion of Islamic 
revivalism is not concerned with usurping the organs of government, as such, but 
with contesting the authority to represent and institutionalise the framework of 
moral values and mode of knowledge upon which the political order rests. It may be 
thought as the subversion of the cultural edifice upon which the political system is 
based. This concerns fundamental values, but these depend upon the way in which 
the world is perceived. As Pierre Bourdieu observed of all collective struggles, 
‘political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of 
the world’.269 
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Conclusion 
The Global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain:  
A Cultural and Political Movement 
The individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-
Islami in Britain, as the preceding three chapters have shown, are organisationally 
networked, bonded with the ties of cultural solidarity, and engaged in a conflict of 
values with Britain’s mainstream liberal democratic culture as well as the British 
political authorities. This thesis can therefore conclude that collectively they form a 
social movement.  
This is not a social movement in the sense in which the term is most commonly 
understood in the popular imagination or in the academic study of social 
movements. It does not have a central leadership structure with clearly identifiable 
spokespeople, it is not primarily driven by a desire to address inequalities within the 
political system, and the conflict in which it is involved is not merely with the state. 
But it is a social movement nonetheless. It is decentralised, but very well networked 
and organised. It is concerned with what its protagonists perceive as injustices 
within Britain’s political and legal apparatus, but this concern drives deeper to the 
taken-for-granted values underlying and sustaining this apparatus. It is engaged in a 
conflict with the state but, more importantly, it is opposed to the culture—political, 
legal, economic, scientific and social—that the state represents and protects. It is a 
social movement but, to emphasise its concern with both a way of life and the 
authority to present and maintain it, it is perhaps better described as a cultural and 
political movement. 
The individuals that feature prominently in this movement do not constitute a clear 
vanguard, in the sense of a unified front directing its strategic direction. There is no 
hierarchical central command structure but, rather, a multiplicity of overlapping 
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leadership structures. In each distinct field of contention, there are clearly positioned 
leaders or clusters of leaders with specialist knowledge and experience. Without a 
central or dominant leadership structure, it may be asked whether the network of 
revivalists are engaged in disconnected and diverse struggles, and thus whether it is 
a movement at all. But what makes this a singular struggle, as opposed to a plurality 
of struggles, is not only the overlapping organisational connections between the key 
protagonists, but also the singularity of stakes in the various fields in which they 
conflict.  
For the protagonists of the revivalist movement—whether advocating for changes in 
government policy and legislation, influencing the education of Muslim children, 
arbitrating disputes in Muslim communities or acquiring political power in local 
government—the stakes are the same: The embodiment of a distinct Islamic 
worldview and associated values within the social and political structures of the 
British state, and within the cognitive structures of its people. This involves the 
religious identity not only of Muslims and Muslim social institutions, but also—on a 
timescale of no immediate concern to them—of would-be Muslims and would-be 
Muslim social institutions. For the authorities of the state, including central and 
local government, the stakes involve the protection of the liberal democratic 
worldview and associated values within Britain’s social and political order, as well 
as in the minds of its citizenry.  
The conflict in which the revivalist movement in Britain is engaged is networked or 
distributed throughout the social order in various fields, including education, media, 
governance and law. The raison d’être of the work of all revivalists is to defend and 
promote Islam as a way of life in Britain. This includes an epistemology and an 
ethics—an approach to knowledge and a moral code—that conflicts with the liberal 
democratic status quo and the powers that preside over it. Because a way of life has 
a multiplicity of expressions—such as how people educate their children and how 
they settle disputes—there is a multiplicity of antagonisms or potential antagonisms 
with the authorities protecting the liberal democratic status quo where these 
individuals and groups are active. These include the subtle contention of ‘British 
values’ in campaigns to influence government policy or law, for example in MCB 
and others’ efforts seeking the criminalisation of ‘blaspheming’ Islam or special 
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provisions for Muslim schoolchildren in state schools.1 They also include more 
confrontational campaigns agitating Muslim sentiment against the government, for 
example in CAGE and FOSIS’s collaborative work in British universities 
undermining its counter-radicalisation strategy, Prevent.2  
According to Lorenzo Vidino, all global Muslim Brotherhood organisations in the 
West possess two goals. The first, he says, is ‘the preservation of an Islamic identity 
among Western Muslims’.3 This alludes to a crucial feature of the movement. But 
these groups, as this thesis has shown, do not simply seek to ‘preserve’ Muslim 
identity. They seek to define and practically engineer it. If there is something as an 
Islamic identity of Muslims in the West perceived in need of protection from the 
corrupting influences of decadent secular culture, then it is also something that is 
contested between Muslims with very different perceptions of their faith and its role 
in contemporary Western societies. Muslim identity is not something to be taken for 
granted, but something that is actively produced and contested within a web of 
often-conflictual relationships. 
The second goal that Vidino sees them as possessing is to become the official or de 
facto interlocutors for Muslims in their respective countries.4 This claim also 
intimates an important point, but it is somewhat concealed by a slight empirical 
inaccuracy: Not all groups in the movement aspire to represent Muslims’ interests to 
the state authorities officially or unofficially. In Britain, some groups, such as the 
UK Islamic Mission and the Islamic Forum of Europe, do not have any 
communicative channels to the government and prefer to work within Muslim 
communities, leaving MCB to act as the primary interlocutor and other groups, such 
as the Association of Muslim Schools UK to represent Muslim needs in specialist 
fields such as education.  
                                               
1 See, for example, Murtaza Ali Shah, ‘Muslims call for change in UK blasphemy laws’, The 
International News (Pakistan), November 14, 2012. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-
142770-Muslims-call-for-change-in-UK-blasphemy-laws. See also Association of Muslim Lawyers 
(2003b), n.18.1.1. 
2 See, for example, Stuart (2015). 
3 Vidino (2011), p.10. 
4 Ibid., pp.12-13. 
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Nevertheless, whilst only some groups have an official or unofficial intermediary 
role with the state, all of the individuals and groups comprising the movement are 
engaged in symbolic work that might be thought to ‘represent’ Islam and Muslims, 
whether in relation to the state or within Muslim environments. Yet, in the same 
sense in which these actors are engaged in engineering (rather than merely 
protecting) Muslim identity, they are also engaged in determining (rather than 
merely representing) Muslims’ needs. Strictly speaking, the revivalist actors—who 
may be public interlocutors, local community activists below the radar of media 
interest, or both—are involved in a symbolic struggle not to represent Islam as a 
way of life, but to present it as such.  
Vidino’s two goals highlight two key aspects of the revivalists’ struggle, one 
relating to Muslim communities and the other relating to the secular authorities. We 
must add that these two aspects are linked. For the revivalist movement in Britain, 
the struggle within Muslim milieus is arguably more important than that in the 
social and political mainstream. Muslims are viewed by revivalists as an important 
vanguard for da’wa and bringing Islam to the British people, so activities that 
impart a certain Islamic worldview and set of values which can affect concentrations 
of Muslims are particularly significant. But this struggle is inevitably connected 
with the state, since the state is the guardian of policies, regulations and laws that 
affect Muslims as a distinct ‘community’ and that affect them as citizens of the state 
along with everyone else. Much of the work of the revivalist movement focuses on 
Muslims, but this necessarily involves a relationship with the state, not just as the 
regulator of policy that affects British Muslims as British citizens, but also as ‘the 
ultimate source of symbolic power’ that protects a dominant worldview and 
associated values perceived to be antagonistic or obstructive to Islam as a way of 
life.5 
Re-thinking ideology and the ‘battle of ideas’ 
This thesis is the first work to explicitly examine whether the individuals and groups 
sometimes identified as participationist Islamists in Britain collectively comprise a 
social movement. In much of the relevant academic and think tank literature, a 
                                               
5 Swartz (2013), p.141. 
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movement is tacitly assumed to exist through their classification as such. What 
supposedly explains such ascription is the unquestioned view that they share a 
political ideology whose goal is an Islamic state, as well as a gradualist, bottom-up 
methodology. As this thesis has shown, however, these individuals and groups 
generally consider the Islamic state not as a goal but as a reward, as a natural 
outcome of a society infused with Islamic values.  
Whilst ‘Islamist’ does not really apply to the revivalist movement, neither does the 
term ‘post-Islamist’, which involves a conscious and explicit rejection of the Islamic 
state as a model of government. Revivalists in no way eschew what they view as the 
inevitable long-term result of their jihad for an alternative society, but neither do 
they prioritise it as an objective. Their immediate concerns are not a mere means to 
this end but, rather, goals in themselves. These include education for Muslim 
children in accord with teachings from the Qur’an and sunna, national legislation 
that prohibits the ‘vilification’ of Islam and its prophet Muhammad, and the 
arbitration of disputes between Muslims under shari’a. 
Just as the term ‘Islamist’ is somewhat misleading, the classification of these 
individuals and groups as ‘participationist’ is likewise problematic. It is predicated 
upon their distinction from ‘rejectionists’, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, with the 
assumption that they both share the same goal—an Islamic state. Their most 
important point of difference is deemed to be in their choice of methods, which is 
secondary to what binds them. This, however, not only overplays the importance of 
the goal of an Islamic state, but also underestimates the importance of their 
approaches, which are, in fact, integral to their particular Islamic worldview and 
identity. Far from being merely incidental to their religiously conceived long-term 
goal of a society based on Islam, the revivalists’ approach to spreading their religion 
through education, advocacy and participation in secular politics, as well as their 
rejection of cultural isolation and violence, is a key constitutive element of their 
political ideology and religious solidarity. 
Just as the notion of an Islamic state is overemphasised by both political analysts 
and British government leaders, so is the notion of ideology to make sense of what 
drives and unites politically active Muslims in Britain, including ‘non-violent 
extremists’. Not only are the specific characteristics of these groups’ ideology 
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sometimes mischaracterised, the underlying concept of ideology that is used is 
inherently doctrinaire and therefore falls short of the target.  
Mischaracterising ‘Islamism’ 
In a landmark speech on July 20, 2015, David Cameron outlined the government’s 
new five-year counter-extremist strategy, which was subsequently published in 
October 2015. He stated, ‘The root cause of the threat we face is the extremist 
ideology itself’.6 Several months earlier, in September 2014, Home Secretary 
Theresa May asserted, ‘We need to defeat the ideology that lies behind the 
[terrorism] threat’ and outlined this ideology as follows: 
The extremists believe in a clash of civilisations—a fundamental incompatibility 
between Islamic and Western values, an inevitable divide between ‘them and us’. 
They demand a caliphate, or a new Islamic state, governed by a harsh interpretation 
of Shari’ah law. They utterly reject British and Western values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, and equality between citizens, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, 
religion or sexuality. They believe that it is impossible to be a good Muslim and a 
good British citizen. And they dismiss anybody who disagrees with them—including 
other Muslims—as non-believers.7 
This description of the ideology Britain faces from what the government calls 
‘Islamist extremism’ is derived from the report of the prime minister’s Task Force 
on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism, Tackling extremism in the UK, 
published in December 2013.8 It is repeated in the new Counter-Extremism Strategy. 
It blurs many important points of contention that divide those considered as 
Islamists. In relation to the ‘non-violent extremists’ of the global Muslim 
Brotherhood it is, in fact, wrong on almost every point.  
Whilst violent jihadist groups liberally cast other Muslims as apostates, reject 
Western values and prioritise the attainment of an Islamic state, the revivalist 
Brothers, as this thesis has shown, believe some Western values are Islamic values, 
                                               
6 ‘Extremism: PM speech’, British Government website, July 20, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech. 
7 ‘A Stronger Britain, Built On Our Values’, British Government website, March 23, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values. 
8 Cabinet Office (2013), pp.1-2. 
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assert the compatibility of Muslim and British identity, and reject the notion of a 
clash of civilisations. This is because, unlike the militant jihadists, they view Islam 
as a way of life that can and should be propagated from within secular, liberal 
democratic societies. Unlike the jihadists and the ‘non-violent’ rejectionists, such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, they do not reject democracy as an electoral system and encourage 
Muslims to vote, although they idealise the shari’a as the model for government 
policy and law for their prophesised situation of a Muslim majority. They tend to 
believe that Muslim identity can accommodate national identity, as long as the latter 
does not determine the former. Rather than rejecting and isolating themselves from 
non-Muslim culture and identity, the revivalists are generally disposed to 
transforming it from within. This is not merely tactical, since it is linked to their 
mission of da’wa. And as mentioned, an Islamic state is a secondary concern in 
relation to an Islamic society.  
Given the importance that the government places upon ‘non-violent extremism’ as a 
stepping-stone to ‘violent extremism’, the error in classifying them ideologically 
with other ‘Islamists’ is a grave one. By conflating distinct forms of Islamic 
activism under the heading of ‘Islamist extremism’, the government makes itself an 
easy target of criticism by Muslim activists and their sympathisers who can quite 
readily reject its faulty accusations. This risks undermining the government’s 
symbolic and moral authority to make judgments of Muslim groups and pronounce 
upon national values.  
Beyond ideas: a conflict of culture 
The government’s understanding of the ideology of ‘Islamism’ as expressed by 
Home Secretary May and the new Counter-Extremism Strategy—particularly of 
‘non-violent extremism’—is empirically flawed. But its very reference to ideology 
carries problems of its own. This is because the conflict with what it calls ‘Islamist 
extremism’, violent or non-violent, is typically viewed as a ‘battle of ideas’ that may 
be resolved through the triumph of reason. Such a view expresses a very limited 
understanding of the ‘battleground’, and thus the resolvability, of the conflict. 
In the Counter-Extremism Strategy, David Cameron refers to the ‘fight against 
Islamist extremism’ not only as ‘one of the great struggles of our generation’, but 
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also a ‘battle of ideas’ in which ‘the case’ for British values has to be made.9 
Unsurprisingly, this view is shared by a number of ‘counter-extremism’ analysts and 
government advisers, including Ed Husain, the co-founder of Quilliam, a think tank 
that advised the government’s counter-extremism strategy. Husain writes, ‘Winning 
the long-term battle of ideas against Islamist radicals is the only solution. Muslim 
and other communities are in dire need for support to defeat the ideology that 
produces terror.’10 Maajid Nawaz, Quilliam’s chairman, asserts that the organisation 
‘works to critique and refute this ideology wherever it is found’.11 He states that 
‘Islamism the ideology must be intellectually terminated’.12 A similar perspective is 
expressed by Rashad Ali, the director of another London-based ‘counter-extremism’ 
think tank, Centri. In criticising the government’s new proposals to introduce 
banning orders on alleged ‘extremist’ groups, Ali states: 
The Government is obsessed with legislation but this is not something you can defeat 
by legislation. It is a battle of ideas and we have to defeat these ideas by argument … 
What we need, far more than any new law, is a counter-argument and a policy which 
can inspire [Muslim] society to defeat extremist ideas.13 
Ali put this view into practice by co-authoring a theological ‘rebuttal’ of jihadist 
ideology, drawing upon Islamic sources to question the jihadist interpretation of the 
Qur’an and other scriptures.14 
Ideas and ideals undeniably form part of the phenomenon of ‘Islamist extremism’, 
whether violent jihadism, non-violent rejectionism, or non-violent revivalism. But 
what this approach fails to grasp is that what is considered as an ideological battle is 
not equivalent to the rational competition between rival ideas settled through the 
                                               
9 ‘Prime Minister Foreword’, HM Government (2015a), p.5. 
10 Ed Husain, ‘Taking passports would only raise the jihadist threat’, The Evening Standard, 
September 2, 2014. http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/ed-husain-taking-passports-would-raise-the-
jihadist-threat-9706097.html. 
11 Maajid Nawaz, ‘The Way Back from Islamism’, The Washington Institute, July 16, 2008. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-way-back-from-islamism. 
12 Maajid Nawaz, comment on Facebook post, July 7, 2015. http://tiny.cc/mnawaz-ideology-
20150707. 
13 Andrew Gilligan, ‘How banning radical Islamists will play right into their hands’, The Telegraph, 
May 31, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11641188/How-banning-
radical-Islamists-will-play-right-into-their-hands.html. 
14 Ali and Stuart (2014). 
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logic of reason. With Islamic revivalism in Britain, the government is engaged not 
in a contest of argument and counter-argument, but in a conflict of worldviews and 
values waged upon different levels of consciousness and acted out in practice in 
social settings.  
The notion of a ‘battle of ideas’ in which ‘extremists’ might be ‘de-radicalised’ 
through the rebuttal of certain ideas ignores the complex, unconscious and social 
factors that enable the production, meaningfulness and appeal of such ideas. Such 
factors include a taken-for-granted worldview and an associated set of values. The 
primary battleground that makes ideological warfare possible is at the level of what 
Pierre Bourdieu calls the habitus, the unconsciously embodied dispositions and 
‘mental structures’ through which people apprehend the social world as natural and 
self-evident. These are generated socially in experience, inculcated through a 
mixture of subtle processes and overt methods.  
The most important pre-dispositions that enable the embrace of a certain ideological 
outlook include a range of unquestioned distinctions through which an in-group and 
others outside the group are relatively viewed and judged. The basis of the Islamic 
revivalist outlook is a vision of humanity clearly divided between Muslims and non-
Muslims. Although Muslims are viewed within the broader family of humankind, 
they are distinguished internally, since only Muslims have embraced the truth of 
revelation and possess the divine duty to spread Islam, albeit through non-coercive 
means. Non-Muslims may or may not be explicitly cast as inferior, but Islam is 
deemed as a superior way of life that will one day prevail and, as carriers of the 
message of Islam, for revivalists there is an implicit but distinct sense of superiority 
in Muslim identity.  
An important factor that enables such an outlook to take shape in consciousness as 
an ideology—in addition to a shared set of tacitly held dispositions and perceptual 
categories expressed in everyday social settings—are specific social and political 
constraints perceivable as grievances. Cameron is wrong to dismiss what he calls 
‘the grievance justification’ and focus only on ‘ideology’.15 Revivalists are quite 
genuine in pointing to certain grievances, such as British foreign policy in Iraq, as 
                                               
15 ‘Extremism: PM speech’. 
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motivating Muslim dissent and even terrorism. Eliza Manningham-Buller, former 
director-general of MI5, recognised this in 2010 when she told the Chilcot inquiry 
that Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan had ‘radicalised’ Muslims who 
saw such involvement as ‘an attack upon Islam’.16  
However, critics of the government, such as Arun Kundnani, who altogether reject 
the role of ideology or religious belief as an explanatory factor for understanding 
Muslim dissent and even terrorism are equally mistaken.17 Positing religious 
ideology and political grievances as two alternative factors that might explain 
Muslim dissent, radicalisation or violence, as Cameron and Kundnani both do in 
their own ways, sets up a false choice. The political grievances of non-violent 
Muslim activists or Islamist terrorists are perceived through the lens of a religious 
ideology or worldview. This is exemplified by the martyrdom video of Ibrahim 
Savant, one of the terrorist cell caught by the British police plotting to blow up 
transatlantic airliners in 2006. After complimenting his co-plotters’ rants about 
British and American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, he added, ‘I, Savant, have 
sacrificed my life cheaply, within the sake of Allah, not to save myself from a life of 
trials and tribulations but to fulfill a covenant and promise with Allah the almighty, 
and to make his din [religion and way of life] reign supreme’.18  
Crucially, for an ideology to take shape and for religious identity to become 
politicised—whether this leads to non-violent or violent conflict with the prevailing 
cultural and political orthodoxy—grievances need to be articulated as such by an 
elite of professional activists and ideologues. The entertainment of an ideology and 
the recognition of oneself as part of an oppressed group depends upon the trust 
willingly invested in the symbolic authority of the figures articulating an ideological 
vision of the group, its oppression and its struggle. So, any effort to combat an 
ideology needs to undermine the value of this kind of symbolic investment and not 
just the value of the ideas propagated. The ‘battle of ideas’ is better thought as a 
battle for symbolic power, which commands the recognition of certain social and 
                                               
16 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Former MI5 chief delivers damning verdict on Iraq invasion’, The 
Guardian, July 20, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/20/chilcot-mi5-boss-iraq-war. 
17 See Kundnani (2015). 
18 BBC News, ‘“Suicide videos”: What they said’, April 4, 2008, emphasis added. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7330367.stm. 
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political realities, including cultural identity. The key is not so much the assent of 
individuals and groups to certain ideas that conflict with liberal democracy. It is, 
rather, their assent to an alternative authority that pronounces the value of such 
ideas. It is their deference to an alternative, unquestioned source for the legitimation 
of ideas and values, one with which they can collectively identify.  
This is not the simple result of a rational calculation, but of a symbolic and 
psychological investment in an alternative source of cultural and political 
legitimation, enabled by pre-political, cultural dispositions and a context of cultural 
strain. From another perspective, this entails a symbolic and psychological 
disinvestment from the cultural and political orthodoxy, which cannot be fully 
explained by reference to specific unfavourable social norms or government 
policies. A loss of faith in liberal democratic culture and its political system may 
facilitate a new-found or rejuvenated faith in Islam as an alternative way of life and 
form of governance. But this is not the simple result of a rational calculation. It is 
the outcome, rather, of a more inclusive psychological transformation occurring 
within fields of social activity involving competing symbolic authorities. 
Symbolic struggles are inextricable from practical struggles. Thus, it is a serious 
error to locate this ideology solely in the heads of individuals and assume its modus 
operandi consists in ideas and arguments. David Cameron states, ‘What we are 
fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine. And like 
any extreme doctrine, it is subversive’.19 But the ideology that the government is 
concerned with as a possible pathway to violent jihadism is part of a larger, cultural 
problem. Underlying its conscious elaboration as a doctrine, it is expressed in 
practice throughout numerous fields of social activity. This thesis has only 
highlighted local government, education, and arbitration, but there are undoubtedly 
other fields, for example, involving charities, prisons, mosques, and universities. 
Tackling it, as the government wishes to do, will be partial at best if it is treated 
simply as a doctrine. A more complete approach requires a conceptual leap from 
preventing ‘extremism’ as a precursor to ‘radicalisation’, which is focused on 
vulnerable individuals, to preventing the subversion of liberal democratic culture, 
which concerns vulnerable institutions, governmental and non-governmental, and 
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groups. It is not just ‘ideas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as 
democracy, freedom and sexual equality’ that matter, but their embodiment in social 
institutions and cultural practices that are hostile to those very things.  
Political and cultural subversion 
The social movement of Islamic revivalism in Britain is subversive, but not in the 
sense as traditionally conceived by the British government or the few academics that 
have written about Islamist subversion. That is, it is neither primarily geared to 
overthrowing parliamentary democracy, nor primarily a problem in presenting a 
conduit for violence.20 It is subversive in the sense of presenting an organised but 
decentralised programme of cultural propagation whose success entails the 
undermining or transformation of liberal democratic values and institutions. The 
British government has begun to articulate the importance of safeguarding what it 
refers to as ‘British values’ and the ‘British way of life’, and, in doing so, implicitly 
recognises the threat of subversion from ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. But so far 
it has not utilised the term subversion. To do so would require a radical re-
conception of subversion from its Cold War-era formulation. 
Today, the official view of the British government on subversion remains framed by 
the concerns of the era in which the term first entered the modern political 
vocabulary. Subversion was defined in 1975 by the Labour Minister Lord Harris of 
Greenwich, as activities ‘which threaten the safety or well being of the state and 
which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means’.21 This definition remains today as it appears 
in the Security Service Act of 1989. Although it does not use the word ‘subversion’, 
the Act directly borrows Lord Harris’s terms to define the function of the domestic 
security service, MI5, as follows: 
The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in 
particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from 
                                               
20 See, for example, Kilcullen (2007), Roseneau (2007), and Clutterbuck and Rosenau (2009). 
21 Gill (1994), p.120. 
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the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or 
undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.22 
Thus, included in the legal definition of the role of MI5 is the protection of national 
security from subversive threats. The Act relates these to the protection of 
‘parliamentary democracy’ and, in doing so, considers the system of government (or 
in David Maxwell-Fyfe’s terms, the state) as the key target for subversive threats to 
national security.23 This focus on the political system of the state, and blindness to 
the cultural edifice of liberal democratic values that underlies it, is out-dated. But it 
is understandable. The key concern at the time of the Act’s drafting was of Britain 
being subverted by, and into, an undemocratic, authoritarian Communist regime. 
This concept of subversion has not changed in the official view of the security 
service, so the only possible kind of subversive threat is equivalent to a Communist 
one. 24 Accordingly, in MI5’s view, there is no threat of subversion in Britain today. 
‘Since the late 1980s,’ it states, ‘especially following the end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of Soviet communism, the threat from subversion has declined. It is 
now considered to be negligible. We do not currently investigate subversion.’25 
A gradual recognition of cultural subversion 
Despite the government’s official neglect of reassessing or updating the concept of 
subversion, in the last eight or so years it has begun to recognise, albeit implicitly, 
the need to protect against cultural forms of subversion, as presented by Islamic 
revivalism, one form of what it calls ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. The origins 
of this recognition can be traced to the publication of Britain’s National Security 
Strategy in 2008, which marked a significant break from the decades-old paradigm 
influenced by Cold War concerns.26 David Omand describes the most fundamental 
                                               
22 Security Service Act, 1.(2), emphasis added. 
23 In 1952, the British Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe stated that the task of MI5 was to 
defend the country from both internal and external threats, including subversion: ‘MI5’s task is the 
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24 ‘Subversion’, MI5 website. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/other-
issues-former-threats/subversion.html. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Cabinet Office (2008). 
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shift in the strategy as ‘the definition of security itself’.27 This is expressed in the 
document as one from a state-centric concept of security to what Omand describes 
as a new ‘human view of national security’ in which people and communities are 
central. The strategy explicitly emphasises the protection of the state’s citizens and 
their ‘way of life’.28 This new broader concept of national security remains central to 
the current version of the strategy, which states: ‘Above all, we act to maintain our 
way of life: to protect our people and the freedoms we have built for ourselves, and 
the values of our society and institutions’.29 The strategy talks about ‘core values 
[that] are not open to question’, and lists them as ‘the rule of law, democracy, free 
speech, tolerance and human rights’.30 
The importance of protecting or, more accurately, promoting British core values, 
such as universal human rights, equality before the law and democracy, came into 
sharper focus with the revision of the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy, 
Prevent. A previous iteration of Prevent in 2009 acknowledged the importance of 
challenging views ‘which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, 
but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community 
cohesion’.31 The spread of ‘non-violent extremism’, including a rejection of secular 
society and democratic government, was acknowledged as a problem, but primarily 
for creating ‘a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activities’.32 The 
importance of combating ‘extremist (and non-violent) ideas’ continues to be 
recognised in the latest iteration of Prevent, published in 2011, again from the point 
of view that they are ‘part of a terrorist ideology’.33 Prevent’s conception of ‘non-
violent extremism’ as a conduit to terrorism—and not as a problem for Britain’s 
‘way of life’—is understandable given its counter-radicalisation and counter-
terrorism focus. 
                                               
27 Omand (2009), p.4, emphasis added. 
28 Cabinet Office (2008), pp.3-4. 
29 Cabinet Office (2010), p.22. 
30 Ibid., pp.23, 4. 
31 HM Government (2009), p.15. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Home Office (2011), p.6, emphasis added. 
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However, since the latest revision of Prevent, the government has begun to view the 
importance of countering non-violent extremism beyond its function as a pathway to 
violence. It has begun to view non-violent extremism as a problem in itself or, put 
differently, as producing a range of problems affecting British values and key public 
institutions, as well as social integration.  
New teachers’ standards were introduced in 2012 which stipulate that ‘teachers must 
not undermine fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and 
beliefs’.34 In November 2014, all schools were subject to a new duty to ‘actively 
promote’ these values to enhance the ‘spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development of pupils’ and guard against ‘extremism’.35 Complementing this effort 
to positively strengthen ‘British values’ and Britain’s liberal democratic culture, the 
‘Prevent duty’, introduced in 2015, places an onus on schools and other public 
institutions to be prepared to combat ‘extremist ideology’ and prevent radicalisation. 
In December 2013, schools, universities and prisons were all identified by the Task 
Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism as institutions vulnerable to ‘the 
ideology of Islamist extremism’.36  
In July 2015, clearly signalling that the government was taking ‘extremism’ 
seriously as a problem beyond its connection to terrorism, Cameron stated the 
importance of combatting ‘[i]deas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as 
democracy, freedom and sexual equality … [and] which actively promote 
discrimination, sectarianism and segregation’.37 This point of view is now being 
incorporated into government strategy. The Home Office, for example, plans an 
independent investigation into shari’a councils with regard to their impact on 
women’s rights.38 Also demonstrating the strategic incorporation of this awareness, 
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the government has recently created the Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) in the 
Home Office to study and combat both violent and non-violent forms of 
‘extremism’. This point of view is also being incorporated in the government’s plans 
to introduce a new Counter-Extremism Bill to confront those ‘who seek to 
undermine democracy or use hate speech in public places’.39 The Guardian reports 
that this new bill will introduce new legal powers to limit the ‘harmful activities’ of 
‘extremist’ individuals who, in the words of the bill, pose a ‘threat to the functioning 
of democracy’.40 
This remarkably resembles the understanding of subversion first articulated by Lord 
Harris that appears in the Security Service Act of 1989 as activities ‘which threaten 
the safety or well being of the state and which are intended to undermine or 
overthrow parliamentary democracy’.41 Indeed, Cameron has referred to 
‘extremism’ as a ‘subversive’ doctrine.42 As Charles Moore observes, the 
government remains uncomfortable with the word ‘subversion’, but its new 
Counter-Extremism Strategy does use the word ‘entryism’ as a problem affecting 
public institutions.43 The EAU will apparently lead the development of a ‘counter-
entryism’ strategy for key British public bodies. In all but name, this amounts to 
counter-subversion. But the subversion presented by the global Muslim 
Brotherhood in Britain, contrary to Cameron’s description, is not just a doctrine: It 
is a practice, or set of practices, including how children are taught in Muslim 
schools and how women are treated in shari’a courts.  
The Counter-Terrorism Strategy states, ‘Extremists have attempted … to subvert 
our democratic processes’, but the examples it provides refer solely to the efforts of 
rejectionist groups to dissuade Muslims from voting and the vocal rejection of the 
                                               
39 ‘Counter-Extremism Bill - National Security Council meeting’. 
40 Patrick Wintour, ‘David Cameron to unveil new limits on extremists' activities in Queen's speech’, 
The Guardian, May 13, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/13/counter-terrorism-
bill-extremism-disruption-orders-david-cameron. 
41 Gill (1994), p.120. 
42 ‘Extremism: PM speech’. 
43 Charles Moore, ‘Islamists only want one thing. We cannot appease them’, The Telegraph, July 3, 
2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11717180/Islamists-only-want-one-
thing.-We-cannot-appease-them.html. See also HM Government (2015a), p.19. 
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principles underpinning democratic processes.44 This fails to acknowledge the 
subversion of Islamic revivalism in Britain, which is not just the undermining of 
democracy in public speech: It is the undermining of liberal democratic culture 
through an attempt at influencing perception and regulating action. This presents a 
problem that isn’t captured in the security service’s out-dated official view of 
subversion: It presents a problem not so much for parliamentary democratic 
government but for a way of life, a phrase first highlighted in the National Security 
Strategy. 
Yet, there is no trade off between securing a way of life and the state: The cultural 
subversion of the revivalist movement involves not just the undermining of a way of 
life. It also involves undermining the state as the primary power that legitimates this 
way of life both practically, in the political and legal structures of society, and 
symbolically, in the cognitive structures of the people. 
The revivalist movement, as this thesis has shown, is both cultural and political. It is 
opposed not merely to a particular culture—progressive, liberal democracy—but to 
the social and political institutions of this culture. Contrary to the government’s 
view, these ‘extremists’ do not ‘demand a caliphate, or a new Islamic state’.45 But 
they are nevertheless concerned with obtaining political authority. They may not aim 
at toppling Britain’s liberal democratic political system, but they are concerned with 
attaining political power as it relates to the governance of everyday practices—as 
apparent in education and arbitration—and the symbolic capacity to structure 
knowledge and belief in line with their religious worldview. 
Some considerations for the future 
The British government’s conflict with ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’ is likely to 
continue for many years to come. Several factors compound the importance of 
understanding this conflict: Muslim attitudes to integration and Muslim 
demographics. 
                                               
44 HM Government (2015a), pp.12-13. 
45 ‘Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat 
Extremism’. 
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Recent polls consistently show a significant minority of Muslims in Britain desire 
shari’a law. In a poll conducted in 2006 by GfK NOP Social Research, despite 94% 
of British Muslims expressing the desire not to live separately from non-Muslims, 
an average of 30% of Muslims expressed the desire to live under shari’a rather than 
British law, peaking at 34% of 18-24 year olds.46 Just over a quarter wanted to see 
Britain as an Islamic state. In the same year, a poll conducted by ICM for The 
Sunday Telegraph showed that 40% of British Muslims want shari’a introduced into 
parts of Britain.47 Similar findings were found in a poll commissioned by Policy 
Exchange in 2007, which found that an average of 28% of Muslims wanted to live 
under the shari’a, peaking at 37% of 16-24 year olds.48 In 2008, YouGov conducted 
a poll for the Centre for Social Cohesion at 12 universities, which found that 40% of 
Muslim students supported the introduction of shari’a into British law for 
Muslims.49 And, most recently, a survey conducted by ICM for Channel 4 published 
in April 2016 found that 23% of British Muslims would prefer parts of Britain 
governed by shari’a rather than British law.50 The survey, which used a control 
group to compare Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes, found ‘a chasm … between 
those Muslims surveyed and the wider population on attitudes to liberal values on 
issues such as gender equality, homosexuality and issues relating to freedom of 
expression’.51 It also revealed ‘significant differences on attitudes to violence and 
terrorism’. 
These attitudes are a source of concern that is likely to grow as Britain’s Muslim 
population grows. According to the Office for National Statistics, Britain’s Muslim 
population has grown ten times faster than the general population over the last 
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1510866/Poll-reveals-40pc-of-Muslims-want-sharia-law-in-
UK.html. 
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decade, from 1.6 million in 2001 (when the British Census first began to measure 
religion) to 2,869,000 in 2010.52  Demographers expect this trend to continue. In 
January 2011, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life projected that by 2030 
Britain will have a Muslim population of 5.5 million, roughly 8.2% of the total 
population.53 That is almost double its 2010 figure of 2.8 million, at 4.6%. Most of 
this increase will occur in areas where Muslims are concentrated, in cities such as 
Bradford and Oldham.54 According to a study presented to the Royal Geographical 
Society in 2005, the proportion of Britons of Muslim Pakistani origin living in 
ethnic enclaves had already trebled in the previous ten years.55 
Given these considerations, the problems presented by ‘non-violent Islamist 
extremism’ in Britain—from social segregation to jihadist terrorism—are likely to 
become more acute. This thesis cannot present policy recommendations to tackle 
this range of problems. But it can conclude by making several observations that 
might be useful for the government to consider for the development of its efforts to 
counter extremism.   
The government’s official understanding of ‘Islamism’ fails to acknowledge key 
differences not just between violent jihadists and non-violent Islam-inspired groups, 
but also between non-violent groups that reject political participation and those that 
support it. In all of its announcements and reports—including Tackling extremism in 
the UK and its Counter-Extremism Strategy—it blurs all of these groups under the 
heading of ‘Islamist extremism’. By articulating a more sophisticated understanding 
of Muslim activism, the government can avoid making false claims about certain 
groups or individuals, for example, regarding the importance of an Islamic state. It 
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can target its criticisms more precisely and minimise the sting to its credibility that 
erroneous generalisations encourage.  
Furthermore, by being much more specific about national values and laws—for 
example, those relating to women’s rights—the government can make it more 
difficult for ‘extremist’ groups to deploy liberal concepts, such as ‘equality’, in a 
general way whilst concealing the radically different meaning such concepts have in 
their alternative worldview. This will, however, have the effect of forcing a clash of 
cultures onto the public stage.  
Combating this worldview is important for the government, but the conflict that the 
global Muslim Brotherhood is engaged in is greater than a ‘battle of ideas’ that may 
be won by theological counter-arguments. The challenge is far bigger and more 
complex. It is a conflict of schemes of perception and moral judgement, and so 
necessarily involves the cultural institutions and forms of social practice that 
inculcate and reinforce them. Such institutions may include mosques, Muslim 
schools, study groups, community organisations, charities, fatwa councils and 
shari’a courts. This isn’t to say that these institutions necessarily radicalise 
individuals. It is, rather, to say that they may foster a collective habitus for Muslim 
children and young adults in which distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ Muslims, and between men and women are 
prominent and unconsciously naturalised. 
Most importantly, these institutions may help foster a collective Muslim identity 
that is deemed prior to any other form of social identification. Such an identity is 
one that elevates the collective above the individual, as encouraged by the European 
Council of Fatwas and Research (ECFR), which advises European Muslims that the 
integrity of the collective Muslim umma ‘comes before anyone’s individual 
rights’.56 The kind of Muslim identity that ECFR and many other revivalist bodies 
engineer is not necessarily political, but it may serve as the seed for a politically 
activist mentality that consciously opposes Western liberal values and institutions.  
The government’s acknowledgment of the cultural factors in the development of 
‘extremist’ Muslim attitudes opens policy avenues that are far from risk-free. Many 
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new problems and challenges arise, including the entire matter of faith schooling. 
Any government scrutiny of Islamic institutions is bound to provoke accusations of 
‘Islamophobia’ from individuals and groups already active in the revivalist 
movement. 
For the government’s ‘battle of ideas’ to be effective, it has to target the symbolic 
authority of the key ‘extremist’ ideologues and activists. The official understanding 
of the ideology or worldview of so-called ‘Islamist extremists’ will provide an 
insufficient basis for the development of an effective strategy to counter 
‘extremism’ if it does not incorporate into its analysis not only the cultural enabling 
environment, but also the sources of the ideologues’ symbolic credibility. Research 
into this area—that identifies the key actors, their core messages and, most 
importantly, what gives them their social appeal—would fill an important 
knowledge gap.  
The government could also acknowledge that grievances play a role in agitating 
Muslim ‘extremism’, including attacks on the symbolic authority of the state and 
terroristic attacks on its people. Grievances contribute to the symbolic credibility of 
key ideologues, but are in turn amplified by such leaders. Grievances depend upon 
certain ways of perceiving and evaluating the world, but also foster them. So it is 
important for the government to take them seriously. A greater openness to discuss 
grievances may allow the authorities to engage with Muslim sentiment and not just 
‘Islamist’ ideology into which such sentiment may become channelled. Greater 
openness may also enable the authorities to distinguish between the legitimate 
criticism of government policy—where differences of view on the facts or on the 
value of certain actions may be disputed—and attacks on the legitimacy of the state 
that emanate from a radically different worldview whose source is an alternative, 
higher authority. 
Perhaps the most important thing for the government to acknowledge is that the 
protection of liberal democratic values and universal human rights cannot occur 
simply through a battle of ideas or a war of words. They are to be protected in 
practice in numerous fields of social activity, including, most importantly, 
education. How they are to be protected is one of the most important challenges that 
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the government, as their primary champion, faces in the coming decades. There are 
plenty of avenues of research yet to be conducted to help inform such a task.  
This thesis has shown that an organised network of revivalist individuals and 
organisations are active in institutionalising an alternative worldview and set of 
values within Muslim milieus, but it has probably only scratched the surface. The 
extent to which further Trojan Horse operations are underway in places other than 
Birmingham has not been the subject of serious scrutiny. The impact of Muslim 
schools on children’s attitudes to social integration is likewise understudied. Far 
more can be learned about the extent to which shari’a councils, as well as online 
fatwa forums, play a role in Muslim communities and their impact on the human 
rights of women and children. Another potentially useful line of inquiry includes the 
role of social media in the formation of Muslim identity antagonistic to the liberal 
democratic values of British society and the British state. Many of the key 
individuals in the revivalist movement are also engaged in community work at the 
local level, but the extent to which they have an influence on local communities, and 
the way in which they do so, is unclear. The size of the social and cultural support 
base of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain thus presents another potentially 
useful research topic. This thesis may hopefully serve as a starting point for some of 
these lines of inquiry. 
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Appendix 1 
Brief biographies of interviewees 
Suhaib Hasan bin Abdul Ghaff 
§ Secretary, Islamic Sharia Council 
§ Senior imam, Green Lane Mosque 
§ Executive Committee member, Board of Trustees, Muslim Aid 
§ Member, European Council for Fatwa and Research 
§ Member, International Union of Muslim Scholars 
§ Former president, Ahl-e-Hadith 
Usama Hasan 
§ Senior researcher in Islamic Studies, Quilliam 
Mohammed Abdul Aziz 
§ Senior Muslim adviser, Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
§ Director, Faithwise 
§ Former researcher, Islamic Foundation 
§ Founding CEO of the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism and the British Muslim 
Research Centre 
§ CRE commissioner (2004-2007) 
§ Member, Equality and Diversity Forum 
§ Member, government’s steering group on the Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights 
Muhammad Abdul Bari  
§ Chairman of East London Mosque 
§ Secretary of Board of Trustees, Muslim Aid 
§ Chair, National Council, Muslim Council of Britain (2014-2016) 
§ (Elected) Central Working Committee member, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-
2012) 
§ Former secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2006-2010) 
§ Founding president, Islamic Forum of Europe 
Daud Abdullah 
§ Director, Middle East Monitor 
§ (Elected) Central Working Committee member, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-
2012) 
§ Former deputy secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2008-2010) 
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§ Former assistant secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2003-2006) 
§ Former senior researcher, Palestinian Return Centre 
§ Trustee, Centre for the Study of Terrorism 
§ Chairman and khatib, Masjid Annoor, Acton 
 
Iftikhar Ahmad 
§ Founder, the London School of Islamics (one of the first Muslim schools in Britain) 
Anas Altikriti 
§ Director, Cordoba Foundation 
§ Trustee, Centre for the Study of Terrorism 
§ Founding member, British Muslim Initiative (2007) 
§ Founding member and former president, Muslim Association of Britain (2004-2005) 
§ Translator, European Council for Fatwa and Research 
Irshad Baqui 
§ Executive Director, Islamic Foundation 
Abdullah Faliq 
§ Head of research, Cordoba Foundation (and editor, Arches Quarterly) 
§ Media and research secretary, Islamic Forum of Europe  
§ Director of training, Centre for the Study of Terrorism (and assistant editor, Islamism 
Digest) 
§ Trustee, East London Mosque 
§ Founding committee member, National Interim Committee of Muslim Organisations 
(precursor of the Muslim Council of Britain) 
§ Former president, Young Muslim Organisation UK (Britain’s oldest youth Islamic 
movement) 
§ Founding member, European Platform (headed by Tariq Ramadan) 
§ Co-ordinator, Global Civilisations Study Centre 
§ Founding director, Muslim Community Radio 
Omer El-Hamdoon 
§ President, Muslim Association of Britain 
Dilwar Hussain 
§ Founding chair, New Horizons 
§ Senior programme adviser, Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
§ Research fellow, Lokahi Foundation 
§ Associate of the Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge. 
§ Former head of the Policy Research Centre, Islamic Foundation (2007-2013) 
§ Former president, Islamic Society of Britain (2011-2013) 
§ Specialist adviser to the CLG/HOC Inquiry into Preventing Violent Extremism (2010) 
§ Member, Preventing Extremism Together workgroups, Home Office 
§ Former commissioner, Commission for Racial Equality (2006–2007) 
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Tehmina Kazi 
§ Director, British Muslims for Secular Democracy 




§ Senior research fellow and head of outreach at the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation, Kings College London 
Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed 
§ Chairman, Islamic Shariah Council 
§ President, Dawatul Islam UK & Eire 
§ Member, European Council for Fatwa and Research 
§ Member, International Union of Muslim Scholars 
§ Teacher, Dar ul-Umma Secondary School, London 
§ Khatib, Darul Ummah Mosque 
Ibrahim Mogra 
§ Assistant secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain 
§ Vice chair and trustee, Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board 
Farooq Murad 
§ Director, Islamic Foundation 
§ Former secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-2014) 
§ Trustee, Muslim Aid 
§ Former chair, Muslim Aid (2004-2008) 
§ Former president, Islamic Society of Britain  
Suleman Nagdi  
§ Founder member, Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire 
§ Public relations officer, Federation of Muslim Organisations 
Anas Shaikh-Ali 
§ Director, International Institute of Islamic Thought, London 
 
	   324 
Appendix 2 
Data for network diagram produced in Gephi 
Table 3: Key to individuals and organisations 
 
Below are the names of the individuals and organisations that are included in Figure 1 (page 
152), the network diagram of the revivalist movement in Britain. The abbreviations of the 
names of the individuals and organisations are listed below as they appear both in the 
diagram and Table 4 (below) from which the diagram was generated. Their full names are 
also provided. 
A) Individuals 
Abbreviation Full name 
A.Ali Azad Ali 
AbdulBari Muhammad Abdul Bari 
Abdullah Daud Abdullah 
AbuSayeed Maulana Abu Sayeed 
Ahmad Khurshid Ahmad 
Ahsan Manazir Ahsan 
Alam Tahir Alam 
Altikriti Anas Altikriti 
Ansari Zafar Ishaq Ansari 
Arshad Shazia Arshad 
Asaria Iqbal Asaria 
Azad Hamid Azad 
Aziz Mohamed Abdul Aziz 
Baqui Irshad Baqui 
Begg Moazzam Begg 
Birawi Zaher Birawi 
Dilly Muhammad Dilwar (‘Dilly’) Hussain 
Dubayan Ahmad al-Dubayan 
F.Ahmed Farah Ahmed 
Faliq Abdullah Faliq 
Faour Ghassan Faour 
Ghaffar Ashraf Muhammad Abdul Halim Abdul Ghaffar 
Haddad Haitham al-Haddad 
Hamdoon Omer el-Hamdoon 
Harrath Mohamed Ali Harrath 
Hasan Suhaib Hasan 
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Helbawy Kemal el-Helbawy 
Hewitt Ibrahim Hewitt 
Hussain Dilwar Hussain 
I.Bunglawala Inyat Bunglawala 
Islam Yusuf Islam 
Ismail Sufyan Ismail 
Kazim Raza Kazim 
Khamissa Edris Khamissa 
Khan Dilwar Hussain Khan 
KhanCheema Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema 
Kozbar Mohammad Kozbar 
L.Ali Lutfur Ali 
Madi Arafat Madi 
Madni Maulana Sarfraz Madni 
Merali Azru Merali 
Mirza Babar Mirza 
Mogra Ibrahim Mogra 
Mohammed Jahangir Mohammed 
Mukadam Mohamed Mukadam 
Munir Ibrahim Munir 
Murad Farooq Murad 
Parvez Zahid Parvez 
Qaradawi Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
Rabbani Muhammad Rabbani 
Rahman Lutfur Rahman 
Rawi Riyadh al-Rawi 
S.Bunglawala Shenaz Bunglawala 
Sacranie Iqbal Sacranie 
Sadiq Asif Sadiq 
Sahin Abdullah Sahin 
Saleem Amjad Saleem 
Sarwar Ghulam Sarwar 
Sawalha Mohammad Sawalha 
Seddon Mohammad Siddique Seddon 
Shadjareh Massoud Shadjareh 
Shaikh Anas al-Shaikh 
Shoukri Arafat Madi Shoukri 
Siddiqui Abdur Rashid Siddiqui 
Tamimi Azzam Tamimi 
Thomas-Johnson Amandla Thomas-Johnson 
Thompson Ahmad Thompson 
Uddin Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin 
Wasti  Syed Tanzim Wasti 	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B) Organisations 
Abbreviation Full name 
Alt.L.Inq Alternative Leveson Inquiry 
AML Association of Muslim Lawyers 
AMSUK Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK) 
AMSS Association of Muslim Social Scientists 
AST Al-Aqsa School Trust 
BMI British Muslim Initiative (BMI) 
Cage Cage Prisoners 
Committee Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations 
Cordoba Cordoba Foundation 
CMA Centre for Muslim Affairs 
CST Center for the Study of Terrorism 
Dawatul Da’watul Islam UK & Eire 
ECESG European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza (ECESG) 
ECFR European Council of Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
ELM East London Mosque 
FEMYSO Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO) 
FIOE Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE) 
FOSIS Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) 
IBERR International Board of Educational Research and Resources (IBERR) 
ICC/LCM Islamic Cultural Centre / London Central Mosque 
iERA Islamic Education and Research Academy 
IFE Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) 
IHRC Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) 
IIIT International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) 
IMUS International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) 
INCEIF International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) 
Interpal Palestinian Relief and Development Fund 
Int.Ikhwan International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood 
ISB Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) 
ISF Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation 
IslamExpo Islam Expo 
IslamicFnd Islamic Foundation 
M.W.House Muslim Welfare House 
MAB Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) 
MCB Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 
MEMO Middle East Monitor (MEMO) 
MEND Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) - formerly iEngage 
MET Muslim Educational Trust (MET) 
MINAB Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) 
MRDF Muslim Research and Development Foundation (MRDF) 
MSF Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) 
MTEC Muslim Teachers and Educators Committee (MTEC) 
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MuslimAid Muslim Aid 
MuslimLawyersEur Muslim Lawyers (Europe) 
NAMP National Association of Muslim Police 
NICMU Interim Committee for Muslim Unity (NICMU) 
Nida Nida Trust 
P.V.E.Trust Park View Educational Trust 
PRC Palestine Return Centre (PRC) 
Ramphal Ramphal Institute 
ShariaCouncil Islamic Sharia Council 
UG Union of Good (UG) 
UKBSC UK Board of Sharia Councils (UKBSC) 
UKIM UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) 
YMOUK Young Muslims Organisation UK (YMOUK) 
YMUK Young Muslims UK (YMUK) 
 
Table 4: Relationships between individuals and organisations 
Table 4 was produced during research for Chapter 3, which describes the network of Islamic 
revivalist organisations and individuals. Whilst it is not exhaustive, it is perhaps the most 
comprehensive data set available for the relationships between the organisations and 
individuals comprising the network. 
Each row in the table below identifies a link between an individual and an organisation (or 
two individuals or two organisations). The two linked parties appear in the Source and 
Target columns. Gephi uses the data in these two columns to produce the network diagram 
as seen in Figure 1. ‘Link type’ refers to one of several kinds of relationship: (1) a working 
relationship (‘Work’), where an individual has worked or is working for an organisation or is 
involved in an organisation as a trustee; (2) a collaborative relationship (‘Collab’), where 
two organisations or an individual and an organisation have worked together on projects or 
events; (3) an affiliation (‘Affiliate’), where one organisation is connected to another as an 
affiliate or mutually recognised long term partner; or (4) a personal relationship (‘Personal’), 
such as close friends, spouses or relatives.  
The ‘Notes’ column provides a brief description of the relationship, and the ‘Sources’ 
column provides website addresses where many of the relationships were ascertained. These 
sources are by no means exhaustive, but are particularly useful to clarify formal trustee and 
director positions in organisations.  
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Source Target Link 
type 
Notes Sources 
A.Ali ELM Work Member http://www.islamchannel.tv/PresenterProfil
es.aspx 





A.Ali IslamChannel Work Presenter, 'Your 




A.Ali MCB Work Chair of 
membership 
committee; 













A.Ali MSF Work Founding 
chairman. 
















AbdulBari Committee Affiliate Individual rep Interview with Faliq 























AbdulBari Nida Work Patron http://www.amanaparenting.com/?page_id=
2 
AbdulBari Ramphal Work Patron http://www.amanaparenting.com/?page_id=
2 





Abdullah CST Work Trustee 2010 http://web.archive.org/web/2010102803194
8/http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=sta
ff 
Abdullah FOSIS Collab Event speaker http://standforpeace.org.uk/federation-of-
student-islamic-societies-fosis/#_edn6 












Abdullah MEMO Work Director https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/
132-dr-daud-abdullah 
Abdullah PRC Work Former researcher http://www.palestine-
conference.net/2014/speakers/28-dr-daud-
abdullah 
AbuSayeed Dawatul Work President http://www.darulummahmosque.org.uk/kha
tib-imam/abu-syed/ 
AbuSayeed ECFR Work Member of ECFR Interview with Sayyed 
AbuSayeed IUMS Work Member Interview with Sayyed 


















Ahmad Committee Affiliate Individual rep Interview with Faliq 
Ahmad IIPT Work Adviser http://web.archive.org/web/2005030518262
6/http://www.ii-pt.com/web/advisors.htm 
Ahmad IslamicFnd Work Chairman http://www.islamic-
foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.asp
x 
Ahsan IslamicFnd Work Director general http://www.islamic-
foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.asp
x 
Ahsan MCB Work Elected national 
council member 
2012-14, 2014-16, 




















Ahsan NICMU Work Founder of MCB Interview with Faliq 











Alam MCB Work Former assistant 
secretary general 
2006-2008; 
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Alam P.V.E.Trust Work Former director 
and chair of board 









Altikriti BMI Work Co-founder http://www.globalmbwatch.com/anas-al-
tikriti/ 










Altikriti Faliq Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 
Altikriti IslamExpo Work Listed director http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05275
366/ISLAM-EXPO-LTD/directors-
secretaries 




















AMSUK MTEC Affiliate Listed partners http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php 
Ansari AMSS Work Fellow at US 
branch of AMSS 
http://www.mef-ca.org/mef-ad-board.html 
Ansari IslamicFnd Work Member of board 
of advisers 
http://www.mef-ca.org/mef-ad-board.html 






















Asaria MCB Work Former chair of 
the business and 
economics 
committee 2001; 
special advisor on 
business & 
economic affairs 

















	   331 
Asaria MIHE Work Lecturer http://www.mihe.org.uk/node/147 








Azad MuslimAid Work Chief Executive http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/muslim-aid-
promotes-hamid-azad-chief-
executive/management/article/1289090 
Aziz AMSS Work Executive 
committee 



















of Department of 
Trade and 
Industry 2006. 
Interview with Aziz; 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfre
e/2006/may/04/muslimcouncilrejectsgaydia 







Baqui ISB Work Active member' Islamic Foundation newsletter, November 
2005. 
Baqui IslamicFnd Work CEO Islamic Foundation newsletter, November 
2005. 











Birawi PRC Work Listed director 





BMI IslamExpo Collab Official 
supporters 
http://www.islamexpo.com/ 






terror.html. See also HJS report on Cage. 
Cage iERA Collab Joint event on 












DawahProject Nida Collab Event partner, 
Fair 2013 
http://nidatrust.org.uk/content/view/188 
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Dawatul Committee Affiliate Unsure of rep Interview with Faliq 




Dawatul ShariaCouncil Affiliate Founding 
organisation 
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ 
Dilly Cage  Collab Advocate for 
Cage 
Stuart (2015), pp. 26-27. 
Dubayan ICC/LCM Work Director http://www.iccuk.org/page.php?section=ab
out&page=trustees 










ELM MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 





Faliq AbdulBari Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 
Faliq Abdullah Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 




Faliq Altikriti Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 
Faliq CMA Work Former director http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05973
664/CENTRE-FOR-MUSLIM-
AFFAIRS/directors-secretaries 
Faliq Committee Affiliate Rep of IFE Interview with Faliq 
Faliq Cordoba Work Head of research http://thecordobafoundation.com/attach/Staf
f%20Profiles.pdf 





Faliq ELM Work Trustee https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/musl
imgovtconf/participants/#AbdullahFaliq 




Trustee of IFE 
Trust 





Faliq Khan Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 
Faliq Kozbar Personal Associates Interview with Faliq 





Interview with Faliq 
Faliq NICMU Work Founder of MCB Interview with Faliq 
Faliq YMOUK Work Former president https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/musl
imgovtconf/participants/#AbdullahFaliq 
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FIOE FEMYSO Affiliate FEMYSO is the 
student arm of 
FIOE 
  





FOSIS FEMYSO Affiliate Member http://www.femyso.org/about/members/fosi
s 
FOSIS MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 
FOSIS MEND Collab Listed supporter 
of MEND 
http://iengage.uk.net/ 




Ghaffar M.W.House Work Raised money for 
International org 





Haddad ELM Collab Frequent speaker http://hurryupharry.org/2012/02/07/haitham
-al-haddad-will-not-appear-at-lse-isoc/ 
Haddad FOSIS Collab Speaker at events, 
including a 2011 
dinner event and 












Haddad iERA Work Former adviser http://standforpeace.org.uk/islamic-
education-and-research-academy-iera/ 




Haddad ShariaCouncil Work Judge http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16522447 




Hamdoon Committee Affiliate Rep of MAB Interview with Faliq 
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Harrath DawahProject Work Founder, trustee 







Harrath IslamChannel Work Listed director http://companycheck.co.uk/director/911525
828/MR-MOHAMED-ALI-HARRATH 














Hasan ECFR Work Member of ECFR Interview with Hasan; http://e-
cfr.org/new/members/page/2/ 





Hasan IUMS Work Member Interview with Sayyed 
Hasan MCB Work Spokesman' - 






Hasan MuslimAid Work Vice-chair of 
board of trustees 
https://www.muslimaid.org/about-
us/governance/ 













Helbawy M.W.House Work Founder http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5353/uk-
interfaith-extremsim 


















Hewitt AST Work Trustee http://opencharities.org/charities/1072676 
Hewitt FOSIS Collab Hewitt a speaker 
at FOSIS events 
http://standforpeace.org.uk/federation-of-
student-islamic-societies-fosis/#_edn6 
Hewitt IBERR Work Trustee http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/ibrahi
m-brian-hewitt/ 
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Hewitt MEMO Work Senior editor https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/compo
nent/content/article/133-ibrahim-
hewitt/4538-ibrahim-hewitt 
Hewitt MET Work Assistant director 










Hussain ISB Work Former president 
2011-2013 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/dilwar 
Hussain IslamicFnd Work Former head of 
research 
https://dilwarh.wordpress.com/about/ 


















I.Bunglawala S.Bunglawala Personal Kin http://archbishop-
cranmer.blogspot.com/2011/03/engage-
blasts-idiot-cameron.html 
I.Bunglawala YMUK Work Member (1987) http://www.theguardian.com/global/2007/ju
n/03/inayatbunglawala 




IBERR Nida Collab Jointly involved 




teachers in Britain 
http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=84 
iERA Cage Collab iERA and Cage 
held a joint event 
on “the limits of 







IFE ELM Affiliate     






IFE IslamExpo Collab Official 
supporters 
http://www.islamexpo.com/ 
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IFE MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 








IIIT AMSS Affiliate Both headed by 
Anas al-Shaikh 
  
IIIT IslamicFnd Collab Distributor for 
IIIT books 
  
Interpal UG Affiliate A member at least 
up until 2012; 
then had to 
dissassociate itself 







ISB FEMYSO Affiliate Member http://www.femyso.org/about/members/isb 




ISF IBERR Collab Jointly involved 




teachers in Britain 
http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=84 
ISF Nida Collab Jointly involved 




teachers in Britain 
http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=84 


















Islam MuslimAid Work Founder, since 
retired from MA 
http://www.peacetv.tv/en-
gb/speakers/yusuf-islam 










IslamicFnd Committee Affiliate Unsure of rep Interview with Faliq 









IslamicFnd MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 
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IslamicFnd Nida Collab Participated in 









J.Mohammed Cage Collab Speaker at events https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BN1b-
B_V-UA 
J.Mohammed CMA Work Director https://jointmuslimstatement.wordpress.co
m/ 






Khamissa IBERR Work Staff http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111 
Khamissa ISF Work Adviser http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111 
Khan Committee Affiliate Rep of IFE/ELM Interview with Faliq 




Khan IFE Work Central president http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/if
e.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=536 
KhanCheema AMSUK Work Founder http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5696/full 








Kozbar BMI Work Listed director http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05703
363/BRITISH-MUSLIM-INITIATIVE-
LIMITED/directors-secretaries 
Kozbar IslamExpo Work Project director http://www.onislam.net/english/news/europ
e/444079 
















L.Ali CMA Work Former chair http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05973
664/CENTRE-FOR-MUSLIM-
AFFAIRS/directors-secretaries 
L.Ali Rahman Collab Rahman secured 







M.W.House Int.Ikhwan Affiliate MW House used 
by International 
org of the MB to 
'cover its work' 
http://www.globalmbwatch.com/ibrahim-
munir/ 








M.W.House ShariaCouncil Affiliate Founding http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ 
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organisation 
M.W.League ELM Collab ELM one of thee 
'important' links 
on MWL website 
http://www.mwllo.org.uk/ 
M.W.League ShariaCouncil Affiliate Founding 
organisation 
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ 
MAB FEMYSO Affiliate Member http://www.femyso.org/about/members/ma
b 















Madi ECESG Work Chairman http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/
News.aspx/145361#.VMT8i3DLcjk 
Madi PRC Work Trustee http://www.propagandistmag.com/2010/10/
20/big-british-left-liberal-blind-spot 
Madni IslamicFnd Work Adviser on 
Advisory Board 
Islamic Foundation newsletter, October 
2011 

























MCB MEND Collab Listed supporter 
of MEND 
http://iengage.uk.net/ 




MCB MTEC Affiliate Partners http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php 










Merali IHRC Work Co-founder, 
spokesperson and 
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MIHE Nida Collab Provided course, 
'History of Islamic 
Education: Past, 









Mogra AST Work Trustee http://opencharities.org/charities/1072676 
Mogra IslamicFnd Work Adviser on 
Advisory Board 
Islamic Foundation newsletter, October 
2011 


















Security Bill, now 






Mukadam AMSUK Work Former chairman http://ams-uk.org/events-1/2012-
2/overview/ 









Murad ISB Work Former president http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-
britain-elects-new-leadership-and-pledges-
to-build-alliances/ 
Murad IslamicFnd Work Director since 



























Murad YMUK Work Former president Trends Magazine 
MuslimAid FOSIS Affiliate An 'official 
partner' 
http://www.fosis.org.uk/ 




MuslimAid Nida Collab Sponsor of 
conference, 
'Islamic Education 
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2013 






MuslimAid UG Affiliate Member of UG's 
101 Days 
Campaign. 
Banned by Israel 











NAMP IHRC Collab NAMP requested 
Muslims to report 
















Nida MAB Collab Nida provided 
leaders training 
for MAB 2012 
http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsle
tter_summer_2012.pdf 
Nida MTEC Affiliate Partners http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php 
Nida RegentsPkMo
sque 
Nida Regular venue for 
courses 
  







Parvez IslamicFnd Work Trustee http://www.islamic-
foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.asp
x 
Parvez MCB Work Nationally elected 




Parvez MIHE Work Trustee and 




Parvez MuslimAid Work Trustee https://www.muslimaid.org/about-
us/governance/ 






















Qaradawi ECFR Work Chairman http://e-cfr.org/new/members/ 
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Qaradawi IIPT Work Adviser http://web.archive.org/web/2005030518262
6/http://www.ii-pt.com/web/advisors.htm 
Qaradawi IUMS Work President http://iumsonline.org/en/default.asp?MenuI
D=42&MenuSubID=55 











Rabbani IFE Work Training provider 









Rahman IFE Collab IFE supported 
Rahman's rise to 
the mayorship of 







Rawi FOSIS Work Was president 93 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_
Student_Islamic_Societies 

















ShariaCouncil Affiliate Founding 
organisation 
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ 








S.Bunglawala MEND Work Head of research http://mend.we-
convey.com/advocacy/about-us/; 
http://iengage.uk.net/about-us/engage-team/ 














Sacranie MuslimAid Work Trustee https://www.muslimaid.org/about-
us/governance/ 
Sacranie NICMU Work Founder of MCB   
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Sadiq NAMP Work President https://uk.linkedin.com/pub/asif-
sadiq/14/58b/b8a 
Sahin MIHE Work Head of research 
and senior lecturer 
in Islamic studies 
and education 
http://www.mihe.org.uk/abdullah-sahin 
Sahin Nida Collab Keynote speaker 
2013; course 
deliverer 2012: 
'History of Islamic 
Education: Past, 










Saleem MCB Work Nationally elected 




Saleem MuslimAid Work Former country 






Sarwar MET Work Director and chair http://web-eab.wix.com/met#!__page-0 



































Sawalha MCB Work Nationally elected 




Seddon AMSS Work Executive 
committee 




Seddon IslamicFnd Work Former researcher See bio in 2012, Muslim Youth: 
Challenges, Opportunities and 
Expectations, edited by Mohammad 
Siddique Seddon 




Shadjareh IHRC Work Chairman http://www.ihrc.org.uk/multimedia/video/1
0163-massoud-shadjareh-human-rights-
activism 
Shadjareh Merali Personal Married   
Shaikh AMSS Work Chairman http://www.amssuk.com/news.html 
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Shaikh IIIT Work Director http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people
/anas-al-shaikh-ali 
ShariaCouncil MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 
ShariaCouncil UKBSC Affiliate Affiliated member Interview with Abu Sayeed 
Siddiqui IslamicFnd Work Vice-chair of 




























Tamimi MAB Work Co-founder http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/azza
m-tamimi/ 


































Work  Secretary http://www.gatewaytodivinemercy.com/hajj
-ahmad-thomson.html 
Thompson ShariaCouncil Work Committee 
member 
Interview with Abu Sayeed 





Uddin IFE Work Co-founder http://www.spittoon.org/archives/2996 






Uddin MCB Work Co-founder http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
london-22959927 
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UKIM Dawatul Affiliate Created by UKIM   






UKIM MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 
UKIM MET Affiliate UKIM established 
MET 
  




UKIM YMUK Affiliate Used UKIM's 
mosque network 
upon founding in 
1984 
  




elected member of 






Wasti MuslimAid Work Trustee https://www.muslimaid.org/about-
us/governance/ 







YMOUK MCB Affiliate Affiliated member http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-
mcb/affiliates/ 








YMUK ISB Affiliate ISB became 
YMUK's parent 
organisation in 
1994 
  
 
